

Satyavrata
Singh

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HIS LIFE,
WORKS,
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VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA:

**HIS LIFE, WORKS AND PHILOSOPHY:
— A STUDY —**

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TO THE MEMORY

OF

MY TEACHER

Mahamahopādhyāya, Śrī C. Narasimhachariar

1994

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INTRODUCTION

Beginnings of Deśika Studies.

Vedānta Deśika, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet-philosopher had been, even in his life-time, (the 13th-14th centuries) a great subject of study. A subject of study he was as his life was a real spiritual inspiration for people given to spiritual yearnings. People studied him for his poetry which was relished in comparison with the poetry of Kālidāsa. He was an object of veneration as his whole life was a long experiment with his own moral and spiritual philosophy. A moving figure of his times, he dominated the world of Indian scholarship in the succeeding centuries also. His life, works and philosophy were installed not only in the Deśika shrines or the temples dedicated to him, but in the minds of men of thinking. He was fortunate in having in his own son, Varada Nātha Vedāntācārya, a profound scholar of his works. In fact Varada Nātha Vedāntācārya may be looked upon as the pioneer of Deśika studies. Besides him, there was the sage Parakāla, who spared no pains in the dissemination of the teachings of Vedānta-Deśika's life, works and philosophy. In fact Vedānta-Deśika became an institution as early as his life-time.

Deśika studies in the 15th-16th centuries.

In the succeeding centuries (the 15th and the 16th) Deśika studies became the privilege of such great scholars as Mahācārya (or Doḍḍayācārya), Śrī Nivāsa, Nṛsiṃha Deva and Appayya Dīkṣita. It was through the efforts of these savants that the Deśika-literature found its proper place in the literary and the philosophical history of India. What Mahācārya did for the logical exposition of Deśika's philo-

sophy, Appayya Dīkṣita did for the spiritual appeal of Deśika's life and works. These scholars were chiefly responsible for removing the doubts or disillusionments in the minds of people concerning Deśika's philosophy.

Deśika-studies in the 17th-18th and the 19th centuries.

In the 17th-18th and the 19th centuries, the students of poetry and philosophy did not neglect Deśika-studies. A popular appreciation of Vedānta-Deśika's life, works and philosophy resulted in panegyric poems, raising him to a superhuman stature. Vedānta Deśika had become, in fact, a spiritual myth by this time. Such works as the Vedānta Deśika Vaibhava Prakāśikā, the Saptati Ratna Mālikā, the Vedānta Deśika Maṅgalāśāsana and so on written by the authors of these centuries are in fact the songs of spiritual glories of Vedānta Deśika. Centres of Deśika-studies had sprung up at places of learning like Kāñcī, Tirupati, Tiruvāhīndrapuram, Śrīrangam and so on. The Sanskrit scholars and the Tamil savants both had an equal share in the study and appreciation of Vedānta Deśika and his works. While the Vedānta Deśika Vaibhava Prakāśikā and the Saptati Ratna Mālikā spoke of Vedānta Deśika's greatness to the Sanskrit-knowing public, the Guruparaṁparā Prabhāvam and the Koviḷoḷugu brought forth the spiritual significance of Vedānta Deśik's life and works to the Tamil-knowing public. While the institution of the Deśika-shrine inculcated popular faith in the ideals of Vedānta Deśika's life and mission, the institution of the Deśika-study circles propagated to the thinking minds the ideals of Vedānta Deśika's works and philosophy.

Deśika-studies in the 20th Century.

The present century of Indological study and research has its own interest in the study of Vedānta Deśika's life,

works and philosophy. There are, first, the Śrīvaiṣṇava (Vāḍagalai) scholars who look upon their Ācārya with the same profound faith as their predecessors. Vedānta Deśika's spiritual greatness is a great reality for them. They are enamoured of the old halo on Vedānta Deśika's birth and life, works and philosophy. Then there are the students of Sanskrit literature and the Indian religious and philosophical systems who also have taken the cause of Deśika studies in their own way. Their idea is to view Vedānta Deśika in a real historical perspective and in his real human achievements.

The following may be looked upon as the various kinds of Deśika-studies in vogue in the present century :—

(1) Firstly, mention may be made of the schools of Deśika studies started by the Vāḍagalai Śrīvaiṣṇava scholars for the propagation of the teachings of their Ācārya and the revival of the Deśika-cult. Such academies as the Deśika Saṁpradāya Vivardhini Sabhā (Madras and Kumbhakonam) and the Vedānta Deśika Vijaya Vaijayantī Pāṭhaśālā (Conjeevaram) made no secret of their aim and object. It is under their aegis that the poetical, the theological and the philosophical writings of Vedānta Deśika have seen the light of day. The recently established Śrī Venkaṭeśvara Oriental Research Institute at Tirupati, has, as one of its aims, the publication and the exposition of the works of Vedānta Deśika.

(2) Secondly, there are certain publications started chiefly for the propagation of the writings and the teachings of Vedānta Deśika. The Śāstra Muktvāṇī Series publications started at Conjeevaram have presented to the world of Indologists some of the major works of Deśika. The Vedānta Deśika Granthamālā Series publications begun by P. B. Annangarachariar Swami have brought out cheap and handy

editions of almost all of Deśika's works. The Śāthakopādyā-cārya Shri Sūktisudhā Svādinī Series and the Vani Vilās Sanskrit Series deserve our consideration. The Shri Nigamanta Mahādesika Memorial Edition beginning though ending also at the publication of the Nyāya Pārisuddhi can not be lost sight of. Besides, these South Indian projects of Deśika studies, the 'Paṇḍita' of Banaras also deserves a special mention for it was through its volumes (28 to 38) alone that the North Indian students of Sanskrit literature and Indian Philosophy were attracted to the Deśika-Kāvya and the Deśika-Darśana.

(3) Thirdly, we notice scholarly attempts at the reconstruction of Vedānta Deśika's life and times in the pages of various research journals given to Indology. The articles of Shree Gopinatha Rao in the Madras Review (1905), of Shree Govindacharya in the J. R. A. S. Bombay Branch (1909-1912), of Shree V. Raghavachari in the issues of the J. R. A. S. and so on, all touching on the life and mission of Vedānta Deśika, still form the handy raw material for further finish and perfection. Apart from articles exclusively written on Vedānta Deśika, the above research journals as well as the Epigraphica Indica, the Indian Antiquary and the J. R. A. S. Bengal Branch all abound in copious allusions to Deśika and his works, Then there is the South Arcot Gazeteer which contains the traditional anecdotes of Vedānta Deśika's life, works and philosophy. The Sri Veṅkaṭeśvara Oriental Research Journal has taken the cause of Deśika study anew.

(4) Further, Deśika studies have been greatly facilitated by so many authentic Sanskrit Catalogues compiled by such learned scholars as Dr. Hultsch, Rice, Dr. Keith, M. M. Kuppaswami Sastriar, P. P. S. Shastriar and so on who all record Vedānta-Deśika's minor or major works and note down anecdotes concerning his life and times. Though there

is some confusion in some of these catalogues, as for instance in the D. C. S. Mss. (Madras, Author Index 1940) which identifies our Śrivaishṇava poet-philosopher Venkaṭanātha Vedānta-Deśika with some other authors of similar names or surnames, as for instance one Vedāntācārya, the author of the Kāvya Prakāśa-Vyākhyā and the Vedānta Kaustubha or one Vedāntācārya, the author of the Vedāntācārya Vijaya Campū or for that matter, one more Vedāntācārya, the author of the Siddhānta-Candrikā and so on. Be it as it may, these catalogues remain the basis for the student of Indology to acquaint himself with the range and the nature of Vedānta Deśika's writings.

(5) Moreover, we find the writers of the histories of Sanskrit literature as for instance Dr. Keith and Dr. Krishnamachariar giving some place or the other in their scheme to the literary writings of Vedānta Deśika. Whereas the older historians of Sanskrit literature show no acquaintance with Vedānta-Deśika, the latter ones—Dr. Keith being the pioneer amongst them—seem to have no dispassionate opinion on his literary endeavours or achievements.

(6) Coming to the histories of Indian religious orders and schools as compiled by scholars like Monier Williams, Barth, Wilson, Farquhar and others, we notice Vedānta Deśika's importance recorded either as a Śrivaishṇava-teacher next to the great Rāmānuja or as a leader at the head of the Śrivaishṇava Schism. One thing is clear that the historians of Indian religious literature can ill afford to forget Vedānta Deśika as a religious teacher of India.

(7) Though the histories of Indian philosophical systems written by the pioneers such as Paul Deussen, Prof. Max Muller, Dr. Vidya Bhushan and so on know nothing about Vedānta Deśika's philosophical contributions, but the recent detailed histories of Indian philosophical schools written

by Dr. Keith, Dr. Radhakrishnan, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta, Prof. Hirianna and others show keen interest in finding some place or the other for the philosophical ideas of Deśika in the galaxy of India's philosophical thoughts and speculations.

(8) Apart from the historians of India's literary, religious or philosophical achievements, the political historians of medieval India as for instance, those who have written on the Vijayanagar empire, the Nāyaka dynasty and so on, have all recorded the political importance of Vedānta-Deśika, the Śrivaishṇava teacher-philosopher.

(9) Now, we come to notice some poetical works of Vedānta Deśika published along with their English notes or translations or appreciations such as :

(i) the Hainsa Sandeśa (Madras Edn. 1902, 1903 and the Journal of Mythic society, Bangalore Vol. 18).

(ii) the Subhāṣita-Nivī (Madras and Srirangan Edn.).

(iii) the Yādavābhyaśaya (A. V. Gopalachari Edn.) and,

(iv) the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya (Narayanachari Edn.).

The authors of the editions of the above works have all touched upon the life-story and the literary achievement of Vedānta Deśika. But what strikes one most therein is the Vedāgalai Śrivaishṇavite fervour of the authors for their Deśika's literary greatness rather than any critical literary evaluation or balanced dispassionate judgment.

(10) Last but not the least, there are a few works, though small in scope, written on Vedānta Deśika's life, works and philosophy, which all must form the ground for further intensive research on the subject. One such work, "The Life and Writings of Vedānta Deśika" by M. K. Tatacharya, the other, "The Bibliography of Vedānta Deśika's

works" by Dr. K. C. Varadachari and the third, the Vaiṣṇavite Reformers of India—which includes discussion on Vedānta Deśika also—by Rajagopalachari, have all served their purpose as they have introduced our author to the students of Indology.

The Scope and purpose of the present work.

The scope and purpose of the present work is defined and determined, by the scope and purpose of the long unbroken tradition of Deśika-studies. No one denies, now, the importance of Vedānta Deśika, in the history of the medieval poetical and philosophical literature of India. While Vedānta Deśika enriched Sanskrit literature with his major poems, philosophical writings and religious discussions, he gave some rare literary gems in his Maṇi Pravāla—contributions to Tamil also. Whereas the Sanskrit-knowing student can study and appreciate him as the man, the poet, the philosopher and the teacher, the Tamil-knowing votary is especially privileged to master the secrets of Deśika's Śrivaishṇava esotericism. Though Deśika's mental make-up must needs be presumed to contain the Vedic and the Prābandhic strains in equal measure, the Vedic indicative of the Āryan intellectualism and the Prābandhic, of the Dravidian emotionalism, but, it must be said to his great credit that he was clear in his mind as to the difference of the types of his audiences, the Sanskritic and the Dravidic and the matter he had to give to both of them and the method he had to adopt to appeal to their minds and susceptibilities. Thus it is that one's lack of knowledge of Tamil does not present any insurmountable difficulty in one's progress with the study of his life, works and philosophy.

Now, coming to the various papers published in the journals, the tracts or the pamphlets written by the Vaḍagalai Śrivaishṇava enthusiasts and a few references or chapters

inserted in the literary, the political, the religious and the philosophical histories of India, all concerning Vedānta Deśika's life, works and philosophy, it can be safely pointed out that none of them has any comprehensive picture in view. Here, for the first time, an all-comprehensive scope of Deśika-studies is chalked out and an attempt made, in the following pages, at a thorough discussion of the whole problem, as far as practicable and within the means of the author. The scheme of the treatment is as follows :—

(A) Vedānta Deśika, the man—In this section the life-story of Deśika is presented not for its own sake, but, with a view to studying the various influences working in upon his mind, resulting ultimately in the progression of his thought and the foundation of what came to be known as the Deśika-Kāvya and the Deśika-Darśana.

(B) Vedānta Deśika : His contributions to Viśiṣṭādvaita.—This section deals with Deśika's synthetic outlook on Indian philosophical systems and his contributions to Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, ultimately resulting in the foundation of the Deśika-Darśana.

(C) Vedānta Deśika : His contributions to Śrīvaiṣṇavism—In this section, Deśika's Śrīvaiṣṇavism is shown in its broad outlines as emerging from the Vedic and the Prābandhic devotional trends.

(D) Vedānta Deśika : The Poet of Bhakti and Prapatti.—In this section, the poet in Deśika as manifest in the vast field of Deśika's writings is presented and appreciated.

As regards the purpose of the present work, the writer may humbly lay down—

(i) that his attempt, in the following pages, will be to bring out the man in Vedānta Deśika whose daily worship as a divinity in the Viḍagalai Śrīvaiṣṇava shrines has so far

been keeping him away from the gaze of the students of Indian thought,

(ii) that his study of Deśika's philosophical works will comprise the study of the philosophy of Rāmānuja influencing and influenced by what is called the Deśika-Darśana.

(iii) that his interest will chiefly lie in seeing through the religious teachings of Deśika, the contemporary religious urge of India.

(iv) that his concern primarily will be to analyse the ingredients of Deśika's poetic personality and to study his contributions to the cause of Sanskrit poetry of the medieval times.

Be it as it may, the real purpose of the present work will have been served if it could but generate a sincere desire in the minds of the votaries of Deśika to view and appraise their Ācārya as a great teacher rather than a god, a gifted poet rather than the personification of Lord Hayagriva and to crown all, a philosopher with a mission rather than Lord Veṅkaṭeśa in flesh-and-blood.

Before concluding, it is the privilege of the author to gratefully acknowledge his deep indebtedness to Prof. K. A. S. Iyer, Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University, for his guidance and interest in the publication of this study. It is also the author's pleasant duty to express his deep gratefulness to the Late Mahamahopadhyaya Shri C. Narasimbachariar and the Late M. M. Shri Cinnaswami Shastrigal for their un stinted help in this study of Deśika. All thanks of the author are also due to His Holiness Shri Parakāla Swamin, the Head of the Parakāla Muth, Mysore, for evincing keen interest in the progress of the study at each and every step.

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30. Nyāyavārtika Tātparya Tikā (Vācaspati Miśra).
31. Nyāya Mañjarī (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa).
32. Tārkika Rakṣā (Varadarāja).
33. Nyāya Sāra (Bhāsarvajña).
34. Nayaviveka (Bhavanātha Miśra).
35. Prakaraṇa Pañjikā (Śālikanātha).
36. Brhati (Prabhākara).
37. Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha (Mādhavācārya).
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46. Siddhitraya (Yāmunācārya).
47. Viśvaguṇādarśa Campū.
48. Nārada Bhakti Sutra.
49. Prabodha Candrodaya.
50. Śrīmadbhāgavata etc.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. Abhīti-Stava.	A. S.
2. Acyuta-Śataka.	Ac. S.
3. Adhikaraṇa-Sārāvalī	Ad. S.
4. Aṣṭabhujāṣṭakam	A. B.
5. Bhagavaddhyāna-Sopānam	B. S.
6. Bhūgola-Nirṇaya	B. N.
7. Bhūstuti	Bh. S.
8. Catuśślokī Bhāṣya	C. S. B.
9. Dayāśatakam	D. S.
10. Daśāvatāra Stotram	Da. S.
11. Dehalīśa Stuti	De. S.
12. Devanāyaka Pañcāśat	De. P.
13. Dhātī-Pañcakam	D. P.
14. Dramilopaniṣat sāra	Dr. S.
15. Dramilopaniṣattātparya-ratnāvalī	D. R.
16. Īśopaniṣad bhāṣyam	Isb.
17. Garuḍa-daṇḍakam	G. D.
18. Gadya Traya Bhāṣya	G. T. V.
19. Garuḍa-Pañcāśat	G. P.
20. Gītātātparya-candrikā	G. T. C.
21. Gītārtha-sangraha-Rakṣā	G. S. R.
22. Gopāla-Vimśati	G. V.
23. Godā-Stuti	G. S.
24. Haṁsa Sandeśa	H. S.
25. Hayagrīva Stotra	Ha. S.
26. Kāmāsikāṣṭakam	K.
27. Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā	M. P.
28. Nikṣepa Rakṣā	N. R.
29. Nyāya-Pariśuddhi	N. P.
30. Nyāya-Siddhānjana	N. S.

31.	Nyāsa-Daśakam	N. D.
32.	Nyāsa-Tilakam	N. T.
33.	Nyāsa-Vimśati	N. V.
34.	Paramārtha-Stuti	P. S.
35.	Pādukā Sahasra	Pa. S.
36.	Pāñcarātra Rakṣā	P. R.
37.	Raghviragadya	R. G.
38.	Śatadūṣaṇi	S. D.
39.	Seśvara-Mīmāṃsā	S. M.
40.	Sarvārtha Siddhi	S. S.
41.	Subhāṣita Nīvi	S. N.
42.	Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya	San. S.
43.	Śaraṇāgati-dīpikā	Sar. D.
44.	Śrī Stuti	S.
45.	Śudarśanaṣṭaka	Su.
46.	Ṣodaṣāyudha Stotra	So.
47.	Saccaritra Rakṣā	S. R.
48.	Stotra Ratna Bhāṣya	S. R. B.
49.	Tattva Muktākalāpa	T. M. K.
50.	Tattva Tikā	T. X. T.
51.	Varadaraja Pañcāśat	V. P.
52.	Vegā Stuti	V. S.
53.	Vairāgya Pañcakam	V.
54.	Yatirāja Saptati	Y. S.
55.	Yādavābhyudaya	Y.

Part I.

VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA : THE MAN

VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA : HIS LIFE-SKETCH

(I) *His Birth and Parentage.*

According to the records of the Vaḍagalai Guruparamparā, the date of Vedānta Deśika's birth¹ is Kali 4371, Śaka 1190 or A. D. 1268. The age of Vedānta Deśika can be ascertained without any doubt on the basis of the mention of his name, Veṅkata Nātha² and the quotations from his Tattvamuktākālāpa³ in the Sarva Darśana Sangraha of Mādhavācārya (1350 A.D.). The name of Veṅkata Nātha Vedāntācārya or Vedānta Deśika cannot be mistaken in the host of similar names of authors, Śrī-Vaiṣṇavites or non-Śrī-Vaiṣṇavites. The social, religious and political state of affairs revealed in the writings of Vedānta Deśika points to his personal knowledge of the India of the Khiljis and the Tughlukhs, the Delhi imperial Moslem dynasties of the 13th and the 14th centuries. The autobiographical touches abounding in his drama, the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya and alluding to his native land and its social, religious and political conditions are all proofs to ascertain his association with the age of the later Colas such as Vijaya Gaṇḍa Gopāladeva of Kāncī, whose inscription of Saka 1207 has been found on the Caṇḍamaulīśvara temple at Conjeevaram.⁴ That Vedānta Deśika could not have been born, as Dr. Hultzsch contends⁵, in A.D. 1268, for the simple reason that the tradition records

1. J.R.A.S. (Bombay) Vol. XXIV, page 230.

2. Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, (Abhyankara Edn.) page 111.

3. " " " pages 105 & 112.

4. Ep. Ind. Vol. XIII, page 195.

5. Ep. Ind. Vol. VI, page 323.

his death in 1369 A. D., i.e. just after a century, is inadmissible, in as much as many a man lives to die a centenarian. There is no reason to disbelieve that Vedānta Deśika lived the full span of human life or for full one hundred years.

Vedānta Deśika's birth-place was Conjeevaram or more particularly Tuppil, a suburb of Conjeevaram. His birth was a glorious event to his parents as he is said to have been their first child after 12 long years of their wedded life. A tradition regarding his birth says that his parents separately dreamt dreams. His father dreamt that Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara, the deity of the Tirupati-temple appeared before him and blessed him with the birth of a son if he went on pilgrimage to Tirupati to worship the deity. His mother also dreamt that Padmāvati, the goddess stood before her and promised her a son if she paid a visit to her shrine to worship her. The parents narrated their dreams to each another and with a view to fulfilling their long cherished desire for a child went on pilgrimage to Tirupati. At Tirupati, his mother dreamt a dream in which she saw Veṅkaṭeśvara, the deity, stand before her in the guise of a child, present her with a bell, bid her swallow it, bless her with a son and ultimately disappear from her vision. The strange dream materialised, as the tradition goes, there and then, in the strange fact of the disappearance of the bell of the Veṅkaṭeśvara shrine. People suspected some of the temple-priests with the theft of the bell. But as the deity had informed of the swallowing up of the bell to the head-priest in vision, no action was taken against any temple-ministrant or pilgrim. The devout Śrīvaiṣṇava couple, who were blessed with such a vision and such a promise met the applause of all the Śrīvaiṣṇavas of Tirupati. It was after they returned from Tirupati, say, in A.D. 1256, and waited and waited for full 12 years i.e. till A. D. 1268, that their dream was realised in the birth of a son

to them. Just to commemorate the vision, they named their son as Veñkaṭanātha after the name of the deity installed in the Tirupati-temple.

Vedānta Deśika belonged to the Viśvāmitra Gotra.¹ His father was one Ananta Sūri,² who as Vedānta Deśika remembers him in his works, was famous for the qualities of head and heart. His grandfather was one Puṇḍarikākṣa,³ a devout performer of the Soma-sacrifice and a scholar of repute. The traditional accounts mention the name of his mother as Totārammā or Totādryanābā. The panegyrics on Deśika also record his mother's name as Totārammā. Totārammā, as the tradition goes, was the sister of Ātreya Rāmānuja (A. D. 1221-90) the great Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician, the author of the Nyāyakuliśa and the immediate successor of Vātsya Varadācārya (A.D. 1165-1275) to the 'Siṁhāsana' or the Bhāṣyic and the Prābandhic-throne, instituted by the Great Rāmānujācārya. Thus, Vedānta Deśika's mother was a celebrated lady of celebrated Śrīvaiṣṇava descent. His father also was a Siṁhāsanaḍhipati-descendant, being the son of Ācārya Puṇḍarikākṣa, the son of Ananta Somayājīn who was one of the 3 chief pontiffs of Śrīvaiṣṇavism and an immediate successor of Rāmānujācārya to the Bhāṣyic-throne.

As the Guruparamparā describes the Great Rāmānuja as the Śeṣa-Avatāra of Viṣṇu, Viṣṇucitta as the Vijaya-avatāra of Viṣṇu, Varadācārya as the Subhadra-avatāra of Viṣṇu and Ātreya Rāmānuja as the Garuḍa-avatāra of Viṣṇu, so does it describe Vedānta Deśika as the Ghaṇṭā-avatāra of Viṣṇu. The Śrīvaiṣṇava Ācāryas were regarded the Avatāras of Viṣṇu for their work of establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. Vedānta Deśika records the

1. S. S. 1. 11 (Prose passage).

2. S. S. 1. 11

3. S. S. 1. 11

event of his birth as the incarnation of the Ghaṇṭā or the bell of Śrīnivāsa or Veṅkaṭeśvara, the deity of the Tirupati-temple.¹

All through his life, Vedānta Deśika served the purpose of the Ghaṇṭā or the bell of Śrīnivāsa in proclaiming, far and wide, the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaitam, in pouring forth strains of Śrīvaiṣṇava Spiritualism, in announcing his presence amongst his contemporaries and finally in attending to the Divine Cause.

The Ghaṇṭā-episode has been immortalised in the practice of no bell being hung in the Śrī Veṅkaṭeśvara-shrine at Tirupati, even today. This, by all means, suggests the great importance of the birth of Vedānta Deśika to generations after generations of the Vadagalai and the Tēngalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas.

Heredity gave much to him. Love of learning, devotion to duty and sincerity and singleness of purpose were his inheritance from his forefathers. He enriched this endowment by his own accomplishments in his later years.

(II) *Childhood.*

Vedānta Deśika the child is Vedānta Deśika the man. The traditional accounts dwell upon his childhood at great length. Love and devotion to God, which coloured the period of his 'inward ripeness', tinged his young impressionable years also.

He was a precocious child and as such was an object of love and affectionate care for his maternal uncle, Ātreya Rāmānuja who had foreseen a bright future awaiting his nephew.

The Vadagalai Guruparamparā-tradition records an episode of the childhood of Vedānta Deśika :—Once, the then Siṃhāsanādhipati, Naḍāḍūr Ammāl or Vātsya Varadācārya

was expounding the Rāmānuja Darśana, in the lecture-hall of the Viṣṇu-Varadarāja shrine of Conjeevaram, to a distinguished gathering of Śrīvaiṣṇava scholars. As soon as Ātreya Rāmānuja entered the hall along with his nephew, the gaze of the assembly of scholars was fixed on the unusual air of the five-year-old child, Venkaṭanātha. There was present, then, in the assembly, Kṛṣṇapāda or Vādakkuṭiruvidhi-Pillai, the Tēngalai Ācārya, a Siṃhāsanādhipati, who was deeply moved by the intelligent looks of the child Veṅkaṭanātha. There was present, there, Sudarśanācārya also, the celebrated author of the Śrūta Prakāśikā-Commentary on the Śrī Bhāṣya, who shared the general feeling of the learned assembly concerning the five-year-old Veṅkaṭanātha. The Siṃhāsanādhipati, Vātsya Varadācārya could not continue his lecture, conscious as he was of the stir in the assembly. After a while, when he wanted to continue his exposition he could not remember the point where he had stopped. The learned assembly also could not remind him of the exact point of discussion he had stopped at. The whole assembly of Śrīvaiṣṇava scholars was in a predicament, whereupon, the five-year-old Veṅkaṭanātha, as the tradition goes, pointed out, to the astonishment of the people assembled there, the exact point of the lecture the great Ācārya was to begin at. Varadācārya's happiness at the child's precosity knew no bounds and he is said to have blessed the child with a prophecy of rank next to none but the Great Rāmānujācārya. Vedānta Deśika records this childhood-episode of his in his drama, the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya.¹

It was thus in his childhood days that the foundations of love of God were laid in his mind and heart.

(III) Education.

• Vedānta Deśika's career as a student began in A. D.

1. S. S. 2.15,

1273 and ended in A. D. 1289. He himself states in his *Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya* the time i. e. the 20th year of his life, when his student-career came to an end.¹

Vedānta Deśika had a singleness of aim and ambition in his life. His life was planned with a view to teaching and propagating the Rāmānuja Darśana. His maternal uncle, Ātreya Rāmānuja, the *Sirhāsanādhipati* at Conjeevaram was growing old and was very much concerned with his nephew's early completion of studies for the sake of filling up the vacancy after him. Thus Vedānta Deśika, out of his inward impulse to master all the learning of his times and as a response to the earnest desire of his teacher and maternal uncle, Ātreya Rāmānuja, accelerated the speed of his study and was able to come up to the expectations of all who knew him and were interested in his future career.

Vedānta Deśika was gifted with a retentive memory. His memory was so sharp that he required no *Koṣa* or the Manuscript-book to refer to after his teachers had finished their teachings and lectures.²

Apart from his power of retentive memory, he had a critical mind. He was conscious of his originality in the interpretation of the Śāstra.³ He had a great delight in discussing things with scholars. Although he entered the arena of discussion in the dispassionate spirit of a seeker of knowledge, yet, at times, he could not help indulging in polemics for winning his point.⁴

Vedānta Deśika himself alludes to the branches of learning he studied and mastered.⁵ He says he was well-acquainted with the *Vaiśeṣika* system, thoroughly educated in the *Nyāya* school, quite conversant with the *Mīmāṃsā* doctrines, and amply proficient in the *Sāṅkhya* and the *Yoga*.

1 S. S. 1.15.

4. N. P. Page 129.

2. N. P. Page 117.

5. S. S. 2.50,

3, S. S. 2.19.

philosophies. His knowledge of the Vaiśeṣika philosophical literature through the works of Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda, Udayana, Śrīdhara and Śivāditya can be easily proved from his criticisms of the Vaiśeṣika-System. His intensive study of the Nyāya-school and the Naiyāyikas such as Gotama, Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana, Bhāsarvajna and Varadarāja has resulted in his own contributions to the Nyāya in the shape of his Nyāya Parīśuddhi. To his Mīmāṃsā-scholarship and his insight into the intricacies of the Mīmāṃsā-works of Jaimini, Śābarasvāmin, Prabhākara, Śālikānātha, Kumārila, Maṇḍana, and Pārtha Sārathi Miśra, his own Mīmāṃsā-writings preserved in his Seśvara Mīmāṃsā bear ample evidence. His use of the Mīmāṃsā-technique in the enunciation of the Śrīvaiṣṇava spiritual science of Prapatti in his Nikṣepa Rakṣā is the 'greatest of the proofs of his being a Mīmāṃsaka of a high order. His study of the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga philosophies is evident in his criticisms of the Sāṅkhya-Kārikā and the Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī and the Yoga-tenets.

Apart from these five systems, his special course of study was the Uttara Mīmāṃsā in general and the Śrī Bhāṣya in particular. There was nothing that he did not know in the Śrī Bhāṣya and of the Śrī Bhāṣya.

Besides, he knew the non-orthodox philosophical literature as well.¹ His criticisms of the Cārvāka, the Jaina and the four Buddhistic schools i. e. the Vaibhāṣika, the Sautrāntika, the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika, are clear evidences of his intimate knowledge of these systems.

He was introduced to the vast Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophical literature at an early age. He studied thoroughly the Nyāya-Tattva of Nātha Muni, the Siddhitraya of Yāmuna, the Tattva Ratnākara of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, the Tattva Sāra of Vātsya

1. S. S. 2, 42;

Varadācārya, the Nyāya Kuliśa of Ātreya Rāmānuja and the writings of Nārāyaṇārya and Varada Viṣṇu Miśra.

The philosophical development of the Sanskrit Grammar, say, the philosophy of speech or the Sphotavāda was also known to him as is clear from his trenchant criticism of the Sphota-philosophy.

He had an impulsive love for poetry. That he was a keen student and admirer of Kālidāsa is evidenced by his own poetical writings which become interesting when compared to the works of Kālidāsa. Bhavabhūti also was his favourite study as it is Bhavabhūti's philosophy of love that has been dittoed by him in his own poetical writings. Samasyā-Parī and Śleṣa-Kāvya formed the juvenile hobby of Vedānta Deśika.

Apart from the Sanskrit lore, he had mastered the Tāmil lore also. His retentive memory of the songs of the saint Ṇammālvāra along with their traditional exposition is evident in the way he has summarised the Tāmil Veda in his Dramidopaniṣatsāra and Dramidopaniṣadratnāvalī.

To all these courses of studies he used to apply his Tarka-method of learning. He had also mastered the difficult Mahāvidyā-syllogisms of Kulārka and was well-acquainted with the Mahāvidyā-refutations of the Tārkikas such as Vādindra (1225 A. D.) and so on.¹

On his own statement, we know that his teacher was his maternal uncle, Ātreya Rāmānuja, the celebrated author of the Nyāya Kuliśa.²

Ananta Sūri Somayājīn, Vedānta Deśika's father had no small share in the education of his son.³ And Vedānta Deśika always regarded Vātsyā Varadācārya (A. D. 1165-1275) as his ideal teacher.⁴

1. T. M. K. 4. 46, 48.

2. N. P. Page 137, 181.

3. T. M. K. 1. 2.

4. T. M. K. 1. 2.

All his teachers were great scholars of their times. Vedānta Deśika is never tired of expressing his thankfulness to them for all that he learnt and wrote and thought.¹

IV Life as a married man.

After the completion of his education, Vedānta Deśika entered the married life. The traditional accounts inform us that he married a lady of high descent, whose name was Tirumaṅgai. We know that his maternal uncle and teacher, Ātreya Rāmānuja did not live after A.D. 1295. So we can say that A. D. 1295 or the 6th year of his married life was a memorable year for him for two reasons : first, for the great shock he suffered and sustained in the sad demise of Ātreya Rāmānuja, his teacher and maternal uncle and second, for his accession to the Ācāryic-throne at Conjeevaram, fallen vacant after Ātreya Rāmānuja's death. Thus on the Kāñchi-throne of Ācāryaship sat the young scholar Vedānta Deśika, while the Śrīraṅgam Ācāryic throne was occupied by the celebrated Śrutaprakāśikācārya or Sudarśanācārya.

Vedānta Deśika's married life was a happy one. He was an ideal Ghamedhin.²

We know from the traditional accounts that his married life reached its consummation in the birth of his son, Kumāra Vedāntācārya in A. D 1317 or when he had entered the 46th year of his life.

V—Sojourn at Tiru Vāhndrapuram.

We have referred to Ātreya Rāmānuja's death in or about A. D. 1295. Since then, Vedānta Deśika, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācārya occupying the Conjeevaram Ācāryic seat, launched upon a new career of a round of activities of

1. T. M. K. 5. 135.

2. H. S. 2.20 and S. S. 1.42.

teaching the Śrī Bhāṣya and preaching the Śrī Vaiṣṇava spiritualism and morality. Before his death, Ātreya Rāmānuja had initiated him, as the tradition goes, into the mysticism and esotericism of the Garuḍa Mantra or the Mantra which empowered one to remain unassailable in any circumstance. At Conjeevaram the growing popularity of Vedānta Deśika could not but engender jealousy in the heart of the scholars of the rival Śrī Vaiṣṇava sect i.e. the Teṅgalais. And this must have been one of the main factors of Vedānta Deśika's shifting the scene of his activity from Conjeevaram to Tiruvāhīndrapuram. Besides, the great desire to worship Garuḍa and complete the Sādhana of the Garuḍa Mantra had impelled him to take his quarters at Tiruvāhīndrapuram, a quieter and more sequestered place than Kāñci, the populous capital of the then Colas.

Tiruvāhīndrapuram attracted Vedānta Deśika immensely. His presence inspired a new life all round. The traditional accounts dwell at great length at the depiction of Vedānta Deśika's life at Tiruvāhīndrapuram. The Mount Cappar overlooking the small stream of Gaḍilam or Garuḍanadī, on which stand, even today, the Devanāyaka-temple and the Hayagrīva-temple must have been the favourite resort of the young Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācārya. It was there that Vedānta Deśika meditated upon the mysticism of the Garuḍa Mantra. In the Sādhana of the Mantra, he was worshipping his teacher, who, for him, was the Garuḍa-incarnation.

Apart from his personal progress in spiritualism he was doing the duties of an Ācārya for the good of the students of the locality and its neighbourhood. His fame as a first-class exponent of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Saṃpradāya had spread far and wide. Apart from teaching and preaching at Tiru-

vāhīndrapuram he betook himself to the writing of works of poetry and philosophy and Srī Vaiṣṇava spiritualism.

A tradition¹ records Vedānta Deśika's stay at Tiruvāhīndrapuram for 15 years or till A. D. 1310. But another tradition records his recall to Srīraṅgam to save Srī Vaiṣṇavism and Viśiṣṭādvaita from the attacks of rival religionists about the same time. To reconcile the divergent traditions, we may presume that Vedānta Deśika's stay at Tiruvāhīndrapuram, say, for 15 years, was not an uninterrupted one.

The tradition honours him with a vast literary activity during his sojourns at Tiruvāhīndrapuram. Both in Sanskrit and Tāmil, he is said to have composed devotional hymns and poems. Some of his best Sanskrit poems such as the Devanāyaka Pañcāśat, the Hayagrīva Stotra, the Acyuta Śataka, the Gopāla Viṃśati and the Garuḍa Pañcāśat were written at Tiruvāhīndrapuram. About 9 Tāmil songs reminiscent of the Divya-Prabandham's mysticism are also said to have been composed by him while sojourning at Tiruvāhīndrapuram.

As we know, on Vedānta Deśika's own statement,² that at the time of writing the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya he had finished the 30th session of the teaching of the Śrī Bhāṣya, we may safely presume that a few terms and sessions of his Bhāṣyic discourses must have taken place at Tiruvāhīndrapuram also. And his honorific name, Vedānta Deśika or Vedāntācārya must have owed its inception to his Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta-expositions during his Tiruvāhīndrapuram sojourns. Veṅkaṭa Nātha³ or Veṅkaṭeśa⁴ of the time of the composition of the Hayagrīva-stotra, the Devanāyaka Pañcāśat etc. began to be called Vedāntācārya⁵ at the

1. S. Arcot Gaze, P. 321.

2. S. S. 1-15.

3. Ha. S. 33.

4. De. P. 53.

5. Ac. S. 101.

time of the composition of the *Acyuta Sataka* by the people of *Tiruvāhīndrapuram* and the neighbouring locality.

That *Vedānta Deśika* was the most popular figure of *Tiruvāhīndrapuram* of the 13th century A. D. can be realised by any one who happens to visit *Tiruvāhīndrapuram* (*Cuddalore New Town, Madras Presidency*) today. The entire locality is hallowed by the memories of the *Śrī Vaiṣṇava* poet-philosopher, *Veṅkaṭa Nātha Vedāntācārya*. The visitor is shown by the *Śrī Vaiṣṇava* priest the exact place where *Vedānta Deśika* lived and lectured upon *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. The local *Śrī Vaiṣṇava* shrines daily resound with the strains of devotion set forth by *Veṅkaṭanātha* some seven hundred years ago.

The traditional accounts record many an episode of *Vedānta Deśika's* life at *Tiruvāhīndrapuram*. Why was *Veṅkaṭanātha* called *Sarva-Tantra-Svatantra* ? Because, during his *Tiruvāhīndrapuram* sojourns, he was challenged by a mason to prove his all-round knowledge—his *Sarva-Tantra-Svatantra*-ship by way of constructing a well. And to the great dismay of the mason and the people around, *Vedānta Deśika* is said to have constructed a well and daily used its water as long as he stayed there !

It was at *Tiruvāhīndrapuram* that his poetical hymns met a devoted audience. The people of the locality acclaimed him as *Kavi-Kathaka-Ghaṭā-Kesari Veṅkateśa*,¹ *Kavi-Kathaka-Siṃha*² or *Kavitārkika-Kesari-Vedāntācārya*.³

The *Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntic* teachings of *Veṅkaṭanātha* at *Tiruvāhīndrapuram* won for him universal applause. He became famous as *Vedāntācārya*. A visitor to *Tiruvāhīndrapuram* even today would be shown a marble-image of *Vedānta Deśika* in the pose of a *Vedāntācārya*, installed in

1. G. P. 52.

2. R. G. Last verse.

3. Ac. S. 101.

the Deśika-shrine of the place. At Tiruvāhīndrapuram, a place after his heart, Vedānta Deśika lived a life of renunciation.

VI—*Residence in Conjeevaram.*

What Ujjayinī was to Kālidāsa, Kāñcī was to Vedānta Deśika. The vivid poetic touches in the delineation of Ujjayani by Kālidāsa are equalled by similar touches in the description of Kāñcī by Vedānta Deśika. A later writer, Veṅkatādhvarin (A. D. 1637) says that Kāñcī derives its glory and greatness due to its being Vedānta Deśika's birth-place.¹ Kāñcī is not only Vedānta Deśika's place of birth, but, the scene of the intense actions of his life's drama. If his sojourns at Tiruvāhīndrapuram meant calm and quiet contemplation, his residence in Conjeevaram meant ceaseless activity in the sphere of literature, religion, and philosophy. The Viṣṇu Kāñcī probably had never seen such intellectual activity, such religious atmosphere, such teaching and preaching as during the days of Vedānta Deśika's residence there. If the invocations to different Śrī Vaiṣṇava deities of different Śrī Vaiṣṇava shrines prefixed to his works or incorporated in his works are the clues—as presumably they are—to the places where the works were written, then Kāñcī or Conjeevaram certainly claims the production of the greatest number of his works, such as, his super-commentary on the Śrī Bhāṣya i.e. the Tattva Tīkā, his outline of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy i.e. the Tattva Mukta Kalāpa, the portions of his magnum opus i.e. the Śata Dūṣaṇi and so on.

Little Conjeevaram or the Viṣṇu Kāñcī attracted him for the grandeur of the Varadarāja temple and for the religious atmosphere that pervaded it. The Viṣṇu Varadarāja-image has received from Vedānta Deśika probably the finest poetic bouquet that a votary could ever make. Kāñcī

1. Viśvagunadarśa-Campū.

had charmed the Śrī Viṣṇava poet so much so that even sectarian differences could not stop him from enjoying the beauty of the Śiva Kāñcī and inhaling the air laden with the sweet smell of the mango-groves of Śiva Ēkāmrēśvara.¹

His long and intimate association with Conjeevaram will be evident to the reader of his works viz. the Śaraṇāgati Dīpikā, the Aṣṭabhujāṣṭaka, the Nyāsa Daśaka, the Varadarāja Pañcāśat, the Vegā Setu Stotra, the Paramārtha Stuti, and so on. The Śaraṇāgati Dīpikā throws much light on the everyday conduct of Vedānta Deśika's life—his walks along the Vegā-stream, his visits to the Dīpaprakāśa shrine, his contact with the devoted Śrīvaiṣṇavas of the locality and his love for his native land. The Aṣṭabhujāṣṭaka immortalises the Aṣṭabhujā Gajendra-varada-temple now in an almost dilapidated condition. The Nyāsa Daśaka and the Varadarāja Pañcāśat bear testimony to the loving heart of Vedānta Deśika, a daily worshipper of the Śrī Viṣṇu-image of Conjeevaram. The Vegāsetu Stotra suggests Vedānta Deśika's devotion to Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion which enjoins upon its votaries the worship of God in the Image-form. The Paramārtha Stuti even to-day seems to record the impressions left on Vedānta Deśika's mind by the Tirupputkuḷi-temple of Vijaya Raghava, situated at a distance of some seven miles from Conjeevaram. The Artha Pañcaka, besides, contains the propagation of Viśiṣṭādvaita which formed the daily routine of Vedānta Deśika's life in Conjeevaram.

The Brahmotsavam festival, which the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas of Kāñcī celebrate these days, must have been celebrated many a time and with more pomp and piety by Vedānta Deśika in the 13th-14th centuries A. D.² The Conjeevaram of the 13th-

14th centuries seems to live in the pages of Vedānta Deśika's poetical and philosophical writings.

The tradition records some episodes of Vedānta Deśika's life at Conjeevaram. Why was Vedānta Deśika called Sarvatantra-Svatantra? Because, once, in Conjeevaram, a magician, who wanted to test Vedānta Deśika's knowledge of magic, entered a tank, drank its water and made Vedānta Deśika's stomach ache with the intake of water! But Vedānta Deśika was not to be outwitted. He knew the magician's trick and scratching a nearby pillar by his nail caused all the water in his stomach to flow from the pillar itself! The magician was crestfallen as he recognised in the Śrīvaiṣṇava poet-philosopher a better magician than himself. And the Śrīvaiṣṇava Ācārya was acclaimed 'Sarva-Tantra-Svatantra'!

Yet there is another episode suggesting Vedānta Deśika's Sarva-Tantra-Svatantraship in a different way:—

Once a snake-charmer challenged Vedānta Deśika in Conjeevaram in the art of snake-charming. Many a poisonous snake was let loose against Vedānta Deśika, but, none could cross the line drawn by him—a Sarva-Tantra-Svatantra Ācārya. At long last a most venomous reptile was let loose, but, it also failed to do any harm to Vedānta Deśika as the latter invoked Garuḍa who came and devoured it! The adversaries who had instigated the snake-charmer were all defeated in their purpose. The snake-charmer recognised, to his great surprise, a greater snake-charmer in Vedānta Deśika!

There is a story relating how Vedānta Deśika lived in Conjeevaram in an atmosphere of sectarian adversity. The Tengalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas knew that Vedānta Deśika lived a life of renunciation. But to tease him, as the story goes, they sent a poor student to him for financial help. Like a

true Śrīvaiṣṇava, he was not incited at the student's request and what he did was—as a wall-painting in the Varadarāja shrine of to-day portrays—that he invoked Śrī, the Goddess of Wealth and fulfilled the desire of the student. The Tēngalais were defeated in their mischievous move and none in Conjeevaram could challenge the dignity of Vedānta Deśika, the Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher.

VII—*Holy Trip to Tirupati.*

Vedānta Deśika's holy trip to Tirupati is known from the traditional accounts of his life. He has himself immortalised his trip to Tirupati in his devotional lyric, the *Dayā Sataka*. His familiarity with the surroundings of Tirupati is evident in his *Haṁsa Saṁdeśa* also¹. The *Yādavābhyudaya* Canto VI, describing the Govardhana, describes, in fact, the Tirupati-Tirumalai chain of hills, sanctified by the Veṅkateśvara shrine.

The serpentine Tirumalai block of hills, a source of mystic inspiration to the Tamil saint Nammālvār was a source of poetic inspiration to Vedānta Deśika. It was Tirupati, in fact, that gave Vedānta Deśika an opportunity to observe Nature in her sweet and serene moods. Tirupati influenced him enormously. It taught him the might of meekness and gave him the strength of subservience to God. In the grandeur of Nature he saw the grandeur of God.² Just as Tiruvāhindrapuram had given him the opportunity of intellectual apprenticeship, Tirupati gave him the opportunity of spiritual apprenticeship.

VIII. *Visit to Northern India.*

According to the autobiographical touches scattered in *Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya*, we may say that Vedānta Deśika was

1. H. S. 1. 21 & 22.

2. D. S. 108.

familiar with the centres of learning in Northern India of the times. His traditional biographies also mention his pilgrimage to the Vaiṣṇava shrines of the Northern India. A tradition records his coming into contact¹ with the sage Vidyāraṇya and suggests a date for the event, sometime between A. D. 1325-1336. It is also alleged that he met Vidyāraṇya in a Sāstraic duel at Shringeri. According to the tradition Vedānta Deśika is said to have cured a Vijayanagara princess possessed by a malvolent spirit. It is also alleged that it was Vidyāraṇya who cured the princess, while Vedānta Deśika left Vijayanagara as he could not stand the royal court and its atmosphere.

Dvārakā was one of the places he visited while going upon his pilgrimage to the North of India. The political degeneracy of Guzrat and the adjoining country of the times was shocking to the Śrīvaiṣṇava poet-philosopher as he saw religious and moral bankruptcy reigning rampant everywhere.² The impression of the people he met in his Dvārakā pilgrimage was ever fresh in his mind. He met people posing to be paṇḍits (क़शावरुन्धितपुस्तकाः) and saints (विस्तारितकूर्वभाराः) and doing anything to gain the favour of some petty chief or the other.³

Mathurā⁴ or the modern Muttra seems to have been included in the religious itinerary of Vedānta Deśika. The Mathurā region, the birth-place of Kṛṣṇa, had ceased to be a place for the virtuous to live in.

It is not certain whether Vedānta Deśika went to Vadarikāśrama or the modern Badrinath also. But the description of the cool breeze blowing in the Himalayan Terai lands and the swift stream of the Gangā upwards of

1. *Vaiḥhava Prakāśika*

2. S. S. 5. 13.

3. S. S. 5. 14.

4. S. S. 6. 33 & 34.

Haridvāra (the modern Hardwar)¹ seems to point to his observation of the Himalayas, at least from a distance.

Ayodhyā or the modern Ajodhya was another place of pilgrimage for Deśika. What he saw of Ayodhyā simply disappointed him. Ayodhyā was 'पाषण्डिमण्डलप्रचारखण्डितकार्त-युगधर्मो देशः'² or a place with no trace of its ancient religious and spiritual glory. The वसुमतीरुल्लामभूतं वाराणसीक्षेत्रम्³ or Banaras was also a place of our Śrī Vaiṣṇava teacher's religious itinerary in Northern India. The Banaras of Vedānta Deśika seems to be the same as that of today. The sight of the so-called aspirants after Mokṣa, the hypocrisy of the heads of religious institutions, the mockery of Sanskrit education, the misappropriation and misuse of public property by the Sanyāsins, the moral degeneracy of the people—all seem to have pained the pilgrim from Conjeevaram to the holy city of Banaras of the 13th-14th centuries.⁴

He must have visited Prayāga or Allahabad also. The 'सितासितनदीसंभेदः'⁵ or the Gangā-Yamunā-Confluence from which he expected peace and piety was a shocking sight to him.⁶

Probably he did not proceed to Gayā. He met, either at Allahabad or at Banaras, some one, some ascetic (!) who was 'अष्टगवाश्राद्धभोजननिरन्तराध्यातकुक्षिः'⁷ or a picture of gluttony and greed.

With disgust and disillusionment he returned to his native-land, probably passing through the Vindhya-regions, which, for him, were 'अनार्यजनभूयिष्ठः'⁸ or full of the 'wicked'. The Āryāvarta and the Madhyama-Deśa which were once

1. S. S. 6. 23 & 24.

2. S. S. 6. 29.

3. S. S. 6. 35.

4. S. S. 6. 37 to 39 and S. S. 5. 21 to 27.

5. S. S. 5. 27.

6. S. S. 5. 33.

7. S. S. 5. 34.

8. S. S. 6. 39.

glorious lands (*आजानशुद्ध*) appeared to Vedānta Deśika completely shorn of their old splendour.¹

IX. South Indian Pilgrimage.

Apart from Conjeevaram, Tiruvāhīndrapuram, Tirupati and Srīraṅgam, where Vedānta Deśika lived for years together, he had been to other places of Śrī Vaiṣṇava interest in Southern India. One of his most favourite resorts was Tirunārāyaṇapuram or modern Melcote in the Mysore state. He liked the place immensely for its religious atmosphere and its calm and quiet surroundings. He used to call it 'Dakṣiṇa Vadarikāśrama'² and the ornament of the Karṇāṭa-country.

Śrī Perumbudur about 10 miles from Trivellore was another place of Vedānta Deśika's sojourn during his South Indian pilgrimage. It was the birth-place of Rāmānuja and a most sacred place for Vedānta Deśika. It was here that he composed his Yatirāja Saptati and worshipped the image of the Bhāṣyakāra Svāmin installed in the shrine of the same name.

Modern Travancore, sanctified by the presence of the deity Padmanābhā³ attracted the Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet-pilgrim very much. But here also he could not get the spiritual satisfaction he so much desired and dreamt of.

It seems he travelled widely through the then unsafe tracts of Cola-Pāṇḍya territories and enjoyed the wild beauty of nature. The sight of Draviḍa soliders running for their lives when chased by the Muslem Vandals, was a disgusting sight for him.⁴

1. S. S. 6. 39 & 40.

3. S. S. 6. 53.

2. S. S. 6. 49.

4. F. 22. 170.

The South Indian pilgrimage, like the North Indian holy trip, strengthened his faith in the practice of the religion of the inner being.¹

X. *Home-Coming.*

Vedānta Deśika's home-coming means his stay at Conjeevaram and Śrīraṅgam undisturbed by any religious tour or pilgrimage. It was then that he could busy himself with his unceasing literary and religious activities. He could afford time to teach his son Varadanātha and his devoted disciple Brahmatantra Parakāla. He could as well expound the Vaḍagalai Śrī Vaiṣṇava ritualism to his disciples. At this time especially he ever hoped for the cementing-up of the differences of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava sects :—

‘अन्योन्यवैरजनी विजहात्वसुया’.

But the hope could not be realised. Vedānta Deśika is no more in flesh and blood, but the Śrī Vaiṣṇava sectarian split remains even now.

XI. *Life in Śrīraṅgam.*

It was not only Vedānta Deśika's choice that he left Conjeevaram for Śrīraṅgam ; it was rather the voice of the people that summoned him there. As the tradition goes, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholars of Śrīraṅgam, such as the old Ācārya Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, Pillai Lokācārya, Peria-Āchchān-Pillai and others could not meet the Advaitic challenge to Viśiṣṭādvaitism. At long last the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas of Śrīraṅgam invited the Conjeevaram Acārya, Vedānta Deśika, to meet the challenge. As soon as Vedānta Deśika knew that Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and Viśiṣṭādvaita required his services he left his home and went to Śrīraṅgam. No mutual difference between Vaḍagalaism and Teṅgalaism ever stood in the way of his

1. S. S. 6. 82 & 83.

championing the cause of Rāmānuja's religion and Rāmānuja's philosophy. At Śrīraṅgam he was given a great ovation. It seems the Vāda-act of his 'Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya' hints at the happy occasion when he defeated the Advaita teacher or teachers at Śrīraṅgam and vindicated the cause of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

The Śrīraṅgam Ācāryic seat was offered to him by Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, the illustrious exponent of the Śrī Bhāṣya. The installation ceremony was duly performed and Vedānta Deśika became the Ācārya of the Śrīraṅgam and the Conjeevaram seats, to the great chagrin of the Teṅgalai Śrī Vaiṣṇavas.

His career at Śrīraṅgam was even more brilliant than what it had been at Conjeevaram. His literary activities were simply ceaseless. His Bhāṣyic teachings continued uninterrupted. His religious preachings were his pre-occupations.

Momentous works such as the Śata Dūṣaṇī, the Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī, the Tattva Tīkā, the Tātparya Candrikā and so on, were written by Vedānta Deśika at Śrīraṅgam. It is this fact indeed that explains his assertion of his being acclaimed Vedāntācārya or Vedānta Deśika by the God of Śrīraṅgam.¹

The Teṅgalais became jealous of Vedānta Deśika. They forgot that Vedānta Deśika was at Śrīraṅgam on their own invitation. They could not tolerate the popularity of the Vaḍagalai teacher. The tradition records many interesting anecdotes suggestive of the above circumstance. It is said that, once, the Teṅgalai teacher, Alagia Maṇavāḷa Perumāḷ Nainār, challenged Vedānta Deśika in a Sāstraic duel. But Vedānta Deśika, who had defeated the indomitable Advaitins in the presence of both the Vaḍagalai and

1. Ad. S. 1.

the Tēngalai scholars, did not accept the challenge of his 'सयूय', his compeer, as he was averse to any further split in Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. This exasperated the Tēngalai followers very much. What they did was that they hung old shoes on the door of Vedānta Deśika's residence, and as his head touched the shoes while passing, he understood the game and blessed the Tēngalais all the more.

The news that the Vaḍagalai poet-philosopher was beyond any pettiness enraged the Tēngalais all the more. More and more of such pranks were played upon Vedānta Deśika, but, they did not touch him at all, rather, they pricked in turn his rival or rivals. Thus it is said that, once, the Tēngalais decided to boycott the Śrāddha ceremony of his father. The Śrāddha was duly performed and three great Śrī Vaiṣṇavas (!) the deities of Tirupati, Conjeevaram and Śrīraṅgam took part in it ! When the news spread in Śrīraṅgam, the Tēngalai opposition abated a bit.

Soon after, as the tradition goes, a different type of opposition raised its head. It was this : Alagia Maṇavāla Perumāl Nainār challenged Vedānta Deśika in a duel of extempore poetic composition. The subject of composition that was chosen, was—Raṅganātha. The Vaḍagalai poet-philosopher composed the beautiful 'Pādukā Sahasra' or One Thousand and odd verses on the deity Raṅganātha, in a few hours, but it took hours and hours for his rival, the Tēngalai poet, to do only half of his 'Pada Kamala Sahasra'. The Śrī Vaiṣṇavas believed that Hayagrīva, the God of Learning Himself composed the 'Pādukā Sahasra' for his great votary Vedānta Deśika !

The Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet-philosopher of Śrīraṅgam, became famous for his saintly character and simple life. A prince, Sarvajña Singappa by name,¹ whose identity is still

1, J. R. A. S. (Bombay) Vol. XXIV P. 800.

a problem for the historian to solve, is said to have been greatly influenced by the character of our Śrī Vaiṣṇava teacher.¹ The colophon to the 'Rahasya Sandeśa' is the only clue to the problem. It is said that it was for this prince that Vedānta Deśika wrote his Subhāṣita Nivī. It is further held² that the above prince flourished in or about A.D. 1330 and was called 'Sarvajña' for his learning and patronage of learning. He is believed to have patronized the Telugu poet Bamnera Potarāju, who translated the Śrī Bhāṣya in Telugu and one Śrī Nātha who translated the Naiṣadha in Telugu. Moreover, the Vaḍagalai Guruparaṁparā-tradition records the visit of Vedānta Deśika's son, Varadanātha to the court of Sarvajña Singappa. Varadanātha is further alleged to have defeated the poet Śākalyamalla, the author of the play Udāra Rāghava and the court-poet of Sarvajña. It is not easy to dismiss the above tradition.

Again the unscrupulous jealousy of the Tengalais, as the tradition goes, stood in the way of Vedānta Deśika's living a peaceful life at Srīraṅgam. As the story goes, once, the Tengalai Ācārya, Kandādai Lakṣmaṇācārya, accompanied by his disciples happened to pass by the residence of Vedānta Deśika. As the Vaḍagalai teacher was engrossed in some work, he could not pay due respect to the old Tengalai Ācārya. Thereupon, the Tengalai followers were so much enraged that they flung brutal injuries on Vedānta Deśika and dragged him on the street. The Vaḍagalai teacher paid his respects to the Tengalai leader and his followers left Srīraṅgam for Satya Maṅgalam or Saktimaṅgalam in the Coimbatore district.³ But Kandādai Lakṣmaṇācārya became,

1. Vaibhava Prakāśika, page 112.

2. Epigraphica Indica Vol. XIII page 222.

3. Imperial Gazetteer (Madras) II p. 95, and Sewell's Antiquities

soon after, as the tradition goes, consumptive. His wife came to know of the cause of the malady and took him to Satya Maṅgalam to please and propitiate the great Bhāgavata, Venkaṭanātha Vedāntācārya, as she believed it was 'Bhāgavatāpacāra' or harm done to the votary of God, that made her husband consumptive. As Vedānta Deśika did not harbour in his heart, any illwill, against Lakṣmaṇācārya, he blessed the latter with speedy recovery from illness.

It was at Satya Maṅgalam that Vedānta Deśika bequeathed his spiritual heritage to his son, Varada Nātha by initiating him into the intricacies of Sri Vaiṣṇavism and Viśiṣṭādvaitism. It was here that he met in Śrī Parakāla Brahma-Tantra-Svatantra, a disciple after his heart, who, in course of time, founded the Parakāla Mutt of Mysore and instituted the Deśika-Cult and the Deśika-worship.

After his self-exile at Satya Maṅgalam for some time, when Vedānta Deśika came back to Srīraṅgam, an unfortunate incident happened in the form of the sack of Srīraṅgam by the Moslem Vandals, in or about A.D. 1327. The city of Srīraṅgam, which had once escaped the pillage of Malik Kafur, Alauddin's general, in A.D. 1306-1310 could not escape the scourge that fell upon it in A.D. 1327. The temple-priests were butchered, the old Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholar Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa was done to death, the temple-walls were raised to the ground and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, it seemed, met the Divine chastisement for all its sectarian bigotry and petty bitterness. While the Tēngalai teacher and philosopher, Pillai Lokācārya laid down his life wandering from place to place in saving the idol of Raṅganātha from the Vandal's eye, the Vaḍagalai poet-philosopher, Vedānta Deśika, was busy saving the 'Śrī Bhāṣya' and the 'Śrūta Prakāśikā' and the two sons of Sudarśanācārya, Vedācārya Bhaṭṭa and Parāṅkuśa Bhaṭṭa

by name. It is held that Vedānta Deśika providentially escaped the mass slaughter by hiding himself against the dead and the dying.

Vedānta Deśika passed through Tirunārāyanapuram, a place situated in Mysore. As the place was somewhat sequestered, it gave some peace to the refugee. The people of the place received the saviour of their faith with gratitude. The panageric verses composed on the occasion by his votaries are recited like invocatory stanzas by the students of the Śrī Bhāṣya and the Bhagavadviṣayam, even today.

At long last Vedānta Deśika reached his shelter, Satya Maṅgalam and as long as he lived there, he prayed, through his Abhīti-Stava, for the return of peace to Srīraṅgam. The tradition records an important incident of probably his second exile at Satya Maṅgalam. It was an invitation sent to him by the Vijayanagara Court under the advice of the scholar-statesman, Vidyāranya. This invitation is traditionally said to have been flatly refused by Vedānta Deśika and his 'Vairāgya Pañcaka' is regarded as a true embodiment of his spirit of renunciation of all pomp and splendour.

One Vijayanagara prince, Kampanṇa Udaiyār, assisted by his generals, Gopaṇṇa and Saluva Mangu is said to have flung crushing defeat on the Mohammedan governor of Madura in or about A.D. 1358. It is also held that he established a stable administration throughout the region and appointed many chiefs (Nāyakkanmārs) for the supervision of the temples.¹ Vedānta Deśika is said to have hurried back to Srīraṅgam at the happy news of the place returning to normal. The General Gopaṇṇa was hailed as the champion

1. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar—South India and Her Mohammedan Invaders, Page 182.

of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. Vedānta Deśika himself joined the chorus of praise in honour of Gopāṇṇa.

At this time, Vedānta Deśika must have been over 90 years of age. But his energy was youthful. It was at this time that he gave to the Śrī Vaiṣṇava world his precious treasure, the Rahasya Traya Śāra, and helped Gopāṇṇa in the cultural restoration of Śrīraṅgam and other Śrī Vaiṣṇavite centres.

The tradition gives a fascinating account of this last period of his life in Śrīraṅgam. Once, there arose, as the story goes, a great dispute between Akṣobhya Muni, the Dvaita teacher and Vidyāraṇya—the Advaita philosopher on the point of the 'Tattvamasi' text and its import. The contentions of both the parties were communicated for arbitration to Vedānta Deśika. Vedānta Deśika decided in favour of Akṣobhya Muni. Thereupon, Vidyāraṇya started finding fault with the Śata Dūṣaṇī of Vedānta Deśika. The only defect that he could think of was the use of the word 'ca' in a certain context. It was just to prove its propriety that the Śrī Vaiṣṇava teacher wrote his 'Cakāra Samarthana'. The date of the 'Sāstrārtha' between Akṣobhya Muni and Vidyāraṇya is suggested to be about A.D. 1336. But it is not correct. Akṣobhya Muni or Akṣobhya Tīrtha, the fourth in line of teachers from Madhva, could not have been nominated to the Ācāryic seat before A.D. 1357. And before that time he could not have been recognized a fit rival to Vidyāraṇya Śrīpāda. Moreover, A.D. 1335, the year of the foundation of Vijayanagara, could not have been celebrated by Vidyāraṇya with a Sāstrārtha, leading ultimately to his defeat! In all probability, the incident took place in or after A.D. 1357-58 or when Vedānta Deśika had become famous for his great learning and saintly character. That there was

a Śāstrārtha and that Vedānta Deśika arbitrated therein is a matter of long tradition, dating back to the 15th century AD. Brah̥ma Tantra Svatantra III, who wrote the Guruparaṃparā Prabhāva, mentions the incident. The Mādhva-teacher Vyāsa Tirtha also records it in his Jaya Tirtha Vijaya (Canto II 54-68). The Mādhvas read an inscription, extremely mutilated, on a pillar at Mulbagal which means to commemorate Akṣobhya Tirtha's victory over Vidyāranya.

It was thus at long last that Vedānta Deśika, the scholar-saint, was given an opportunity to lead peaceful life in Śrīraṅgam, almost till his end.

XII. The End.

Vedānta Deśika's life came to an end during his residence in Śrīraṅgam. The traditional date of his passing away is November 14, 1369. There is a difficulty in maintaining this date. It is this: Vedānta Deśika is said to have composed two stanzas which were meant for an inscription of A.D. 1371-72. Now, if he is said to have passed away in A.D. 1369, how could he be held to have composed the verses of the inscription of A.D. 1371-72? But the difficulty can be solved if we take the stanzas to have been composed before November 1369, their inscription taking place in A.D. 1371-72.

In the passing away of Vedānta Deśika, Lord Viṣṇu's bell stopped ringing and sending forth its undying reverberations. Even to-day Vedānta Deśika is invoked for blessings by a Vaḍagalai Śrī Vaiṣṇava. Every auspicious occasion of the life of a Vaḍagalai Śrī Vaiṣṇava is sanctified by the utterance of the name of Deśika. Every Śrī Vaiṣṇava temple is hallowed by the image of Deśika. Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholars of today of the orthodox type try to follow, as far as possible, the path of their 'Deśika.' The name of Deśika lives and his memory is cherished by the Śrī Vaiṣṇava world.

XIII. *His Character.*

That Vedānta Deśika was looked upon as the Ghaṇṭāvatāra, or the Bell-incarnation of Viṣṇu or Venkaṭeśa, by his contemporaries, let alone, his successors, is the greatest proof of the greatness of his character. His character had won the applause of both the sections of the Sṛī Vaiṣṇavas, the Vaḍagalais and the Teṅgalais. His Praśastis by Teṅgalai writers far surpass in tone and tenor of reverence his Praśastis by Vaḍagalai writers. In fact, it is his hold on the minds of men of his time that finds its mouthpiece in these Praśastis. Vedānta Deśika the man is not less famous than Vedānta Deśika, the poet or Vedānta Deśika, the philosopher. Only an Appayya Dikṣita (16th Century A.D.) can appreciate the beauty of the ideas and ideals of Vedānta Deśika, the poet.¹ Only a Doddayācārya (16th Century A.D.) can appraise the philosophical acumen of Vedānta Deśika, the philosopher.² Vedānta Deśika, the logician and the dialectician can be judged only by a Śrīnivāsa Dāsa.³ But Vedānta Deśika, the man is known to the common people. In spite of the schism in Śrīvaiṣṇavism, attributed to him, he was an object of love for the people of his times. That is why Venkaṭādhvarin, a poet of the 16th-17th Century A.D., presents Vedānta Deśika in his Viśvagunādarśa Campū⁴ as an ideal man of all times.

In his words, thoughts and deeds, Vedānta Deśika was sincere to a fault. It was rather his sincerity, his singleness of purpose that made him rebuke the Advaitins and the rival religionists at times. He disliked the Advaita-ācārya i.e. Saṅkara, because he liked his Viśiṣṭādvaita-ācārya, i.e. Rāmānuja. He had no regard for the riches of the mundane

1. Yādevabhyudaya, page 14 (Vāni Vilāsa Edn. 1907).

2. Caṇḍamāruta on S.D. Vāda 33 (Conjeevaram Edn.).

3. Nyāyasāra Commentary on N. P. page 360 (Chaukhamba).

4. V. C. Śloka : 291.

existence. But he had every regard for the riches of the spiritual existence.¹

The life he led was well-planned. No temptation of worldly prosperity or opportunity could swerve him from the path of love and devotion to God he had himself chosen to follow. Worldly success never found favour with him. Success to him meant success in the spiritual sphere, the sphere of the Divine.²

Although he had his eye on the world of Bliss Eternal, yet, he took a great delight in the affairs of the every-day world. He mixed with the man in the street, shared the joys of the man in the street and suffered the sorrows of the man in the street. His self-caricature³ suggests to us his keen sense of humour and inborn geniality.

We may laugh at Vedānta Deśika's running here and there, in the midst of waste and destruction, to preserve the copy of the Śrī Bhāṣya. We may ridicule Lokācārya's laying down his life in an attempt to preserve the image of Raṅganātha. But for Vedānta Deśika, the Śrī Bhāṣya was the embodiment of the philosophical spirit of India. Similarly for Lokācārya, the image of Raṅganātha was the embodiment of the religious spirit of India. It was the simple, sincere zeal of Vedānta Deśika and Lokācārya that saved the philosophical and the religious spirit of the country in the 13th-14th centuries. The Vijayanagara empire was founded, but it is, now, a relic of history alone. But the literary heritage left by Vedānta Deśika and Lokācārya is simply immortal.

Vedānta Deśika had in him, in an ample measure, the qualities of a leader of men. Although a staunch conservative

1. V. 5.

2. V. 2.

3. S. S. V. 36.

and a lover of tradition, he had the good sense and sagacity to spread and popularise the essentials of Śrīvaiṣṇavism, far and wide. He had the courage of conviction to a fault.

All the traditional accounts of his life paint him as an Avatāra, a super-human being. But Avatāra or no Avatāra, he was a great man, aiming at great things and achieving great things.

To sum up, we can say that Vedānta Deśika was a great relentless critic not only of poetry and philosophy and religion, but of his own words and thoughts and deeds, and of the Great Divine also at moments of his intense realisation of 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam'. Throughout his life, he had a loving heart, a forgiving nature, a self-questioning tendency, and a great sense of duty.

XIV—*Characteristics of His Mind.*

The characteristics of Vedānta Deśika's mind revealed in his poetical or philosophical writings are the same as revealed in his outward life. Sincere in his life, he was sincere in his poetry and philosophy also. It was his sincerity that made his co-religionists as well as his rival religionists love him. It was his sincerity that was the secret of his success as a poet or as a philosopher. He was "a true human soul to whom your soul can say 'brother'". He was the sincere lover and admirer of Rāmānuja and hence, his life was a dedication to the cause of Rāmānuja.

He wrote so much and he left the stamp of his individuality on all that he wrote. With his vast scholarship and thinking mind he has contributed much to Śrīvaiṣṇavism and Viśiṣṭādvaita. But he has not claimed originality for his works. He thought his works to be just his sincere studies,

into the mind and heart of Rāmānuja ¹

He was indebted to Rāmānuja for his very life. The sincerity of his heart to devote himself to the cause of the Rāmānuja Darśana was always a living force with him. So he scorned worldly advancement. So he liked a sort of spiritual seclusion. He led the life of a spiritual recluse.

He expressed what he believed to be true without fear or favour. He believed in the greatness of Rāmānuja's philosophy. He knew that he would incur the displeasure of so many people if he spoke ill of Śaṅkarācārya's philosophy. But he was not afraid of calling Advaita Vāda, the Kudrṣṭi-Vāda.

He cared a fig for the world as he sincerely believed in the saving power of Viśiṣṭādvaita and practised Śrī-vaiṣṇavism in his day-to-day life.

With his sincerity was mixed up his sense of humility. All that he achieved in his writings, he thought, was not his, but belonged to God and Divine Providence.

He was a man amongst men, not for the number of cells in his brain, but for the amount of hope he gave to his fellow beings. And the amount of hope he gave to men is great indeed. He asserts that God is graceful and merciful and both the virtuous and the vicious shall receive Divine blessings. For him, the human soul is more sinned against than sinning. He maintains that God is God but for His universal grace and goodness. ²

Very truly does Veṅkaṭādhvarin,³ the author of the Viśva Guṇādarśa Campū (A.D. 1637) sum up the character of Vedānta Deśika—

1. Y. S. 24.

2. Dayāśataka—15.

3. Viśvagūṇādarśa Campū—291.

'Simplicity was a great characteristic of Vedānta Deśika. In fact, sincerity and simplicity constituted the strength of his personality. He hated dancing attendance on kings and was outspoken in his views. God was his king and God was his patron. And all those who knew him loved him for his outspokenness—his simplicity and his straightforwardness'.

He had a great reverence for law. He believed that Law guiding the whole sphere of Life worked invariably for the good of man. Law for him was the very essence of God, the Līlā or the Dayā of God.

Another striking feature of Vedānta Deśika's mind was the nobility of his thoughts and sentiments. Never did he touch upon a base subject. He always stood for God and Divine Goodness, for man and beauty of human life.

As in his life, so in his works he had a keen sense of duty. He lived a life of virtue and righteousness and he wrote on virtue and righteousness.

He had a passion for all that was good and true. Being a staunch advocate of Prapatti or self-surrender to God, he did not speak ill of other paths of God-realisation.¹ He maintains that acts of charity and deeds of philanthropy, offerings of objects of worship and offerings of one's own heart and soul, sacrifices of external goods and sacrifices of the inmost being—all these, without any distinction, endear and lead man to God.

His mind was essentially contemplative. And he was convinced that his contemplative mind was a gift from the Divine.

He uttered nothing base and was pleased with himself that he had drunk deep into the philosophy of Rāmānuja. It was this contentment, this single-ness of interest that was the

1. §. 8. 9.6.

secret of his success as a poet and as a philosopher. All his poetry and philosophy breathe :—

‘An assured belief
That the procession of our fate, howe’er
Sad or disturbed, is ordered by a Being
Of infinite benevolence and power ;
Whose ever-lasting purposes embrace
All accidents, converting them to good.’

And in this ‘assured belief’ we read his mind—sincere and honest, contemplative and content and full of reverence for Law and Life.

XV. *His Special Faculty.*

Vedānta Deśika’s field of activity is so varied and vast that it is difficult to show the special line his genius followed for its manifestation. That he was a logician of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic school is a matter of common knowledge. That he was not only a philosopher, but a teacher of Śrīvaiṣṇava religion also is no secret. But what is not generally known is that he was pre-eminently a poet.

It is really surprising that his philosophical writings have a poetic ring. In fact they are poetry first and philosophy afterwards. For instance, his *Tattvamuktā Kalāpa*, outlining the whole system of Viśiṣṭādvaita in a little over 500 stanzas of the *Sragdharā* metre, is a piece of poetry, from beginning to end. Although it is written in the language of logic, yet one cannot miss the emotional tones and undertones ringing through it. He plainly states that as poets compose poems, so do philosophers formulate philosophies.¹ In fact, it is the poetry of the ‘*Tattvamuktā Kalāpa*’ that is the mouthpiece of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. For instance, the lines².

1. T. M. K. 1. 5.

2. T. M. K. 1. 70.

‘वायुर्दोषयते यद्यदयमुद्गुणो बंभ्रमीति द्रुतं खे,
 तेजो जाज्वल्यते यद् यदपि न जलधिर्माधवीं दोधवीति ।
 भूर्यद्वा बोधवीति स्थिरचरधृतये तच्च तादृक् च सर्वम्
 स्वायत्ताशेषसत्तास्थितियतनपरब्रह्मलीलोर्मिचक्रम् ॥’

suggesting the divine immanence and transcendence in world-creation, are poetic lines, to be sure. They allow the reader to imagine an ever-surging sea of Divine glory and Divine grace with the constituents of Life as its waves, different from it, and yet, one with it.

Even in his philosophical and epistemological works in prose, such as the Nyāya Siddhāñjana, and the Nyāya Parīśuddhi, he writes the language of a poet-simple, sweet, suggestive and vivacious. He sprinkles the essence of poetry over logic and epistemology as is evident in his discussion on perception.¹

‘प्रत्यक्षं चिद्विन्मयं जगदिदं यश्येत्यनुश्रूयते,
 यश्चानन्यधियामनन्यविभवः प्रत्यक्षतामश्नुते ।
 यश्चैको युगपत् सदा स्वत इदं विश्वं दरीदृश्यते,
 प्राज्ञं तं प्रतिपन्नमोक्षणविधादक्षं दिदृक्षेमहि ॥’

Here, he means to say, that, whereas, the perception of human beings is a second-hand perception, the perception of God is perception in its real logical and psychological import. This idea as it comes through poetry is an object of relish to the reader.

The following poetic lines of the Nyāya Siddhāñjana, a philosophical work in prose, are simply memorable.

‘एनामात्मतिरस्क्रियायवनिक्कामिच्छाविहारस्थलीम्,
 निर्व्यापारविभावरीसहचरीं निद्रामनिद्रात्मनः ।
 ब्रह्मरश्म्वमहेन्द्रजालरचनापिञ्छायलीं श्रीमतो
 विष्णोर्लोहितशुक्लकृष्णशबलां विद्यामविद्यात्मनः ॥’

Here is poetry beautifying philosophy and philosophy sanctifying poetry.

Even in his religious works and sectarian treatises, Vedānta Deśika is a poet first and a religious teacher and sectarian head afterwards. For example, the prose passage, introducing the Nikṣepa Rakṣā, a work on the Śrī-vaiṣṇava cult of Prapatti or self-surrender spreads a poetic atmosphere around it. Even in the desert of sectarian treatises such as the Saccaritra Rakṣā, we come across oasis of poetic charm and beauty.¹ It is, thus, no exaggeration to say that Vedānta Deśika is pre-eminently a poet.

Pre-eminently a poet, in his poetical, philosophical, theological and esoteric writings, Vedānta Deśika is extremely skilled in the art of the Sragdharā metre, for the expression of his sublime thoughts and sublime sentiments. His Sragdharās are the denizens of the Divine land, breathing poetry and philosophy wherever they please to move.²

To conclude, we may say that his philosophy is the crown of his poetry and his poetry, the essence of his philosophy.

XVI—A Resume.

The life of Vedānta Deśika, a long life of intellectual and spiritual activity, knows no break in its ideal course, no change in its idealism, no extraneous intrusion in its vistas and no haphazard happening in its smooth sailing. In its span of one hundred and odd years, all that comes is planned and projected, direct and distinct. His ambition

1. S. R. Pages 44, 86, 87.

2. Ad. S. 580.

‘सत्कर्तृत्वात्परिकर्मितमाशरीराच्छारीरकप्रवचनब्रतम्’ equals His achievement—

‘यतीश्वरसरस्वतीरसभरेण नीतं वयः,
प्रफुल्लपलितं शिरः परमिह क्षमं प्रार्थये ।
निरस्तरिपुसंभवे कचन रंगमुख्ये विभो
परस्परहितैषिणां परिसरेषु मां भावय ॥’^२

Even his blemishes, as for instance, his lack of sympathetic attitude towards the rival philosophical and religious systems and his high-caste and high-class conservatism, look beautiful in the light of the beauty of his character and personality.

1. S. S. 2-102.

2. Abhiti Stava—28.

HIS WORKS: THEIR CONTENTS, THEIR VIEWS & REVIEWS

Vedānta-Dēśika is the most versatile and the most prolific of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava writers. He has written in Sanskrit, in Tamil and in Tamil-cum-Sanskrit or the Maṇi-Pravāla. His works can be classified under the following six heads :—

1. Manuals of Śrī Vaiṣṇava Religion and Esotericism,
2. Theses on Śrī Vaiṣṇava Theology and Ritualism,
3. Devotional and Didactic poetry,
4. Literary works of Epic, Drama and Lyric type,
5. Original philosophical treatises, and
6. Commentaries.

Each head contains large numbers of works. His traditional biographies¹ record the number of his works as one hundred and odd. The following is the list of his works under the above 6 heads :—

1. Manuals of Śrī Vaiṣṇava Religion and Esotericism (Sanskrit and Tamil and Maṇi-Pravāla).

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|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Nyāsa Daśakam. | 9. Pannirunāmam. |
| 2. Nyāsa Viṃśati | 10. Āhāra Niyamam. |
| 3. Vairāgya Pañcakam. | 11. Tirumantra-curukku. |
| 4. Haridina Tilakam. | 12. Dvaya-curukku. |
| 5. Yajñopavīta Pratiṣṭhā. | 13. Carama śloka-curukku. |
| 6. Vaiśvadeva Kārikā. | 14. Tattva Navanītam. |
| 7. Śrī Vaiṣṇava-Dinacaryā. | 15. Rahasya Navanītam. |
| 8. Artha Pañcakam. | 16. Upakāra Saṅgraham. |

1. Vaiṣṇava Prakāśikā etc,

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 17. Sāra Saṅgraham. | 39. Abhaya Pradāna-Sāra. |
| 18. Munivāhanabhogam. | 40. Sārāsāra. |
| 19. Madhurakavihṛdayam. | 41. Pradhāna Śatakam. |
| 20. Tattva Traya-Culukam. | 42. Rahasya Ratnāvali- |
| 21. Rahasya Traya-culukam | Hṛdayam. |
| or Sāra Samkṣepa. | |
| 22. Sāradīpam. | 43. Rahasya Ratnāvali |
| 23. Nigama Parimalam. | 44. Tattva Ratnāvali-Prati- |
| 24. Stheyāvirodham | pādyā-Saṅgraham. |
| 25. Guruparaṭhparā Sāram. | 45. Tattva Ratnāvali. |
| 26. Virodha Parihāram. | 46. Rahasya Sandeśa- |
| 27. Tattva Śikhāmaṇi. | Vivaraṇam. |
| 28. Mummani Kovai | 47. Rahasya Sandeśa. |
| 29. Navaratnamālai | 48. Tattva Sandeśa |
| 30. Panduppā. | 49. Rahasya Māṭṛkā. |
| 31. Kazalpā. | 50. Tattva Māṭṛkā. |
| 32. Ammanepā. | 51. Rahasya Padavī. |
| 33. Usalpā. | 52. Tattva Padavī. |
| 34. Achalpā. | 53. Saṃpradāya Pariśuddhi |
| 35. Adaikāla Pattu. | 54. Ārādhana Kārikā. |
| 36. Tirucchinnamālai | 55. Prabandhasāram |
| 37. Añjali Vaibhavam. | 56. Hastigiri-Māhātmyam. |
| 38. Rahasya Śikhāmaṇi. | 57. Paramapada-Sopānam. |

2 *Theses on Śrī Vaiṣṇava Theology and Ritualism (Sanskrit & Maṇi Pravāla).*

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|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 58. Nikṣepa Rakṣā | 62. Dramiḍopaniṣattātparya- |
| 59. Pañcarātra Rakṣā. | Ratnāvali. |
| 60. Saccaritra Rakṣā. | 63. Rahasya Traya Sāram. |
| 61. Dramiḍopaniṣatsāra. | 64. Bhūgola Nirṇaya. |
| | 65. Śilpārtha Sāram. |

3. *Devotional and Didactic Poetry.*

- | | |
|------------------------|--------------------|
| 66. Hayagrīva Stotra. | 68. Bhagavaddhyāna |
| 67. Daśavatāra Stotra, | Sopāna. |

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| 69. Gopāla Viṃśati. | 82. Raghuvīra Gadya. |
| 70. Śrī Stuti. | 83. Bhū Stuti. |
| 71. Abhīti Stava. | 84. Ṣodaśāyudha stotra. |
| 72. Varadarāja Pañcāśat. | 85. Sudarśanāṣṭaka. |
| 73. Vegāsetu Stotra. | 86. Garuḍa Daṇḍaka. |
| 74. Aṣṭabhujaṣṭaka. | 87. Garuḍa Pañcāśat. |
| 75. Kāmāsikāṣṭaka. | 88. Yatirāja Saptati. |
| 76. Paramārtha stuti. | 89. Dhātī Pañcaka. |
| 77. Śaraṇāgati Dīpikā. | 90. Divya Deśa Maṅgalā-
śāsana-Pañcaka. |
| 78. Devanāyaka Pañcāśat. | |
| 79. Acyuta Śataka. | 91. Pādukā Sahasra. |
| 80. Dehalīśa Stuti. | 92. Subhāṣita Nīvi. |
| 81. Nyāsa Tilaka. | |

4. *Literary works of epic, drama and lyric type.*

- | | |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| 93. Yādavābhyudaya. | 97. Godā Stuti. |
| 94. Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya. | 98. Yamaka Ratnākara. |
| 95. Haṁsa Sandeśa. | |
| 96. Dayā Sataka. | 99. Samasyā Sahasra. |

5. *Original philosophical treatises.*

- | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| 100. Nyāya Parīśuddhi. | 106. Mīmāṃsā Pādukā. |
| 101. Nyāya Siddhāntajana. | 107. Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī. |
| 102. Tattva Mukta-Kalāpa. | 108. Paramata-Bhaṅga. |
| 103. Sarvārtha Siddhi. | 109. Adhikaraṇa Darpaṇa. |
| 104. Śata Dūṣaṇī. | 110. Vāditraya Khaṇḍana. |
| 105. Śeṣvara Mīmāṃsā. | 111. Cakāra Samarthana. |

6. *Commentaries.*

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| 112. Tattva Tikā. | 116. Catuṣśloki Bhāṣya. |
| 113. Tātparya Candrikā. | 117. Stotra Ratna Bhāṣya. |
| 114. Gītārtha Saṅgraha
Rakṣā. | 118. Gadya Traya Bhāṣya |
| 115. Gītārtha Saṅgraha
Pattu. | 119. Īsopaniṣad-Bhāṣya. |

Now, we shall see the contents and the critical appreciations of his works under each of the above-mentioned heads :—

1. *Manuals of Śrī Vaiṣṇava Religion & Esotericism :*

Vedānta Deśika wrote such manuals for two reasons : first, for the popularisation of the ideas and ideals of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and second, for the preservation of the religion and philosophy of the Ālvārs and the Ācāryas. He wrote them in Sanskrit, in Tamil and in Sanskrit-cum-Tamil. He kept in view a wide audience and aimed at the universalization of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion. These manuals are :—

1. Nyāsa Daśakam. The Nyāsa Daśakam is a short poem on Prapatti or Self-surrender containing 10 Anuṣṭup-verses. As he invokes the deity Varadarāja, it seems, he wrote it at Kāñcī (Conjeevaram). The Śrī Vaiṣṇava ideal of Prapatti is well brought out in the 10 stanzas which are all simple and significant. Although a work of Vedānta Deśika's young age, it has the promise of the future greatness of the author. The memorable lines¹ :—

‘मां सदीयं च निखिलं चेतनाचेतनात्मकम् ।

स्वकैक्योपकरणं वरद ! स्वीकुरु स्वयम् ॥’

suggestive of the spiritual discipline of self-surrender show the man behind the author. That is why Mahācārya, a great exponent of Deśika's philosophy (16th century A. D.) appreciate the work in the lines² :—

‘तस्य (न्यासस्य) दशकं च यस्तं

त्रैयन्तार्यं समाश्रये सततम् ।’

1. N. D. 7.

2. Vaibhava Prakāśika, page 69.

The work has been commented upon by Śrī Bhāṣyam Śrīnivāsācārya.¹ Its Tamil interpretation by Kurici Gopāla Tātācārya is also available.

2. Nyāsa Viṃśati. The Nyāsa Viṃśati is a metrical exposition of Nyāsa or Prapatti as a means to God-realisation. Its 20 stanzas in the Sragdharā metre touch, one after the other, upon the pre-requisites, the essentials and the consummation of Nyāsa or Prapatti. The faculty and the function of the spiritual guide and the spiritual aspirant, the spiritualism of Bhakti and Prapatti, the difference between Bhakti and Prapatti, the significance of Prapatti and the place of Prapatti in ancient Upaniṣadic Sādhana— all these are succinctly stressed upon. It summarises in fact the Prapatti-philosophy of Rāmānuja and Yāmunācārya.²

It has a short commentary written by Vedānta-Deśika himself. It seems his disciples requested him to explain, in his own words, the principles of Prapatti embodied in these verses.³ Later on it was commented upon by one Śrīnivāsa also. A Tamil-cum-Sanskrit interpretation by one Nadādūr Venkaṭarāmācārya is also available.⁴

3. Vairāgya Pañcakam. The Vairāgya Pañcakam contains the traditionally famous five stanzas of Vedānta Deśika, written in reply to the royal invitation from the Vijayanagara Court. The stanzas breathe the air of complete indifference to worldly prosperity. They speak of the supreme satisfaction of a dedicated life. The memorable lines⁵ :—

‘नास्ति पित्रार्जितं किञ्चिन्न मया किञ्चिदर्जितम् ।
अस्ति मे हस्तिशैल्यग्रे वस्तु पैतामहं धनम् ॥’

1. Deśika Saṃpradāya Vivardhinī Sabha publications (Kumbakonam).

2. N. V. 21.

3. N. V. commentary on stanza 1.

4. Kumbakonam Edn.

5. V. 6.

contain the quintessence of Vedānta Deśika's philosophy of life and portray the full-figure of Vedānta Deśika, the man.

Although simple in expression, the poem is full of significance for Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. Scholars like T. Ch. N. R. Tātācārya have commented upon it. Its Tamil exposition is by Vīra Rāghavācārya.¹

4. Haridina Tilakam. The Haridina Tilakam is a collection of 17 Sragdharā-stanzas discussing the observance of the Ekādaśī by the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas. It is attributed to Vedānta Deśika. Although, the colophon to the work does not indicate its authorship, yet, the style of the treatment of the subject-matter helps suggest its ascription to Vedānta Deśika.

5. Yajñopavīta Pratiṣṭhā. The work is written in 9 verses of the Sragdharā-metre to explain the ritualism of the sacred-thread and the esotericism of the Mantras accompanying it. It seems that the work means to give the gist of some other Śrī Vaiṣṇava ritualistic literature on the subject.²

6. Vaiśvadeva Kārikā. It contains 9 Sragdharā-verses on the observance of the Vaiśvadeva-Yāga in the scheme of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava ethics of the Pañcakāla-kṛtya.

7. Śrī Vaiṣṇava Dinacaryā. The work containing 10 stanzas in Tamil is attributed to Vedānta Deśika by the traditional accounts like the Vaiḥnava Prakāśikā etc.³ It summarises the everyday religious practices of a Śrī Vaiṣṇava in keeping with the spirit of the Pāñcarātra Saṁhitās.

8. Artha Pañcakam. It is a Tamil work in 11 verses meant to be a handbook of popular Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. Vedānta

1. Deśika Saṁpradāya Vivardhini Sabha publications.

2. Y. P. 9.

3. Vaiḥnava Prakāśika, Page 34.

Deśika wrote it with a view to emphasizing upon the five points of Śrī Vaiṣṇava spiritual discipline viz. (I) the nature of the Supreme Being, the goal of highest experience, (II) the nature of Jīva or the soul, the attainer of Bliss Eternal, (III) the means of spiritual attainment, (IV) the results of spiritual attainment and (V) the obstacles to the attainment of the goal. Mahācārya (16th century) has a reverential regard for the importance of the work in the inculcation of Śrī Vaiṣṇava religious teaching.¹

9. Pannirunāmam. In 13 Tamil stanzas the work discusses the significance of the 12 Puṇḍras on the body of a Śrī Vaiṣṇava.

10. Āhāra Niyamam. In 21 Tamil verses it prescribes the articles of food for a Śrī Vaiṣṇava, suitable for leading the life of religious discipline.

11, 12 and 13. These are small handbooks of Śrī Vaiṣṇava spiritualism written in Tamil verses by Vedānta Deśika as the Ācārya of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava world. They are meant to suggest the significance of Prapatti embodied in the Mantra, the Dvaya and the Carama-Śloka respectively.

14. Tattva Navanītam and 15. Rahasya Navanītam. These are written in Maṇi-Pravāḷa style to expound the spiritualism of the Rāmānuja-Mata.²

16. Upakāra Saṅgraham. It is a work in Tamil dilating upon the manifestations of Divine Providence in the life of man.

17. Sāra Saṅgraham. Written in Tamil verses, the work is ascribed to Vedānta Deśika by the Vaibhava Prakāśikā (Page 96). It expounds the principles of Śrī Vaiṣṇava morality.

1. Vaibhava Prakāśikā, Page 34.

2. Vaibhava Prakāśikā, Page 84.

18. Munivāhana-Bhogam. It is a Maṇi-Pravāḷa commentary on Tiruppāṇālvār's Amalanāḍippirān. It expresses the mystic experiences of the ancient Tamil sage.

19. Madhura Kavi-Hṛdayam. The work was a Maṇi-Pravāḷa commentary on Madhura Kavi's Kaṇṇiṇṇuṁ-Śrut-taṁbu. Mahācārya mentions it.¹ But it is lost now.

20. and 21. These are the short Tamil treatises on the truths of Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy and the ideals of Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion, respectively.

22. Sāradīpam or Rahasya Traya Sāradīpam. It is a Tamil work, probably a summary of the Rahasya Traya Sāram, as referred to by Mahācārya.² It is not available now.

23. and 24. These works are lost beyond recovery. 23 or the Nigama Parimalam was probably the great exposition of the Prabandhams, which, according to the tradition, far excelled their expositions by the Teṅgalai teachers.

25. Guruparamparā Sāram. The work in Tamil is meant to propagate the cult of the worship of the Pravartakas of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion.

26. Virodha Parihāram. Written in Tamil, it is a rejoinder to the points of controversy arising in the Tamil magum opus of Vedānta Deśika, the Rahasya Traya Sāram.³

27. Tattva Śikhāmaṇi. It is no more available now.

28. to 34. All these works are lost. But they are all referred to by Mahācārya.⁴

35. Adaikāḷa Paṭṭu. It is a devotional Tamil poem on Prapatti or self-surrender in 11 verses.

1. Vaibhava Prakasikā, Page 108.

2. Vaibhava Prakasikā, Page 129.

3. Vaibhava Prakasikā, Page 132.

4. Vaibhava Prakasikā, Page 31.

36. *Tirucchinamālai*. In 11 Tamil verses it meant to be a bugle-song glorifying the Varadarāja-procession in Kānci during the Brahmotsavam festivals.

37. *Añjali Vaibhavam*. It was a Śaraṇāgati-song in Tamil.

38. *Rahasya Śikhāmaṇi*. It was a Maṇi-Pravāla work expounding the Śrī Vaiṣṇava ideal of Prapatti.

39. *Abhaya Pradāna-Sāram*. It also expounded the Śrī Vaiṣṇava concept of Divine Providence. It is lost now.

40. *Sārāsāram*. The work in Tamil embodies the tenets of Vedānta Deśika's religion and philosophy.

41. *Pradhāna Śatakam*. It is a small Tamil work on Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.

42 to 45. These are Tamil treatises on Śrī Vaiṣṇava esotericism and mysticism.

46 to 48. These are the three of the four famous treatises of Vedānta Deśika which according to the Veḍaḷalai Guruparaṁparā-tradition formed the Ācāryic dispatch of Deśika to the scholar-prince, Sarvajña Siṅgappa, with a view to initiating him into the idealism of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion.

49 and 50. These are small Tamil manuals of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Sādhana of spiritualism.

51 and 52. These are handy Tamil works, written with a view to popularising the religion of Rāmānuja.

53. *Sampradāya Paśuddhi*. Written in Maṇi-Pravāla style, it is a fine exposition of the ideas and ideals of the Munitrayam-Sampradāya.

54. *Ārādhana Kārikā*. In two simple verses, it shows the way to the worship of God.

55. *Prabandha Sāram*. In 18 Tamil verses, it means to honour the 12 Āḷvārs, the great seers of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

56. Hastigiri Māhātmyam. In Sanskrit-cum-Tamil. it was a history of Kāñcī, in the style of the Purāṇas. It aimed at the glorification of the Lord Varadarāja of Kāñcī.

57. Paramapada Sopānam. In Maṇipravāla, it was an attempt at establishing the Śrīvaiṣṇava Sādhana of Prapatti to the exclusion of the other means of the realisation of the Divine.

2. *Theses on Śrīvaiṣṇava theology & ritualism.*

Under this head are available some very important and original contributions of Vedānta Deśika as the teacher of Śrīvaiṣṇavism. These Saṁpradāya-works clearly suggest the great importance of Vedānta Deśika's succession to the Saṁpradāya-Pravartana-seat of Rāmānuja. The aim of Vedānta Deśika in these theses is to present the characteristic features of the religion and philosophy of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. These works are—

58. Nikṣepa Rakṣā. As its name suggests, the work is a thesis on Nikṣepa or Prapatti or self-surrender and champions the cause of love and devotion to God in the face of other ways of God-realisation. This one work is enough to immortalise Vedānta Deśika, who regards it to be his literary effort at revealing the supreme secret of all knowledge i. e. love for God and Man and Nature.¹

Here, Nikṣepa or Prapatti is discussed as one's self-abnegating love and devotion to the Divine. Nikṣepa is love for God culminating in love for man. Firstly it is shown that Nikṣepa is a constant remembrance of one's being given to God in utter love and devotion. Secondly, unlike other means of God-realisation, Nikṣepa is winning or attracting to one's side the Supreme Being, the sole refuge, the only goal, the greatest strength.² Thirdly, it is not a cult started by

1. N. B. Page 40.

2. N. R. Page 28.

x or y or z, but an ancient spiritual Upaniṣadic Sādhana.¹ Fourthly, it has its Sāstraic prescription in the Gītā verse—‘सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य’ etc emphasizing upon its obligatoriness to the spiritual aspirant. It is rather remarkable that Vedānta Deśika makes out the Nikṣepa Rakṣā as ‘Ātmanivedana-Mīmāṃsā’ and brings to bear all the technique of the Mīmāṃsā on the discussion of the nature of Nikṣepa. As the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā-Sādhana fulfils itself in the genesis of ‘Āpūrva’, so does the Nikṣepa-Mīmāṃsā-Sādhana lead to its own Apūrva in the form of ‘Deva-Prasāda’ or the Divine desire to save the Soul. Fifthly, the work proves the point that ‘Nikṣepa’ is not prohibited in such sacred scriptures as ‘नान्यः पन्था बिद्यतेऽयनाय’ etc. Sixthly, Nikṣepa has been distinguished from Bhakti and has been shown to be the only means of God-realisation.² Seventhly, the work conclusively proves that Prapatti is not an impracticable philosophy of life. Eighthly, Nikṣepa has been given a distinct place in the ancient Brahmayogās.

The invocatory stanza suggests that the Nikṣepa Rakṣā was written at Śrīraṅgam. The work has got a standard commentary by one Simha Deva. Another commentary called the ‘Nṛsiṃharājīya’ suggests that the work had other expositions also by eminent teachers of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.³

59. Pāñcarātra Rakṣā. It is a long discussion on the self-validity of the Pāñcarātra Saṁhitas and the universality of the Pāñcarātra religion and morality. Vedānta Deśika seems to have written it in his role of the Ācārya of the Vāḍagalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas. It presupposes many other works of its type such as the Āgama Prāmāṇya of Yāmunācārya, the works of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka and Kṛṣṇamuni and so on.

1. N. R. page 29.

2. N. R. page 34.

3. Nṛsiṃharājīya page, 1.

Its first section enjoins upon the Śrīvaiṣṇavas the worship of Vāsudeva following the prescription of one of the four Siddhāntas viz. Āgama, Mantra, Tantra and Tantrāntara of the Pāñcarātra Saṁhitās. The second section is devoted to the discussion of the daily routine of the life of a Śrīvaiṣṇava, consisting of the five-fold duties of Abhigamana, Upādāna, Ijyā, Svādhyāya and Yoga. The last or the third section contains valuable practical suggestions concerning the performance of the Pañcakāla Kṛtyas, the only duties concurrent with the Prapatti-Niṣṭhā or selfless love and devotion to God. The complete worship of the Divine, the perfect Prapatti, has been shown to be an all-round physical, mental and spiritual-purification of one's self¹.

60. Saccaritra Rakṣā. It is a comprehensive exposition of the ritualism of initiation into Śrīvaiṣṇavism. Vedānta Deśika treats the subject in the manner of a Mīmāṃsaka. The work has three sections: The 1st. is devoted to the theory and the practice of marking the body with Viṣṇu's conch and disc. The marking has been suggested to be the sign of one's dedication to God in utter submission of one's whole being.² The second is a discussion on the application of the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra to the different parts of the body. The Ūrdhva Puṇḍra has been shown to be a great sign, suggestive of one's eagerness for leading a higher and a better and a godlier life.³ The third prescribes the use of the food offered by the worshipper to the deity. The practice has been discussed to be nothing short of a spiritual discipline leading to the realisation of the Upaniṣadic maxim of 'तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथाः'⁴ The invocation to the deity Dehaliśa of Tirukkoilūr⁵ is an

1. P. R. page 154.

2. S. R. page 48.

3. S. R. page 60.

4. Iṣopaniṣad—1.

5. S. R. 1st. Adhikāra, last stanza.

indication of its composition at Tirukkoilūr.

61. *Draṁḍopaniṣatsāra*. As its name suggests, it is an epitome in Sanskrit, in the *Sragdharā* and the *Śikharīṇī*-metres, of the *Draṁḍopaniṣat* or the *Gāthās* of the saint *Ṇammālvār*. *Vedānta Deśika* has captured here the entire atmosphere of the Tamil *Gāthās* singing of the majesty and the grace of the Great God. It is one of the advanced works of *Vedānta Deśika*. It has a Tamil interpretation by *Śrīnivāsa Deśika*.

62. *Draṁḍopaniṣattātparya-Ratnāvalī*. It summarises in 130 *Sragdharā*-stanzas, divided in 10 sub-sections, all the songs of the great *Ṇammālvār*. Like the songs of the Tamil saint, the *Sragdharās* of *Vedānta Deśika* contain the essence of self-surrender.

It seems it was written at *Śrīraṅgam*¹. Its Tamil commentary is by one *Venkaṭeśācārya*.

63. *Rahasya Traya Sāram*. It is the Tamil magnum opus of *Deśika*, the *Śrīvaiṣṇava Ācārya*. It embodies the secrets of *Śrīvaiṣṇava* esotericism. It is the great *Prapatti-Sāstra* of the *Vaḍagalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas*.

64. *Bhūgola Nirṇaya*. Along with its small commentary, it is a short treatise in 9 verses. The main aim of the author is to describe all the parts of the globe, following the *Purāṇas*. Although some scholars do not take it to be an authentic work of *Vedānta Deśika*, yet, it is not improbable that *Deśika* wrote it as a sequel to the *Tattva-Mukta-Kalāpa* stanza '*Tiṣṭhatyūrvībhacakram*' (1.63) etc. *Māhācārya* takes it to be a genuine work of *Vedānta Deśika*.²

65. *Silpārtha Sāra*. It is referred to by *Mahācārya* as one of the works of *Vedānta Deśika*.³ The work is irretrie-

1. D. R. 130.

2. *Vaibhava Prakāśikā* page 70.

3. „ „ „ 127.

vably lost now. There is a tradition that the Śilpārtha Sāra was a work on the art of sculpture in general and iconography in particular and that it contained the 'Ācārya Mudrā' executed by Vedānta Deśika in his own bust, preserved, even to-day, in the Deśika-shrine at Tiruvāhīndrapuram.

3. *Devotional and Didactic Poetry.*

Vedānta Deśika wrote a large number of devotional and didactic poems. These poems suggest his intensely religious spirit and his poetic faculty as a writer. These works occupy a distinct place in the galaxy of poems of Śrī Vaiṣṇava Sanskrit writers. It is a fact that Vedānta Deśika wrote these poems under the inspiration of the songs of the Ālvārs. But there is no dearth of originality in them. These works are:—

66. *Hayagrīva Stotra*. It is a hymn containing 32 stanzas, mostly of the Upajāti metre, on Hayagrīva, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava deity of Light and Learning. It is probably the first work of Vedānta Deśika as a writer of poetry. It was composed during the author's sojourn at Tiruvāhīndrapuram. A visitor to Tiruvāhīndrapuram is shown, even today, the seat where Vedānta Deśika sat and composed and recited the Hayagrīva stotra. The hymn is recited by the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas of Tiruvāhīndrapuram during the Brahmo-tsavam festivals. The devout Vaḍagalai Śrī Vaiṣṇavas have a reverential regard for this hymn as they take it to be the poetic idealisation of the esotericism of the Hayagrīva Mantra.

Some of the stanzas of the Hayagrīva stotra such as 'Samāhārah Sāmnām' and 'Svataḥ Siddham' etc. are very favourite with the poet as he reproduces them more than once in his other works. It seems the poet himself liked his juvenile poetic compositions.

1. Ha. S-2.

2. Ha. S-3.

Mahācārya, the famous Teṅgalai critic and philosopher, seems to be very fond of this hymn as he highly appreciates it in his *Vaibhava Prakāśika*.¹

The hymn has been commented upon (i) by Velāmūr Śrīnivāsācārya and (ii) Śrī Śaila Tirumalai Nambi Rāghavārya in Sanskrit. Its Tamil interpretations (i) by Kurichi Gopāla Tātācārya and (ii) by Gārgya Veṅkatācārya are also well-known.

67. *Daśavatāra Stotra*. It is a *stotra* or hymn on the *Avatāras* or incarnations of Śrī Viṣṇu or more particularly, Śrī Rāṅganātha. It was written at Śrīraṅgam. All the images of Lord Viṣṇu's incarnations installed in the Śrī Rāṅganātha shrine have been honoured by the poet in this *Stotra*.

It has 13 stanzas in the *Śārdūlavikrīḍita*-metre suggestive of the vehement beating of the poet's heart under the stress of love and devotion to Rāṅganātha.

The poet gives a prominent place to this hymn in Act VII of his drama, the *Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya*. He repeats almost all its stanzas in connection with the description of the incarnations of Viṣṇu (*Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya*, Act VII). The work is meant to excite worshipful mood in the readers' mind.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇavas of Tiruvāhīndrapuram say that the hymn was written on the deity *Devanāyaka* and the incarnations of *Devanāyaka* consecrated in the Tiruvāhīndrapuram-temple.

About this *Stotra*, the *Vedānta Deśika-Vaibhava-Prakāśikā* says that it greatly contributes to one's faith in Divine Providence.²

1. *Vaibhava Prakāśikā*, Page 30.

2. *Vaibhava Prakāśikā*, Page 66.

It has three commentaries :—

- (1) by Śrī Śaila Tirumalai Nāmbi Rāghavārya (in Sanskrit).
- (2) by Kurichi Gopāla Tātācārya (in Tamil) and
- (3) by Gārgya Veṅkatācārya (in Tamil).

68. Bhagavaddhyāna Sopāna. It is a devotional poem written by Vedānta Deśika at Śrīraṅgam. It is a work of the period of his 'inward ripeness'.

It has 12 Maṇḍākrāntā-stanzas all suggestive of the poet's heart melting in Divine love in the presence of Divine beauty.

It conceives of the limbs of the images of Raṅganātha as steps for the devotee's heart to climb to reach the Divine. It presents the sublime sense of self-surrender, the great spiritual Sādhana of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

The name 'Bhagavaddhyāna Sopānam' is significant. According to the votaries of Raṅganātha, the word 'Bhagavat' signifies directly 'Raṅganātha' and no other deity of the Śrīvaiṣṇava pantheon. As 'Dayā Śatakam' means Śrīnivāsa-Śatakam, so does 'Bhagavaddhyāna Sopānam' mean Raṅganātha-Sopānam. The Stotra echoes forth the lofty ideas of the Tamil-Gāthās of Muni Vāhana, a great Tamil saint.

It is commented upon by Anvil Veṅkaṭa Gopāladāsa¹ who has a high regard for its suggestiveness and sweet reflections. From A. V. Gopāladāsa's commentary, we know that the great Advaita-Ācārya, Appayya Dīkṣita also had commented upon it. Its other commentaries are (i) by Śrī Śaila Tirumalai Nāmbi Rāghavārya (in Sanskrit); (ii) Śrī Śaila Vedānta Rāmānuja (in Sanskrit); (iii) Śrī Śaila Sinnamu Raṅganāthācārya (in Tamil) and (iv) by Gārgya Venkaṭācārya (in Tamil).

1. Vani Vilas Press (Śrīraṅgam).

69. *Gopāla Viṃśati*. It is a hymn in 21 verses on Lord Kṛṣṇa. It has a variety of metres, suggestive of the variety of the poet's moods, ranging from simple faith to philosophical idealisation concerning Lord Kṛṣṇa.

According to the *Vaibhava Prakāśikā*, it was composed at Tiruvāhindrapuram.

Some of its fine stanzas are incorporated by the poet in his *Mahākāvya*, the *Yādavābhyudaya*, Canto XV. Its first stanza,—*वन्दे इन्द्रावनचरम्* etc. containing the quintessence of the poetry and the philosophy of Vedānta Deśika forms the prologue to the *Yādavābhyudaya*. And Appayya Dikṣita, while commenting upon it, points out that Vedānta Deśika, being a great Kṛṣṇa Bhakta, was capable of the highest flights of Kṛṣṇa-poetry¹.

The Late M. M. Chetlur Narasimhachariar of Tiruvāhindrapuram took this stotra to be the elucidation of the mysticism of the Gopāla-Cakra.

It has been commented upon (i) by Śrī Saila Tiru-Malai Nambi-Rāghavārya (in Sanskrit) and (ii) by Śrī Śaila Sinnamu Ranganāthāchārya (in Tamil).

70. *Śrī Stuti*. It is a hymn in 26 stanzas of the *Maṇḍākrāntā* metre on Śrī or Lakṣmī. It was occasioned by hymns on Śrī, composed by pre-Deśika Śrī Vaiṣṇava poets. The *Śrī Stuti* of Yāmunācārya is its main source of inspiration. According to the traditional biographies of Vedānta Deśika it was composed at Śrīraṅgam. But the Śrīvaiṣṇavas of Conjeevaram claim their city to be its place of origin. There is nothing in the *Śrī Stuti* to suggest its composition at Śrīraṅgam or Conjeevaram or Tiruvāhindrapuram. What is certain is that it was written at a time

1. X. commentary on 1-1.

when the Śrī Vaiṣṇava world had been split up into two halves. Probably the contention of the Teṅgalais and the Vaḍagalais on the point of Śrī or Lakṣmī has a hand in its composition. It is held in high esteem by Chaṇḍa Māruta Mahācārya, the celebrated commentator of the Śataduṣaṇi.¹ It has been commented upon (i) by Ātreya Varadācārya (in Sanskrit) and (ii) by Kurichī Gopāla Tātācārya (in Tamil).

71. Abhīti Stava. It is a hymn on Lord Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. It is supposed to have been written at Satya-maṅgalam in the Coimbatore district.

It contains 29 stanzas. It is a beautiful piece of poetry. The poet expresses, here, his devotion to Raṅganātha. It is a work of our poet's advanced age. It has some autobiographical touches. Besides, it gives a clue to the chronology of Vedānta Deśika's works.

Probably it has no Sanskrit commentary. It has, however, a Tamil commentary by Śrī Śaila Sinnamu Ranganāthacārya.

72. Varada Rāja Pañcāśat. It is a hymn on the deity Varadarāja, worshipped in the Varadarāja shrine at Conjeevaram. It has 51 stanzas all full of the youthful energy of the poet. It is called 'Devarāja Pañcāśat, also. It reads like a fine exposition of the theology of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. Besides, it is a Prapatti-poem for the Śrī Vaiṣṇava worshipper of Varadarāja at Conjeevaram. It has captured the entire beauty of the Image of Varadarāja. It contains a fine sketch of the Brahmotsavam festival of Varadarāja. It is read and regarded as Śāstra-poetry or poetry expressive of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava-conception of the Divine Being. It has been commented upon by Kārur Śrī Sāila Śrīnivāsācārya.

73. Vegāsetu Stotram. It is a hymn on the deity enshrined in the Yathokta Kārin-temple at Conjeevaram. It has 10 stanzas suggestive of the story that runs as follows:—

‘Once Brahmā, the world-progenitor, began the Aśva-medha sacrifice at Kāñci. Sarasvatī, his spouse, did not attend the function. When the function was in full swing, she changed herself in the form of a river, Vegavatī by name and flowed tempestuously with a view to extinguishing the sacrificial fire of Brahmā, her husband, But Viṣṇu, the Yathokta Kārin threw himself across the stream and stopped the waters from impetuously moving towards the sacrificial alter. As Viṣṇu, the Yathoktakārin became the ‘Vegāsetu’ or the Setu or the dam to the Vegavatī river, the hymn composed on Him is called ‘Vegā Śetu-Stotra’.

Another significance attached to the Stotra is that it eulogises the gifts its author had received from Sarasvatī, the Goddess of Learning. Sarasvatī is Vegavatī or quick to respond to the poet’s prayers. Our poets’ speech is arrested no sooner than it reaches God, the Ultimate Transcendental. God becomes the Setu or the dam to the flow of Deśika’s speech. The hymn hints at the secret of the devotional outpourings of its author.

It has been commented upon by T. Ch. N. R. Tātācārya in Sanskrit and by Śrī Śaila Sinnamu Ranganāthācārya in Tamil.

74. Aṣṭa Bhujaṣṭaka. It is a hymn dedicated to Viṣṇu or Gajendravarada with 8 hands, enshrined in the Aṣṭabāhu-temple, adjacent to the Yathoktakārin-temple at Conjeevaram. It contains 10 stanzas. Our poet says that if a devotee were to meditate upon the form of Viṣṇu presented in the hymn, he would grow in Divine consciousness and Divine love.¹ The Stotra is a work of Deśika’s early literary career.

1. A. B. 9.

It has a Sanskrit commentary by I. R. Sheshadryacharya. Its Tamil interpretation by Agnihotram Chakrapani Pattara-arya Dasa is also well-known.

75. Kāmāsikāṣṭaka. It is a hymn on Viṣṇu in the form of Narasimha enshrined in the Kāmāsikā-temple at Conjeevaram. It also is a work of our poet's early career as a writer of devotional hymns and poems. It has 9 stanzas, which lend immortality to the Kāmāsikā-temple and the deity installed therein.

76. Paramārtha Stuti. It is a hymn in 10 stanzas on Viṣṇu in the form of Rāma or Vijaya Rāghava or Samara Puṅgava, installed in a shrine near Tirupputkūḷi, about seven miles from Conjeevaram. It is called 'Vijaya Rāghava-Stuti' or "Samara Puṅgava-Stuti" also. It suggests our poet's devotion and self-surrender to God.

It has a commentary in Sanskrit by I. R. Sheshadryacharya. Agnihotram Chakrapani Pattara-arya Dasa has written a Tamil Commentary also on it.

77. Saraṇāgati Dīpikā. It is a hymn on the deity Dīpa Prakāśa, consecrated in the Dīpa Prakāśa-shrine at Conjeevaram. It expounds the principles of the religion and the philosophy of Rāmānuja.

It occupies an important place in the works of Vedānta Deśika. It contains many an autobiographical touch. It is full of reminiscences of our poet's love for the Tamil songs of the Ālvārs. It is suggestive of the sentiment of Acārya-Niṣṭhā. It is, as the poet himself says, enough to flood the reader's heart with divine love and divine joy.¹

Its name Śaraṇāgati Dīpikā is significant as it shines like a lamp showing to us the inner recesses of the heart of Vedānta Deśika, a Śaraṇāgata'.

It contains 60 stanzas changing in tone with the change of the poet's moods, ranging from Image-worship to intuitive immersion in the Divine Being.

It has been commented upon (i) by Śrī Saila Tirumalai Nāṭṭhi Rāghavārya and (ii) by Gārgya Veṅkatārya in Sanskrit. Its Tamil commentary by K. M. Rajagopalacharya is also available.

78. Devanāyaka Pañcāśat. It is a hymn on Devanāyaka, the deity of Tiruvāhīndrapuram. It was composed by Vedānta Deśika during his sojourn there. It has 53 stanzas, 50 being in the Vasanta Tilakā-metre. It abounds in the ideas of the songs of the great Tamil Saint Nāmmālvār. It contains our poet's reflections on the beauty of Arcā and the mystery of Image-worship. It is sung in chorus in the Tiruvāhīndrapuram temple, on the occasion of the Brahmo-tsavam festival every year. Doddayācārya appreciates it very much.¹

It has a Sanskrit commentary by Śrī Śaila Tirumalai Nāṭṭhi Rāghavārya. Its Tamil interpretation by K. M. Rajagopalacharya is also available.

79. Acyuta Śataka. It is a devotional poem in Prākṛt. It has 101 Gāthās. It was written at Tiruvāhīndrapuram and dedicated to the deity Devanāyaka or Acyuta. It is inspired by the Tiruvayamozhi of the Saint Nāmmālvār. It shows each and every facet of Śrīvaiṣṇavism and Viśiṣṭādvaita. The Late M. M. Chetlur Narasimhachariar held it to be the quintessence of the Rāmānuja Darśana.

It is written in Prākṛt. Our poet regards Prākṛt as the sweet voice of Sarasvatī.² Doddayācārya appreciates it as a

1. Vaibhava Prakāśika, page 31.

2. A. S. 3.

novel hymn on Acyuta.¹ It has many commentaries, suggestive of its importance ; such as :—

- (i) by T. Ch. N. R. Tātācārya (in Sanskrit).
- (ii) by T. V. Deśikācārya (Grammatical).
- (iii) by Śrī Saila Sinnamu Ranganāthācārya (in Tamil).
- (iv) by Taiyar Vangipuram Deśikācārya (in Tamil).
- (v) by S. T. A. T. Kumāra Tātārya (in Sanskrit).

80. Dehalīśa Stuti. It is a poem of devotional attitude towards the Divine. It was written on the deity Dehalīśa at Tirukkoilur. It contains 28 stanzas, all suggestive of the ideas and the imageries of the Tamil songs of the three ancient Ālvārs-Peyālvār, Puḍaṭṭālvār and Poigai. It is an important work of the poet. It contains the story of the coming into being of the Munitrayam Saṁpradāya of Śrī-vaishṇavism, the Saṁpradāya to which Vedānta Deśika belonged.

Vedānta Deśika himself likes this poetic composition of his² very much.

It has two Sanskrit commentaries, one by T. Ch. N. R. Tatacārya and the other by Śrī Saila Sinnamu Ranganāthācārya. Its Tamil exposition by P. I. Lakshmi Nareshacharya is also available.

81. Nyāsa Tilakam. It is a hymn on Śrī Raṅganātha of the Śrīraṅgam temple. It has 32 stanzas, all composed at Śrīraṅgam where Vedānta Deśika lived and worshipped Lord Raṅganātha.

Its subject-matter is Nyāsa or Self-surrender to God.

It has been commented upon in Sanskrit (i) by Nainārācārya, our poet's own son and (ii) by Śrī Bhāṣyam Śrīnivāsā-

1. Vaibhava Prakāśika

2. De. S. 23.

cārya. It has a Tamil commentary also by Kurichi Gopāla Tātācārya.

82. Raghuvīragadya. It is a prose-poem on Śrī Rāma. Doddayācārya says that it was composed at Tiruvāhīndrapuram.¹ It has a striking resemblance to the Raṅga-Gadya of Rāmānuja. In fact, it is inspired by the Raṅga Gadya. The Śrīvaiṣṇavas of Tiruvāhīndrapuram recite it on the occasion of the Brahmotsavam festival of the deity Devanāyaka. It is a beautiful poetic epitome of the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki. Its rhythmic movement and mellifluous music recommend it to the reader. The poet likes it very much.² It is called Mahāvīra-Vaibhava also. It is commented upon by Tenbarai Rājagopalācārya.

83. Bhūstuti. It is a highly suggestive devotional poem composed on Bhū or the Goddess Earth. It contains 33 stanzas. It is supposed to have been composed at Śrīraṅgam. But, it might have been composed on the Goddess of the Varāhāvātāra-temple at Idvainḍai, near Mahāvalipuram, in the Madras Presidency. It contains our poet's mystic speculations on the earth, a mode of the Divine. It reads like a poem on the glory and the grandeur of 'Bhārata-Varṣa' also. It has been commented upon by Śrī Saila Tirumalai Naṁbi Rāghavārya in Sanskrit and by K. M. Rājagopalācārya in Tamil.

84. Ṣoḍaśāyudha Stotra. It is a hymn on the 16 weapons accompanying the Sudarśana of Śrī Viṣṇu, installed in the Śrīraṅgam Temple. It has 18 stanzas in the Anuṣṭup metre. As the poet does not suggest any purpose of the 16 weapons such as the destruction of the Turuṣkas or the Moslem Vandals, we may presume it to have been written before the sack of Śrīraṅgam in A. D. 1310. Doddayācārya says that

1. Vaibhava Prakāśikā, page 32.

2. R. G. last stanza.

it was composed at Conjeevaram on the weapons of Lord Varadarāja.¹ The work reminds the reader of the Astrādhyāya or the weapon-chapter of the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. It has been commented upon by Tenbarai Rājagopālācārya in Sanskrit and by Karichi Gopāla Tātācārya in Tamil.

85. Sudarśanaṣṭaka. It is a hymn in 8 stanzas on Sudarśana or Viṣṇu's disc. It is said to have been written at Tiruvāhīndrapuram. But Doddayācārya says that it was composed at Conjeevaram.² It has a Sanskrit commentary by Tenbarai Rājagopālācārya. Its exposition by Kurichi Gopāla Tātācārya in Tamil is also well-known.

86. Garuḍa Daṇḍaka. It is a hymn addressed to Garuḍa, in the Daṇḍaka metre. It is a regular type of Daṇḍaka, having 4 quarters, each containing 108 syllables, consisting of the initial pair of 'Nagaṇas' followed by 'Ragaṇas'. Daṇḍaka, in fact, is rhythmic prose, producing stately music. Our poet uses the Daṇḍaka with a view to expressing the sense of the Sublime. The Daṇḍaka metre in the Prabodha-Candrodaya of Kṛṣṇa Miśra (Act IV) probably influenced the poet in his Garuḍa-Daṇḍaka.

It was composed at Tiruvāhīndrapuram. It is sung on the occasions of the Brahmotsavams by the Śrīvaiṣṇavas of the locality. But Mahācārya in his Vaibhava Prakāśikā states that it was composed at Conjeevaram when Vedānta Deśika—the Sarva-Tantra-Svatantra—was challenged by a snake-charmer. It is this Garuḍa-Daṇḍaka with which the poet is said to have invoked Garuḍa and defeated the snake-charmer.

The work is incorporated by the poet in his Saṅkalpa-Sūryodaya, Act X. Its recitation appears attractive even today.

1. Vaibhava Prakāśikā, page 35.

2. Vaibhava Prakāśikā, page 36.

It has a Sanskrit commentary by Tenbarai Rājagopālācārya and a Tamil one by K. M. Rājagopālācārya.

87. Garuḍa Pañcāśat. It is a hymn in 52 stanzas, on Garuḍa, the presiding deity of Wisdom and Reason. It was composed at Tiruvāhīndrapuram. It is recited on the occasions of the Brahmotsavam festivals of the locality. It is written in stately Sragdharā metre. The Śrīvaiṣṇavas regard it as the embodiment of the Gaṇḍa-Maṅtra. Some of its stanzas, liked by the poet, are included in the Saṅkalpa-Sūryodaya, Act X.

88. Yatirāja Saptati. It is a hymn on Rāmānuja, the great Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher and philosopher (A. D. 1017-1137). It contains 74 stanzas. It was written probably at Śrī Perumbudur. Here our poet gives expression to his deep sense of devotion to Rāmānuja, enshrined as Śrī Bhāṣyakāra, in the Perumbudur temple. But Doddaiyācārya says that it was written at Srīraṅgam. Many of its stanzas are incorporated in other works of Deśika. The poet liked the Yatirāja Saptati very much.¹ It has a commentary by one Rāmānujācārya.

89. Dhātī Pañcaka. It contains 5 stanzas. It is traditionally ascribed to Vedānta Deśika. It glorifies Rāmānuja, the great Conqueror of rival religionists and rival schools of philosophies. Its third stanza 'चारित्र्योद्धारदण्डम्' etc.² reminds the reader of the first benedictory stanza of the Daśakumāracarita³ of Daṇḍin.

90. Divya Deśa Maṅgalāśāsana-Pañcaka. It is a collection of 5 stanzas composed on places of sanctity like Śrī Raṅgam, Tirupati, Conjeevaram, and Tirunārāyaṇapuram. It glorifies the Divine Arcās consecrated in the four famous

1. Y. S. 73.

2. Dhātī. 3.

3. ब्रह्मकुमारचरितः etc.

Śrīvaiṣṇava shrines. Its stanzas are included in the Rahasya-traya Sāram. It is for this reason that some scholars do not take it to be an independent work of Deśika.

91. Pādukāśahasra. It is a long hymn, having 1008 verses, in 32 Padyās or sections, on the Pādukā of the deity Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. It was composed at Śrīraṅgam. There is a story about its origin :—

‘Once, Aḷagīmaṇavāḷa Perumāḷ Nainār, Pillai Lokācārya’s brother, challenged Vedānta Deśika for the latter’s title of ‘Kavi-Tārkika-Simha’. It was decided that one who composed 1000 Ślokas on Raṅganātha in one night would be called the ‘Kavi-Tārkika-Simha.’ The Vaḍagalai poet and his Teṅgalai rival started their work. While the Teṅgalai poet took the whole night to compose 500 Ślokas only, Vedānta Deśika finished 1000 Ślokas in a very short time. The Vaḍagalai poet’s 1000 stanzas are called the Pādukā Sahasra.

The Pādukā Sahasra was so much liked by Deśika’s followers that they believed it to have been composed by Lord Hayagrīva, the God of Light and Learning Himself. The work is a study into the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki. It brings out all the niceties of the Rāmāyaṇa as an epic poem of love and devotion. It reads, besides, as an eulogy of the great Saint Nammālvār. Like the Vaḍagalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas, the Teṅgalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas also love it for its poetry and philosophy.

It has a Sanskrit commentary by Bhāradvāja Śrīnivāsa. Besides, it has a Tamil translation. Appayya Dīkṣita also is said to have commented upon it.

92. Subhāṣita Nivī. It is a book of didactic poetry in a terse style. It has 144 stanzas divided into 12 chapters.

As the tradition goes, Vedānta Deśika composed it for one Sarvajña Singappa Nāyaka of Rajmundry, who sought moral and religious instruction from the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācārya.

Doddayācārya thinks that it was written at Srīraṅgam.¹ Some of its stanzas are found in our poet's drama, the 'Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya.' It has a Sanskrit commentary called the 'Ratna-Peṭika' by one Srinivāsa.

4. *Literary Works of Epic, Drama and Lyric type.*

93. Yādavābhyudaya. The Yādavābhyudaya is a Mahākāvya on the lines of the Raghu Varṇa and the Kumāra Saṁbhava of Kālidāsa. It is also called Yadu Varṇa or Kṛṣṇābhyudaya.

The traditional story about its origin is very interesting. It is said that, one Diṇḍima Kavi, probably the first of the line of the Diṇḍima-Sārvabhaumas, the court-poets of Vijayanagara, challenged Vedānta Deśika in these words :—

‘प्राज्ञानामेव राज्ञां सदसि न सहते जल्पमल्पेति
क्षुद्रेष्वक्षेपमुद्रां न खलु गणयते डिण्डिमः सार्वभौमः ।
भोर्कुर्वद्भेककुक्षिभरिषु भयभरभ्रान्तभोगीन्द्रसुभू-
भ्रूणभ्रंशी किमम्भः फणिषु पतगराट् संभ्रमी वंभ्रमीति ॥’

But Vedānta Deśika was not to be outwitted. He retorted at once :—

‘बाह्यैर्वर्णाडम्बरैर्मा भ्रमन्तु छित्वा गर्भाभ्यन्तरं शोधयन्तु ।
निर्णेतारो नीरसत्वेन को वा डिण्डीराणां डिण्डिमानाञ्च भेदः ॥’

At this, Diṇḍima, is said to have accepted Vedānta Deśika's superiority of poetic talents.

It is also said that Diṇḍima showed his work, the Rāghavābhyudaya, to Vedānta Deśika for the latter's favour of appraisal. At this, Vedānta Deśika, is said to have shown

1. *Vaibhava Prakāśikā* page 110.

his Yādavābhyudaya to him, which he had composed in the span of a night. Diṇḍima's surprise, as the story goes, knew no bounds at such a marvel of his rival's poetic faculties and he is said to have acknowledged, with pride, his defeat at the hands of none else but Vedānta Deśika :—

‘क्षिप्तुष्यदपरिवर्तनगर्वितकविशरभगण्डभेरुण्डः ।

खण्डनखण्डनकविरिह डिण्डिमकविगण्डडिण्डिमो जयति ॥’

We may not believe in the above origin of the Yādavābhyudaya. We know that the Yādavābhyudaya is a composition requiring time and patience for completion. Some part of it might have been written at Conjeevaram, another at Tirupati and the rest at Śrīraṅgam.

The Yādavābhyudaya has 24 Cantos written in a variety of metres, suggestive of a variety of ideas and imageries and emotions. It has been commented upon by Appayya Dikṣita (16th century), the celebrated Advaitic teacher and Philosopher. Its fame as a Mahākāvya, as the tradition goes, reached the ears of the then Vijayanagara kings.¹ And it was acclaimed as a Mahākāvya even in the life-time of the poet.

The following is the plan of composition of the Yādavābhyudaya—

- Canto 1 Description of the Yadu-race on the lines of the Raghu-race described by Kālidāsa.
- Canto 2 & 3. Birth of Kṛṣṇa.
- Canto 4. Kṛṣṇa's childhood.
- Canto 5, 6, 7 The Govardhana-episode, the seasons and the conquest of Indra.
- Canto 8 The Rāsa-Līlā.
- Canto 9 The slaying of the Demon Keśin and the lamentation of the ladies of Braja at Kṛṣṇa's departure for Kamsa's capital.

1. Y. commentary (Appayya Dikṣita) Introductory stanzas.

But the stamp of Vedānta Deśika's personality clearly tells his *Haṁsa Saṁdeśa* from its namesakes, such as the *Haṁsa Saṁdeśa* of a Śaiva poet¹ or of Pūrṇa Sarasvatī (15th century) and so on.

4. *Dayā Śataka*.

It is a fine reflective lyric. Vedānta Deśika wrote it while he was at Tirupati. It embraces all the aspects of Divine Love and Divine Providence. The devout Śrī Vaiṣṇavas regard it as a poetic elucidation of the Dvaya Mantra.²

It has 108 stanzas in varying metres suggestive of the varying shades of sentiments of love and devotion to God.

The opinion that the *Dayā Śataka*³ is a 'collection of a hundred and odd stanzas rather harsh in style and obscure in the expression of thought, a combination frequently pervading his (Vedānta Deśika's) more elaborate works, especially of the earlier period,' appears to be unfounded. In fact the *Dayā Śataka* reads as a lyric of the first order. Though a work of our poet's early career, it suggests, nevertheless, the future greatness of its author as a poet of high order.

5. *Godā Stuti*.

It is a lyric on *Godā*, the famous Āṇḍāl, worshipped as a goddess in the Śrīvaiṣṇava shrines. It contains 29 stanzas all suggestive of Vedānta Deśika's devotion to the Divine. The reader is sent into raptures over its sweet ideas and emotions of love. It was composed at Śrīraṅgam. But the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas of Tiruvāhīndrapuram claim its origin at their place. It captures all the charms of the songs of Āṇḍāl

1. *Haṁsa Saṁdeśa*—Trivandram Sanskrit Series 129.

2. *Vaibhava Prakāśikā*

3. Rangachari. *The Vaiṣṇavite Reformers of India*.

collected in the Divya Prabandhams. Doddāyācārya¹ appreciates this lyric very much.

It has been commented upon by Śrī Śaila Tirumalai Nambi Rāghavārya (in Sanskrit) and by K. M. Rājagopālācārya (in Tamil).

6. *Yamaka Ratnākara*.

As its name suggests, it ought to have been a voluminous work abounding in 'Yamaka'. In the Catalogue of Sanskrit mss. in Mysore and Coorg, Rice mentions it as No. 166 and ascribes it to Vedānta Deśika. Dr. Aufrecht also includes it in his Catalogus Catalogorum in the works of Vedānta Deśika. But Dr. Hultsch in his 'Reports on Sanskrit Mss. in Southern India (No. II)' describes under No. 936 one 'Yamaka Ratnākara' by Śrīvatsāṅka Mīśra, one of the predecessors of Vedānta Deśika. In the absence of the Mss. it is difficult to ascribe the work, with any certainty, to Vedānta Deśika. That Vedānta Deśika was an adept in Yamaka-writing is evident to the readers of his Yādavābhyudaya. It may, therefore, have been a work of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava polyhistor-Vedānta Deśika.

7. *Samasyā Sahasra*.

As its name suggests, it ought to have been a collection of one thousand and odd Samasyās. Unfortunately it is irretrievably lost now. It was probably this work that made Vedānta Deśika famous as 'Samasyās Sahasrī'.²

But it is not unreasonable to maintain that Vedānta Deśika never wrote a work called the 'Samasyā-Sahasra'. He might have been called 'Samasyā Sahasrī' for the composition

1. *Vaibhava Prakāśika*, page 66.

2. *Vaibhava Prakāśika* (commentary) Page 107;

of his Pādukā Sahasra. He himself mentions 'Samasyā Sahasrī' as his title.¹

5. *Original Philosophical Treatises.*

Under this head come the most important philosophical works of Vedānta Deśika. That the works are original does not mean that they show any departure from the system of Rāmānuja. Their originality consists in their convincing presentation of the Rāmānuja Darśana. It is these works, indeed, that build up what is called the 'Deśika Darśana'. These works are :—

1. The Nyāya Parīśuddhi. As its name shows, it is a successful attempt of Vedānta Deśika at the syncretisation of the ancient Nyāya-realism with Viśiṣṭādvaitic spiritualism and transcendentalism. It is not the first of its type. Such syncretisation dates back to Nātha Muni, the first pre-Rāmānuja Śrīvaiṣṇavācārya, (9th century A.D.) whose Nyāya-Tattva is decidedly the first work presenting the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita against the realistic background of the Nyāya. Whereas the traditional Nyāya-scholiasts satisfied themselves with the Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsa, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians studied the Pramāṇas with a view to reasoning out and rationalising the Prameya. The Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādyā of Śrī Harṣa presented a sarcastic outlook of the Vedānta towards the Nyāya. As Udyotakara stood forth to save the Nyāya against the inroads of Buddhistic logic and dialectics, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins stood forth to champion the cause of realism against the idealism of the Advaitins. After Nātha Muni and before Vedānta Deśika, many a Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosopher had worked for the reorientation of the Nyāya. Most of such works are either unfortunately lost now, or have not seen the

1. Stotra Ratna Bhāṣya, page 65.

light of day. As for instances, the Tattva Ratnākara of Parāśara Bhatta, the Nyāya Sudarśana, the Prajñā-Paritrāṇa, the Nyāya-works of Nārāyaṇa Muni, Viṣṇu-citta, Varada Viṣṇu Miśra and many more are only known from their quotations in the Nyāya Pariśuddhi. Presumably they were eclipsed by the Nyāya Pariśuddhi.

The Nyāya Pariśuddhi occupies the same place in Rāmānuja-darśana as does the Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-Tikā-Pariśuddhi in the Nyāya-Darśana. As Vedānta Deśika himself suggests, his Nyāya Pariśuddhi was a great 'Paṇḍita-Kṛtya' meant to synthesize the divergent trends of the Nyāya with the Vedānta.¹

The plan of the Nyāya Pariśuddhi is comprehensive. In the 1st introductory discourse of the 1st chapter, the Pramāṇas or the means of knowledge are discussed. The discussion of the Pramāṇas is not for its own sake but for the sake of the aspirant after Truth and Knowledge and Infinity. Epistemology has been discussed here as the first step to any theoretical or practical philosophy of life. The 11th discourse of the 1st chapter outlines the types of knowledge and distinguishes right knowledge from wrong knowledge. The first type of right knowledge i.e. the perceptual knowledge in its many forms and phases is discussed with regard to its psychological, epistemological and philosophical aspects.

The 2nd chapter, in its 1st discourse, contains the exposition of Inference. The topic of Vyāpti or universal concomitance covers the major portion. Here the influences of Bhāsarvajña (8th century) and Varadarāja (11th century) are clearly traceable. Unlike the Naiyāyikas, Vedānta Deśika has delimited the range of inference in the field of life. Intuitive knowledge has been preferred to inferential know-

1. N. P. Page 16 (chaukhamba).

ledge in regard to the ascertainment of the nature of Absolute Reality. Although the types of inference discussed here are the same as in the old Nyāya-works, yet, some intelligent remarks passed against the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians for their inability to shed traditional Nyāya-influences concerning the concept of inference and its types are interesting enough.¹ The trenchant criticism of the Kevala-Vyatirekin-type of inference as propounded by the Nyāya-system is quite instructive. It shows the following aims which the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician must needs have foremost in his mind before he wants to harmonize the Nyāya with the Vedānta :—

1. The superiority of the Āgama or the Śāstra or the intuitive utterances embodied in the Upaniṣads and the Vedānta over inferential reasoning and argumentation with regard to super-sensuous entities.
2. The upholding of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic position concerning epistemology.
3. The acceptance of the great part played by perception and verbal authority in human life and even in 'Vyāpti', the very basis of inference.

The Hind discourse of the Inference-chapter contains the criticism of the Parārthānumāna. The trend of the argument is this : As the inferential process is a mental process, the Svārthānumāna is the real inference, the Parārthānumāna or the syllogistic process being an indirect, secondary inference. The criticism is psychological rather than logical. There is some sense in characterising all the Pramāṇas as Svārtha and Parārtha on the authority of Parāśara Bhattāraka², because, so far as the psychological and the epistemological considerations are involved, all the means of knowledge are Svārtha,

1. N. P. page 128 (Chaukhamba).

2. N. P. page 156 (Chaukhamba).

which, with regard to the linguistic usage, may be treated as Parārtha.

The five-fold syllogistic processes have also been criticised and the conclusion has been reached that the number of 'avayavas' vary with regard to the conventions and conditions of the topic under discussion, the person or persons involved in syllogistic argumentation, the nature of the discussion and so on.¹

The topic of dialectics has been elaborately expounded. What is clearly evident here is that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinkers following in the footsteps of the Naiyāyikas of the School of Bhāsarvajña devote much time and energy to dialectical problems.

The IIIrd discourse of the Anumāna-chapter contains comprehensive treatment of the Jātis or Refutations very much in use in medieval Naiyāyika circles. The discourse is important for the student of the history of Indian philosophy as it surveys the subject-matter of the Jātis in historical perspective.

In the IVth discourse, the Pramāṇābhāsas are outlined in the style of the Nyāya-logicians like Bhāsarvajña and Varadarāja. The un-Viśiṣṭādvaitic ideas of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians have been carefully studied and criticised and construed in keeping with the Nyāya-Vedānta-syncretistic principles. The Hetvābhāsas or fallacious reasonings have been shown to be parts of logical fallacies. Tarka or hypothetical argumentation which appears to be a different logical process of reasoning in the older Viśiṣṭādvaitic works of Rāmānuja, Viṣṇucitta, Parāśara Bhattāraka, Varada Viṣṇumīśra and so on, suggesting thereby the Nyāya-influence

1. N. P. page 164 (Chaukhamba).

on Viśiṣṭādvaita, has been equated with and subsumed under Anumāna.¹ The ultimate conclusion arrived at is the superiority of intuition over cogitation.

The 3rd chapter, in its 1st discourse on Śabda-Pramāṇa, harmonises the apparent contradictions existing in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic² logical and philosophical works as regards the meaning of the sentence and its unit. The theory of 'Anvitābhīdhāna' has been accepted by Vedānta Dośika as the Viśiṣṭādvaita-view³ to the non-admission of the theory of 'Abbihitānvaya.' The Anvitābhīdhāna has been shown to be the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of 'meaning' on the expressed or implied statements of Yāmunācārya, Śrī Rāmā Miśra⁵, Varada Viṣṇu Miśra⁶ and Parāśara Bhattāraka⁷. What is stressed, more than once, is that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy cannot do without the theory of Anvitābhīdhāna in its exposition of the central theory of 'meaning' viz. that all the words of human language are but the Aprthaksiddha Viśeṣaṇas of the Viśeṣya i.e. the Divine, the only essential sense and signification of all speech. The Svataḥ Prāmāṇya-vāda of the Mīmāṃsakas has been accepted as the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of the validity of Śabda as Pramāṇa with a view to proving the infallibility of the Vedic scriptures.

In the IInd discourse, the infallible Vedic scriptures have been divided in three parts viz. Vidhi, Mantra and Arthavāda and the sub-divisions of these have also been noted and explained.

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1. N. P. page 324 (Chaukhamba).
 2. N. P. page 370, 371 (Chaukhamba).
 3. N. P. page 372 (Chaukhamba).
 4. N. P. page 370 (Chaukhamba).
 5. N. P. page 372 (Chaukhamba).
 6. N. P. page 370 (Chaukhamba).
 7. N. P. page 370 (Chaukhamba).

The 4th chapter (1st discourse) or the Smṛtyādhyaḃya purports to present Smṛti or memory as an independent means of knowledge for its conformity to the requirements of epistemology, psychology and the very life of man. The 11nd discourse shows the Viśiṣṭādvaitic position as regards the nature and the number of the means of knowledge.

The 5th chapter (1st discourse) or the Prameyādhyaḃya is a study of the Prameya or the knowable, the 2nd of the 16 categories of the Nyāya. The six or the seven-fold knowables of the Vaiśeṣika system have been criticised. The six-fold Viśiṣṭādvaitic categories of Jaḁa Dravya, Jīva, Īśvara, Buddhi, Nitya Vibhūti and Adravya have been shown to be conformant with the demands of scientific precision. But in the 11nd discourse, God has been established as the real Viśiṣṭādvaitic category as it is the knowledge of this supreme category that ultimately leads to the Nisśreyas or the Parama Puruṣārtha i.e. the highest attainment of life. Over and above this idealistic category, the category of Vaśīkaraṇa or Śaraṇāgati¹ or selfless love and devotion has been suggested to be the real category of the practical philosophy of life.

The sum-total of impression of the Nyāya Paṛiśuddhi is that its author has given a reorientation to the ancient view, bringing out the importance of the Nyāya-Vistara in the study and the practice of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy :

The Nyāya Paṛiśuddhi has been commented upon by Śrīnivāsa Dāsa. The commentary is called Nyāya Sāra and it follows the text extremely faithfully. It is available upto the Śabda Pramāṇa.

2. The Nyāya Siddhāṇjana. The work may be called Pt. II of the Nyāya Paṛiśuddhi as it continues the topic of Prameya, the last topic of the Nyāya Paṛiśuddhi and discusses

1. N. P. page 514 (Chaukhamba).

it threadbare. Unfortunately the end-portions of the last topic i.e. the *Adravya Pariccheda* have been lost. It is called *Tarka-Sidhānjana* also¹. *Vedānta Deśika* himself means it to be a supplement to the *Nyāya Parisuddhi*².

The 1st chapter or the *Jada-Dravya-Pariccheda* contains the exposition of the *Jada Dravya* or inert matter as a mode of the Divine. What has been shown is that Matter, being a substance, is an abiding entity in its multifarious manifestations. *Kāla* or time, like *Īśvara* or God has been defined as *Vibhu* and yet subject to change. The conception of *Kāla* as the temporal absolute in the midst of the temporal relativities of our convenience is perfectly analogous to the conception of God, the metaphysical Absolute, abiding in His modes or manifestations such as the *Prakṛti* and the *Jīva* and so on. What is not clear is the relationship between the two eternal all-pervasive entities i.e., *Kāla* and *Īśvara*. One cannot as well understand as to how Time has been or can be looked upon as the *Śarīra* of the Divine, the *Śarīrin*. The material substances have been posited to be the eternal uncaused *Śarīra* of *Īśvara* and the transient Karma-caused *Śarīra* of the *Jīvas*. At the end of the discussion, the poetic imagery of 'एनामात्मतिरस्क्रियायवन्निष्काम्' etc³ is meant to suggest the Advaitic Concept of *Māyā* and *Avidyā* as mere philosophical figment. The *Māyā* of the Divine or for that matter, the *Avidyā* of the soul is the evolution of matter under the guidance of the Divine, the Great Comedian of *Līlā* and *Dayā*.

The IInd chapter or the *Jīva-Parichhedha* discusses the nature of the *Jīva* or the self. The acme of achievement of the self viz. its conscious, constant realisation of its subservience to the Overself is also discussed. The chapter

1. & 2. N.S. Page 185. 3. N.S. page 211.

contains the controversy amongst the Viśiṣṭādvaitins themselves, concerning some of the connected problems such as the means of God-realisation and the goal of God-realisation and so on. The Jīva and the Prakṛti have been poetically presented and shown to work together, like the husband and the wife or the lover and the beloved, in the enactment of the drama of life for the delight of the Divine.¹

The IIIrd chapter or the Īśvara-Parichheda presents Īśvara or the Divine as the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Absolute and identifies It with Śrī Nārāyaṇa, the highest Śrīvaiṣṇava religious ideal. The concept of 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' has been fully analysed. The relationship between the substrate and the subsisting, the controller and the controlled, the independent and the subservient, the self and the organism, the cause and the consequent and so on, is discussed as the relationship between God and the 'cidacit'-principles of life.² It is this conception of the Divine that is the supreme sense of the syncretization of the Vedānta with the Nyāya,

The IV chapter or the Nitya Vibhūti-Parichheda conceives of the Spiritual Matter and Its evolution resulting in the Vaikuṇṭha on the analogy of the temporal matter and its evolution resulting in the Saṁsāra.

The Vth chapter or the Buddhi-Pariccheda contains the epistemology of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school and the philosophy of the Dharmabhūtajñāna or knowledge as 'substance-attribute' subsisting with the Jīva.

The VIth chapter or the Adravya-Pariccheda outlines the 10 Adravyas (the Guṇas of the Nyāya) such as Sattva, Rajas, Tamas, Śabda, Sparśa, Rūpa, Rasa, Gandha, Saṁyoga and Sakti and defines and discusses them. Varada Viṣṇu

1. N. S. page 224.

2. N. S. page 233.

Miśra has been vehemently criticised for holding the first three Adravayas i.e. Sattva, Rajas and Tamas as Dravyas.¹ The other Guṇas of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-system such as Gurutva, Dravatva, Sneha, Saṁkhyā etc. have been criticised and subsumed under the 10 Adravayas. It has been suggested that the division of the Padārthas as 'Dravya' and 'Adravya' is more scientifically precise and comprehensive than their categorisation as Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, Samavāya and Abhāva.

Its commentary by Raṅga Rāmānuja is an illuminating study.

3. The Tattva Mukta-Kalāpa. It is meant to be a necklace of 500 pearls of Sragdharā-verses, wreathed into 5 strings. It is one of the most important and authoritative works of Vedānta Deśika. That is why Mādhavācārya Vidyāranya (13th century) quotes from it, in his Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha², while summing up the essentials of the Rāmānuja Darśana. Its mention by Mādhavācārya as Tattva Muktaṅgī³ and not as Tattva Mukta Kalāpa does not change its identity. Tattva Muktaṅgī is a term of endearment used by Mādhavācārya for the Tattva Mukta-Kalāpa. Although other works of the type such as the Siddhi-Traya of Yānūnācārya (10th century A.D.), the Tattva-Traya of Lokācārya (13th century A.D.) and so on are also available, yet, the Tattva Mukta-Kalāpa seems to outshine all of them in the respect of its comprehensive scope and logical treatment of topics.

The 1st string or the Jaḍa-Dravya-Sara shows matter and the material evolves as the Śarīra of the Indwelling Divine. Prakṛti is discussed as the Divine organism. Prakṛti

1. N. S. page 247.

2. Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, pages 105 & 112 (Abhayankar Edn.)

3. Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, pages 104 (Abhayankar Edn.)

along with its properties is proved to be a perceptible entity. Unlike the Sāṅkhya system, the philosophy of Rāmānuja does not allow human reasoning to prove or disprove matter. Prakṛti which forms the Divine organism is meant to ensoul the Absolute. It can bind the soul, but not the Soul of the souls. Although the material evolution has been shown to conform to the Sāṅkhya theory, yet, the guidance and the supreme presense of God under which Prakṛti has to reveal all its charms, makes all the differences in the world between the Sāṅkhya and the Viśiṣṭādvaitic views. The modern reader will have some moments to laugh at the astronomy of Vedānta Deśika¹ which posits the solar system as revolving round the steady earth !

The IIrd string or the Jīva-Sara reveals the Jīva or the self in its real essence of subservience to the Great Self. The self-psychology has been thoroughly presented to lead to the conclusions of the self-philosophy. The metaphysics of Rāmānuja and the mysticism of Nammālvār have formed the warp and the woof of the logical and the philosophical treatment of the topic of the Jīva.

The IIIrd string or the Nāyaka-Sara is the main string containing the most precious pearls of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy. The God of religion is equated, here, with the Absolute of philosophy and the Kṛṣṇa of poetry is identified with the Śrīnivāsa of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

The IVth string or the Buddhi-Sara is meant for the presentation of the self-luminous consciousness as the inalienable adjunct of the finite self and the Supreme Self. What follows further is an illuminating discourse on the 'Khyātis' and the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of knowledge.

The Vth string or the Adravya-Sara is meant to show the

1. N. S. page 247,

'adravayas' as the states or the attributes or the energies or the functions of the Tattvas or the substances. Until and unless one realises the 'thisness' and the 'whatness' of a thing, one cannot be supposed to have known the thing. All knowledge is determinate. The determinants or the determinatives are all real realities. The meaning of Viśiṣṭādvaita, here, is the uniqueness of the Nāyaka or the Madhya-Maṇi, the main pearl-string, in the midst of the other strings, all deriving their lustre from it and shining, in turn, for it.

The comprehensive scheme of the Tattva Mukṭā-Kalāpa entitles it to be the book of reference for Rāmānuja's philosophy.¹

Its gloss called the Ānanda-Dāyini of Nṛsiṃha Deva (16th or 17th century) has been published, in part, along with its companion, the Bhāva Prakāśa of Śrī Parakāla Svāmin.

4. The Sarvārtha Siddhi. It is a gloss on the Tattva Mukṭā Kalāpa by Vedānta Deśika himself.

It is through the 'Sarvārtha Siddhi' that one can understand the Tattva Mukṭā-Kalāpa. The Sarvārtha Siddhi is a great suggestion of the vast study, of the critical faculty, of the jovial temper and the poetic bent of mind of Vedānta Deśika, the philosopher.

5. The Śata Dūṣaṇi. The work is the great dialectic of Vedānta Deśika, the logician-philosopher. It is a great attempt at the refutation of the philosophy of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Yādava. The 'Sapta Vidhānupapattis' or the seven-fold incompatibilities or absurdities of the Nirviśeṣādvaita of Śaṅkara as pointed out by Rāmānuja have been amply magnified here. As its name suggests, it should contain 101 refutations. But only 66 refutations have come

1. T. M. K. 5. 134.

down to us. It is surmised that the rest of the 34 refutations, criticising the Mādhva-Mata, were destroyed by Vedānta Deśika himself. Some Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholars believe that some day or the other all the 101 refutations will come to light. Vedānta Deśika might have planned 101 refutations. He has magnified the 'anupapatti' of Advaitism following Rāmānuja. But how could he make up the number 101 ? Some of the refutations are not the refutations of the philosophy of Śāṅkara, but of the cult and the ritualism of the sects of Sanyāsins of Advaitic persuasion. Moreover, the 66th Vāda or the 'Sūtra-Svārasya-Bhaṅga-Vāda' pointing to the conflict between Śāṅkara's Advaita and the Brahma-Sūtras seems, in fact, to have been the concluding refutation.

The story that the Śata Dūṣaṇī is the record of the Śāstrārtha of Vedānta Deśika with Kṛṣṇa Miśra is nothing more than a myth as there is a gap of some 200 years between the times of Kṛṣṇa Miśra and Vedānta Deśika. What the Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādyā of Śrī Harṣa is for 'Advaita' or the Tarka Tāṇḍava of Vyāsa Tīrtha, for 'Dvaita', the Śata Dūṣaṇī of Vedānta Deśika is for 'Viśiṣṭādvaita'.

The work has a masterly commentary called the 'Caṇḍa Māruta.' The author Doddāyācārya (16th century A. D.) is known as Māhācārya for this very commentary.

The Vedāntācārya-Vijaya-Campū¹, a prose-poetic composition on the life and works of Vedānta Deśika eulogizes the Śata Dūṣaṇī and its author in high terms.

Many a Viśiṣṭādvaitic writer followed the Śata Dūṣaṇī-dialectic of Vedānta Deśika. The 'Advaita Vidyā-Vijaya' of Mahācārya² appears to have been one of such works. The Brahmājñāna Nirasa³ of one Śrīnivāsa mentions the Śata

1. D. C. S. (Madras) Vol. XXI. No. 12365.

2. D. C. S. (Madras) Vol. X (Rangacharya) No. 4850.

3. D. C. S. (Madras) Vol. X (Rangacharya) No. 4978.

Dūṣaṇi by name and discusses the points touched upon by Vedānta Deśika.

There are some other commentaries on the Śata Dūṣaṇi such as the Nṛsiṃha Rājīya' of Nṛsiṃha Deva (the commentator of Vedānta Deśika's Nikṣepa Rakṣā) and the Sahasra Kiraṇi of one Śrīnivāsācārya.² These commentaries suggest the importance of the Śata Dūṣaṇi in the polemics of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

6. The Seśvara Mīmāṃsā. It aims at an exhaustive exposition of the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras of Jaimini with a view to suggesting inherent relationship between 'Karma' and 'Jñāna' (Jñāna = Bhakti). The Mīmāṃsā literature does not believe in God for rewarding the performer of sacrifices. It is the sacrificial act itself, culminating in its potential power of Apūrva that rewards the sacrificer. Such a tendency of the Mīmāṃsā, according to Vedānta Deśika, is enough to characterise the system as 'Nāstika' (hedonistic). Vedānta Deśika's attempt in his Seśvara Mīmāṃsā is to equate the 'Apūrva' (the power of action) to the 'Saṅkalpa' or the will of God to save the soul. The source of inspiration for Vedānta Deśika is the concept of 'Pūrvottara-Mīmāṃsaikakāṇṭhya' of Rāmānuja.³ The work might as well have been occasioned, as Vedānta Deśika himself states⁴, by the un-Viśiṣṭādvaitic interpretation of the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras by Nārāyaṇa Muni, a Śrī Vaiṣṇava savant.

The work is available only upto the 11th Pāda of the 1st Adhyāya of the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras and expounds 84 Sūtras in all. Probably, Vedānta Deśika left it incomplete for some

1. D. C. S. (Madras) Vol. X (Rangacarya) No. 5043.

2. D. C. S. (Madras) Vol. X (Rangacarya) No. 5044.

3. Śrī Bhāṣya Page 2 (Chowkhamba).

4. S. M. Page 18.

reason or the other. Nevertheless, it suggests to the reader the great Mīmāṃsā-scholarship of its author. It was begun after the Nyāya Pariśuddhi¹ and the Tattva Mukta Kalāpa.² It stands like a monument to Vedānta Deśika's mastery of the Pūrva and the Uttara Mīmāṃsā-systems.

For Śabara Svāmin Dharma means the sacrificial act.³ For Prabhākara Dharma is the potentiality of Apūrva, actualising itself in the Śāstraic imperative. For Kumārila Dharma is Yajña, as an objective entity. But for Vedānta Deśika Dharma is Īśvara-Saṅkalpa for the liberation of the Jīva.⁴

The Śeśvara Mīmāṃsā has influenced the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought to a very great extent. One 'Pūrvottara-Mīmāṃsaika Kaṇṭhya'⁵ containing the introductory stanzas of the Śeśvara-Mīmāṃsā, seems to have been another work of Deśika on the lines of the Śeśvara Mīmāṃsā.

7. The Mīmāṃsā Pādukā. It is a metrical introduction containing some 173 Sragdharā-stanzas, to the Śeśvara Mīmāṃsā-philosophy as propounded in the Śeśvara-Mīmāṃsā. It contains a poetic suggestion which is this : Just as the Śāstraic imperative impels man to act to achieve धर्म, so does the Divine Providence impel God, the 'Saptalokīgṛhastha'⁶ to act to achieve धर्म, which means the liberation of the selves.

Vedānta Deśika seems to have got the idea of the Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā and the Śeśvara-Mīmāṃsā from his great teacher Vādihaṃsāmbuvāha⁷ or Ātreya Rāmānuja. Both the works prove that the Dharma is the Brahman, the Eternal Absolute Reality.⁸

1. S. M. page 31.

2. S. M. page 31. 3. Śabara Bhāṣya page 4 (Chowkhamba)

4. S. M. page 26. 5. D. C. S. Mas. (Rangacarya) Vol. X No. 4930-31

6. M. P. 1. 7. M. P. 2. 8. M. P. 2.

The work appears to be incomplete. But in fact it is not so. The words of the author—‘न्यासि दिङ्मात्रमेतत्’¹ mean that it was meant to be a poetic exordium to the *Seṣvara-Mīmāṃsā* and not a full-length metrical commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*.

8. The *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī*. The work is intended to be a metrical exposition of the various sections of the *Brahma Sūtras*. *Vedānta Deśika* got the idea of this work also from his teacher, *Ātreya Rāmānuja*.² It was written, presumably, before the *Tattva Ṭikā*. It serves the purpose of a poetic synopsis of the *Tattva Ṭikā*.³

Vedānta Desika's mastery of the intricacies of the *Sragdharā*-verse as seen in the *Tattva Mukta Kalāpa* reaches its climax in the *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī*.⁴ Although the work is meant to sum up the discussions of the *Brahma Sūtras*, topic-wise, section-wise and chapter-wise,⁵ yet, it is an independent *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* work of importance. It is not only a metrical summary of the *Śrī Bhāṣya* of *Rāmānuja*, but an original philosophical contribution to the *Rāmānuja Darśana*. *Rāmānuja* does not clearly seem to state in his *Śrī Bhāṣya* that the *Prapanna* is the *Adhikārin* of *Mokṣa*. Neither does he declare while commenting upon the last *Sūtra* of the *Brahma Sūtras*⁶ that *Prapatti* is the only means to *Mokṣa*. But *Vedānta Desika*, taking his stand on the *Śaraṇāgati Gadya* of *Rāmānuja*, proves that the *Prapanna* is the real aspirant after *Mokṣa* and that *Prapatti* is the only means to God-realisation.

The *Adhikaraṇasārāvalī* is decidedly one of the best works of *Vedānta Desika* written during his residence at *Śrī Raṅgam*.⁷

1. M P. 169.

2. Ad.S. 562.

3. Ad S. 4.

4. Ad.S. 559.

5. Ads. S. 559.

6. *Śrī Bhāṣya* page 575 (Chowkhamba).

7. N.R. page 33.

Its commentary, the Adhikaraṇa Cintāmaṇi, was written by Vedānta Deśika's son and successor, Kumāra Vedāntācārya.¹ Another commentary, called the Adhikaraṇa Kalpataru of Attippattu Sathakopa Rāmānuja is also available and is a good study of the work.

9. The Paramata Bhaṅga. It is a Maṇi-Pravāla work of Vedānta Deśika. It has the same method of treatment as the Sarva-Darśana-Saṅgraha of Mādhava Vidyāraṇya. It critically sums up the Indian philosophical systems and points to the greatness of Rāmānuja Darśana as the only practical philosophy conducive to the life of man forming a stage in Life Divine.

It has an English translation, in parts, by Dr. K. C. Varadacari, published in the Tirupati Oriental Research Journal.

10. The Adhikaraṇa Darpaṇa. The work is referred to by Vedānta Deśika himself² as his work on the Brahma Sūtras on the lines of the Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī. But it is not available now.

11. The Vāditraya Khaṇḍana. The work is catalogued as No. 4992 by Raṅgācārya in his Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Mss (Madras) Vol. X. It seems to have been a brief criticism of the philosophy of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Yādava Prakāśa.

12. The Cakāra Samarthana. It is supposed to have been written by Vedānta Deśika with a view to proving the propriety of the occasional usages of 'च' in the Śāta Dūṣaṇi, which were, probably, charged with redundancy by his critics. It is irretrievably lost now.

6. Commentaries.

The commentaries of Vedānta Deśika form important

1. T.T. Introductory stanza 5, 2. T.T. Introductory stanza 7.

contributions to Viśiṣṭādvaitic literature. These works are faithful to the texts and yet critical to the core. The ideal that Vedānta Deśika seems to have set before him in his commentaries is the ideal of the great Mīmāṃsā-exponent, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. The purpose of the commentaries is either to note the points of difference from the previous commentators or to exhaustively expound the import of the texts dealing with weighty problems of philosophy and religion and ethics and spiritualism. These works are :—

1. The Tattva Ṭikā. It is meant by Vedānta Deśika to be an exposition of the Śrī Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja and it presents the outlines of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Metaphysics in all its details.¹ It was designed to be an improvement on the Śruta Prakāśikā of Sudarśanācārya, a great exponent of the Śrī Bhāṣya. It is in fact the outcome of the 28 terms or sessions of the Śrī Bhāṣyic teachings undertaken by Vedānta Deśika for the cause of the propagation and the preservation of the Rāmānuja Darśana.

Unfortunately it breaks abruptly in the midst of the exposition of the Mahāsiddhānta i.e. at the 41st page of the Śrī Bhāṣya (Chaukhamba). One may presume that the author could not, for some reason or the other, complete this most ambitious of his projects. So many commentaries of the Śrī Bhāṣya have come down to us but the Tattva Ṭikā is decidedly the best of the lot.

If one studies and follows even the interpretation of the first Invocatory stanza i. e. 'अखिलभुवनजन्मस्थेम' etc. of the Śrī Bhāṣya, one is bound to feel the presence of a master-mind. Each and every line seems to bear the stamp of the vast scholarship and the versatile genius of the author.

2. The Tātparya Candrikā. It is a super-commentary on the Gītā Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja. It is as much cons-

1. T. T. Introductory stanza 5.

tructive as critical. It brings out the import of the words, the constructions, the sentences, the paragraphs and the topics of the Gītā Bhāṣya. Moreover, it presents the philosophy of the Gītā in a critical manner.

In the Tātparyā Candrikā, Vedānta Deśika has contributed much to the philosophy of the Gītā. He has presented convincingly the view-point of Rāmānuja on the highest philosophy of human life i.e. Prapatti. What is called the 'एकपेदिकात्व'¹ or the inherent coherence of the 3rd, the 4th, the 5th and the 6th Adhyāyas of the Gītā with the 1st and the 2nd ones, is very clearly and comprehensively brought out. Simple words of Rāmānuja appear transfigured with deep poetic and philosophic sense and significance.² While the first group of the 6 Adhyāyas of the Gītā has been taken to suggest the search of man after the self, the second group consisting of the Adhyāyas 7 to 12 is meant to point to the final aim of the soul-search viz. love and devotion to God. The third group of the 6 Adhyāyas or the final group which according to Rāmānuja was devoted to the clarification of the points of Bhakti-philosophy is interpreted by Vedānta Deśika with a view to proving 'Śaraṇāgati' or 'Prapatti' to be the real practical philosophy of life.

Vedānta Deśika's great study of the Gītā along with Rāmānuja's Gītā Bhāṣya has reached its climax in the exposition of the Carama Śloka i.e. 'सर्वधर्मान् परित्यज्य' etc.³ The Carama Śloka is analysed to contain the quintessence of the Gītā which means deep selfless love and devotion to God.

3. The Gītārtha-Saṅgraha-Rakṣā. It is a commentary on the 'Gītārtha-Saṅgraha' of Yāmunaċārya. Following Yāmunaċārya, Vedānta Deśika attempts a convincing synthesis of action plus knowledge with love plus devotion. An

1. G. S. R. on the 6th Śloka (G. S.).

2. G. C. page 130.

3. Gītā 18. 66.

interesting feature of the Gītārtha-Saṅgraha-Rakṣā is the nomenclature for the 18 chapters of the Gītā. For instance, the following chapters are given the following names :—

Chapter	I—Śravaṇādhikārīn.
Chapter	II—Śravaṇādhikārī-mohaśamanam.
Chapter	III—Karmayoga-Kartavyatvam.
Chapter	IV—Tadavāntarabhedah.
Chapter	V—Tadantargatajñānavipākah.
Chapter	VI—Yogābhyāsa-Vidhih.
Chapter	VII—Pratibuddha-prādhānyam.
Chapter	VIII—Trividhādhikāra-Vedyopādeya-Vibhāgah.
Chapter	XI—Saparakāro Bhaktiyogah.
Chapter	X—Guṇavibhūtyānantyam.
Chapter	XI—Vaiśvarūpadarśanopāyah
Chapter	XII—Bhaktyāroha-Kramah.
Chapter	XIII—Viśuddhakṣetrajñā-Vijñānam.
Chapter	XIV—Traiguṇya-Viśodhanam.
Chapter	XV—Puruṣottama-Vailakṣaṇyam.
Chapter	XVI—Śāstra-Vaśyatvam.
Chapter	XVII—Śāstriya vivecanam.
Chapter	XVIII—Sāroddhārah.

Vedānta-Deśika had a purpose in writing the 'Rakṣā' on the Gītārtha-Saṅgraha. He did not want any interpolation to be made, in future, in Yāmunācārya's work. Moreover, he wanted to preserve the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition of the study of the Gītā.

The Gītārtha-Saṅgraha-Rakṣā has made the Gītā the Prapatti-Sāstra for the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas.

4. The Gītārtha-Saṅgraha-Pattu. It is a Tamil treatise embodying the philosophy of the Gītā as explained by Yāmunācārya in his Gītārtha Saṅgraha.

5. The *Catuśślokī Bhāṣya*. It is a commentary on the 'Catuśślokī' of Yāmūnācārya. Here Vedānta Deśika presents his views on the significance of Śrī in the concept of 'Śrī-Viṣṇu'. Five view-points on 'Śrī' are mentioned and discussed : (i) 'Śrī' as Divine Nature, (ii) 'Śrī' as Divine Essence or Energy, (iii) 'Śrī' as Divine Bliss, (iv) 'Śrī' as the 'Māyā', and (v) 'Śrī' as the supreme sense of Viśiṣṭā-davitam.

6. The *Stotra-Ratna-Bhāṣya*. It is an exhaustive exposition of the 'Stotra-Ratna' of Yāmūnācārya. The *Stotra-Ratna* has 65 stanzas and is replete with the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The *Stotra-Ratna-Bhāṣya* is similarly replete with the tenets of Viśiṣṭādvaita as taught by Yāmūnācārya.

7. The *Rahasya-Rakṣā* or the *Gadya-Traya-Bhāṣya*. It is a fine commentary on the three Gadyas viz. the Śaraṇāgati-Gadya, the Śrīraṅga-Gadya, and the Vaikuṇṭha-Gadya of Rāmānuja. It was written by Vedānta Deśika because the Teṅgalai teachers used to put their own interpretations on the Gadyas. Vedānta Deśika believes that the 'Gadyas' of Rāmānuja contain the real essence of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrīvaiṣṇavism as the philosophy and religion of man.¹

According to Vedānta Deśika, the 'Gadyas' are the text of the *Prapatti-Vidyā*, the Śrī Bhāṣya being the text of the *Brahma-Vidyā*.²

Different views with regard to *Prapatti* are presented here : (i) that *Prapatti* and *Bhakti* are one ; (ii) that *Prapatti* alone is not the means to God-realisation ; (iii) that *Prapatti* with its 6 essentials is essential for life dedicated to God ; (iv) that *Prapatti* is a stepping stone to the Divine Land ;

(v) that Prapatti should be practised till the end of life, (vi) that Prapatti is a part of Bhakti and (vii) that Prapatti cannot cut asunder the chain of actions and so on. But the final view established is this: Prapatti and Bhakti are two distinct ideals. Prapatti, in fact, is the culmination of Bhakti.

An important feature of the *Rahasya-Rakṣā* is its discussion on the significance of Prapatti or self-surrender in relation to the Divine 'arcā' or image.

8. The *Īśopaniṣad Bhāṣya*. It is an exposition of the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣad* according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view. Vedānta Deśika takes the *Upaniṣad* to be the support of the *Śaraṇā-gati*-doctrine of Rāmānuja.

So far we have noticed some 119 works of Vedānta Deśika, written in Sanskrit, in Tamil, in Prakrit and in Sanskrit-cum-Tamil or the Maṇipravāḷa. Out of these about 16 have not come to light or are irretrievably lost. All these works cover a very vast range of India's ancient accumulated Sāstraic learning.

In addition to the above works whose authenticity is indisputable, there are other works also ascribed to Vedānta Deśika. A tradition recorded by Dr. M. Krishnamacharier (Vide. *History of Classical Sanskrit Literature*, Page 208) attributes a 'Māra Saṁbhava', a 'Bhāravi' and a 'Phālguna' to Vedānta Deśika all written with a view to outshining the Kumāra Saṁbhava of Kālidāsa, the Kirātārjunīyam of Bhāravi and the *Śiśupāla Vadha* of Māgha, respectively. Although the tradition contains no truth, yet, it is enough to suggest the indefatigable literary energy of Vedānta Deśika.

A 'Nīlā Stuti' mentioned by the late Dr. M. Krishnamacharier in his *Classical Sanskrit Literature* (Page 209) is really a collection of the verses of the *Dayā Śataka*, bearing on

Nilā, the spouse of Viṣṇu.¹ A 'Kāṇaka-Dhārā-Stotra' ascribed to Vedānta Deśika² is only a different title for his Śrī Stuti. The 'Prātarnivedana Kārikā³, containing the rules of the 1st of the Pañcakāla Kṛtyas i.e. Abhigamana, is another work, supposed to have been written by Vedānta Deśika. It is not improbable that the Śrī Vaiṣṇava teacher had written it for his Sanskrit-knowing disciples, just as he had written the Śrī-Vaiṣṇava-Dinacaryā for his Tamil-knowing adherents.) A Rahasya-Trayādhikāra-Saṅgraha⁴ or Adhikāra-Saṅgraha⁵ which is attributed to Vedānta Deśika, is nothing else than the collection of the Sanskrit stanzas of the Rahasya-Traya-Sāra that sum up the discussions chapterwise. A Prahlāda Vijaya⁶, ascribed to Veṅkaṭa Nātha is not mentioned in his ancient traditional biography i.e. the Vedānta Deśika-Vaibhava-Prakāśikā of Māhācārya. It seems, it is some other Veṅkaṭa Nātha, probably the teacher of Dharmarājādhvarīndra (the author of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā) who is the real author of the work. A 'Nṛsiṃhāṣṭotara-Śāta-Nāma Stotra'⁷ seems to have been wrongly attributed to Veṅkaṭa Nātha Vedāntācārya as there is no tradition to support its authenticity.

A 'Kārigiri Daṇḍaka'⁸ is also supposed to have been composed by Vedānta Deśika. But as the Vaibhava Prakāśikā tradition is silent about it, it may be dismissed as spurious. One 'Anjana Nātha' or 'Veṅkaṭa Nātha'-Stotra or 'Śrīnivāsa-Dhyāna-Stotra'⁹ ascribed to Vedānta Deśika

1. D.S. 8.

2. N.P. Introduction Page 8 (Choukhamba).

3. N. P. Introduction (Choukhamba).

4. D.C.S. Mss (Madras) Page 97 author Index.

5. N. P. Introduction Page 8 (Choukhamba).

6. D.C. (Tanjore) Vol. VI. No. 3696.

7. D.C.S. Mss (Rangacharya) Vol. XVII Madras.

8. D.C.S. Mss (Rangacharya) Vol. XVII No. 8948.

9. D.C.S. Mss (Rangacharya) Vol. XVIII No. 10469.

is also some other author's work. A 'Vedānta Kaustubha'¹ is also wrongly fathered upon Deśika as its colophon unmistakably tells its author from the famous Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet-philosopher, Vedānta Deśika.

Two works i.e. *Rasa-Bhūmāmṛtam*² and *Br̥kṣa-Bhūmāmṛtam* on Āyurveda are also said to have been written by Vedānta Deśika. None can deny the interest of Vedānta Deśika in Āyurveda which is evident from many an allusion to its topics found in his works.³ But the ascription of the above Āyurvedic works to him has no foundation in facts.

A 'Daśa-Dīpaka-Nighaṇṭu', a metrical treatise on words, having 10 meanings, published as the Kośa Mañjarī series (Vizagapattam 1899) No. 2 is also ascribed to Vedānta Deśika, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava teacher. But its real author seems to be some other Vedānta Deśika. A 'Sajjana Vaibhava' (vide D. C. S. Mss. Vol. XI, page 4192) on the greatness of the Vaikhānasa school is yet another work wrongly attributed to Vedānta Deśika.

In addition to the above, there are some stray verses, not found in Vedānta Deśika's available works, that are ascribed to him. For instance, the stanzas—'अहन्ते नाहन्ते' etc. 'सूते शूकरयुवतिः' etc. 'कर्मावलम्बकाः केचित्' etc. 'असिना तत्त्वमसिना' etc., and the two stanzas inscribed on the Śrīraṅgam temple-wall such as 'आनीयानील' etc. are all supposed to have been Vedānta Deśika's compositions.

A 'Cāṭudhārā-Camatkāra,' an anthology of Sanskrit verses, commented upon by Allamraju Subrahmanya Kavi

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1. D.C. (Tanjore) Vol. XIV No. 7803.
 2. T.M.K. Sanskrit Introduction (Mysore).
 3. G.C. Pages 132 and 848 (Ananda Press, Madras).
 4. Collected by P. B. Annangarācārya and published at the end of the *Vyākhyāna Vibhāga Mālā* of Vedānta Deśika's works, No. III.

ascribes two verses, generally taken to be Raghunātha Siromaṇi's compositions, to Vedānta Deśika.¹

The above literary heritage left by Vedānta Deśika to the succeeding generations is vast indeed. It all suggests his deep sense of duty to the Rāmānuja Darśana, his great sense of satisfaction at the accomplishment of the duty and finally his God-intoxicated mind and heart.

1. Indian Culture (Calcutta) Vol. 7.

CHAPTER III

CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORKS

An attempt at setting Vedānta Deśika's works in their true chronological order is difficult indeed. Nevertheless, it is possible to have a comparative chronological perspective of his writings on the basis of their cross-references, their style and their progression in thought. Our main plank in the chronology of his works is his own statement in the *Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya*¹ :—

‘विंशत्यब्दे विश्रुतनानाविधविद्यः
त्रिंशद्वारं श्रावितशारीरकभाष्यः ।
श्रेयः श्रीमान् वेङ्कटनाथः श्रुतिपथ्यं
नाथप्रीत्यै नाटकमर्थ्यं व्यधितैतत् ॥

where, he claims to have composed his drama the ‘*Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya*’ at the time of completing the 30th session of the teachings of the *Srī Bhāṣya*, beginning from after the termination of his studies at the age of twenty or thereabouts. A further light on the assignment of dates to his works is thrown by another statement contained in one of the introductory verses to his *Tattva Tikā* :—

‘यतिपतिमुद्यो भाष्यस्यासन् यथाश्रुतचिन्तित-
प्रवचनविधावष्टाविंशे जयध्वजपट्टिकाः ।’

which means that he started the *Tattva Tikā* at the 28th session of his discourses on the *Srī Bhāṣya*.

The import of the above statements is that we will not be far from the truth if we assign A.D. 1322 and A.D. 1325 to the composition of the ‘*Tattva Tikā*’ and the ‘*Saṅkalpa*’

Sūryodaya' respectively. The dates of the other works will fall, accordingly, before or after the above two works.

Beginning with his devotional and didactic poems we can state that he composed most of them, as for instance,

1. the Hayagrīva Stotra,
2. the Daśāvatāra Stotra,
3. the Varadarāja Pañcāśat,
4. the Vegāsetu Stotra,
5. the Aṣṭabhujāṣṭaka,
6. the Kāmāsikāṣṭka,
7. the Śaraṇāgati Dīpikā,
8. the Devanāyaka Pañcāśat,
9. the Paramārtha Stuti,
10. the Dehaliśa Stuti,
11. the lost Tamil stotras,
12. the Śrī Stuti and so on.

at an early age, just after completing his student-career. This may be called the 'first period' of Vedānta Deśika's literary activity beginning in about A.D. 1293 and stretching for about 15 years i.e. upto A. D. 1310.

The 'second period' of Vedānta Deśika's authorship begins in A.D. 1311 and continues upto A.D. 1361. It is in this period that he emerges as a poet with a mission, a logician to reckon with and a philosopher of eminence. It is crowded with many a great event of his life. The following are the literary or philosophical works that can be assigned to this period :—

(1) The Tattva Tīkā. The work was written, in all probability, in A. D. 1322-'23. Since Vedānta Deśika's career as a student came to an end in A. D. 1288 and the work was written at the termination of the 28th session of his Śrī Bhāṣyic teachings, the only approximate date that can be assigned to it is A. D. 1322-'23.

(2) The *Śata Dūṣaṇī*. The work, the magnum opus of Vedānta Deśika, the great dialectician and philosopher of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic School was written sometime before the *Tattva Tīkā*. In fact the *Tattva Tīkā* that was begun in A. D. 1322, was meant to be a sequel to the *Śata Dūṣaṇī*.¹ The work, accordingly, may be assigned to A.D. 1320-21.

(3) The *Gītā-Tātparya-Candrikā*. This most comprehensive of the commentaries on Rāmānuja's *Gītā Bhāṣya* was written after the *Śata Dūṣaṇī*. The *Gītā Tātparya Candrikā* refers to the *Śata Dūṣaṇī*. But it must have been written before the *Nyāya Siddhānta* in as much as the latter alludes to it in the line (cf. N. S. Page 177-Madras edn.):—

‘उभयविरुद्धतया ग्रन्थनिवहणं तु श्रीमद्गीताभाष्यटीकायां
तात्पर्यचन्द्रिकायामुक्तमस्माभिः ।’

As the ‘*Gītārtha-Saṅgraha-Rakṣā*,’ a commentary by Vedānta Deśika on the ‘*Gītārtha-Saṅgraha*’ of Yāmānācārya mentions the *Gītā-Tātparya-Candrikā*², it can be held that the latter was written before the former.

The *Seśvara Mīmāṃsā*⁴ must have seen the light of day after the *Gītā-Tātparya-Candrikā* as the former refers to the latter. Having these cross-references in mind we shall not be wrong if we assign A. D. 1318 as an approximate date for the completion of the *Gītā-Tātparya-Candrikā*.

(4) The *Gītārtha-Saṅgraha-Rakṣā* came after the *Gītā-Tātparya-Candrikā* as the allusions to the latter are found in the former. As it also refers to the *Nikṣepa Rakṣā*⁵ it seems, it was written after the *Nikṣepa Rakṣā*. Thus A.D. 1322-23 may be approximately fixed upon as the period of its production.

1. T. T. Introductory verse 5. 2. G. T. C. Page 3.

3. G. S. R. Commentary on Verse IV. 4. G. T. C. Page 81.

5. G. S. R. Verse 2.

6. G. S. R. Verse 22.

(5) The *Seśvara Mimāṃsā* was written after the *Nyāya Pariśuddhi* and the *Tattva Mukta Kalāpa* as it refers to both of them.¹

Further, as it has been referred to by the *Gītā Tātparya Candrikā* (page 81 Madras edn.) of about A. D. 1318, it was written before A. D. 1318, say A. D. 1316 or thereabouts.

(6) The *Nikṣepa Rakṣā* was written before the *Gītārtha Saṅgraha Rakṣā* which alludes to it².

Besides, as it refers to the *Adhikaraṇa Darpaṇa*, one of the extinct works of Vedānta Deśika, it seems it was written after the *Adhikaraṇa Darpaṇa*. It came after the *Saccaritra Rakṣā* which has been referred to in the line (cf. N.R. page 29).

‘प्रपञ्चितं चैतदस्माभिस्त्वच्चरित्ररक्षायां सुदर्शनादिधारणाधिकारे’

It was also written after the *Śata Dūṣaṇī* (A.D. 1320-21) as the latter has been mentioned in it in the line (cf. N. R. page 5)

‘इदञ्च शतदूषण्यामलेपकमङ्गे प्रपञ्चितमस्माभिः ।’

Taking into account the above allusions and counter-allusions we can assign about A. D. 1321-22 as the date of its composition.

(7) The *Saccaritra Rakṣā* was written in about A. D. 1321 or before the *Nikṣepa Rakṣā* as the latter refers to the former (cf. N. R. Page 29).

(8) The *Pāñcarātra Rakṣā* came after the *Nikṣepa Rakṣā* i. e. in A. D. 1322 as the latter is alluded to in the former.⁴

(9) The *Padukā Sahasra* has been assigned by its commentator, Śrī Nivāsa of Bhāradvāja Gotra, the son of

1. Se. M. Page 31, Conjeevaram Edn.

2. G. S. R. Verse 22.

3. N. R. page 33.

4. P. R. Page 120.

Śrī Nivāsa Dāsa, the celebrated commentator of Vedānta Deśika's Nyāya Pariśuddhi, to about Kali-4415 or Saka-1286, conforming to A. D. 1313, on the numerical interpretation and calculation of the Pādukā Sahasra Stanza—'Jayati Yatirāja Saktih' etc. (Pā. S. Stanza 1008). Thus it marks a transition from the 1st. period of Vedānta Deśika's literary career ending in A. D. 1310 to the IInd. period of his literary and philosophical and theological writings stretching as far as A.D. 1360-61 or for about full 50 long years.

(10) The Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya, on the assertion of Vedānta Deśika himself (cf. S. S. I. 15) was begun in A. D. 1325 or after he had finished 30 sessions of his lectures on the Śrī Bhāṣya, beginning from A. D. 1295 or when his maternal uncle, Ātreya Rāmānuja alias Vāḍihamśāmbudācārya had died leaving the Acāryic seat to him.

(11) The Yādavābhyudaya seems to have been a late contemporary to the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya. Our poet-philosopher must have kept himself occupied, for some years, with the composition of these dramatic and epic works. Some portions of his drama and his epic must have been written after his return from his North India tour, say between A. D. 1325-35.

(12) The Subhāṣita Nivā, as the tradition goes, was meant to instruct one Sarvajña Singappa Nāyaka of Rajmundry (A. D. 1330) in general morality and ethics. Thus its approximate date will be A. D. 1329-30.

(13) The Haṁsa Sandeśa which is a mature poetic composition of Vedānta Deśika may be conveniently placed in A. D. 1338-39 as it meant to provide a great relief to our poet-philosopher after his strenuous career as a teacher and propagator of Rāmānuja Darśana.

(14) The *Tattva-Muktā-Kalāpa*, the most comprehensive of the representative works of Vedānta Deśika as a Viśiṣṭādvaitic teacher-philosopher was written at a time when its author was fully in command of a vigorous poetic style. As it has been alluded to in his *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī* (verse 43 and 559)—

‘तद्भङ्गे लक्षणानामगणि गमनिका तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापे ।’

‘विश्वं द्रव्यादिभेदाद्विशदमभिहितं तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापे ।’

it must have seen the light of day before the latter.

As the *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī*, the *Dramiḍopaniṣattātparya-Ratnāvalī* and the *Mīmāṃsā-Pādukā* represent a uniform masterly style and may be dated at about A.D. 1336-37, the *Tattva Muktā Kalāpa* can be safely assigned to A.D. 1333-34 or just before the *Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī*. The *Tattva Muktā Kalāpa* gained early eminence to merit quotations in the *Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha* of the Advaitic philosopher Vidyāraṇya (A.D. 1368).

(15) The *Sarvārtha Siddhi* the exhaustive commentary on the *Tattva Muktā Kalāpa* must have been written in about A.D. 1339-40 or after Vedānta Deśika had intended to clarify the intricacies of the metrical composition of the *Tattva Muktā Kalāpa* in simple prose.

(16) The *Nyāya Pariśuddhi* was written much before the *Sarvārtha Siddhi* as the latter contains a reference to the former in the line (cf. S.S. Page 279)—

‘अन्यत् सर्वं न्यायपरिशुद्धौ विस्तरेणोक्तमस्माभिरिति
नेह प्रपञ्चितम् ।’

It was written, besides, after the *Pāṇca Rātra Rakṣā* which has been alluded to in it (Cf. N.P. Page 169) in the line—

‘तत् सर्वं श्रीपाञ्चरात्ररक्षासिद्धान्तव्यवस्थायां सर्वपराम-
र्शेण साधितमस्माभिरिति तत्रैव तद्विस्तरः शाश्वतधर्मगोपु-
रनन्यैरमुसन्धातव्य इति नात्र प्रब्रूमः ।’

As the time of the Pāṇca Rātra Rakṣā has been fixed as A.D. 1322, the Nyāya Pārisuddhi may be placed in about A.D. 1324 or when Vedānta Deśika first began giving expression to his 'pāṇḍitya' or 'pāṇḍita-kṛtya' which he speaks about, while beginning his Nyāya-Viśiṣṭādvaita-syncretism (vide N. P. Page 87 Annangaracharya's edn.).

(17) The Nyāya Siddhānjan, which was meant to be a supplement to the Nyāya Pārisuddhi as is clear from the statement (cf. N. S. introductory verse) :—

‘यन्न्यायपरिशुद्धयन्ते संग्रहेण प्रदर्शितम् ।

पुनस्तद्विस्तरेणात्र प्रमेयमभिदध्महे ॥

must have been written after the Nyāya Pārisuddhi (A. D. 1324) but before the Sarvārtha Siddhi (A. D. 1339), which, while mentioning the Nyāya Pārisuddhi (Cf. S. S. Page 279) means instead its supplement i. e. the Nyāya Siddhānjan, in as much as its allusion to the topic viz. Gold : Earth Vs. Fire finds its treatment in the Nyāya Siddhānjan.

Moreover, as the Tattva Mukta Kalāpa (A. D. 1333) has been referred to in the Nyāya Siddhānjan (cf. page 289 Madras edn.) it may be safely held that the latter was written in about A. D. 1334-35.

(18) The Gadya Traya Bhāṣya, (19) the Stotra Ratna Bhāṣya (20) the Catuśślokī Bhāṣya and (21) the Īsopaniṣadbhāṣya—all forming the Rahasya Rakṣā-group were presumably written between A. D. 1345-50, the contemplative period of Vedānta Deśika's life. The Gadya Traya Bhāṣya was of course written before the Catuśślokī Bhāṣya as the latter alludes to the former in the stanza (Cf. the C. S. B. on Verse I) :—

‘पृथुगद्यमुखेऽस्माभिः श्रीप्रपत्तिरियं सताम् ।

श्रीपतौद्विष्यतमैकान्त्यं न विहन्तीति साधितम् ॥

The period of propagation of the ideals of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism in Vedānta Deśika's ācāryic career begins from A. D. 1345 and stretches upto the end of his life i.e. A. D. 1369. It is enriched by small tracts in Tamil written to propagate and popularise the philosophy of devotion propounded by the great Tamil saints. It is also graced by the production of the Abhīti Stava, an impassioned poem of patriotic and devotional sentiments. It is sanctified, besides, by his Tamil-cum-Sanskrit magnum opus, the Rahasya Traya Sāra and the Paramāta Bhanga, a rejoinder to the Sarva-Darśana-Sangraha of Mādhavācārya.

Even while nearing the end of his life Vedānta Deśika seems to have composed some memorable lines such as the 'अनौघनील' etc. which were inscribed on the walls of the Śrīrangam temple in about A. D. 1371 to commemorate the victory of Hinduism in general and Śrīvaiṣṇavism in particular over the Mohammedan vandalism of the times (vide Epigraphica Indica Vol. VI page 330).

To sum up, we may mark out the following three periods in the literary career of Vedānta Deśika, the Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher and poet-philosopher :—

- (i) The 1st. period, which may be called the formative period, begins from A.D. 1295 and ends in A. D. 1310 or thereabouts.
- (ii) The IInd. period, which may be characterised as the creative period of intense literary activities, covers approximately the span of 50 years of Vedānta Deśika's life i.e. from A.D. 1311 to A.D. 1361.
- (iii) The IIIrd period, which may be called the contemplative period, stretches as far as A. D. 1369 or

almost till the end of his life. It is this period, indeed that is the period of the establishment of the Deśika-Dharma and the Deśika-Darśana as the religion and the philosophy of what may be called a very large part of the medieval India.

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CHAPTER IV.

LITERATURE KNOWN TO HIM

Vedānta Deśika's learning was simply encyclopaedic. Simply to tabulate the works and authors quoted or referred to by him will mean a book of no small size. Our attempt in the following few pages will be to suggest the vast range of his mental culture as reflected in his allusions to the literature ancient as well as contemporary.

Vedic Literature.

First of all, his knowledge of Vedic literature is simply stupendous. On many an occasion, he quotes from the Vedic Saṁhitās. His knowledge of the following four Saṁhitās in their different recensions i. e.

- (i) The Ṛgveda Saṁhitā (The Vāṣkala Śākhā)¹ and The Vājasaneyā Śākhā¹ (a)
- (ii) The Yajurveda Saṁhitā (the Katha Śākhā)¹ and The Vājasaneyā Śākhā¹ (a)
- (iii) The Sāmaveda Saṁhitā (The Ekāyana Śākhā)¹, and
- (iv) The Atharva Veda Saṁhitā.¹

is evident, even, to a casual reader of his works. Apart from the above Vedic Saṁhitās, he knew the Khilas or the Vedic Miscellanies² and taking them to be later compilations, contended for their validity equal to that of the Vedas in the respect of what may be termed 'Vaiṣṇava Sadācāra'.

1. S. R. Page, 43 and 1 (a) S. R. B. Page 40.

2. S. R. Page 43.

The Brāhmaṇas and the Āraṇyakas.

His works contain abundant allusions to the following Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka works : —

- (i) The Satapatha Brāhmaṇa¹
- (ii) The Taittiriya Āraṇyaka¹
- (iii) The Rahasyāmnāya Brāhmaṇa²
- (iv) The Ekāyana Brāhmaṇa³
- (v) The Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa⁴
- (vi) The Maitrāyaṇīya Brāhmaṇa (Cf. S. D. Vāda 65).

The Upaniṣads.

Along with the major Upaniṣads such as the Chāndōgya, the Taittiriya, the Brhadāraṇyaka, the Īśa, the Kena, the Praśna, the Katha, the Muṇḍaka and the Svetāśvatara, the minor Upaniṣads of Vaiṣṇavite interest such as—

- (i) The Mahopaniṣad⁵
- (ii) The Sudarśanopaniṣad⁶
- (iii) The Subālopaniṣad⁶
- (iv) The Maitrāyaṇīyopaniṣad⁶
- (v) The Amṛtavindūpaniṣad⁷
- (vi) The Nārāyaṇopaniṣad⁸
- (vii) The Kauśītaki⁹
- (viii) The Sātyāyana¹⁰

and so on have contributed to his great grasp of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.

The Sūtra-Works.

Amongst the Sūtra-works of Śrauta, Dharma and

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| 1. G. T. C. on 3. 9-10 and S. R. B. Page 49. | |
| 2. S. R. B. Page 49. | 3. S. R. Page 49. |
| 4. S. R. B. Page 49. | 5. S. R. B. Page 49 and S. R. Page 43. |
| 6. S. R. B. Page 41. | 7. G. T. C. 18.20. |
| 8. G. T. C. 13.20. | 9. G. T. C. 13.4. |
| 10. S. D. Vāda 65. | |

Gṛhya topics, the work of Vedānta Deśika contain references to—

- (i) the Bodhāyana Dharma Sūtra¹
- (ii) the Āpastamba Dharma Sūtra²
- (iii) The Gautama Dharma Sūtra (S. R. Page 65).
- (iv) the Āpastamba Gṛhya Sūtra (P. R. Page 125), and
- (v) The Lokākṣi Gṛhya Sūtra (S. D. Vāda 65).

The Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata.

Vedānta Deśika's works abound in extensive quotations from the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata on points of Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion and ritualism. What they suggest is that much before the time of Vedānta Deśika interpolations were regularly taking place in the two great National Epics of India. For Vedānta Deśika the Rāmāyaṇa was a Sāstra of esoteric Śrī Vaiṣṇavism³ and the Mahābhārata, a Śrī Vaiṣṇava Dharma Śāstra.⁴

There was one *Itihāsa Samuccaya*,⁵ (Vide No. 1974-77 of D. C. S. Mss. Madras Vol. IV – Rangacharya) a compilation of interesting moral stories of the Mahābhārata much in vogue in Deśika's times. One *Itihāsottama*⁶ (Vide No. 1978 D. C. S. Mss. Madras, Vol. IV – Rangacharya) is also mentioned by Deśika which was, in all probability, a work in line with the Itihāsa Samuccaya.

The Purāṇas and the Upapurāṇas.

Almost all the Purāṇas and the Upapurāṇas have been used by Vedānta Deśika to prove the points of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. On one single page of his Saccaritra Rakṣā (Page 58) the following 10 Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas have been quoted—

- (1) the Padma, (2) the Bhāgavata,

1. S. R. Page 92. 2. P. R. Page 125 and S. R. B. Page 63.

3. N. R. Page 32. 4. S. R. B. Page 56.

5. S. R. Page. 55. 6. S. R. B. Page 56.

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| (3) the Agni, | (4) the Bhaviṣya, |
| (5) the Brahma Vaivarta, | (6) the Linga, |
| (7) the Varāha, | (8) the Skanda, |
| (9) the Vāmana, and | (10) the Matsya. |

Besides these

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| (11) the Garuda ¹ | (16) the Mārkaṇḍeya ³ |
| (12) the Brahmāṇḍa, | (17) the Śiva, ⁴ |
| (13) the Vāyu ¹ | (18) the Kūrma, ⁵ |
| (14) the Āditya ¹ | (19) the Viṣṇu Purāṇa |
| (15) the Harivaṁśa ³ | and so on are also referred to. |

The widely prevalent custom of 'Purāṇa Pravacana' has also been noted by Deśika. By his time all the Purāṇas and the Upapurāṇas had come into being in their present shape and magnitude. He mentions a *Purāṇa Sāra Samuccaya* which is not mentioned by any Catalogue whatsoever of Sanskrit Mss. (vide S.R.B. Page 62 and P.R. Page 144).

The Smṛti-works.

In addition to the Manu-Smṛti and the Yājñyavalkya-Smṛti which are commonly used, the following Smṛtis also have been handled by Vedānta Deśika :

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| (1) the Śāṇḍilya ⁶ | (9) the Atri ¹⁰ |
| (2) the Vaśiṣṭha ⁷ | (10) the Dattātreyā ¹⁰ |
| (3) the Yama ⁷ | (11) the Br̥ddha Dakṣa ¹⁰ |
| (4) the Viṣṇu ⁸ | (12) the Likhita ¹⁰ |
| (5) the Śankha ⁹ | (13) the Medhātithi. |
| (6) the Āṅgiras ¹⁰ | (14) the Parāśara, |
| (7) the Hārita ¹⁰ | (15) the Vṛhaspati |
| (8) the Br̥ddha Jābāla ¹⁰ | and so on. |

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| 1. S. R. Page 59. | 2. S. R. Page 57. | 3. S. R. Page 66. |
| 4. S.R.B. Page 30. | 5. S.R.B. Page 38. | 6. S.R. Page 54. |
| 7. S.R. Page 58. | 8. S.R. Page 63. | 9. S.R. Page 65. |
| 10. S.D. 65th Vāda. | | |

In his times the *Smṛti Sangraha* of Varadarāja¹ must have been in great vogue. A *Smṛti Sangraha* (vide No. 2808-9 of D.C.S. Mss. Madras, Rangacharya), an anonymous work does not seem to be the *Smṛti Sangraha* of Varadarāja, which was presumably an ambitious work of *Smṛti*-collections. Other digests of *Smṛtis* such as the *Smṛti Candrikā*² of Yājñika Devaṇa Bhaṭṭa (of 12th Century) and the *Prayoga Paddhati Ratnāvalī* of Bhojarāja³ (13th Century) must have been current in his times as is evident from his allusions to them. The *Smṛti*-works of *Vijñāneśvara*⁴ were also known to Vedānta Deśika.

The Āgamas and the Saṁhitās.

Vedānta Deśika had an access to the vast field of the Āgamas and the Saṁhitās of Vaiṣṇavite interest. He was a Pāncarātrika and his allegiance to the Pāncarātra-Saṁhitās is pronounced. In his study of the Saṁhitās of the Pāncarātra school of the Bhāgavatas, he had taken, it seems, great pains in collating different recensions and correcting the texts, where necessary. He was well aware of the Pāncarātra Saṁhitās in the making even in his own times, as he refers to the temple-ministrants busy making interpolations in the Saṁhitā-literature.⁵

Apart from the Three Gems of the Pāncarātra-school⁶ i.e. (i) the Jayākhya Saṁhitā, (ii) the Sāttvata Saṁhitā and (iii) the Pauṣkara Saṁhitā which he handles, time and again, in his Pāncarātra Rakṣā, Saccaritra Rakṣā and Rahasya Rakṣā, he refers to or quotes from the following Saṁhitās also—

1. S. R. Page 58. 2. S. R. Page 76.

3. P. R. Page 144. 4. S. D. Veda 64.

5. P. R. Page 101. 6. P. R. Page 109.

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| 1. Pādma ¹ | 15. Vaihāyasa ¹⁵ |
| 2. Hayagrīva ² | 16. Citra Śikhaṇḍin ¹⁶ |
| 3. Pārameśvara ³ | 17. Jayottara ¹⁷ |
| 4. Nāradiya ⁴ | 18. Sanatkumāra ¹⁸ |
| 5. Bhārgava ⁵ | 19. Padmodbhava ¹⁹ |
| 6. Vāśiṣṭha ⁶ | 20. Sātātapa ²⁰ |
| 7. Gārgya ⁷ | 21. Tejodravṛṇa ²¹ |
| 8. Vihagendra ⁸ | 22. Maya ²² |
| 9. Ahirbudhnya ⁹ | 23. Vaiṭhanvika ²³ |
| 10. Kālottara ¹⁰ | 24. Pañcapraśna ²⁴ |
| 11. Śrīkara ¹¹ | 25. Sukapraśna ²⁵ |
| 12. Īśvara ¹² | 26. Tattva Sāgara ²⁶ |
| 13. Bhāradvāja ¹³ | 27. Śāndilya ²⁷ |
| 14. Saumantava ¹⁴ | |
| 28. Dakṣa (P. R. Pages 111-149). | |
| 29. Kratu " " " | |
| 30. Atri. " " " | |
| 31. Bodhāyana (P. R. Pages 111-149). | |
| 32. Parama. " " " | |
| 33. Saṃkarṣaṇa (, " " | |
| 34. Śaunaka " " " | |
| 35. Prahlāda " " " | |
| 36. Viṣṇutattva (S. R. Hage 46-71). | |
| 37. Ānanda " " " | |
| 38. Pārāśara " " " | |
| 39. Pārameṣṭhya " " " | |
| 40. Pārāśarya " " " | |
| 41. Marici " " " | |
| 42. Mañkaṇa (C. B. page 62). | |
| 43. Svayāmbhū (cf. Catuśślokī Bhāṣya page 22). | |
| 44. Kāśyapa " " " | |
| 45. Śatamukha " " " | |

1 to 4. P. R. Page 96 to 99.

5 to 27. P. R. Pages 101-110.

46. Dhanada (cf. Catuśślokī Bhāṣya page 22)
47. Viśvakṣena¹
48. Hiraṇyagarbha.²
49. Balapauṣkara³ and so on.

Amongst the Śrīvaiṣṇava writers of theology, it is Vedānta Deśika alone, who, next to Yāmunācārya, dives deepest into the 'Pāncarātra-Mahābhodhi'⁴ and takes out the genuine pearls for the good of his followers.

Unlike other teachers of Śrī Vaiṣṇāvism who cast aspersions on the Vaikhānasa Saṁhitās, Vedānta Deśika tries to harmonise the Vaikhānasa and the Pāncarātra-views and in spite of his adherence to the latter takes great pains to prove the validity of the former.⁵ It seems the growth of the Pāncarātra Āgamas and Saṁhitās had become enormous by his times i.e. the 13th-14th centuries and all the apocryphal contributions passed for the genuine literature.

Apart from the above Saṁhitās held to be of divine inspiration and origin by the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, Vedānta Deśika refers to the following Saṁhitā-digests and allied Nibandhas:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1. Śatyaki Tantra. | 9. Viṣṇukalpa. |
| 2. Lakṣmī Tantra. | 10. Naladīya Sangraha. |
| 3. Śattvata Tantra. | 11. Śrī Viṣṇu Dharma. |
| 4. Viṣṇu Tantra. | 12. Viṣṇu Mandira. |
| 5. Śrī Sāstra. | 13. Brahmarātra. |
| 6. Nārādīya Paddhati. | 14. Kāśmirāgama prāmānya. |
| 7. Śrīmadāṣṭākṣara -
Brahmavidyā. | 15. Tantra Sāra-Samuccaya,
and |
| 8. Śrī Kṛṣṇa Mantra Kalpa. | 16. Nāmstraya Vidhāna. |

1. S. R. B. Page 62.

3. S. R. B. Page 73.

5. N. P. Page 169.

2. S. R. B. Page 73.

4. P. R. Introductory Verse.

It is a pity that most of the above Saṁhitās are not available in print now and many more are known only through their quotations in Vedānta Deśika's works.

Now, as regards the literature known to him. of

- (i) the 6 orthodox systems of philosophy in original and in commentaries.
- (ii) the non-orthodox schools of thought.
- (iii) the Kāvya, the Nāṭakas and the Stotras.
- (iv) works on poetics, metrics, dramaturgy and so on.
- (v) lexicography and
- (vi) medical and miscellaneous works

all available information has been given in Chapter I (His Education).

Early Viśiṣṭādvaitic Literature.

Vedānta Deśika was in close touch with the whole field of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophical literature and Śrī Vaiṣṇava esotericism and spiritualism. In fact what he did not know of the 'Ubhaya Vedānta' literature, probably did not exist. All the works, say, of

- (i) The Ālvārs.
- (ii) the Exponents of the Ālvārs.
- (iii) Yāmunācārya and his exponents.
- (iv) Rāmānuja and his commentators.

were well known to him.

Most of the works of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophers and Śrī Vaiṣṇava teachers are known only through their quotations in Vedānta Deśika's works. Only a few of them are available in manuscripts, mostly in fragments and rarely in full. As for instance, the works of -

1. *Nātha Muni.*

the first Ācārya of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta are known only through their allusions in the writings of Vedānta Deśika. Nātha Muni, the first Ācārya of Ubhaya Vedānta was the grand-father of the illustrious Yāmunācārya, the spiritual teacher of Rāmānuja (A. D. 1017 to A. D. 1137) 'Had there been no Nātha Muni, there could have been no Viśiṣṭādvaita Darśana.' The period assigned to him by unimpeachable tradition is A. D. 824 to A. D. 820. His life mission was the preservation of the songs of the Great Ālvārs. The systematization of the Dravidāmnāya, and the propagation of the ideals of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism were his great life-works.

The Nyāya-Tattva of this great Śrīvaiṣṇava saint and savant, Nātha Muni, of Vedānta Deśika's information,¹ was a trenchant criticism of the Nyāya of Gotama, the Vaiśeṣika of Kaṇāda and the traditional expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika teachers. It was through this work that Nātha Muni, the first Ācārya of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrīvaiṣṇavism, showed the way to harmony subsisting between the realism of Nyāya and the pluralism of Vaiśeṣika.

The chief feature of the Nyāya-Tattva, as referred to by Vedānta Deśika, were the following :—

(1) All knowledge, whether right or wrong, presupposes the reality of the object of knowledge. The Nyāya Tattva had a Bhṛāntyadhikaraṇa or a section on Error which established the theory of error-*'Yathārtha-khyāti'*-and demolished all the Khyāti-vādas of the ancient epistemologists. It was the Yathārtha-Khyāti-Vāda of Nātha Muni that went a great

way in striking at the root of the theory of cosmic illusion (Māyā) of the Nirviśeṣādvaita Vedānta.¹

(ii) The purpose of Vāda or Śāstraic discussion is to dispel the doubts in the minds of the Guru and the Śiṣya. Vāda does not mean winning points over the opponent.² In the 'Saṁyogādhikaraṇa', the Nyāya Tattva contained Nātha Muni's views on dialectics. It discussed 3 fallacies only³ viz. Asiddha, Anaikāntika and Viśuddha, but, Vedānta Deśika contended that the other two also viz. Kālātyaya and Prakaraṇa-Sama were implied in them. In fact the Hetvābhāsa-section of the Nyāya Tattva was the chief authority for Vedānta Deśika's treatment of the topic in his Nyāya Parīśuddhi.⁴

(iii) In its discussion on the Prameya-topic, the Nyāya Tattva held the view that the first Vedānta Sūtra viz. Athāto Brahma Jijñāsā, never meant that Brahman, the Omniscient Reality, was in need of any Jijñāsā or inquiry,⁵ In fact, Nātha Muni, wanted to criticise the earlier Bhāṣyakāras who used to construe 'Brahma-Jijñāsā' as the 'Tṛtiyā Tatpuruṣa Samāsa.'

(iv) In its 'Pramātṛ Pāda' a section on the real Pramātā, the Nyāya Tattva seemed to suggest that the existence of God could be inferred from cosmic creation⁶—a view hotly discussed by Vedānta Deśika in his works. Through much ingenuity of interpretation Vedānta Deśika synthesizes this view of Nātha Muni with the final Viśiṣṭādvaitic standpoint on the subject.

1. T.M.K. and Sarvārtha Siddhi 4. 10; N.P. Page 91 (Conjeevaram).

2. N.P. Pages 109 and 110.

3. N.P. Page 130. and 132.

4. N.P. Page 138.

5. Tattva Tika page 52 (Madras).

6. N. S. Page 225.

(v) The Nyāya Tattva contained discussion on 'Saṁvit' (Consciousness and was the source of inspiration for Yāmūnācārya' 'Saṁvitsiddhi'.

It is really strange how the Nyāya Tattva was allowed to be lost by the post-Vedānta Deśika teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The commentators of Vedānta Deśika such as Śrī Nivāsa Dāsa and others show no acquaintance whatsoever with any of the excerpts of the Nyāya Tattva found in the works of Vedānta Deśika.

It is clear from Vedānta Deśika's references to the Nyāya Tattva that it was one of the most comprehensive and ambitious treatises on the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. It was written mostly in prose¹ intermixed with verses² to suit the occasion. Its division of topics into Pāda and Adhikaraṇa³ was suggestive of its adherence to the hoary tradition of Śāstraic discussion. Quotations from the first to the 8th Adhikaraṇa are scattered here and there in the Nyāya Parīśuddhi, the Nyāya Siddhānjana, the Tattva Tīkā and the Sarvārtha Siddhi of Vedānta Deśika. On the basis of these it can be safely pointed out that the work of Nātha Muni, being an attempt at the reorientation of the ancient Nyāya-realism, was, at the same time, a succinct exposition of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. That it is extinct now is a great pity indeed. The Late Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, mentions, in his Indian Philosophy Vol. III, one 'Puruṣa Nirṇaya' and one 'Yoga Rahasya' as the works of Nātha Muni.

2. *Puṇḍarikākṣācārya.*

Only two stanzas are quoted by Vedānta Deśika from an anonymous work of Puṇḍarikākṣācārya (vide Śata Dūṣaṇī,

1. N. S. Page 335.

2. N. S. Page 249.

3. N. S. Page 366.

Vāda 7), the teacher of Yāmunācārya. But these stanzas convincingly prove the logical and dialectical character of the work of Puṇḍarikākṣācārya which is lost now.

3. *Rāma Miśra. I.*

No work of Rāma Miśra, the disciple of Puṇḍarikākṣācārya and the teacher of Yāmunācārya (10th century A.D.) has come down to us except in its allusions in the works of Vedānta Deśika. Rāma Miśra had presumably expounded the views of Nātha Muni and Puṇḍarikākṣā in his work or works. He was an upholder of the Yathārtha-Khyāti theory.¹ He is not to be confused with Rāma Miśra II, who is, otherwise, known as Somāśiyāṇḍān, a contemporary of Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated exponent of the Śrī Bhāṣya (the end of 12th century A.D.). Vedānta Deśika does not mention the name of the work or works of Rāma Miśra I, But a sentence of Rāma Miśra I quoted in the Nikṣepa Rakṣā (Page 16 and 35 Annangaracarya's edn.) abundantly suggests² his importance in the galaxy of pre-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachers.

4. *Yāmunācārya* and 5. *Rāmānuja.*

Almost all the works of Yāmunācārya and Rāmānuja are available now. No small credit goes to Vedānta Deśika for the preservation of the works of these two great teachers. But the Puruṣa Nirṇaya or the Mahāpuruṣa Nirṇaya of Yāmunācārya, mentioned by name by Vedānta Deśika³ has, nevertheless, become extinct, at present. This work of Yāmunācārya, the great spiritual teacher of Rāmānuja must have been a valuable treatise on the Highest Reality of Intuition and Devotion i. e. the Brahman.⁴

1. N.P. Page 91 (Conjeevaram).

2. Tattva Tika Page 42 (Madras).

3. N. P. Page 148 (Conjeevaram Edn.)

4. N. S. page 165.

6. *Rāma Miśra II.*

Rāma Miśra II, better known as Somāśīyāṇḍān, who has been mentioned by name and whose works have been profusely quoted by Vedānta Deśika, was an exponent of the works of Rāmānuja. His exposition of the Śrī Bhāṣya referred to as the Vivaraṇa¹ is almost extinct now except for its passages quoted by Vedānta Deśika. He is called the 'Vivaraṇakāra'. He seems to have been the first Viśiṣṭādvaitic teacher to undertake the exposition of the works of Rāmānuja. Sudarśanācārya, the author of the Śrūta Prakāśikā on the Śrī Bhāṣya probably refers to Rām Miśra II along with Varadācārya as the first teachers of the Rāmānuja Darśana.² The 'Śrī Bhāṣya Vivaraṇa' of Rāma Miśra II has been criticised, here and there, by Vedānta Deśika, in his Tattva Tikā.³

The Śrī Bhāṣya Vivaraṇa, it seems, was not known to Ranga Rāmānuja Muni, the commentator of the Upaniṣads and the Nyāya Siddhānjana of Vedānta Deśika. Nowhere does Ranga Rāmānuja show any acquaintance with the Vivaraṇa while commenting on the text of the Vivaraṇa in his Nyāya-Siddhānjana-Bhāṣya. Its early extinction is due, probably, to the other famous expositions of the Śrī Bhāṣya.

Rāma Miśra II seems to have written a gloss on Rāmānuja's Vedārtha Sangraha also and Vedānta Deśika knew this work as the Vedārtha-Sangraha-Vivaraṇa.⁴

Another lost work of Rāma Miśra II which Vedānta Deśika quotes from and criticises is the 'Ṣaḍārtha Saṁkṣepa'.⁵ From Vedānta Deśika's references it is clear that Rāma Miśra II was a Mīmāṃsaka and a Viśiṣṭādvaitin and that he

1. T. T. Page 7 (Madras edn.)

2. Śrūta Prakāśika Śloka—12.

3. T. T. Page 64.

4. N. S. Page 211 and 352.

5. N. S. Page 261.

had explained the works of Rāmānuja from the standpoint of the 'Anvitābhīdhāna-Vāda' of the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsā.¹

Rāma Miśra II must have been a contemporary of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka. According to old tradition he was the brother of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka and the son of Śrī Vatsāṅka Miśra.

7. *Śrī Vatsāṅka Miśra.*

Śrī Vatsāṅka Miśra, better known as Kūreśa or Kurat-tālvān, was one of the few foremost direct disciples of Rāmānuja. The Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition mentions that it was Śrī Vatsāṅka Miśra who had procured the manuscripts of the Bodhāyana Vṛtti for Rāmānuja. It also records that it was Śrī Vatsāṅka Miśra to whom Rāmānuja dictated his Śrī Bhāṣya and his other works. The Cola King Koluttunga I (A. D. 1078) who is said to have persecuted Rāmānuja and his Śrī Vaiṣṇava disciples is also said to have punished Śrī Vatsāṅka Miśra by pulling out the latter's eyes !

His works are :—

- (1) A Bhāṣya on the Dramiḍa Bhāṣya. It is extinct now.
- (2) Śrī Vaikuṇṭha Stavah.
- (3) Atimānuṣastavah.
- (4) Sundara Vāhustavah.
- (5) Varadarāja Stavah.
- (6) Śrī Stavah.

The works (2 to 6) are devotional lyrics and hymns and their choice stanzas are referred to by Vedānta Deśika.² All these are published from Conjeevaram.

1. N. P. Page 152.

2. (i) Śaraṅgati Gadya Bhāṣya Page 100.

(ii) Stotra Ratna Bhāṣya on Stanza—44, 32.

(iii) Catuṣṣloki Bhāṣya, page 17.

8. *Parāśara Bhaṭṭa*.

Parāśara Bhaṭṭa, a contemporary of Vangi Vangeśvara or Ranganārāyaṇācārya¹ who, according to the Guruparaṃparā-tradition, is said to have converted Nārāyaṇa Muni, an Advaitic teacher-philosopher to Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and Viśiṣṭādvaitism, flourished in the 12th century A. D. Vedānta Deśika mentions Śrī Vatsānka Miśra as the teacher of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa.² The tradition records that Śrī Vatsānka Miśra, alias Kūrēśa was the father of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa. Vedānta Deśika refers to Parāśara Bhaṭṭa as Bhaṭṭāraka³ or Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka⁴ or simply Abhiyukta, the venerable teacher.⁵

The works of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa played a great part in the mental make-up of Vedānta Deśika. None of his philosophical and logical works has so far seen the light of day. Abundant allusions to them are scattered, here and there, in Vedānta Deśika's works. The Nyāya Pariśuddhi alone refers to Parāśara Bhaṭṭa and his works more than 24 times. In his Nyāya Siddhānjana also Vedānta Deśika refers to him and his works more than 20 times. It is very rarely⁶ that Vedānta Deśika differs from the viewpoint of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa. In the opinion of Vedānta Deśika, Parāśara Bhaṭṭa was evidently the best of the Post-Rāmānujist Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians.

Only the following poetical works of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa are in print :—

- (i) Śrī Ranga Rājastava (I and II Parts).
- (ii) Śrī Guṇa Ratna Kośa.
- (iii) Aṣṭa Ślokī.
- (iv) Śrī Ranga Nātha Stotram.

1. P. R. Page 111.

2. P. R. Page 131.

3. P. R. page 130.

4. P. R. page 111.

5. S. M. page 25.

6. N. P. Page 99 and 103 and N. S. Page 37.

(v) *Bhagavaḍguṇa Darpaṇa* (a commentary on the *Viṣṇusahasra Nāme Stotra*).

All the above works are devotional lyrics and contain some of the finest lines¹ of Viśiṣṭādvaitic poetry.

His most important work, which Vedānta Deśika mostly draws upon, is the *Tattva Ratnākara* written in prose-cum-verse Śāstraic style. To-day the *Tattva Ratnākara* is known to us only from its copious quotations in Vedānta Deśika's *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*. It was a most comprehensive treatise on the logic of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. None of the catalogues of Sanskrit Mss. makes even a mention of it. Even in the times of Vedānta Deśika, the *Tattva Ratnākara* does not seem to be available in full² as it ended at the passage 'Atra Tattvavidah etc. presumably a passage of the 'Prameya' chapter, dealing with 'acit' or inert matter.

Another authoritative work of his mentioned by Vedānta Deśika is the 'Adhyātma Khaṇḍa Dvaya Vivaraṇa.'³ It also is lost now. It seems to have been a great attempt at the explanation of Viśiṣṭādvaita'. It contained a discussion on 'Śarīra' and held Rāmānuja's conception of Śarīra in the *Srī Bhāṣya* to be of a unitary nature though allowing of triple interpretation.⁴ It also held the view that the ultimate realisation was the realisation of Brahman and never the acquisition of Aśvarya or the attainment of pure selfhood.⁵

A work of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa, abundantly alluded to by Vedānta Deśika in his *Pāṇca Rātra Raksā*,⁶ was presumably a discussion on the Śrīvaiṣṇava cult and ritualism. It also is irretrievably lost now. Moreover, the tradition ascribes

1. Ranga Rāja Stava I Part, Śloka 28, 89 etc.

2. N.S. Page 74 and 376.

3. N.S. page 100 and 173.

4. N.S. page 100.

5. N.S. page 173.

6. P.R. page 95, 111, 130.

to Parāśara Bhaṭṭa the authorship of a commentary on the 'Sahasra-*Gīti*' the Songs of the Ālvārs).

9. *Varada Viṣṇu Miśra.*

Vedānta Deśika refers to Varada Viṣṇu Miśra in his *Nyāya Pariśuddhi* and *Nyāya Siddhānjana*¹. He mentions him, sometimes, simply as Viṣṇu Miśra.² At times he characterises him as 'Ekadeśin' and labels his views as 'Ekadeśi-matam'.³ No catalogue of Samskrit Mss. contains any reference, whatsoever, either to Varada Viṣṇu Miśra or to his work or works. What seems is that Varada Viṣṇu Miśra, a much studied Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician, came ultimately to be forgotten by the Rāmānujists of the post-Vedānta Deśika period. Be it as it may, his importance in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic school cannot be minimised so long as we know that it was he, amongst others of his times, who paved the way to the progress of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic and the synthetisation of the Nyāya with the Rāmānuja Darśana. Varada Viṣṇu Miśra seems to have been deeply imbued with the impressions of the ancient Nyāya of Udayana and Bhāsarvajña and Vasudeva.⁴ Hence it is that Vedānta Deśika takes him to task, labelling his reconstructions of Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic as 'Un-Bhāṣyic'.⁵

His foremost work, extensively used by Vedānta Deśika was the '*Māna-Yāthātmya-Nirṇaya*'. It was an authoritative prose-cum-verse treatise on Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic. It was a comprehensive work dealing with all the topics of the Nyāya such as *Pratyakṣa*, *Anumāna*, *Vāda*, *Jalpa*, *Jāti* and so on. In fact, Vedānta Deśika quotes from it, on all the above topics, in his *Nyāya Pariśuddhi*.⁶ It seems that the

1. N. S. page 351, 339, 368, 376 and so on (Madras) and N. P. page 95, 99, 102, 110 and so on (Conjeevaram).

2. N. S. page 126.

3. N. S. page 376.

4. N. P. page 122 (Conjeevaram).

5. N. S. page 93 (Madras),

6. N. P. page 95, 99, 102, 110, 122, etc;

Viśiṣṭādvaitic logical terminology was in a liquid stage in the times of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra. Thus it is that Varada Viṣṇu Miśra used the Nyāya-terms, such as Guṇa etc. instead of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic terms, such as Adravya etc.¹ He did not, however, find favour with Vedānta Deśika. But the fact is that he was one of the precursors of Vedānta Deśika and that his Māna-Yāthātmya-Nirṇaya was one of the sources of the Nyāya-Pariśuddhi. It is a pity that the Māna-Yāthātmya-Nirṇaya is irretrievably lost. As early as the days of Ranga Rāmānuja, the celebrated exponent of the Nyāya Siddhānjana, the above work of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra seems to have gone out of vogue. There was another work of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra which had equally met the same fate as the Māna Yāthātmya Nirṇaya. It appears that this work was a commentary on the Sruta Prakāśikā of Sudarśanācārya and was written presumably before the Māna Yāthātmya Nirṇaya. Although Vedānta Deśika does not mention the name of this work, yet, he seems to allude to its discussion on 'Soul: atomic VS. all-pervasive'.²

Varada Viṣṇu Miśra preceded Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhattāraka, another eminent Viśiṣṭādvaitic writer, known only through Vedānta Deśika's works. Vedānta Deśika suggests, more than once, that, the Prajñā Paritrāṇa of Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhattāraka followed the views of the Māna-Yāthātmya-Nirṇaya of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra in regard to the limbs of syllogistic reasoning.³

We can safely assign 12th century A.D. to Varada Viṣṇu Miśra and his activities in the field of Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic and metaphysics. Being Rāmānuja's sister's son and a pupil of Viṣṇucitta he must have held a high position amongst the 74 Śimhāsanādhīpatīs of Rāmānuja.

1. N.S. page 288 (Madras).

2. N.S. page 188 (Madras).

3. N.P. page 109 (Conjeevaram).

10. *Nārāyaṇa Muni.*

Nārāyaṇa Muni is known to us only through the extensive quotations of his works in Vedānta Deśika's Pāncarātra Rakṣā (pp. 111, 117, 145 etc.), Stotra Ratna Bhāṣya (page 40) and so on. He is to be differentiated from Nārāyaṇācārya, the author of the Tattva Nirṇaya who was a follower of Yādava Prakāśa.¹ He is also not the same as Nārāyaṇārya, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic teacher and exponent of the Mīmāṃsā Sūtras² and the author of one Nīti Mālā (published in the Annamalai University Philosophy Series).

He is said to be a student-disciple of Vangi Vangeśvara³ alias Śrī Ranga Nārāyaṇācārya⁴, who, in turn, was, presumably the direct disciple of the great Rāmānuja.⁵ As Rāmānuja's date is A.D. 1017 to A.D. 1137, Vangi Vangeśvara must have been his late contemporary and Nārāyaṇa Muni could be placed, therefore, in the later half of the 12th century A.D.

Vedānta Deśika does not give the name of his work or works. But the quotations clearly suggest the nature of his work or works. One of the works of Nārāyaṇa Muni must have been a comprehensive metrical treatise on the cult and ritualism of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and the doctrine of Prapatti⁶ and Pañca Kāla Kṛtya⁶. Another work in prose was probably a short manual on the Pāncarātra-worship.⁷

Apart from the above unnamed treatises known through Vedānta Deśika's works, Nārāyaṇa Muni seems to have also written a commentary on the Stotra Ratna of Yāmunācārya.⁸ It seems, besides, that he had commented upon the work or works of his teacher i. e. Vangi Vangeśvara.⁹ The

1. S.R. page 46. 2. M.P. 11th Stanza and S.M. page 18.

3. P.R. pp. 144—145. 4. & 5. P.R. page 110.

5. P. R. page 117. 6. P. R. page 111. 7. P. R. page 133.

8. S. R. B. on S. R. Verse 12. 9. P. R. page 136.

Adyar Library contains the following Mss. of Nārāyaṇa Muni's works –

1. Aṣṭaśloki Vyākhyā.
2. Ārādhana Sangraha Kārikā.
3. Bhagavadgītārtha Sangraha Vibhāga.
4. Bhāva Prakāśikā (a commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras).

Rangācārya in his Catalogue vol. 5 (vide No. 2876) mentions Nārāyaṇa Muni as 'Ṣaṣṭiprabandhanirmātā' or the author of 60 works.

As Nārāyaṇa Muni is held in much esteem by Vedānta Deśika, we may presume that he was a great exponent of Viśiṣṭādvaita in its practical side and had a clear and complete grasp of the Rāmānuja Darśana and the Srī Vaiṣṇava religion.

According to the Guruparamparā, Nārāyaṇa Muni had his appellation of 'Nanjiyār' (our saint) given to him by Paṇḍura Bhatta in recognition of his staunch adherence to Viśiṣṭādvaita.

11. *Viṣṇu Citta*.

Viṣṇucitta or Engal Ālvān (A.D. 1106-1200) was the disciple-successor of Kuruśvara or Tirukkuruhaipairan Pillan (A.D. 1061-1161). On many an occasion, Vedānta Deśika quotes from Viṣṇucitta's works.

One of his works was a commentary on the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, known as 'Viṣṇucittīya'. It is available, now-a-days, in print. He had written, besides, the following works which Vedānta Deśika quotes from :—

- i. Prameya Sangraha.
- ii. Sangati Mālā.

None of the above works has been mentioned by any of the Sanskrit Mss. Catalogues, The quotations from Prameya Sangraha¹ suggest that it was a comprehensive treatise on Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic and metaphysics, contributing much to the thoughts of the Nyāya Pañśuddhi and the Nyāya Siddhānjana of Vedānta Deśika. Most of the anonymous quotations² in the Nyāya Pañśuddhi seem to be from this work of Viṣṇucitta. The Sangati Mālā³ was a work after the Srī Bhāṣya of Rāmānuja and promised to preserve the viewpoint of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, while expounding the Adhikaraṇas or the sub-sections of the Vedānta Sūtras.

Viṣṇucitta seems to have also expounded the Prapatti-philosophy of the Gadyas of Rāmānuja in his work called the 'Gadya Vyākhyāna.'⁴

12. *Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka.*

Vedānta Deśika mentions Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka, by name, in his works. He also quotes profusely from his works. Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka seems to have written the following works :—

1. Nyāya Sudarśana or Vedānta-Nyāya-Sudarśana, an exposition of the Srī Bhāṣya (some portions of the work are published by A. R. Krishnamachariar in his Śrī Bhāṣya edn. with 10 commentaries).
2. Prajñā Paritrāṇa. This work is known only through its quotations in Vedānta Deśika's works. It was a metrical treatise on Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic. It was one of the precursors of the Nyāya Pañśuddhi and the Nyāya Siddhānjana. On many an occasion, Vedānt Deśika dittoes its views.

1. N.P. page 94, 95, 150 etc. and N.S. page 40,

2. N.P. page 173, 174, 175, 176 etc,

3. N.P. page 142 and N.S. page 174, 275.

4. Catusloki Bhāṣya page 19.

Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka was a younger contemporary of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra. His 'Prajñā Paritrāṇa' was written after the 'Māna-Yāthātmya-Nirṇaya' of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra. We shall not be wrong if we assign the last decades of the 12th century A. D. to his literary activities.

Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka had his appellation as 'Vakulabhṛtkiṅkara'. In fact, Kumāra Vedāntācārya, the son and successor of Vedānta Deśika, identifies him with Vakulabhṛt Kiṅkara.¹

13. *Varadācārya.*

Varadācārya or Vātsya Varada, known also as Nadādūr Ammāl (A.D. 1165-1275) was the greatest of the exponents of the philosophy of Rāmānuja. He had in Ātreya Rāmānuja his most devoted student and disciple. Vedānta Deśika, early in his childhood, as the tradition goes, is said to have met in Varadācārya his spiritual teacher and preceptor.² The hall of the Varadarāja temple at Little Conjeevaram is said to have been the lecture-hall where Vātsya Varada had expounded the Rāmānuja Darśana.

The following are his works referred to by Vedānta Deśika :—

1. Tattva Sāra.³
2. Tattva Nirṇaya.⁴

The catalogues of Sanskrit Mss. mention⁵ certain other works also by Varadācārya : —

1. Ārādhana Kārikā.
2. Paramārtha Stutih.

1. Adhikaraṇa Cintāmaṇi on Adhikaraṇa Sarāvali 1. 25.

2. A. S.—2 Verse.

3. N. P. page 182 and N. S. page 71, 189 (Madras Edn.)

4. N. S. page 189.

5. Alphabetical Index of S. Mss. in the Adyar Library.

3. Prapanna Pārijāta.

4. Prameya Mālā.

But Vedānta Deśika does not mention any one of them.

The Tattva Sāra, a compendium of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vedānta has been published in the Annamalai University Philosophy Series.

The late Dr. S. N. Das Gupta notes some other works also of Vātsya Varada in his 'Indian Philosophy' :—

1. Sārārtha Catuṣṭaya.

14. *Senesvarārya*

Vedānta Deśika mentions Senesvarārya in his Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī (1. 25) as the first and the foremost of the post-Rāmānuja teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita. He also refers, in his Tattva Tīkā (Page 20 Madras edn.) to a Nyāya Saṅgraha or Śārīraka Nyāya-Kalāpa-Saṅgraha as the work of Senesvarācārya. Before the Śruta Prakāśikā of Sudarśanācārya and the Nyāya Sudarśana of Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka it was, in fact, the 'Nyāya-Kalāpa-Saṅgraha' of Senesvarārya which was considered to be an authoritative interpretation of the Brahma Sūtra-topics. We can assign the middle of the 13th century A.D. to Senesvarārya. The late Dr. S. N. Das Gupta does not seem to be right in taking Senesvarārya or Senānātha as 'an author of later date' (vide History of Indian Philosophy Vol. III Page 117).

15. *Sudarśana Bhaṭṭāraka*.

Sudarśana Bhaṭṭa alias Vyāsārya or Sudarśana Bhaṭṭāraka was an early contemporary of Vedānta Deśika. The celebrated Vātsya Varada is said to have been his teacher. He wrote the following works :

(1) Śruta Prakāśikā, a commentary on the Śrī Bhāṣya.

This work is one of the sources of inspiration for

the Tattva Tikā of Vedānta Deśika. It is published in parts.

- (2) Śruta Pradīpikā, an independent exposition of the Brahma-Sūtras. Its manuscript copy is preserved in the Madras Oriental Mss. Library.
- (3) Tātparya Dīpikā, a commentary on the Vedārtha Saṅgraha of Rāmānuja. It is known only through its allusions in Vedānta Deśika's works.
- (4) Subālopaniṣadvyākhyāna, an exposition of the Subālopaniṣad. Ranga Rāmānuja, the famous Viśiṣṭādvaitic exponent of the Upaniṣads¹ and a commentator of the Nyāya Sidhānjana of Vedānta Deśika, shows his acquaintance with this work of Sudarśanācārya.
- (5) An exposition of the Rāmānuja Gadyas.² The work is lost now.

16. *Nārāyaṇārya.*

The works of Nārāyaṇārya have been referred to by Vedānta Deśika. The following seem to be his works: —

1. Nīti Mālā³. It has been published in the Annamalai University Philosophy Series. According to Vedānta Deśika, the views of the Nīti Mālā are 'Ekadeśimatam'.
2. An exposition of the Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras.⁴ Vedānta Deśika has criticised this exposition of the Mīmāṃsā labelling it as 'Praudhi Prakāśana' or a mere show of interpretative skill. Nevertheless, this work of Nārāyaṇārya was one of the sources of inspiration, for Vedānta Deśika's Mīmāṃsā-writings.

1. N.S. Bhāṣya Page 31.

2. Gadya Traya Bhāṣya, Page 107.

3. N. S. Page 16, 83.

4. N. S. page 376.

3. A commentary on the Gītā.¹ The work is preserved only in some of its passages quoted in the Gītā Tātparyā Candrikā of Vedānta Deśika.

His period of activity is the beginning of the 13th century A. D.

17. *Ātreya Rāmānuja.*

Ātreya Rāmānuja or Vādihaṁsāmbudācārya was Vedānta Deśika's great teacher.² He was well-versed in the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta.³ It was he who had initiated Vedānta Deśika into the secrets of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.⁴ He was the fourth in direct descent from Rāmānuja. He was famous as Vedāntodayanācārya. He was also known as Praṇatārthihara or Mahānasācārya. Venkaṭādhvarin, the celebrated author of the Lakṣmī Sahasra and the Viśvaguṇādarśa-campū (17th century A. D.) is said to have been one of his descendants.

Ātreya Rāmānuja's date according to the Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition falls between A. D. 1221-1295. He was a resident of Kāncī (Conjeevaram) and Vedānta Deśika was his sister's son. He is traditionally known as the author of 3 works. So far, only his 'Nyāya Kuliśa'⁵ (published as Annamalai University Philosophy series No. 1) has seen the light of day. A mere look at the progression of its themes such as—

- (i) Siddhārtha Vyutpatti Samarthana Vāda,
- (ii) Svataḥ Prāmāṇya Nirṇaya Vāda,
- (iii) Khyāti Nirūpaṇa Vāda,
- (iv) Svayaṁprakāśa Vāda and
- (v) Īśvarānumāna Bhanga Vāda and so on,

1. Mīmāṃsā pāduka-11 and Se. M. page 18.

2. G. T. C. page 947 and N. P. page 112.

3. Adhikaraṇa Sārāvali-Śloka 562.

4. M. P. Śloka 2.

5. N. P. page 103 and 137.

is enough to suggest its voluminous and authoritative nature. Its loss is a great loss to Viśiṣṭādvaita and to the study of Vedānta Deśika.

Vedānta Deśika in his Tātparya Candrikā¹ on Rāmānuja's Gītā Bhāṣya quotes a stanza of Ātreya Rāmānuja. The stanza in question suggests another work of Ātreya Rāmānuja, presumably a work on the Śrī Bhāṣya.

The late Dr. S.N. Das Gupta mentions a 'Mokṣa Siddhi' of Ātreya Rāmānuja in his Indian Philosophy. This 'Mokṣa Siddhi' might have been only a chapter of the Nyāya Kuliśa.

18. *Meghanādāri Sūri.*

Meghanādāri Sūri was an early contemporary of Vedānta Deśika. Vedānta Deśika mentions him as 'Asmadīyāh' (our own man) in his Nyāya Pariśuddhi. He was a Tēngalai Śrīvaiṣṇavācārya and a great Tārkika. He wrote the following works :—

1. Nyāya Prakāśikā, a commentary on the Śrī Bhāṣya. Vedānta Deśika refers to the work in his Tattva Tīkā (pages 13 and 18, Madras edn.) and characterises it as an Ekadeśin's work.
2. Naya Dyumaṇi, an extensive treatise on Nyāya-Viśiṣṭādvaita-syncretism. Vedānta Deśika indirectly alludes to it in his Nyāya Pariśuddhi.
3. Bhāva Prabodha.

Now, in addition to the above well-known Viśiṣṭādvaitic writers, Vedānta Deśika refers to some others also, who, though less known, are of great importance to the reconstruction of the history of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought.

1. G. T. C. page 891-92 (Ananda press, Madras Edn.).

i. *Yādava Prakāśa*

Yādava Prakāśa was the teacher of the great Rāmānuja. He was a convert from Advaitism to Viśiṣṭādvaitism. The tradition records how Yādava Prakāśa and Rāmānuja differed, once, on the interpretation of the text 'Kapyāsam Puṇḍarikam' etc. of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and how the incident drove Rāmānuja to establish Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism to the chagrin of Advaita and Śaivism.

Yādava Prakāśa is said to have been defeated by Rāmānuja in a Śāstraic duel. Accepting his defeat in good grace, he is further said to have become a Viśiṣṭādvaitin. Vedānta Deśika takes the work of Yādava, the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, as a classic of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic concept of Sanyāsa. This work of Yādava is the 'Yati-Dharma-Samuccaya'. For Vedānta Deśika, Yādava is a 'Paramācārya' on the point of 'Yati-liṅga-Samarthana'.¹

Another work of Yādava Prakāśa, alluded to by Vedānta Deśika, is a Bhāṣya on the Bhagavadgītā.² Vedānta Deśika notes and criticises certain textual variants of the Gītā³ as commented upon by Yādava Prakāśa. The Gītā Bhāṣya of Yādava Prakāśa does not seem to be available now.

Vedānta Deśika also alludes to a commentary by Yādava Prakāśa on the Brahma Sūtras.⁴ Yādava Prakāśa flourished in the 11th century A. D. Along with Yādava Prakāśa, Vedānta Deśika mentions the following other Gītā-Bhāṣya Kāras :—⁵

1. Yajña Svāmin. Vedānta Deśika quotes from the Gītā Bhāṣya of Yajña Svāmin in his Gītā-Tātparya-Candrikā (page 71).

1. S. D. Vāda 64.

2. G. T. C. page 682, 649, 625, etc.

3. G. T. C. page 211, 248 and 625.

4. T. T. page 127.

5. G. T. C. page 952.

2. Piśāca.
3. Rantideva.
4. Gupta or probably Abhinava Gupta (1)

Tātparya Tulikā-Kāra.

Vedānta Deśika quotes from a 'Tātparya Tulikā' in his 'Tā-Tikā' more than eight times. At times, he characterises the view of the Tātparya Tulikā as 'Vaibhava Vāda'. Generally he accepts the Tulikā-interpretations as authoritative.

The author of the Tulikā or the Tātparya Tulikā has been wrongly assigned by the late Dr. S. N. Das Gupta (History of Indian Philosophy Vol. III, Page 114) to the 11th century. The very fact that Vedānta Deśika extensively quotes from the Tulikā is enough to suggest a much later period for the Tulikā Kāra, say, the 12th-13th centuries A.D.

Vāmana.

Vedānta Deśika mentions on Vāmana¹ as a commentator on Dramiḍa Bhāṣya. Apart from his name nothing more is known about this teacher of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Varadarāja Paṇḍita.

Vedānta Deśika mentions by name one Varadarāja Paṇḍita as a Śrī Vaiṣṇava writer.² He also refers to his work called the 'Sanmārga-Dīpikā.' This 'Sanmārga-Dīpikā' must have been a treatise on Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and a source of inspiration for Vedānta Deśika in his Saccaritra.³ About Varadarāja Paṇḍita we can only say that he is a pre-Vedānta Deśika exponent of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.

1. T. T. page 41.

2. S. R. page 77.

3. S. R. page 77.

v. *Bhoja Rāja.*

Vedānta Deśika notes in his *Saccaritra Rakṣa* (Page 87) one Bhoja Rāja and mentions the latter's work, 'the *Prayoga-Paddhati-Ratnāvalī*' as a treatise on the cult and ritualism of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. In his *Pāncarātra Rakṣā* (pp. 110 and 137) he quotes from this '*Prayoga-Paddhati-Ratnāvalī*'. Nothing more is known about this work.

vi. *Śrī Kṛṣṇa Muni.*

Vedānta Deśika quotes in his *Pāncarātra Rakṣā* (pp. 94, 113 and 122) some verses from a work of one Śrī Kṛṣṇa Muni. One Kṛṣṇa Guru, a disciple of Śrī Rāma Miśra II is mentioned by the Adyar Library Catalogue as a commentator of the *Bhāgavata*. It is possible to take 'Kṛṣṇa Muni' of Vedānta Deśika's references and 'Kṛṣṇa Guru' of the Adyar Library Catalogue as one and the same person.

vii. *Valadevācārya.*

Vedānta Deśika mentions one Valadevācārya along with Bhoja Rāja as an authority on the cult and ritualism of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.¹

viii. *Vasudeva Svāmin.*

Vedānta Deśika mentions one Vasudeva Svāmin as a champion of the cause of the *Pāncarātra-Vaikhānasa Sādhana*.² Nothing more is known about Vasudeva Svāmin.

ix. *Gṛdhra Saromuni.*

Gṛdhra Saromuni and his '*Nityakarma-Sangraha*' are mentioned in Vedānta Deśika's *Pāncarātra Rakṣā*.³ But we know nothing more about him and his work or works.

1. P. R. page 95.

2. P. R. page 102.

3. P. R. page 122.

x. Vangi Vangeśvara.

Vedānta Deśika mentions Vangi Vangeśvara and his anonymous work or works in his Pāncarātra Rakṣā (pp. 123, 110, 135 and so on). Vangi Vangeśvara alias Śrī Ranga Nārāyaṇācārya was, according to Vedānta Deśika, an immediate disciple of Rāmānuja.¹ We can accordingly fix his time as the beginning of the 12th century A. D.

xi. Pratāpa Bhūpa.

One Pratāpa Bhūpa and his 'Ācamana-Nirṇaya', are mentioned by Vedānta Deśika in his Pāncarātra Rakṣā (Page 133). But we know nothing more about the author or the work.

xii. Śrī Viṣṇu Vaibhavādhikāra.

In his Catuṣślokī Bhāṣya, Vedānta Deśika mentions one Śrī Viṣṇu Vaibhavādhikāra and quotes a verse of his.² The verse in question suggests the work to be a Stuti on 'Śrī'.

xiii. Bharata Muni.

One Bharata Muni, a Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ācārya of some eminence finds mention in Vedānta Deśika's Stotra Ratna Bhāṣya.³ We know nothing about him. But he may be identical with Yatiśekhara Bharata, a disciple of Rāmānuja.

xiv. Bhavasvāmin.

A Bhavasvāmin has been mentioned by Vedānta Deśika in his Saccaritra Rakṣā.⁴ He was, in all probability, a writer of some Smṛti-digest and a contemporary of Hemādri (12th Century A.D.).

1. P. R. page 110.

2. C. B. page 15.

3. S. R. B. page 62 and Gadya Traya Bhāṣya, page 107.

4. S. R. page 1.

xv. Nārāyaṇācārya.

Nārāyaṇācārya, on the basis of a reference in the Saccaritra Rakṣā¹, appears to be a follower of Yādava Prakāśa and the author of a 'Tattva Nirṇaya', an extensive treatise on Vaiṣṇavism and Vedāntism.

xvi. Varadarājācārya.

One Varadarājācārya, an author, different from Varadarāja Paṇḍita, whom, we have referred to as the writer of the Sanmārga Dīpikā and also different from Varadarājā, the author of a Smṛti-digest has been mentioned by Vedānta Deśika in his Śata Dūṣaṇi.² Nothing more is known about him.

xvii. Śāḍguṇya Viveka.

This anonymous work is mentioned in the Tattva Tīkā of Vedānta Deśika.³ Nothing more is known about it or its author.

xviii. Parakāla Sūri.

Vedānta Deśika quotes a stanza only of Parakāla Sūri⁴

The above is the extent of literature known from the works of Vedānta Deśika. It all goes to suggest Vedānta Deśika's range of mental culture and erudition. Some of the works, untraceable now, but known to Vedānta Deśika, must have been great assets to Sanskrit literature in general and Viśiṣṭādvaitic literature in particular. A few works, hitherto unknown, such as the Nyāya Kulīśa, the Nīti Mālā and the Tattva Sāra have, however, seen the light of day. An intensive research is needed to unearth the other ones known only from their quotations or references in Vedānta Deśika's works.

1. S. R. page 48.

3. T. T. page 59.

2. S. D. page 60.

4. P. R. page 135.

HIS SUCCESSORS

1. *Varadanātha or Kumāra Vedāntācārya* :—

Vedānta Deśika's immediate successor was his son Varadanātha alias Kumāra Vedāntācārya or Nayinārācārya (A. D. 1317-1414). Like his illustrious father, Varada Nātha also was a great scholar and exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. He was probably the first and the foremost of his father's devoted disciples who had a hand in establishing the Deśika-cult and instituting the worship of the image of Deśika. The Vaḍagalai Śrī Vaiṣṇava temples, containing Deśika Sanctuaries, resound, even to-day, with the strains of Varadanātha's compositions, in honour of Vedānta Deśika.

Some of the incidents connected with his life have already been noticed in Chapter I. The following are the works of Varadanātha :—

1. Tattva Traya Culukam, a small tract on the essentials of Viśiṣṭādvaita.
2. Rahasya Traya Culukam, a small tract on the essentials of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.
3. Adhikaraṇa Cintāmaṇi, a commentary on the Adhikaraṇa Sārāvalī of Vedānta Deśika.
4. Rahasyatrayasārārtha-Sangraha, a summary of the voluminous 'Rahasya-Traya-Sāra' of Vedānta Deśika.
5. Verses on Vedānta Deśika's greatness.
6. Abheda Khaṇḍana—in MS (Adyar Library).
7. Avidyā Khaṇḍana—in MS (Adyar Library).

8. Prapañcamithyātva 'Khaṇḍana—in MS Adyar Library).

It is these works, indeed, that have made Varadanātha famous as Varadanātha Vedāntācārya. The chief-most contribution of Varadanātha, Vedānta Deśika's son and successor, was the popularisation of the 'Deśika Darśana' and the 'Deśika Dharma'. After Varadanātha, it seems, Vedānta Deśika's family-line becomes untraceable. But the line of his disciples runs uninterrupted, even to this day.

Brahma Tantra Svatantra Svāmin (1286-1386 A.D.).

In Brahma Tantra Svatantra Svāmin, Vedānta Deśika had met his spiritual successor and a most faithful exponent of the Deśika Darśana. Brahma Tantra Svatantra Svāmin along with Varadanātha, Vedānta Deśika's son, has been chiefly responsible for propagating and popularising the teachings of Vedānta Deśika. He had a great hand in the spread of the Deśika-Saṃpradāya. According to the 'Epigraphia Indica' (Vol. XXIV, part VII, July 1940 pp. 318-326) he was the founder of a Matha in Conjeevaram in 1360 A. D. for the dissemination of Vedānta Deśika's ideas and ideals. He is also said to have transferred his headquarters to Tirupati, a meeting-place of scholars of repute of different persuasions of the times. After Tirupati, the Svāmin is said to have moved to Mysore on the invitation of Kumāra Kampana, the Viceroy (Daṇḍanāyaka) of the then Vijayanagara Emperor. The famous Parakāla Matha of Mysore owes its origin to him. It is with Brahma Tantra Svatantra Parakāla Svāmin that the spiritual line of Vedānta Deśika starts and knows no break till to-day. The Parakāla Svāmin, Śrī Abhinava Ranganātha Brahmatantra Svatantra Swamihāl II (1925-), under whose feet the writer (of this study) has had the privilege of sitting for sometime, is the present-day bearer of the torch of knowledge (Śemuṣī Bhaktirūpa) borne by his illustrious predecessors. The Cata-

logues record the following two works of Parakāla Svāmin I (14th Century A.D.)¹

1. Ācārya Mangalam.
2. Vijayīndra Parājaya.

The 2nd. viz. Vijayīndra Parājaya seems to have been a dialectic of defence of Viśiṣṭādvaita against Dvaita.

2. *Prativādi Bhayāṅkaram Anṇanācārya* :—

Vedānta Deśika's second famous disciple was a Tēngalai teacher of the name of Prativādi Bhayāṅkaram Anṇanācārya (A.D. 1400-1410). Being a Tēngalai, he was drawn towards the Vaḍagalai Ācārya, Vedānta Deśika. He has immortalized Vedānta Deśika in his work, the Saptati-Ratna-Mālikā. His other works are :—

1. Mithyātva Khaṇḍana Sāra.
2. Vyāvahārikatva Khaṇḍana Sāra.
3. Ānanda Tāratamya Khaṇḍana.

3. *Śrī Nivāsa Dāsa* :—

Śrī Nivāsa Dāsa of Bharadvāja Gotra (14th-15th centuries A.D.), though not in the direct line of Vedānta Deśika's disciples, was, yet, a great Deśika-Bhakta. His most valuable contribution to Deśika-studies is the 'Nyāya Sāra-Sama-Vyākhyā' on Vedānta Deśika's Nyāya Parīśuddhi. Though the Vyākhyā is lost in some parts, it is, yet, suggestive of the great part it plays in the Nyāya-Vedānta reconstruction of Vedānta Deśika.

Śrī Nivāsa Dāsa does not refer to any other work of his in his Nyāya-Parīśuddhi-commentary. It appears, therefore, that such works as the Vādādri Kulīśa, the Viśiṣṭādvaita Siddhānta, the Nyāsa Vidyā Vicāra and so on that are ascribed to him are by his namesake, some other

1. Adyar Library MSS. Catalogue.

Śrī Nivāsa. He is to be distinguished from Śrī Nivāsa, the author of the Yatindra Mata Dīpikā (16th Century A.D.) who refers to the Nyāya Sāra of Śrī Nivāsa Dāsa as one of the sources of the study of the "Rāmānuja Darśana"¹

4. *Brahma Tantra Svatantra Svāmin or Parakāla Yati III*
(14th—15th Century).

This Brahma Tantra Svatantra Svāmin, was probably the author of the Paraṁparā Prabhāvam, a work in Tamil, which gives all the traditional accounts of the lives of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava teachers.

5. *Rāmānuja Dāsa alias Mahācārya* (16th Century A.D.)

He was decidedly the greatest of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholars of his times. He has made himself immortal by his super-commentary, the Caṇḍa Māruta on the Śata Duṣaṇī of Vedānta Deśika.

In his Vedānta Deśika Vaibhava Prakāśikā, a metrical biography of Vedānta Deśika, he has preserved, against the ravages of time, the personality of Vedānta Deśika, the great Viśiṣṭādvaitin and Śrī Vaiṣṇava after the great Rāmānuja. Mahācārya was a prolific writer. He has written the following works (mostly in ms) :—

1. Pārāśarya Vijayah.
2. Brahma Vidyā Vijayah.
3. Sadvidyā Vijayah.
4. Śruti Tātparya Nirṇayah.
5. Advaita Vidyā Vijayah.
6. Gurūpasadana Vijayah.

6. *Appayya Dīkṣita* (16th Century A. D.) :—

Appayya Dīkṣita, the great Advaitācārya, though not a Śrī Vaiṣṇava disciple of Vedānta Deśika, was yet a great admirer of Deśika's ideals. That he wrote commentaries on

1. Yatindra Mata Dīpika. page 101.

Deśika's Yādavābhyudaya and Pādukā Sahasra is a proof, indeed, of his keen sense of admiration for Vedānta Deśika, a rival religionist, to all intents and purposes.

7. *Rāṅga Rāmānuja Muni (16th-17th century A.D.) :—*

Rāṅga Rāmānuja Muni was a famous Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholar and author of his times. He is said to have written 60 works. He has commented upon all the important Upaniṣads, the Śrī Bhāṣya, and the Brahma Sūtras. That he was a keen student of Vedānta Deśika's works is clear from his super commentary on the Nyāya Siddhānta.

8. *Veṅkatādhvarin (16th-17th century A. D.) :—*

The name of Veṅkatādhvarin, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet and a direct descendant of Ātreya Rāmānuja, cannot be omitted in the list of Vedānta Deśika's successors. In his work, the Viśvaguṇādarśa Caṁpū, he has devoted an exclusive section to the delineation of Vedānta Deśika's character and personality. His another work, the Lakṣmī Sahasra, bears the impress of the spirit of the Dayā Śataka and the Pādukā Sahasra of Vedānta Deśika. He is, besides, the author of the following works (cf. Adyar Library MSS Catalogue) :—

1. Ācārya Pañcāśat.
2. Uttara Caṁpū.
3. Varadābhyudaya Caṁpū.
4. Rāghavayādaviyam.
5. Vidhitraya-Paritrāṇa.
6. Pradyumnānandam.
7. Mīmāṃsā Makaranda.

In addition to the above well-known disciples and admirers of Vedānta Deśika, there are others, though less known, of the succeeding centuries (i.e. 17th-18th), who have held the cause of Deśika Darśana, dearest to their hearts. Some of them, such as,

1. Nṛsiṃharāja, the Commentator of the Nikṣepa Rakṣā,
2. Nṛsiṃharāja, the author of the Śata Dūṣaṇī-Vyākhyā, and
3. Nṛsiṃharāja, the author of the Ānanda Dāyini Tīkā, on the Tattva Mukta Kālāpa.

were all great scholars and exponents of the Deśika Darśana.

The line of the followers of Vedānta Deśika is traceable in the 19th-20th centuries also in the person of the following Viśiṣṭādvaitic and Śrī Vaiṣṇava scholars of repute :—

1. The heads of the Parakāla Matha of Mysore.
2. The heads of the Ahobila Matha.
3. The late M. M. C. Narasinhacaryar, and
4. The Prativadi Bhayamkaram Annangaracariar of Conjeevaram.

Some 600 years have gone by since the passing away of Vedānta Deśika. But, the figure of Vedānta Deśika still dominates the world of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought and Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion.

HIS PLACE IN ŚRĪVAIṢṆAVISM.

What is discernible in the Prapatti-doctrine of the Pāncarātra Saṁhitās is the blend of ideas of philosophical and theological significance. The soul-sense of Nārāyaṇa or Vāsudeva appears to be encrusted with sectarianism and pedagogism. It is with the advent of the Ālvārs or the God-mad mystics that the springs of the soul-religion of the Pāncarātrāgama well-up again. Even when the Ālvārs did not profess Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, they lived Śrī Vaiṣṇavism in their day-to-day lives. The first three Ālvārs i. e. Poygaiy-Ālvār, Bhutatt-Ālvār and Peyālvār had abundantly realised, for themselves, the love of God for man and the 'Saulabhya' (the easy accessibility) of the Divine to humanity. The soul-ravishment experienced by Āṇḍāl in her communion with God, symbolizes, in fact, the sublimest sense of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism realised by the Ālvārs. The great Nammālvār's realisation of 'Preyasī-Pāratantrya' in face of the Divine is another great aspect of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism forming the essence of the Ālvārs' lives.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇavism of the Ālvārs was pure soul-religion, the religion of love and devotion to God. It transcended all the bounds of Śrī Vaiṣṇava institutionalism. The Ālvārs, in fact, were blessed with the immediate intuitive realisation of Reality. The Ālvārs knew of no line of demarcation between the domains of philosophy and the dreamlands of religion. In the life of the Ālvārs the Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion had reached the status of a universal religion of man.

And then, slowly but surely, change set in. Śrī Vaiṣṇavism became subject to speedy transitions from the intui-

tionalism of the Ālvārs to the intellectualism of the Aragiyaś. Then came upon the scene the great Yogin, Nātha Muni. What he did, first of all, was to advocate the culture of Prapatti as practised by the Ālvārs. He proclaimed as well, the equality of the Draviḍāmnāya (The Ālvār's songs) with the infallible Vedas. The main idea in Nātha Muni's mind was to rejuvenate religious conservatism and sectarianism with the spirit of the Ālvārs' religion. Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, accordingly, was proclaimed as the real spiritual heritage of India.

Soon after Nātha Muni came his spiritual successor, Alvandār or Yāmunācārya. What he did was to harmonise the Vedic religion with the Prapatti-religion of the Ālvārs. He gave, first of all, a philosophical foundation to the mysticism and the spiritualism of the Ālvārs. Being a mystic himself, he leaned towards Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism which, for him, was the religion of heart rather than of head. His heart ever yearned for the highest Śrī Vaṣṇava ideal, which, meant for him, the laying bare of one's contrite heart before the Divine. The strings of his heart burst forth in divine melodies bringing solace to the hearer—

‘पिता त्वं माता त्वं दयिततनयस्त्वं प्रियसुहृद्,
 त्वमेव त्वं मित्रं गुरुरसि गतिश्चासि जगताम् ।
 त्वदीयस्त्वद्भृत्यस्तव परिजनस्त्वद्गतिरहम्,
 प्रपन्नस्त्वेवं सत्यहमपि तवैवास्मि हि भरः ॥’

Then came Rāmānuja in whose mind, the religion of the Ālvārs and the high philosophy of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads became one coherent whole. His main concern, accordingly, was to build up the philosophy of Śrīvaiṣṇavism. This could be done only by clearing away the Nirviṣeṣādvaitic growth round the ancient Brahma Sūtra-tradition of the Vedānta. He set himself to work. He achieved his aim in his ‘Śrī Bhāṣya’ and his ‘Saraṇāgati Gadya’. He advocated

‘Viśiṣṭādvaita’ against ‘Nirviśeṣādvaita’, proving his system to be the real representative philosophy of the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Brahma Sūtras, the Purāṇas, the Pāncarātra saṃhitās and the Draviḍāmnāya. He stood for the non-differentiation of the theory from the practice. For him Darśana was the form of Sādhana and Sādhana, the function of Darśana. ‘Viśiṣṭādvaita’ and ‘Śrī Vaiṣṇavism’ meant for him the same reality or the same realisation.

Then come the 74 Siṃhāsanādhipatis or the apostles of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism deputed by Rāmānuja to preach and practise the religion and philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita as the only ideal and the only attainment. All these apostles, being men of unimpeachable character, strove their utmost and with success, to live up to the ideals of Rāmānuja. But what ultimately happened was that after the Master’s Retirement some of them leaned towards philosophy while others were snatched away by religion. That is to say, that, by and by, philosophy and religion parted company. Seeds of dissent started finding congenial soil in the hearts of Rāmānujists. It was at this juncture that Vedānta Deśika arrived on the scene and with the sheer force of his personality brought the situation under control. Antagonism between philosophy and religion, though not dead, could not rear its head for some-time. Although he has been acclaimed as the leader of the Vaḍagalai-sect of Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, having in Pillai Lokācārya, the head of the Tengalai-group, as his rival, yet, he was the only Śrīvaiṣṇava Acārya of his times who stood for the unity and the solidarity of the Śrīvaiṣṇavas. He ever prayed to God - ‘वैरजनती विजहान्वयूया’ (by your grace, O Lord! may faultfindingness, the mother of mutual intolerance, leave us in peace). To blame Vedānta Deśika for the origin of the ‘Aṣṭādaśa-Bhedas’ or 18 dicords as tabulated in :—

‘भेदः स्वामि-कृपा-फलान्यगतिषु श्रीव्याप्त्युपायत्वयोः,

तद्वात्सल्य-दया-निरुक्तिवचसोन्यासे च तत्कर्तारि ।

धर्म-त्यागविरोधयोस्स्वविहिते न्यासाङ्गहेतुत्वयोः,

प्रायश्चित्तविधौ तदीयभजनेऽनुव्याप्ति-कैवल्ययोः ॥'

does not seem to be fully justified. The points of Śrī Vaiṣṇavaite dissention such as—

- (i) Svāmi-kṛpā (the grace of God) : Sahetuka (caused by human merit) VS Nirhetuka (uncaused or spontaneous),
- (ii) Phala (the ultimate emancipation of the soul) : Impersonal (accruing to God) VS Personal (acquired by the soul).
- (iii) Śrī : Vibhu VS Aṇu.
- (iv) Para-Doṣa-Darśitva (removal of doṣa from the devoted soul) VS Para-Doṣa-Duhkhitva (sharing by God in human sorrows), and
- (v) Prapatti (self-surrender) : subservience to Varṇāśrama Dharma VS. freedom from Varṇāśrama Dharma.

are not the products of Vedānta Deśīka's mind but the trends of the times.

Vedānta Deśīka, in fact, was the last man to create schism in the Śrī Vaiṣṇava fold. It is a different story that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism got itself divided into Vaḍagalaism and Tengalaism. Vedānta Deśīka's role in the history of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism is the role of a unifying force trying its utmost for a peaceful settlement of discord between conservatism and progressivism, between Veda and Prabandham, between Dharma and Brahman, between Jñāna and Bhakti and to crown all, between Tengalaism and Vaḍagalaism.

HIS PLACE IN VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA.

In the history of Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought, Vedānta Deśika occupies a unique place. Being a teacher of the system, he commands the same respect as the founder of the system. He is acknowledged by his contemporaries, let alone his successors, as the only representative writer on the Rāmānuja Darśana.

His pre-eminence seems to be due to the following facts :—

- (i) He is the only Viśiṣṭādvaitin after Rāmānuja, who was destined to lead a dedicated life, dedicated to the cause of 'Ubhaya Vedānta'.
- (ii) He is the only Śrī Vaiṣṇavācārya who was equipped with a great dialectical acumen.
- (iii) He is the only Viśiṣṭādvaitin who combines logic with poetry, intellectualism with emotionalism and ritualism with spiritualism.
- (iv) He is the only religious head of his times who led a life of poverty and cared a fig for worldly riches.
- (v) He is the only sectarian leader of his days who was liked, even for his conservatism, by the people.
- (vi) He is the only religious teacher of his times who commanded respect from his rival-religionists.

The post-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachers were concerned with two things :

- (i) the expoundation of the Śrī Bhāṣya and

- (ii) the dissemination of the teachings of the Prabandhams.

Now, those who were engaged in Śrī Bhāṣyic studies were, more or less, of conservative temperament. And those busy with the popularisation of the ideals of the Ālvārs' songs were called progressivists. The first group is represented by such famous scholars as Rāma Mīśra II, the exponent of the works of Rāmānuja; Viṣṇucitta, the mouthpiece of the Rāmānuja Vedānta; Vātsya Varadācārya, the venerable seer and scholar of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism; Sudarśanācārya, the famous Vyākhyākāra of the Śrī Bhāṣya; and last but not the least, Ātreya Rāmānuja alias Vāḍiham-sāmbudācārya, a critical scholar and constructive thinker of Rāmānuja's philosophy. The representatives of the second group are Parāśara Bhattāraka, the logician-saint; Nanjīyar (alias Nārāyaṇa Muni), the apostle of popular Śrī Vaiṣṇavism; Periavacan Pillai, the exponent of the Tāmil Veda in his 'Twenty-four thousand'; Vadaḱku Tiruvīdipillai, the famous exponent of the Prabandhams and to crown all Pillai Lokācārya (A. D. 1264-1327) Vedānta Deśika's elder contemporary, and a great Śrī Vaiṣṇava having a hand in the philosophical foundation of Prapatti' and Śrī Vaiṣṇava spiritualism. But it is in the person of Vedānta Deśika alone that the above two trends of conservatism and progressivism, characterising Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism after Rāmānuja, meet for the first and probably the last time also. Being a Vaḍagalai Śrī Vaiṣṇavācārya, he did more than most of the Tēngalai teachers, for the spread of the progressive tendencies of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion and philosophy.

Unlike any other post-Rāmānuja teacher it was he alone who possessed the real synthetic sense, the key-note of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta. It was he, who carved, first of all, a prominent niche for Prapatti in the midst of the Vedic

Sādhanaś or the Brahma Vidyās. It was he alone who gave, first of all, a sound metaphysical background to Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. It was he alone in the host of his contemporaries or successors who utilised the services of poetry for the spread of the ideals of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism. The Vaḍagalais and the Tengalais both looked upto him for upholding the cause of Viśiṣṭādvaita against the attacks of the Śāṅkara-Vedāntins, the Mādhva-logicians and the other diverse critics of Rāmānuja. The legacy he has left in the form of his Darśana; the Deśika Darśana, to be sure, has ever since been enriching the Rāmānuja Darśana and the Rāmānuja Saṁpradāya. What was Rāmānuja Darśana in the pre-Vedānta Deśika-times became the 'Vedānta Deśika-Darśana' in the post-Vedānta Deśika period. In fact, the strength of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta depends as much on Rāmānuja's masterly formulation as on Vedānta Deśika's critical exposition.

Vedānta Deśika is the real representative of the Rāmānuja Darśana and the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Saṁpradāya. This fact has abundantly been made clear by the great sage Vidyāraṇya (13th-14th centuries A. D.) who quotes Vedānta Deśika's Tattva Mukta Kalāpa, instead of Rāmānuja's Śrī Bhāṣya, while summarising the points of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita (Vide the 'Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha').

That Appayya Dikṣita (15th-16th centuries A.D.) took Vedānta Deśika's Yādavābhyudaya and Pādukā Sahasra to be the real poetic presentations of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism is an evidence in itself of Vedānta Deśika's eminence in the galaxy of post-Rāmānuja Viśiṣṭādvaitins.

The posterity takes Vedānta Deśika to be the only Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vedāntin, who, by his contributions, has given the Rāmānuja Darśana, the high logical character, similar to

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that given by Śrī Haṛṣa, Citsukha, Madhūsūdana Sarasvatī and Appayya Dīkṣita to the Śāṅkara Vedānta. Moreover, Vedānta Deśika is the only Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialectician who is on par with such great Mādhva polemic writers as Jaya Tīrtha and Vyāsa Tīrtha.

CHAPTER VIII.

AS A RELIGIOUS REFORMER OF INDIA.

The role Vedānta Deśika played as a religious reformer of India can be best appreciated by those who make a comparative study of the teachers of Hinduism of the medieval centuries. One thing stands out supreme and it is this : Vedānta Deśika had realised in his life the ideal of self-renunciation. In the times he lived it was self-renunciation of men like him that could save Hinduism from the onslaughts of Mohammedanism. He had enough of Vairāgya in him to work for the good of men. The best of his works of reform was, indeed, his personal practice of the highest ideals of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and Hinduism in his day-to-day life.

It is a fact that he was associated with Vaḍaḡalai Śrīvaiṣṇavism that emphasized the Varṇa-Āśrama-basis of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism. But what he meant by the stress he laid on the performance of the duties of one's social status and standard in day-to-day life, was the preservation of the ancient Vedic culture and never the imposition of restrictions on persons of lower castes in the matter of practising religion. Hinduism gained much through the efforts of Vedānta Deśika. His attitude might have meant some set-back to the universalism of the Ālvār's religion and the liberalism of Rāmānuja's religious culture, but, nevertheless, it went a great way in strengthening the spirit of Hinduism, in those troubled times, when, confusion of ideas, in the wake of Mohammedan onslaughts, was out to weaken the social foundations of India.

The times did not demand from Deśika the inculcation of the spirit of 'Preyasi-Pāratañtrya' of Nammālvār. The

Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa-mysticism of the Bhāgavata was equally out of the question. The religious democracy of the Maratha saints was also not needed. Vedānta Deśika acted on his historical sense of the Hindu religion. Being the head of an institutional religion he always stood for the culture of pure religion. What he prescribed by way of remedy, to the Hindu religion, was the preservation of its age-old individuality. Accordingly, he did not like to weaken the Varṇāśrama-basis of India's religious culture. He knew for certain that the institutional religion of the Vedas and the Smṛtis could not be a universal religion of man. But he knew this also that the religion of the Vedas and the Smṛtis contained the spirit of selfless love and service in such a measure as to make it worthy of universal acceptance and practice—

‘अङ्गेकुर्वन्त्वक्लुषधियः नित्यमध्यात्मविद्याम् ,

आद्यो धर्मः स्पृशतु वसुधामाशिषः पारवर्ती ।’¹

i. e. ‘May the supreme religious sense, that first dawned on the Vedic seers, touch the chords of the hearts of the peoples of the world. May we all be blessed with Self-realisation ever and for ever, in ever increasing measure.’

Part II

**VEDANTA DEŚIKA : HIS CONTRI-
BUTIONS TO VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA**

NYĀYA-VEDĀNTA-SYNCRETISM (EPISTEMOLOGICAL)

The Nyāya-Vedānta-Syncretism has been the first concern of Deśika as the teacher of the Rāmānuja System and the founder of his own philosophy called the Deśika Darśana. It was Nātha Muni, the first Ācārya of Viśiṣṭādvaita, (8th century, A.D.) who in his Nyāya Tattva, known to us from its quotations in Vedānta Deśika's works, had long attempted the syncretism of the Nyāya with the Vedānta, after re-interpreting the Nyāya-Sūtras, divesting them of the traditional concepts of Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara and their followers. Nātha Muni's mission met its fulfilment in the efforts of later Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachers such as Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, Varada Viṣṇu Miśra and so on. Even then the ancient Nyāya-doctrines of the traditional Nyāya teachers were so indelibly impressed on the minds of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians that Vedānta Deśika had to finally tackle the problem of the syncretization of the Nyāya with the Vedānta.

In the following pages our concern will be to study and evaluate the Nyāya-Vedānta-syncretism of Vedānta Deśika in respect of Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology followed by Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic and dialectics.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic Epistemology

Viśiṣṭādvaitic Epistemology takes its being from Viśiṣṭādvaitic Ontology.¹ The ultimate reality according to the metaphysics of Viśiṣṭādvaita is 'Aśeṣacidacitprakāraṇa

1. N.S. Page 260 (Madras edn.)

Brahma',¹ or the Transcendental Being in and through Its material (acit) and spiritual (cit) attributes. It is not an undifferentiated, eternal, self-shining consciousness as the Nirviśeṣādvaitins think. Consequently, consciousness is not an abstract all-pervading independent entity, but the expression of the all-conscious Being in Its essential nature, the very pulsation of the life of Reality, the never-to-be-separable glory of the Great Self. The very being of Reality is self-luminous consciousness and the expression, as well, of Reality is self-luminous consciousness. Consciousness presupposes a Conscious Being.

Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology contrasted with Nirviśeṣādvaitic epistemology.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of knowledge steers a course different from that of the Nirviśeṣādvaitic theory of knowledge. In the school of Śaṅkara, pure undifferentiated consciousness being the ultimate reality, the fact of knowledge presupposing subject-object-relationship is an empiric fact, an appearance. In the school of Rāmānuja and Vedānta-Deśika, as the ultimate reality is an Omniscient, Omnipresent and Omnipotent Being, revealing Itself in Its aspects of 'Cit' and 'Acit' and yet transcending them, the fact of knowledge is the expression of Reality Itself in Its immanent as well as transcendent aspects. The metaphysics of Śaṅkara postulates that knowledge, being essentially relational and differentiated, cannot grasp Reality which is Absolute and Undifferentiated. The metaphysics of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika recognizes all knowledge as the knowledge of Reality. Whereas, the Śaṅkara-system sees a bridgeless gulf between the subject and the object because of the mutual contradictoriness of their nature, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic system views the subject and the object meeting together in all conscious experiences.

According to the Nirviśeṣādvaitic conception, all the empiric presentations are ultimately sublated by the absolute universal consciousness ; but, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception, all our presentations are but partial presentations ultimately meant to be sublimated by the supreme transcendental awareness. For Śāṅkara, truth is transcendental, but, for Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika, truth is grasped epistemologically, logically, and metaphysically. Whereas Śāṅkara holds intuition to be identical with 'Nirviśeṣādvaitam' or the absolute reality, Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika take intuition as intuiting 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam' or the absolute reality as a unity in diversity. In the Śāṅkara-Vedānta, epistemology does not take its being from ontology because it is possible only in relational consciousness. But in Viśiṣṭādvaita, epistemology is the explanation of ontology and is true to all levels of consciousness and all aspects of reality.

Nature of Knowledge.

All the systems of Indian philosophy conceive of knowledge as an event brought into being by subject-object-synthesis.¹ It is a different matter whether the subject, the object and their synthesis are true empirically only or really also. Knowledge is the knowledge of an object. Knowledge happens to a subject. Knowledge without an object is an impossibility. It is likewise non-entity without a subject. Knowledge, according to the Nyāya as well as the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vedānta, is an illumination of the object.² The object, of knowledge, in Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology, is not the same as in the Nyāya-epistemology. Whereas Viśiṣṭādvaita admits the One, Absolute, Immanent and Transcendent Being as the ultimate object of knowledge³

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi Page 174 (Conjeevaram edn.)

2. Tārkika Rakṣā Page 124 (Pandit) and N. P. Page 86 (Conjeevaram).

3. N. P. Page 86 (Conjeevaram).

and regards the 6 categories of matter, time, soul, supreme being, pure matter and consciousness as knowable objects, the Nyāya recognizes as objects of knowledge, the sensuous entities such as the earth, the water, the light, the air, the soul and the qualities excluding weights, dharma, adharma, Saṁskāra, movement, generality, inherence and non-existence.¹ Since Viśiṣṭādvaita holds a different view of the nature of the subject, it cannot hold the Naiyāyika view of the nature of the object. In Viśiṣṭādvaita all the knowables and all the objects of knowledge essentially remain the revelations of the Supreme Being Knowledge, which is 'Ārtha Prakāśa', is essentially 'Brahma-Prakāśa'. Like Nyāya, Viśiṣṭādvaita also postulates, for the fact of knowledge, the identity of the metaphysical subject, the epistemological subject and the logical subject. But it differs from Nyāya in the conception of the nature of the subject. For the Nyāya, the subject is Ātman, the Cetana, the soul, where inheres the quality of Caitanya, Jñāna i. e. consciousness.² For Viśiṣṭādvaita, the subject is the Jīva, the Ātman, the self-conscious being, essentially an attribute of the Transcendental Being, though, suffering from imperfections due to the impact of the Saṁsāra and all that Saṁsāra stands for. The Nyāya does not recognize the subject of knowledge as fit to be immediately intuited.³ But the Viśiṣṭādvaita emphatically asserts that the subject of knowledge is self-intuiting and can be intuited immediately.⁴ The subject is all-pervasive, Vibhu,⁵ in Nyāya, but, it does not know all objects at once in as much as its instrument of knowledge i. e. Manas or mind is atomic.⁶ But in Viśiṣṭādvaita

1. Tārkika Rakṣā, Page 124.

2. Tārkika Rakṣā, Page 120.

3. N. S. 1.1.10.

4. N. P. Page 86.

5. N. S. Bhāṣya, Page 310.

6. N. S. Bhāṣya, Page 311.

vaīta the subject, the self-conscious entity the Dharmin-consciousness, even when atomic in nature, can know all objects through its Dharma-consciousness which can reach out to any object whatsoever. Manas in Viśiṣṭādvaita is a sense-capacity like the other five sense-capacities.¹ According to Nyāya, it is the Manas or the mind which brings about the relationship of the subject with the object through the agency of the senses. But according to Viśiṣṭādvaita it is the subject, the self-conscious eternal spiritual being that comes into contact with the objects of knowledge, through its Dharma-Bhūta Jñāna. Although, the Dharma-Bhūta Jñāna is essentially pure and all-pervasive, yet, its powers are restricted by the Kārmic-limitations. Thus it is that it expands and contracts and is not the constant universal effulgence like the Transcendental Dharmin-Consciousness.

Knowledge is the experience of the Knower. The knower, the Dharmin-Bhūta-Jñāna, the self-conscious being energises the Dharma-Bhūta-Jñāna, the attribution consciousness, to illumine the objects as well as itself, both at the same time.

Knowledge is eternal, as the knower is eternal. Yet its experience is possible only when it has illuminated the object. The states of sleep, dream etc. are all explicable, in as much as, knowledge, even when eternal, is restricted in its illumination of an object by the material inertia entering into the physical and the psychical make-up of the knower. Knowledge, which, in deep sleep, is unmanifest, becomes manifest in the state of awakening. There is no knowledge manifest in deep sleep as there is no illumination of an object there. Rāma Miśra's suggestion concerning knowledge as manifest even in sleep is un-Bhāṣyic according to Vedānta Deśika. The persistence of the 'I' or the ego-illumination

1. N. S. page 35

in sleep does not mean the functioning of knowledge but the effulgence of the self, the Dharmin-consciousness.

The most striking characteristic of knowledge, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, is this : While knowledge is an attribute¹ of the self in the sense that it is inalienably related to it and that its essential character of illumination is dependent on it², it is also a substance, like any other substance, in the sense that, being 'continuent' it allows expansion, contraction³ and so on as its 'occurent' phases and operations. Thus knowledge is 'Dravya' and 'Adravya' both. It is a substantive-attributive entity.⁴ The relation, accordingly, between the self and its knowledge is not the relation of inherence as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-realism would have it, but, a natural constitution that may be termed 'apṛthaksiddhi' or inseparability or inalienability. Just as a luminous object and its luminosity are found to co-exist, so do the self and its knowledge naturally exist together. Whereas the one i. e. the luminous object or the soul is the static aspect, the other i. e. luminosity or knowledge is the dynamic aspect of the same being of consciousness. Although the self-conscious soul and consciousness are inseparable, yet, they are, distinguishable.

The subject, and the object, the sentient and the non-sentient are not diametrically opposed to each other, since, they are essentially synthetized in Brahman, their real being. The resultant factor i.e. knowledge also becomes the experience of the One Being.

Knowledge, in Viśiṣṭādvaita, strictly speaking, is neither 'Sṛṣṭi Drṣṭi' as it is in Nyāya, nor 'Drṣṭi Sṛṣṭi' as it is in

1. N. S. page 265.

2. N. S. page 263.

3. N. S. page 265.

4. N. S. page 263.

Nirviśeṣādvaita, but 'Brahma Dṛṣṭi' in as much as it is the Transcendental Subject that is the ground of all knowables, and the experienter of the facts, of knowledge also.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita knowledge is explained in the following ways :—

The subject i.e. the Supreme Being, who is the being of our being, is the ultimate Knower. Knowledge, as essential attribute of the subject, and a substance in regard to its various states, goes out through the sense-channels and contacts the objects of experience. While contacting the objects for the sake of the subject, knowledge illumines itself by illuminating the objects.¹

But in Nyāya its explanation will be like this :—

Knowledge is made manifest on the mind-sense-object-contact and as such it points to a substrate which cannot be other than the self, the subject, wherein it inheres essentially.

We have seen so far that Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not explain knowledge purely from the epistemological and the logical points of view. Because, according to their system, knowledge is neither a chemical secretion of the organism, nor a string of sensations, nor an empiric experience of a transcendental reality suffering under some illusion, nor even an issue of subject-object-meeting, but, an illumination with the self-shining soul that is meant for the manifestation of the objects of experience.

In this Dharma-Bhūta-illumination, in this Buddhi or knowledge are implied pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort² which, according to the Nyāya, are the signs of the Ātman or the soul.³ That means that 'consciousness' includes

1. N. S. page 260.

2. N. S. page 273.

3. Nyāya Sūtra 1. 1. 10.

in itself all its aspects such as the presentative, the emotive, the effective, the conative and so on. It is unreasonable to believe that pleasure and pain etc. are other than agreeable or disagreeable facts of knowledge. Thus there is no point in saying that knowledge, along with pleasure and pain etc., leads to the inference of the substrate i. e. the Ātman. Pleasure and pain, desire and aversion etc. should not also be taken as the Vṛttis or the propensities of the mind¹. Although the 'Ātmasiddhi' of Yāmūnācārya² implies that pleasure and pain etc. are qualities of the mind and the Śrī Bhāṣya³ also suggests that the mind means all the emotive and the conative aspects of consciousness, yet, Vedānta Deśika asserts that 'definite knowledge, indefinite cognition, pleasure, pain etc. should either be taken as distinct aspects of consciousness consequent upon peculiar types of object-illuminations or as inner distinctions in consciousness, so affected by the objects.'⁴ Vedānta Deśika also states that the exponents of Rāmānuja such as Rāma Miśra⁵, Varada Viṣṇu Miśra⁶ and Viṣṇucitta⁷ and others take pleasure and pain etc. as particular aspects of consciousness on account of particular kinds of objects affecting consciousness or the conscious being.

A question may be asked : if desire, aversion etc. be the transformations of consciousness, how can the Transcendental Consciousness remain unaffected by such transformations ! The Viśiṣṭādvaitic system solves it by saying that no agreeable affection is possible to the Transcendental Consciousness. It is possible that the desire, say to create and to protect the universe, may affect the Transcendental Consciousness, but

1. N. S. page 271.

2. N. S. page 272-273.

3. N. S. page 273.

4. N. S. page 273.

5. N. S. page 275.

even then it can do so only indirectly i. e. that it can affect it only in regard to the activity of creation, protection etc. and never in the respect of its essential nature or being.

The super-sensuous entity called the 'Aṛṣṭa' by the Mīmāṃsā-philosophers is simply the pleasure or the displeasure of the Supreme Being and as such it is implied in Divine Knowledge.¹ Some of the ethical and the æsthetic perfections of the Divine Personality such as divine sympathy for soul, divine response to human love and so on are simply the aspects of the transcendental consciousness. The Aesthetic emotions of the permanent and the transient varieties such as Rati i.e. love and Nirveda i.e. self-pity and so on are nothing more than the effective aspects of the Dharma-Bhūta-Jñāna or the attributive consciousness.

Thus in the above analysis of the nature of knowledge, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, what is abundantly clear is that knowledge is the illumination of an object for the sake of the self, the subject, and that it is the subject, the self that imparts its own illumination to knowledge before the latter can illumine an object. Never is knowledge either seen in its static aspect i.e. the Dharmin-consciousness or, the Ātman or viewed in its dynamic aspect i.e. the Dharma-consciousness, the Jñāna an abstract, indeterminable entity. Nature of knowledge follows from the nature of Being.

Self-luminosity as the essential character of knowledge

Knowledge, according to the epistemology of the Vedānta, both of the schools of Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja, has got self-luminosity or self-evidence as its essential character. Although Viśiṣṭādvaita differs from the Nirviśeṣādvaita in its Conception of Self-luminosity of knowledge, yet both the systems look upon self-revelation as an inherent feature of

knowledge. As for instance, Śrī Harṣa, the great Polemic writer of the Śāṅkara School, states in his Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khāḍya (page 21) : —

‘विज्ञानं तावत् स्वप्रकाशं, स्वत एव सिद्धस्वरूपम् ।
न खलु विज्ञाने सति जिज्ञासोरपि कस्यचित् जानामि न वेति संशयः,
न जानामीति वा विपर्ययः, व्यतिरेक प्रमा वा । अतः सर्वजनस्वात्म-
संवेदन सिद्धमेवास्य बोधस्य स्वरूपम् ।’

Or that it is the self-experience of every body that—
‘I know’ requires no further proof of ‘I know that I know’.
Knowledge is essentially self-evident and self-proved. The
fact of ‘I know’ is beyond any doubt or disillusionment.

Similarly asserts Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, the great Viśiṣṭ-
ādvaitic logician-philosopher, in his Tattva Ratnākara I

‘धियः प्रत्यक्षभावत्वात् परतस्तदसंभवात् ।
पारिशेष्यात् स्वतोभानं प्रमाणाच्च ततस्ततः ॥
प्रतीतेर्व्याहृष्यतः सन्देहपरिवर्जनात् ।
सत्तायां सिद्धवत् कारात् ज्ञानं भातीति भावितम् ॥
परस्यादर्शनाद् व्याप्तादन्वयिव्यतिरेकितः ।
अर्थापत्तौश्च युक्तौश्च वचनाच्च स्वदृढमतिः ॥’

Or that knowledge is self-evident in as much as it is
essentially an immediate awareness. As soon as knowledge
comes into being, it is characterised by self-certitude or the
experience of ‘I Know’.

But ‘self-luminosity’ for the Śāṅkara-School means
something else than what it exactly means for the Rāmānuja-
school. The Śāṅkarites will analyse self-luminosity of
consciousness as follows :—

‘Consciousness is self-luminous as it is consciousness,
Otherwise (i. e. if consciousness were to be cognized),
it would be other than consciousness, just like a jar.’

This analysis means that consciousness, to be self-luminous, must not be cognized by another consciousness, because, that which is cognized by consciousness is not consciousness but an unconscious object.

But the Rāmānujists mean by self-luminosity of consciousness the following¹ :—

‘यत्त्वन्मुभूतेः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वमुक्तं तद्विषयप्रकाशनवेलायां
ज्ञातुरात्मनस्तथैव, न तु सर्वेषां सर्वदा तथैवेति नियमोऽस्ति ।’

Or that consciousness to be self-luminous means that when it illumines an object to a particular subject at a particular moment, it illumines itself without requiring any other agent for its illumination. It does not mean, therefore, that it remains self-luminous at all times and to all the subjects.

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology, as Vedānta Deśika puts it,² consciousness, whenever it comes into being, as it always does, as an illumination of an object to a subject, at a time, is essentially characterised with self-luminosity, in as much as, it is ever illumined by its substrate i. e. the self-conscious Ātman. But to other subjects or at other times, it is not self-luminous as in such cases its existence is either inferred or recollected. With regard to the omniscient Being, it may, decidedly, be asserted that He experiences His all-embracing consciousness as ever self-luminous and self-existent.

Following the fundamental difference in the very conception of consciousness, there is a basic difference, between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, in the conception of the self-luminosity of consciousness also. To Śaṅkara, consciousness is objectless, partless, and indeterminate. To Rāmānuja, Consciousness is about an object, and is essentially determinate and divisible in this or that unit. That is why according

1. Śrī Bhāṣya Introduction.

2. N. S. Page 249.

to Śaṅkara and his school the self-evidence of consciousness is an eternal fact transcending time and space and causality. But, according to Rāmānuja and his school, it is commonly experienced in the world of space-time-causality. The analogies of the finger-end not touching itself, the axe not cutting itself and the fire not burning itself do not prove that consciousness cannot illuminate itself.¹

The Nyāya-contention that knowledge is not self-evident is unfounded

The Nyāya or the Vaiśeṣika epistemology does not recognize self-evidence as the essential character of knowledge. Accordingly, whenever a fact of knowledge comes into being, it is cognized by 'Mānasa Pratyakṣa' or mental perception or an act of after-knowledge or introspection called 'anuvyavasāya'. Thus knowledge is not 'svaprakāśa' but 'paraprakāśa'. And knowledge being Paraprakāśa means that without introspection the fact of 'I know' is impossible to explain.

The epistemologies of the Śaṅkara-and the Rāmānuja-schools of Vedānta do not approve of the above Nyāya-Contention. If knowledge revealing objects of experience remained unrevealed then it can never be revealed by any amount of Anuvyavasāya. If, however, a second unit of knowledge were assumed for the revelation of the first unit of knowledge, it may be pointed out that the second unit itself being unrevealed cannot reveal the first unit. If the second unit of knowledge called 'anuvyavasāya' be supposed to be self-revealed, it is better to posit self-revelation with regard to the first unit itself to avoid 'anavasthā' or infinite regress.

One knows that one knows a thing in the same instant.²

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 175.

2. T.M.K. 4.1

Even the Nyāya philosophy postulates omniscience with regard to God. How can God be all-knowing if He did not know that He was all-knowing! It cannot be held that omniscience is only self-experienced but not self-revealed, since one thing cannot be the agent as well as the object at the same time. Without self-revelation as its essential character knowledge ceases to be knowledge.¹

Further, if knowledge were not essentially self-revealed at the moment of its inception, how can the Naiyāyika explain the common experience of stream-consciousness (Dhārāvāhika Vijnāna)! When anything becomes an object of knowledge, say, for an appreciable duration of time, the knowledge that results is a stream of knowledge. If each succeeding unit were to cognize each preceding unit then there will be a break in the flow of knowledge-stream (the Dhārā-Vāhika-Vijnāna). Therefore, the 'Dhārā Vāhika Vijnāna', taken either as a unitary consciousness or a stream consciousness must needs be recognised as self-revealed otherwise if introspection was to help the revelation of the individual units the result will be the blocking of the flow of consciousness². Consequently knowledge must be taken to be self-revealed in the very moment of its existence.³

The Mīmāṃsaka-view that knowledge is revealed through the revelation of objects is unscientific.

The Vedāntic schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja do not agree with the view of the revelation of knowledge through object-revelation as held by the Kumārila-school of mīmāṃsā. Vedānta Deśika criticises the above Mīmāṃsaka-view⁴ which means that what is involved in the expe-

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi on T. M. K. 4.1

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 175.

3. T. M. K. 4.2

4. T. M. K. 4.3 and N. S. page 250 (Mad ras Edn.)

rience of 'I know this or that' is the fact of 'Prakaṣatā' or 'Prākāṣya' or 'Jñātātā' i. e. cognizedness, a quality of the object of experience leading to the inference of knowledge, its cause.

If cognizedness, a product of the cognition of the object, led to the inference of its cause i. e. cognition, why should it not simply lead to the causal collocation of cognition itself! The inference of cognition, instead of the causal collocation of cognition, becomes simply superfluous in the circumstance.¹ If, however, Cognizedness led to cognition, unrevealed in itself, the result will be nothing but doubt and disillusionment. If, on the other hand, it involved cognition as self-revealed, it would mean that cognition being self-revealed must result in cognizedness also as self-revealed which is not the idea of cognizedness in the mind of the Mīmāṃsā-epistemologist. The contention that 'cognizedness' is produced in the object by the cognition of the object, and helps our practical behaviour towards objects or our usage of words for the objects is also absurd, in as much as it is not 'cognizedness' but the very nature and Constitution of the objects that guarantees the practical utility of the objects or the verbal usage for the objects in our day-to-day life.² Even if 'cognizedness' were admitted to lead to its cause i. e. 'cognition', it can only do so in regard to the present objects as it can never apply to the past and the future objects which will have to remain, consequently, unknown for ever.³ Thus it is unscientific, to hold that knowledge, such as 'I know the jar', is inferred from some super-sensible imaginary character of 'knownness' produced in the jar. The fact is that knowledge as such is essentially self-revealed and self-evident at the very moment of its

1. T. M. K. 4.3.

2. M. S. page 251.

3. N.S. page 251.

inception.¹ This self-revelation in turn means the immediate intuitive experience of all objects of all kinds of knowledge.²

Self-Validity of Knowledge.

Along with self-luminosity of self-evidence, self-validity also has been recognized by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology as the essential feature of knowledge. So says Vedānta Deśika—

‘सर्वं साक्षात्करोति स्वत उपधिगणैरुज्झितरसंप्रसादः ।

प्रामाण्यं तत्र नोपाध्युपनतमिति.....³

Or that the immediate intuition of the soul is essentially self-revealing as well as self-valid.

Now, wherein does consist the self-validity of knowledge ? If one sees an object, such as a jar, one apprehends it immediately. What is the validity of the apprehension of the ‘Jar’, here ? It can be nothing more than the existence of the jar in its essential character. How is the validity of the apprehension of the ‘jar’ proved, in the case ? The apprehension that grasps the ‘Jar’ proves its validity as soon as it comes into being.⁴

In fact all kinds of knowledge are self-valid in as much as they all grasp and reveal their corresponding objects. Self-validity is inherent in the very nature of knowledge. If it were not so, it could never be brought about by any external agency. It is a matter of self-experience. Even the erroneous knowledge of ‘Śukti-Rajata’ (the shell-silver illusion) is not essentially invalid in as much as it does grasp something yonder existing in the space-time world.⁵ It is only the presence of certain defects in the vision or the

1. & 2. N.S. page 252.

3. T. M. K. 4.104

4. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 247.

5. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 247.

casual collocation of vision that leads to the invalidity of the 'shell-silver'-experience. Validity of knowledge is intrinsic; invalidity extrinsic. Even those epistemologists, such as the Naiyāyikas, who hold that the validity of knowledge is conditioned by factors external to the factors of knowledge as such, do admit the self-validity of the knowledge of the Supreme Being where no defects of vision can be found. Therefore, it stands to reason, so argues Vedānta Deśika, to accept self-validity of all knowledge, human and divine, and explain invalidity, wherever it may be, as caused by factors outside knowledge.

In the illumination of an object of the space.time-world, all knowledge is self-valid and self-consistent. Otherwise no knowledge can be called 'arthaprakāśa' and 'arthakṛyā-kārin.' Invalidity is caused by other factors and applies to the following two characters of the object.¹

- (i) The 'Svarūpa-Nirūpaka-Dharma' or the characters that determine an object. For instance in 'the shell-silver-illusion' the determining characters of the 'this' (Idam = Śukti) is not grasped and what is grasped instead, is the determining character of a 'silver' (Rajatam)—a different object.
- (ii) The 'Nirūpita svarūpa viśeṣaka Dharma' or the defining details as for instance, in the 'Yellow-conch' cognition, although the object i. e. the conch in its determining characters is grasped, yet, the defining details i. e. the white colour of the conch, remains completely ungrasped and instead, some other colour figures in knowledge.

Thus, knowledge is essentially self-valid and when it is not so it is due to extraneous factors.

The self-validity of knowledge may be analysed in its two-fold aspects :—

- (i) The 'Utpatti' of the self-validity of knowledge
i. e. its ratio-essendi, and
- (ii) The 'Jñāpti' of the self-validity of knowledge
i. e. its ratio-cognoscendi.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology, like the Mīmāṃsā-epistemology, maintains self-validity of knowledge in both the above aspects. The causal collocation producing any knowledge, produces also the self-validity of knowledge. Self-validity is fundamental to knowledge,¹ invalidity being accidental.

As there is self-origination of validity of knowledge, so there is self-cognoscibility of the validity of knowledge². In fact, even those philosophical schools such as the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, that postulate validity of knowledge in its 'Utpatti' and 'Jñāpti'-stages through extraneous causes, have to believe in the self-validity of the all-incompassing Divine Knowledge in the Utpatti-stage at least, in as much as the Omniscient Reality is neither an agent nor has it any instrument of generation of Knowledge. Now, if the Eternal Divine Knowledge, the eternal basis of all self-valid knowledge, were not supposed to know its eternal self-validity the result will be that God will cease to be omniscient!³ Thus, whether it be human knowledge or transcendental divine consciousness, it is essentially self-valid both in its origin and in its cognoscibility. Wherever there is invalidity as in human illusions and erroneous cognitions it is extrinsic both as regards its ratio-essendi i. e. its Utpatti and its ratio-cognoscendi i. e. its Jñāpti.⁴ Invalidity of knowledge means

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 248.

2. T. M. K. 4.109.

3. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 249.

4. „ „ „ 250.

the illumination of an object not in its essentials. All the cases of invalid knowledge are caused by extraneous factors as some defect in the causal collocation of knowledge itself or some subjective defect or some obstacle to right apprehension and so on. That the 'shell-silver-illusion' is not valid, is not known by itself, but, by the failure of its being conducive to our practical needs of life. Similarly, it does not originate from the common causal collocation of knowledge as such, but, from defects or obstacles external to the factors of the generation of knowledge.

Now, when all knowledge is produced as well as known as self-valid and when invalidity of knowledge is caused and known by other factors, what will be the sense of recognizing right knowledge as 'Avisaṁvāda', Yathārthānubhava' and 'Vyavahārānuguna'? Vedānta Deśika thinks that the factors of 'avisaṁvāditā' i. e. coherence or non-contradiction 'Yathārthatā' i. e. correspondence and 'Vyavahārānugunatā' i. e. pragmatic test are meant to firmly establish the already produced and known fact of self-validity of knowledge.¹ The idea is that these factors do not produce the validity of knowledge and do not make the validity of knowledge known. As a matter of fact, what the different theories of knowledge, such as theory of consilience, the theory of correspondence, and the theory of workability mean is that, a 'jar' existing in the space-time-world, comes into contact with the eyes and becomes the object of perceptual knowledge.² The apprehension of the 'jar' that exists, is self-valid. That the truth or the validity of the experience—'there is the jar' is produced and made known by the consistency of the terms of the judgement 'this is the jar' as in the Coherence theory of knowledge, or by the corres-

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 250.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 250.

pondence of the object 'jar' with the knowledge of the jar, as in the Correspondence theory of knowledge, or by the workability of the knowledge of the jar as by the theory of Pragmatic utility of knowledge is nothing more than beating about the bush. The fact of facts is that the 'arthatathatā' or the objectivity of the object is essentially grasped by our self-valid apprehension and the facts of coherence, correspondence and workability simply re-establish the pre-established self-validity of knowledge.¹ It follows, therefore, that the conception of the Buddhistic epistemology that knowledge that is valid and consistent is 'Arthakriyākārin' or practically efficient is against reason and common-sense. Even the Buddhists think that Nirvikalpaka-knowledge or the real knowledge of the 'thing-in-itself,' devoid of any mental construction is self-valid. Why should Savikalpaka-knowledge alone be invalid! In the knowledge of the objectivity of the object, even 'Savikalpaka' is intrinsically generated and known as self-valid.²

The suggestion of the Sāṃkhya-epistemology³ that validity and invalidity of knowledge are self-constituted, is also unacceptable. If validity and invalidity both were to happen to knowledge by themselves, then, either all knowledge would become valid and invalid at the same time or some knowledge would become valid, some remaining invalid for ever. The result will be the supposition of two distinct knowledge-entities, having distinct extraneous causes of validity and invalidity. And it will mean the self-refutation of the Sāṃkhya-system itself.

To avoid the above discrepancy, the Sāṃkhya has to take all knowledge as self-valid, invalidity being caused by extraneous factors.

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 250.

2. T. M. K. 4.105.

3. T. M. K. 4.107.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins follow the Mīmāṃsakas in their concept of self-validity of knowledge and side with all the schools of Vedānta that hold the view of 'Svataḥ Prāmāṇya' and 'Parataḥ Aprāmāṇya' of Knowledge—

‘ . . . वेद्वादिनः ।

प्रमाणत्वं स्वतः प्राहुः परतश्चाप्रमाणात्मा¹ ॥

Even when the Viśiṣṭādvaitins generally follow the epistemology of the Prabhākara-school of Mīmāṃsā, they do not accept the view that knowledge is apprehended as an object of another knowledge—

संवित्तयैव हि संवित् सिद्ध्यति न तु संवेधतया ।

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemologists, like the epistemologists of the Prabhākara-school believe in the origination and manifestation of the self-validity of knowledge as caused by the causal conditions of knowledge itself. The 'Anuvyavasāya' of the Mīmāṃsā-epistemology of Murāri Miśra, which means that knowledge grasping the object in its essential features, reveals the validity of the grasp of the object also, is not acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology is vehemently critical of the Nyāya-epistemology in respect of the latter's 'Parataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda.' The Nyāya postulates that origination of validity, like that of invalidity, is conditioned by factors (i.e. absence or presence of defects etc.) other than the common causal factors of knowledge—

‘प्रमा ज्ञानहेत्वतिरिक्तेहेत्वधीना कार्यत्वे सति तद्विशेषत्वादप्रमावत्’².

Moreover the manifestation of validity, like that of invalidity, according to the Nyāya, is due to causes external to the common causes of knowledge (i.e. the test of practical endeavour and so on). Against this stand of the Nyāya,

1. S.D.S. age 279 (Abhyankara Edn).

2. Kusumāñjali, page 59 (Benares edn.)

Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology emphatically asserts that it is 'Doṣābhāva' the cause of the origin of the validity of knowledge, in as much as it is inapplicable to Divine knowledge, nor is practical endeavour responsible for the origin of the validity of knowledge, because, it depends, in respect of its own self, on the prior cognoscibility of the self-validity of knowledge as such.

To conclude, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, knowledge, as illumination of an object, is valid in itself. Invalidity is only to the misapprehension of the determining aspects or the defining details, as the case may be, of an object of experience and is caused, consequently, by factors alien to the causal factors of knowledge.

Is Pramā or right apprehension ?

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Dharmin-Consciousness is a self-shining consciousness, ever a self-luminous awareness of the character of Divine Consciousness. It is the Unmanifest-Consciousness that admits of the taints of untruth and the impact of Saṃsāra and all that Saṃsāra stands for. Thus, there is all the necessity of distinguishing Pramā from Apramā, truth from untruth, the real from the unreal, the right from the wrong. This distinction does not mean the sublation of Apramā by Pramā. It means, on the contrary, the sublimation of Apramā by Pramā. No knowledge, perceptual, conceptual or revelational is negated in Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology. Pramā is a fact of life and so is Apramā. All knowledge is of the real object, existing in the world of real objectivity. The space-time-world is the world that is revealed to us by our knowledge of it. It is the correlation of the object and the subject or, to tell the truth, the Divine immanence in the object and the subject, that is the real reality of our conscious experience and the background of the phenomena of knowledge.

All that is given is known, but all that is given is not in knowledge. Knowledge is about all that is given. This epistemic theory or the Satkhyāti Vāda of Rāmānuja does not divide Pramā and Apramā as two water-tight compartments of knowledge. The knowledge of the All-knowing Divine is 'Pramā', pure and simple. It is the knowledge of the embodied self that, being conditioned by the psycho-physical factors, and determined by moral obligations under the strain and stress of Saṁsāra, partakes of the characters of truth and falsehood as the case may be. Thus, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology, it is the finite knowledge of the finite self that is divided into Pramā and Apramā, true knowledge and erroneous cognition.

Now, what is Pramā? Some Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemologists, Vedānta Deśika's predecessors or contemporaries, defined 'Pramā' as Samyganubhava¹ i. e. as 'the apprehension of an object as it is' or 'Yathārthajñānam'² i. e. the knowledge of an object as it is or simply 'Anūbhūtiḥ'³ i. e. immediate apprehension. The above definitions of Pramā were put forth for the sake of distinguishing memory from apprehension and excluding memory from the field of Pramā. Memory is mediate knowledge and its truth or falsity depends on the truth or falsity of apprehension, its source. Moreover, memory does not grasp the object at the first instance. Recollection is a second-hand conscious experience only. But Vedānta Deśika differs from the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemologists or for that matter, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Mīmāṃsā epistemologists on this count. It is in keeping with the central theme of 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam' that he differs from others on this point. If Smṛti or memory were denied the characteristic of Pramā, then, Pratyabhijñā or recognition that is

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1. N. P. page 90
 2. „ „ 90
 3. „ „ 90

recognized as Pramā by the epistemologists, will have to be taken as Apramā in part, in as much as its make-up consists of the element of Smṛti also.¹ In fact memory functions as a form of true consciousness in many spheres of life such as poetry and art and literature. It is memory that is responsible for the rise of inferential knowledge or for the use of words and so on. Without memory the very purpose of soul in Saṁsāra i. e. its constant contemplation and communion of God, its self-effacement and selfless devotion would all become inexplicable. It cannot be held, here, that it is prior apprehension and not posterior recollection that serves all the above purposes. Because, in that case the Vedāntic epistemology in general and the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology in particular, will have to take the Divine will alone as responsible for Anubhava. Hence, the contention of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra² that Smṛti, although corresponding to the objective reality, is not Pramā as it is not a knowledge about an object, but a knowledge about a knowledge and that it does not grasp its objects in sight is not the real Viśiṣṭādvaitic position. Moreover, Viṣṇucitta's View³ that 'Pramā' is 'Smṛti-Vyatirikta Jñāna' or 'knowledge other than 'Smṛti' is also not truly the Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of Pramā.

Even the Vaiśeṣikas include Smṛti in the category of vidyā or true knowledge, though labelling it as invalid in other contexts. Thus, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology cannot subscribe to the above view of Pramā that excludes memory from the sphere of right knowledge.

The conception of Pramā, in keeping with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of Reality, is as follows⁴ :—

‘यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानं प्रमा’

1. N. P. page 171.

2. N. P. page 172.

3. N. P. page 172.

4. N. P. page 92

The term 'यथावस्थित', while strengthening the realistic attitude of Viśiṣṭādvaita, that attaches as much importance to objectivity as subjectivity, saves Viśiṣṭādvaita from sinking into mere realism, that does not support the independence of mind and the correlation of mind and matter in the fact of consciousness. The character of 'यथावस्थान', or existence of things as they are, applies as much to the objective world as to the subjective or the 'Dharmabhūtajñāna' in all its varied, and various aspects. Besides, the conception of 'यथावस्थान' integrates the correspondence and coherence theories of knowledge. The confirmation of our knowledge to the objects and the consistency of our judgments regarding the objects are included in the sense of the term 'यथावस्थित'. The term 'व्यवहारानुगुण' is meant to give knowledge a purpose, a life-constituent force. Until and unless knowledge be conducive to the furtherance of our material, moral, and spiritual ends, what is the test that knowledge has come into being? Knowledge is for the attainment of the aims and the objects of the soul in Saṃsāra and out of Saṃsāra. It is not a purposeless, aimless, baseless phenomenon or a mystery, mystifying itself and mysteriously enveloping Life. Thus, Pramā or true knowledge is distinguished from Apramā or erroneous cognition by the virtue of the fact that while Pramā conforms to reality and is confirmed by reality in turn, Apramā does not conform to the whole of reality and is not confirmed by the whole of reality. While Pramā is characterised by internal consistency, Apramā is not invariably associated with internal consistency. Moreover, Pramā leads to our attainments of objects, Apramā ending in the falsification of objects and our utter disappointment.

It is not enough to state that that knowledge is true which is about the object as it is. Because an 'object as it is' or the objectivity of an object is so willed by God, the Real Knower, that it always defies our complete grasp. That is

why there are so many sciences with so many views of the physicality and the objectivity of reality. But 'an object as it is and is conducive to our behaviour' is so constituted by the Supreme Architect, that the finite self having consciousness as its real essence and that allowing consciousness to function, can easily grasp it. Knowledge of objects is not the 'Svarūpa' or the being of the self. Knowledge of objects is one of the duties of the self in Saṁsāra. Out of Saṁsāra, the objective world does not figure in the soul's consciousness. What figures there, instead, is the pure self-conscious soul completely given to the Supreme Soul.

In all the four kinds of true knowledge i.e. perceptual, inferential, verbal and recollective, it is the real object that is experienced by the experiencing self. The experience is of the self. Knowledge is the means of experiencing the objective and the subjective facts of reality.

It is important to note that the theory of true knowledge propounded by Vedānta Deśika, steers clear of many an instance of knowledge that is eventually false and erroneous. It means that the above theory clearly points to the range of Pramā as distinct from the range of Apramā. For instance 'Viparyaya', though not distinguished by the Nyāya theorists, is a distinct fact of consciousness and is other than Pramā. All our moral indecisions, our hanging in the balance is nothing but 'Viparyaya'. Taking one thing for the other, such as the silver for the shell, the snake for the string is a fact of 'Viparyaya'. The psychological factor involved in 'Viparyaya' marks it off from Pramā or true knowledge. In the theory of Being as different and non-different at the same time, according to Bhāskara and the Jains, is 'Viparyaya' pure and simple. The Advaitic contention that the world is neither real nor unreal is also a phenomenon of 'Viparyaya'. 'Viparyaya' differs from 'Saṁśaya' or doubt. Unlike 'Saṁśaya' 'Viparyaya' does not imply contradiction. In such

experiences as the 'Double Moon' and the 'Little Moon' it is Viparyaya that obtains, because, although the knowledge of the moon as characterised by its essential attribute of 'moonness' is there, yet, the other properties such as 'duplication' and 'littleness' figure in the consciousness to the entire oblivion of 'oneness' and 'magnitude.' What is responsible for the experience of Viparyaya is either superimposition or wrong identification. The 'yellow conch' experience is due to super-imposition and it is wrong identification that applies to the experience of the 'Snake-String'.

The conception of 'Yathāvasthita' in the definition of Pramā, as propounded by Vedānta Deśika, is meant thus, to exclude 'Viparyaya'.

The Pramā-theory of Vedānta Deśika excludes Saṁśaya or Doubt also from the sphere of true knowledge. Saṁśaya or Doubt is the cognition of more than one contradictory qualities not cognized as such at one and the same locus. Contradiction and incompatibility of qualities or features are essentially implied in doubtful cognitions. The experience of 'Is it a post or a man?' is common experience of 'Saṁśaya' in which the mind wavers between two possibilities i.e. the 'posthood of the object' and the 'manhood' of the object. A question arises here.—How is the one and the same sense-object-contact responsible for the simultaneity of mutually contradictory cognitions of mutually contradictory features obtaining in the one and the same object. The answer is that as one and the same stroke given to a swing is responsible for the simultaneity of its forward and the backward movement, so is one and the same sense-object-contact responsible for the simultaneity of the cognitions of more than one incompatible alternatives, obtaining at one and the same object. And just as the succession of the movements is not perceived due to the speed of the swing, so is the succession of cognitions not cognized in the

experience of 'doubt' also. Thus, the differentia of the definite knowledge is the decisive contact of the Dharma-bhūtajnāna with the object. And what is decisive contact is nothing more than the absence of incompatibility between the object and its attributes. Similarly, indecisive contact is nothing else than the presence of mutually incompatible characteristics at one and the same locus of experience. According to Yāmūnācārya 'Dṛḍha' Adṛḍha' Saṁyoga¹ form the differentia of the definite and the indefinite cognitions. In the experience of doubt such as 'Is it a post or a man?' the sense-object-contact is said to be 'Dṛḍha' so far as 'tallness' goes, but it is 'Adṛḍha' so far as the mutually contradictory possibilities of 'posthood' and 'manhood' go. Thus 'looseness of sense-object-contact' means mutual incompatibility of alternatives.

Samśaya or doubt, whether it be a psychological fact as in 'is it a post or a man?', or an egoistic creation as in 'is the Soul Jñā or Jnāna?' 'is Jnāna a dharma or a dharmin?' and so on, essentially presupposes the cognition of contradictory alternatives seeming otherwise at a particular locus in a particular situation.

The five-fold causes of Samśaya of the Naiyāyikas are repudiated by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemologists² on the ground that the following two things only are responsible for doubtful cognitions—

- i. Commonalty of characteristics, and
- ii. presence of pointers of incompatibilities where the relative strength of the one against the other is unknown.³

The first obtains in a case like 'is this a post or a man?'

1. Siddhitṛya quoted in N.P. page-93

2. N.P. page 93

3. N. P. page 93.

where 'tallness' predicated of the 'post' and the 'man', gives rise to the cognition of the presence of the incompatibilities of 'posthood' and 'manhood' at the same locus. The second is of many kinds, as for example, 'is the hill on fire or not on fire?' where inference and perception both exercise their strength without coming to a decisive conclusion. Here inference, on the invariable concomitance of fire and smoke, supports the fact of the hill being on fire and perception testifies to the fact of the hill as not being on fire as the properties of fire i. e. shine and flame are not seen. What the ancient Nyāya-theorists thought about the second i. e. Vipratipatti as the cause of Saṁśaya and what Varada Viṣṇu Miśra maintained by 'Vipascitām Vivāda'¹ is merely confined to the dialectical duel of the disputants. But as Vedānta Deśika points out, the scope of Vipratipatti as the cause of Saṁśaya is much larger and vaster. But in both the above types, the main principle involved is 'incompatibility' that does not allow Saṁśaya to coalesce into 'yathāvasthita vyavahārānuṣaṅga Jñāna' i. e. Pramā or truth.

Where truth is one, doubt is of as many descriptions as there are incompatibilities. When truth is decisive, doubt might be absolutely indecisive, or partly indecisive or decisive-indecisive.

Another kind of erroneous cognition i. e. Anadhyavasāya also has been ruled out by Vedānta Deśika's above definition of Pramā or true knowledge. This Anadhyavasāya which obtains in such a case as 'what must be the name of the yonder tree?' has been distinguished by the Jain logicians from Saṁśaya. What happens in Anadhyavasāya is that the mind does not experience a sea-saw as the incompatibilities such as 'might it be a mango tree!' or 'might it be a jack-fruit tree!' do not come to the forefront of consciousness.

But in *Samśaya* the alternatives i.e. 'posthood' and 'manhood' applicable to the tall yonder object, simultaneously strike in upon the mind. *Vedānta Deśika*, however, maintains that *Anadhyavasāya* is not distinct from *Samśaya*. Really speaking '*Anadhyavasāya*' is a state of consciousness wherein what figures is our desire to know an object. And even if it were regarded as a separate kind of indefinite knowledge, it is not different from *Samśaya*, in as much as it also implies, like *Samśaya*, the two alternatives.¹ To say that *Vedānta Deśika's* account of *Anadhyavasāya* is the same as that of *Praśastapāda* and *Śrīdhara*² is far from the truth as *Vedānta Deśika* does not admit *Anadhyavasāya* as a separate type of *Apramā*. In '*Anadhyavasāya*' the object is not '*Yathā*' nor is the knowledge '*yathāvasthita*' or '*Vyavahārānugūṇa*'.

What the ancient logicians meant by '*Ūha*' or conjecture as a kind of indefinite cognition is other than *Pramā*. But it also is not a distinct kind of cognition. It is a kind of *Samśaya* as it contains the two alternatives as in the example 'that tall thing might be a man', where the alternatives of 'manhood' and 'posthood' struggle together for their manifestation, to the suppression of 'posthood' or 'manhood'. That *Śrīnivāsa*, *Vedānta Deśika's* commentator,³ differs from *Vedānta Deśika* with regard to '*Ūha*' is also not correct if we understand the sense of '*Ūha*' according to *Vedānta Deśika* and *Śrīnivāsa*.

To conclude, the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* epistemology understands by truth the knowledge of reality as it is and as it is conducive to our life. In fact it is the Supreme subject in the finite subject or the soul, that is the real knower and it is the Supreme object in all the objects that testifies to the

1. N. P. page 94.

2. *Indian Psychology* by J. N. Sinha, page 269.

3. *Indian Psychology* by J. N. Sinha, page 267.

knowability of reality. As truth cannot be separated from good, knowledge from life and reality from value, so Pramā or true knowledge is always¹—

‘यथावस्थितव्यवहारानुगुणं ज्ञानम् ।’

What is Apramā or Erroneous Cognition.

When validity is the essential and universal feature of knowledge as an illumination of an object, how is it that we experience some fact of knowledge to be right and some to be wrong? The Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology does realise the distinction between Pramiti or right knowledge and Khyāti² or erroneous cognition. It does not, like the Nir-viśeṣādvaitic epistemology, believe in the mystery of Avidyā mystifying pure differenceless universal consciousness to emerge in the illusion of the knower and the known and the fact of knowledge. On the contrary, it advocates the intrinsic validity and reality of all knowledge that happens to a knower and is about an object in the space-time-cause-world. It does not mean, therefore, that all knowledge is Pramiti. Only that knowledge is Pramiti which leads to successful activity on the part of the knower and that which does not issue forth in practical life-utility is Apramā or Khyāti or error. It means that as there is no difference in Pramiti and Khyāti in the respect of object-illumination and is none as well in the respect of the objectivity of the object of Pramā and Apramā, so right knowledge differs from wrong knowledge in the respect of the differences of the volitional and the emotional aspects of the percipient's personality working under the impact of Karman or moral determination. Hence the distinction between right knowledge and erroneous cognition is but relative and obtains in the case of the knowledge of the knowers who are imperfect, or perfection-seeking

1. N. P. page 90.

2. Savārtha Siddhi, page 179.

or half-perfect by virtue of the Kārmic-potency that has not fully exhausted itself. In the perfection of conscious experience what happens is the coming into being of the self-luminous, self-valid knowledge of the object as such.

Now, a question may be asked : How is it that Pramiti alone leads to our successful behaviour while Khyāti ends in futility ? Here, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology puts forth the following three theories having logical as well as a chronological sequence :¹

- (i) Yathārtha-Khyāti.
- (ii) Anyathā-Khyāti.
- (iii) Akhyāti.

The (i) i.e. Yathārtha-Khyāti is the explanation of erroneous cognition by the first Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemologist Nātha Muni (8th Century A. D.) in the Bhrāntyadhikaraṇa-siddhānta of his Nyāya Tattva², now an extinct work. The great Rāmānuja elaborates this very view in his Śrī Bhāṣya.³ Accordingly, all knowledge is 'Yathārtha' or the knowledge of an object as it is. The objectivity of an object of knowledge is not the creation of human mind, but a transcendental fact. The immanence of the great Being in the objects is the real core of the objectivity of the objects. The Divine Will to create cannot be supposed to strictly bind itself down to the laws of Nature, the limitations of matter. The materialist-scientist may analyse the constituents of objects as rigidly fixed and peculiar to each and every material evolute, but, the spiritualist-scientist can only find the Divine Will working upon the primordial stuff and revealing the objects of experience. In this way the ultimate metaphysical analysis of objects may show quintuplication or triplication of the material elements according to the Will of the One to become

1. N. P. Page 37 (Chaukhamba).

2. T. M. K. 4.10

3. Śrī Bhāṣya : Page 66 (Chaukhamba).

Many. It stands to reason, therefore, that the perception of silver in the shell is right knowledge, in as much as the elements of silver and shell are common. Why the shell-silver-illusion does not lead to practical utility is due either to the defects of the perceiver, who uses his knowledge for some end or the other, or to the part-perception of the silver-elements to the exclusion of the prominent shell-elements. *Pravṛtti* and *Bādha* can be explained as due to the limitations of the percipient. Neither can *Pramā* verify the object, nor *Apramā* falsify it. Error does not exist for the perfect epistemological subject which is one with the perfect metaphysical subject i. e. the self. Error creeps into our imperfect awareness and is distinguished as such by our unsuccessful activity resulting from it.

No doubt, the above theory of error explains all our illusions and hallucinations and dreams as the imperfect grasp of the real object and accounts, thereby, for our '*Pravṛtti*' and '*Pravṛtti-Bādha*', but it is so highly imaginative that it cannot be accepted by ordinary human beings. In the early period of *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* epistemology, the theory was looked upon as un-realizable by ordinary minds.¹ Although, conformant with the *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* Ontology, the theory of *Yathārtha-Khyāti* is the only theory of error that *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* epistemology can approve of, yet the scheme of *Nyāya-Vedānta-syncretism* cannot but deny it.

The (ii) i. e. *Anyathā-Khyāti* or the *Naiyāyika*-theory of error in *Viśiṣṭādvaitic* setting was, thus, advocated by *Rāmānuja* as the theory of error. All the details of the *Yathārtha-Khyāti* as given in the *Srī Bhāṣya*² should, therefore, be taken, as *Vedānta Deśika* suggests³, to be but the

1. N. P. page 40 (*Chaukhamba*).

2. *Srī Bhāṣya*, pages 66-69 (*Chaukhamba*).

3. *Sarvārtha Siddhi*, page 180.

elaboration or the reiteration of Nātha Muni's view. Rāmānuja openly states :¹

‘ख्यात्यन्तरवादिना च सुदूरमपि गत्वाऽन्यथावभासोऽवश्यश्रयणीयः ।’

or that erroneous cognitions such as the shell-silver-illusion ultimately mean the presentation of silver in the shell or the apprehension of something other than what it actually is. All the theories of error must have ‘Anyathā-Khyāti’ or the presentation of something other than what is present as the real core of erroneous cognitions. ‘Anyathā-Khyāti’ is the underlying principle in ‘Asat-Khyāti’ in the sense of the presentation of the ‘Sat’ for the ‘Asat’; in ‘Ātmakhyāti’ in the sense of the presentation of the extra-mental objects instead of the ideas; in Akhyāti in the sense of the presentation of the attributes of something other than the thing present or in the presentation of a complex psychosis instead of a single psychosis and last but not the least, in Anirvacanīya-Khyāti also in the sense of the presentation of appearance, instead of reality. Even in Yathārtha-Khyāti what is ultimately implied is the foundational fact of ‘Anyasyānyathāhvabhāsa’², i. e. Anyathā-Khyāti in the sense of the presentation of the comparatively smaller elements of silver, instead of the greater elements of the shell.

But we cannot say that Rāmānuja means by ‘Anyathā-Khyāti’ what is exactly meant by the Nyāya-epistemologists. ‘Anyathā-Khyāti’, in Nyāya, has certain peculiar Nyāya-associations. It is true to the following assumptions of the Nyāya-system :—

- (i) The atomic nature of the mind. Accordingly what is possible is only single-psychosis and never double-psychosis as held by the Akhyātivādins.

1. Śrī Bhāṣya, page 66.

2. Śrī Bhāṣya page 65.

As for instance, what happens in the shell-silver-illusion is the apprehension of silver and not the non-apprehension of the distinction between presentation and representation.

- (ii) The perception by the mind without sense-object-contact. That is that what happens in the above case of illusion is the silver, though not in contact with the visual organ, is mentally apprehended after the recollection of the past impressions of silver, on account of the similarity of lustre of the shell and the previously perceived silver.
- (iii) The fact of knowledge as a result of soul-mind-sense-object-contact and not as an eternal all-pervading, self-shining and self-evident fact of consciousness true to our self-conscious spiritual being.
- (iv) The nature of the object of experience as an elemental configuration in the space-time-cause-universe and not as the 'body' of the Supreme Being subserving the Supreme Will.

It is evident from the above that Rāmānuja cannot unconditionally accept the Nyāya-theory of Anyathā-Khyāti. But it is unreasonable to say, that what Rāmānuja held as his view of error was Yathārtha-Khyāti of Nātha Muni or Sat-Khyāti, pure and simple, and that it was Vedānta Deśika, who, in his eagerness to make Rāmānuja a logician instead of a metaphysician in the respect of error, interpreted Rāmānuja as the upholder of the Anyathā-Khyāti-view.

The fact of Anyathā-Khyāti is realisable by common human beings.² Everybody, under shell-silver-illusion, does perceive the silver instead of the shell as really present and

1. S. N. Das Gupta: Indian Philosophy Vol. III.

2. N.P. Page 40 (Chaukhamba).

ultimately suffers the arrest of his successful activity resulting therefrom. Until and unless one thing were taken as another, any difference of opinion or any contention about a thing or a thought would remain inexplicable. The contradiction of one fact of knowledge by another fact of knowledge, as is actually experienced by men, cannot be possible if something were not taken as something else. Our very activity under an illusion, like the shell-silver-illusion, presupposes our actual grasp of 'silver' rather than the failure of grasp of the difference of the 'silver' from the shell. Error is a positive fact of knowledge not conforming with and corresponding to the real object, present in space and time. Error is never a 'non-existence or absence of grasp' (Agraha) of difference, either, between knowledge or object and object. Thus, it is that Ātreya Rāmānuja, the teacher of Vedānta Deśika, says on Rāmānuja's theory of error viz. Anyathā-Khyāti :¹

‘वादिनां विमतेर्बाधाद् व्यवहाराद्भ्रमोक्तिः ।

स्वारस्याच्चान्यथाख्यातिः प्रसिद्धा नापनीयताम् ॥,

The Anyathā-Khyāti-theory of error as held by the great Rāmānuja and as propounded by Ātreya Rāmānuja is not exactly the Anyathā-Khyāti of the Naiyāyikas. Whereas, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception, 'Anyathā-Khyāti' obtains in the presentation of the lesser elements against the greater elements of the objects, say, in the shell-silver-illusion, the yellow-conch-experience, the fire-brand-circle misapprehension, the mirage-cognition, the dream-chariot-realisation and so on and applies also to the 'Bhedāgraha' or the incomplete apprehension of the object and its nature ;² according to the Naiyāyika idea, it holds good in a water-tight division of Pramā and Apramā, right knowledge and

1. Nyāya Kūṭiśa. page 40.

2. T. M. K. 4-10.

erroneous cognition, consequent upon the absence or the presence of defects in the common causal collocation of knowledge itself.

Although, 'Anyathā-Khyāti', according to Rāmānuja, explained all error in keeping with the main Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of knowledge, viz. 'यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानम्' yet, the later Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemologists were critical of it in as much as it smacked of the Naiyāyika-conception.

The (iii) i. e. The Akhyāti-theory of the Mīmāṃsā epistemologists, who, first of all, believed in 'यथार्थं सर्वविज्ञानम्' is accepted by Vedānta Deśika as the theory of error in keeping with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of knowledge and reality.¹ According to him, 'Akhyāti' is the scientific analysis of the psychology and the epistemology of error.² He is careful enough to suggest that the Akhyāti-view of error in Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology is neither un-Rāmānujic nor his own supposition.³ The 'Anyathā-Khyāti' theory held by Rāmānuja as the theory of error ultimately gave way to 'Akhyāti' in as much as it implied 'Asat-Khyāti' also. Accordingly the 'shell-silver-illusion' was explained as Akhyāti implying Asat-Khyāti because the silver that was perceived instead of the shell, amounted to the 'Asat' or the unreal being perceived, instead of, the 'Sat' or the real.⁴ Although, on the authority of Vācaspati Miśra, we can say that the 'Asat' i. e. the silver is cognized not as 'Sat' but as 'Asat'⁵—

‘तस्माद् यदन्यथा सन्तमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ।

तन्निरालम्बनं ज्ञानमसदालम्बनं हि तत् ॥’

yet, our self-experience in the case asserts that the consequent activity posits the 'Asat' being cognised

1. T. M. K. page 180, 184.

2. N. P. page 40.

3. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 180, 114.

4. T. M. K. 4.13

5. N. V. T. T. page 87 (Benares).

as 'Sat'. Moreover, it is not necessary that error should be only an error of commission as then it can explain the synthesis of knowing and willing and doing. Because, even when error is an error of omission, it explains the integration of knowing and willing and doing.¹ It means this that what is implied even in 'Anyathā-Khyāti' or the error of commission is 'Akhyāti' or the error of omission.²

Now, what is 'Akhyāti' or the error of omission in Viśiṣṭādvaitic account of Apramā? It is "Bhedāgraha" i.e. 'Agraha' or non-discrimination of 'Bheda' or difference. It is this, in fact, that leads to our Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti as the case may be. But it does not mean that Bhedāgraha culminates in activity and 'Abhedāgrah', in the cessation of activity.³ 'Bhedāgraha' explains error, consequent activity of the erring subject, disillusionment and so on in as much as Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti are but the aspects of volition and conation in general. What is this 'Bheda', the 'Agraha' or the Akhyāti of which causes 'Apramā' and conversely, the 'Graha' or the grasp of which results in 'Pramā'? Vedānta Deśika's teacher Ātreya Rāmānuja has dwelt upon 'Bheda' and its 'Agraha' at great length in his Nyāya-Kuṭiśa, Vāda III. The 'Agraha' of 'Bheda' is the causal factor involved in 'अन्यस्यान्यथावभास' i.e. Anyathā-Khyāti. 'Agraha' or non-discrimination of 'Bheda' is due to subjective limitations. It has nothing to do with the objective reality. As a causal factor of all error it does frustrate the activity of the erring subject. Hence, it is that the erroneous cognition, arising out of 'Agraha' or omission of error, is a positive presentation i.e. commission of error.⁴

1. Sarvārtha siddhi page 182-83.

2. " " 180.

3. " " 181.

4. T. M. K. 4.12

The Conception of 'Bheda'.

What is 'Bheda' ? Is it the 'Swarūpa' or the essential being of the object that is not apprehended in 'Bhrama' ? 'Bheda' or difference in Viśiṣṭādvaita amounts to the real nature or the real essence of an object. The real nature or the essential being of the objectivity of the universe is the Brahman. How can Viśiṣṭādvaita postulate the presentation of 'Brahman' in each and every common human sensuous awareness ? For all practical purposes, the 'this' or the substance of the objects of experience is grasped by 'Pramā' and 'Apramā' both. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain 'this is silver' in the shell-silver-illusion. Is 'Bheda', then, 'Vaidharmya' or the uncommon characteristic attribute of an object ? But, then, Pramā also cannot grasp 'Vaidharmya' in its entirety in the objects of apprehension. The 'Agraha', therefore, of 'Vaidharmya' pure and simple, say, of the 'this' in the shell-silver-illusion, is impossible to postulate, in as much as, the 'this' in contact with the sense of vision, is grasped as the substance-aspect and 'silverness' as its 'Akāra' or form-collocation. Had it not been so, it could not lead to Pravṛtti on the part of the perceiver. 'Vaidharmya' cannot apply to the 'silver'-element in the shell-silver-illusion, because, the Bādha-experience viz. 'this is not silver' after close scrutiny of the object will become inexplicable. The knowledge that contradicts the illusion in the above case is—'this is not silver'. If 'Agraha' applied to the silver-elements, then, 'Bādha' would be experienced, ultimately, as—'this is shell' which is simply against our self-experience. Can 'Bheda' mean 'Asaṁsarga' ? But 'Asaṁsarga' or the absence of Saṁsarga is not a category of experience in Viśiṣṭādvaita. Moreover, what can mean 'Asaṁsarga' in the case of the shell-silver-illusion ? The 'Pratīyogin' of Saṁsarga in 'this is silver' is 'silver' itself, the 'Anūyogin' being the 'this'. This 'Pratīyogin' is not apprehended as actually

present in sight, but recollected, on account of the arousal of the impressions of the brilliance of the 'real silver, seen elsewhere. Now, 'Asaṁsarga' or 'Samsargābhāva' will mean the apprehension of the 'this' present before the perceiver or simply the 'this'. Thus, the illusory experience 'this is silver' becomes 'Asaṁsarga-grahaṇa' or the Bādhaka of 'Asaṁsarga-graha'. But the common fact is that 'this is silver' is Bādhya-Jñāna and not Bādhaka-Jñāna.

What then, does this 'Agraha' apply to? It can not apply to 'Vyavahāra-Bheda' in as much as 'Vyavahāra'-Bheda amounts to 'Vastu-Bheda' or 'Bheda' pure and simple, which has already been shown as apprehended, both in the facts of Pramā and Apramā.

Ultimately, the conception of 'Bheda' the 'Agraha' of which results in erroneous cognitions has to be made clear. Here, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology cannot fully endorse the view of the Mīmāṃsaka (i. e. Prābhākara) epistemology. In the Akhyāti Vāda of Prābhākara, 'Akhyāti' or 'Agraha' relates to Viveka or discrimination, as for instance, between the presentation of the 'this' and the representation of the 'silver' in the shell-silver-illusion. So says Prabhākara¹

‘कथं तर्हि विपर्ययः? अग्रहणादेवेति वदामः । अग्रहणनिमित्तता च दर्शिता भाष्यकारेण (शबरस्वामिना)—‘यदि चक्षुरादिभिरुपहृतं मन’ इति । तस्मादग्रहण-निवन्धन एव विपर्यय इति ।’

And so declares Śālikānātha, the great Professor of Prabhākara's philosophy ²—

‘अस्यार्थः—विवेकाग्रहणात् गृह्यमाणस्मर्यमाणयोर्ग्रहण स्मरणयोरपि भेदं न मन्यते, तेन ग्रहणव्यवहारं स्मरणे प्रवर्तयति । स्मरणं हि नाम गृहीतग्रहणम्, तत्र गृहीत विषयत्वाननुसंधाने ग्रहणमात्रमेवाभाति ।’

1. Bṛhatī, page 66 (Madras edn.)

2. Rjuvimala on Bṛhatī, Page, 66.

That is why, Bhavanātha, the celebrated exponent of the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā, elaborates the conception of Vivekāgraha¹ in the following words :—

‘तदेवं विवेकाग्रहणात् क्वचित् स्मृत्योः, क्वचित् गृहीत्योः, क्वचिद् गृहीति-
स्मृत्योः स्वप्न-पीतशङ्ख-शुक्तिरजतादिसिद्धिः ।’

Thus, the ‘Agraha of’ ‘Viveka’ primarily means non-discrimination of difference between two similar psychoses, such as, memory-image and memory-image, presentation and presentation and so on. It also means non-discrimination between two dissimilar psychoses, as for instance, memory and presentation. It is only secondarily that it applies to non-apprehension of difference between two objects corresponding to two psychoses, similar or dissimilar. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology, in keeping with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics, according to which the objective element of knowledge is the real creation of the Transcendental Being, and the fact of knowledge, the experience of the self-conscious soul takes the common human experience of error as caused by the ‘Agraha’ or the non-apprehension of the characteristic feature of the object. Thus ‘Bheda’ is taken in its most comprehensive sense. Like the confusion of two objects of knowledge, there may be the confusion of two facts of knowledge resulting in our ‘Pravṛtti-Bādha’. ‘Bheda’, thus, is the characteristic feature of an object of experience amounting to the difference of the object from other objects²—

‘यो यस्मिन् न संभवतीति निरूपितो धर्मस्त तस्माद् भेदः ।

यथा शुक्तित्वं रजतेऽसंभवद् रजतात् ।

The erroneous cognitions are but the non-apprehensions of this ‘Bheda’. What is apprehended in error is, first, the

1. *Nayaviveka* Page 94.

2. *Nyāya-Kulīśa* Page 55.

'this' or something existing in space and time, to the exclusion of its essential features or its defining details as the case may be and second, the characteristic feature of something else as for instance, 'silverness' as in the shell-silver-illusion. And as such, error meets its annulment the ensuing activity, in error, its cessation and the percipient, his disillusionment.

Thus, according to the epistemology of Viśiṣṭādvaita, 'Akhyāti' is the principle underlying 'Anyathā-Khyāti' which in turn underlies 'Yathārtha-Khyāti', and the rest of the Khyātis. Vedānta Deśika's final opinion is that 'Akhyāti' is the true Viśiṣṭādvaitic explanation of error as much in keeping with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic ontology as with the ancient Yathārtha Khyāti-view of error of Nātha Muni and Rāmānuja and Vādhamsāmbudācārya. In 'Anyathā-Khyāti' there lurks somewhere the aspect of unreality of presentation. In 'Yathārtha-Khyāti', the ordinary distinction between Pramā and Apramā gets obliterated. But in 'Akhyāti' neither does falsification apply to the object nor to the knowledge-entities. Error, accordingly, is the non-discrimination of difference between two objects on the part of the percipient, due essentially to the Karma or the moral determination of percipient.

*The Nirviśeṣādvaitic theory of error vis. Anirvacanīya-Khyāti
is against reason and common-sense.*

According to the Nirviśeṣādvaitins, everything, every thought is characterised by self-contradiction. The reality of the pure, differenceless, universal consciousness is not apprehended and what is apprehended, rightly or wrongly, as this or that, here or there, now or then, is but the distortion of reality, the differentiation of the undifferentiated entity, the creation of Avidyā which is the indefinable principle of individuation. In the shell-silver-illusion, the presentation

of silver, is, really speaking, something indefinable as it is the product of the indefinable principle of Avidyā. The perception of silver in the 'shell-silver-illusion' is neither of silver as existent, as then it will not be illusory and will meet no subsequent contradiction, nor, of silver as non-existent, as then it will mean no presentation at all and will not require to be contradicted by later presentation. Ultimately it has got to be an Avidyā-product and hence neither existent nor non-existent, but indefinable.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not approve of such causal 'Avidyā' and such Avidyā-products which ultimately make the Brahman appear as 'Bhrama'. Moreover, to say that something that is neither existent nor non-existent is indefinable, does not stand to reason. In fact, existence and non-existence cannot apply to the same thing, at the same place and time. If something exists as the Brahman, then it is not non-existent. If something does not exist as the hare's horn then existence cannot be attributed to it. Where do we apprehend the indefinable ?¹ Neither presentation nor its subsequent contradiction ever testifies to the indefinability of the object of erroneous perception. The whole dialectic of the Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya demolishing the notions of the facts of knowledge and the knower and known with a view to establishing indefinability of experience is, accordingly, as Vedānta Deśika states, a self-contradiction.² What is the sense of defining that which is posited as indefinable ?

What do the followers of 'Anirvacanīya-Khyāti' mean when the 'shell' is illusorily presented as 'silver' in the shell-silver-experience ? If they hold, however, that the indefinable silver is illusorily manifested against the background of Reality obscured by Avidyā then, it may be shown that such a

1. Nyāya-Kulīśa, page 62.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 186.

presentation cannot be erroneous and what becomes erroneous, instead, is 'Bādha' or the subsequent contradiction or the experience of 'this is not silver'. Moreover, the presentation of the real silver, instead of the illusory manifestation of silver in the locus 'this' is not 'Anirvacanīya-Khyāti,' but Anyathā-Khyāti, pure and simple.¹

All the seven-fold incompatibilities inherent in Avidyā-conception as pointed out by Rāmānuja and by Vedānta Deśika ultimately point to the futility of 'Anirvacanīya-Khyāti.' How can Avidyā envelope the Brahman, the all-pervasive pure consciousness-bliss-existence !

The Ātmakhyāti of the Buddhist Idealist is self-contradictory.

The Buddhist Idealist believes that reality is Vijnāna or consciousness and all the diversifications of experience such as something as the subject, something as the object and something as the apparatus of knowledge are but unreal, being super-imposition that may be analysed into

- (i) the super-imposition of the Tṛkṣaṇa or tri-momentariness on the Kṣaṇika or the momentary sensations.
- (ii) the super-imposition of the appearance of permanence on the real apprehension of the evanescence of vibrations of consciousness.
- (iii) the false ascription of causal collocation of consciousness to the causeless consciousness moments, and,
- (iv) the wrong attribution of existence and non-existence to things that neither exist nor non-exist as such.

The underlying principle of all such super-impositions, all such 'Vikalpas' is Māyā which is inexplicable, but, which is removed by 'Bodhi' or enlightened intuitive vision resulting in 'Nirvāṇa'.

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 187.

Now, according to the above Vijnānavādin's view there is nothing like Pramā or Apramā as such. What is experienced is but the form of consciousness caused by suprimposition. Therefore, in 'shell-silver-illusion' the error lies in attribution of temporal and spatial-existence to the sensation of silver which, in fact, is a series of vibrations of consciousness.

It is evident that Viśiṣṭādvaita cannot countenance such a conception of reality and knowledge. The creation and imposition of the form of silver on consciousness, in 'shell-silver-illusion', is simply unimaginable. It cannot be due to silver existing as an object outside, because, there is nothing extra-mental, according to Vijnāna-Vāda. It cannot be caused by enlightened intuition, because, the latter causes Nirvāṇa and not forms of consciousness. If, however, consciousness were supposed to be bifurcated into cause and effect in regard to the form 'silver' then the immediate presentation of silver becomes a mystery in as much as the moments of cause-consciousness and effect-consciousness presume a sequence that is denied by Vijnāna-Vāda.

Vedānta Deśika hints at a further objection to the theory of Ātmakhyāti. The Vijnāna-vādins themselves posit two Vijnānas:—(i) the Ālayavijnāna and (ii) the Pravṛtti-Vijnāna. Besides, they distinguish between the ego-consciousness of A and the ego-consciousness of B. Now, if there be distinction between the moments of ego-consciousness, then it stands to reason that the first moment of ego-consciousness must cognize the second moment of ego-consciousness or for that matter the Ālayavijnāna of A must apprehend the Ālayavijnāna of B. If the first moment of ego-consciousness as cognized by the second moment of ego-consciousness is taken to be real, then, it means that the form of the first moment of consciousness is also real which goes against the Vijnānavādin. If the first moment of

ego-consciousness is not cognized by the second-moment of ego-consciousness, then, it means that there is nothing like a Grāhya or a Grāhaka aspect of consciousness and ultimately consciousness is one differenceless, formless entity which also goes against the Vijnāna-vāda-idealism.¹

Finally, Ātma-Khyāti is against all common human experience. It is not mind but the extra-mental object that is cognized in our daily experience of 'Ghaṭa' and 'Paṭa'. There can be no identity, besides, between the 'Grāhya' and the 'Grāhaka' i.e. the blue and the sensation of blue, because, identity postulates prior difference. Thus to maintain identity and non-identity between Grāhya and Grāhaka as the differentia between Pramā and Bhrama is futile and self-contradictory.²

The Asat-Khyāti of the Buddhist-Nihilist has no foundation in fact.

The Buddhist Nihilist does not negate only the extra-mental objects but even the Vijnānas of the Buddhist Idealist. According to him reality cannot be characterised. Reality amounts to Śūnya or Tathatā which is a transcendental truth. Thus, the presentations and the presented, both, are relational, the non-relational being the only reality. Thus no point is made by Pramā and none lost by Apramā, as both are 'Asat'

The Viśiṣṭādvaitins refute the above speculation. Vedānta Deśika argues :³ If Śūnya were the ultimate reality, is it known or not known by human means of knowledge ! If known, then, it means that Śūnya being known as 'Śūnya' posits something else as really real ; if not known,

1. N.P. Page 44 & T.M.K. 4, 20 and 22.

2. N.P. Page 45.

3. N.P. Page 47.

then, does it not mean that the idea of Śūnya is nothing but a misapprehension and as such never a transcendental truth !¹ Without any 'Adhiṣṭhāna' or locus, how can error take its rise ! Even the Nihilists have such an experience—'this is there'. If, however, the experience of 'there' were taken as a real experience then it means that some Ādhāra or Adhiṣṭhāna or locus is known as 'Sat', but, it goes against the main principle of Nihilistic Buddhism. If, it is said that the experience of 'there' does not take place, it may be shown, then, that there is no 'Khyāti' or error at all in the case. Without spatial or temporal relationship existence or non-existence cannot be posited of anything. Moreover, the idea of 'Asat-Khyāti', according to which the non-existent appears as existent without any cause and substrate, eventually means the appearance of something as something else viz. 'Anyathā-Khyāti'.

The Central idea of Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of knowledge.

To conclude, knowledge in Viśiṣṭādvaitic epistemology is the experience of the knowing self. As it is the most essential characteristic of the conscious self it is to be called Dharma-Bhūta-Jñāna. As the human being and the Divine Supreme Being are, in their real essence, self-shining consciousness or the Pratyak-principle of the Universe, so, knowledge, their most essential characteristic is to be distinguished as Dharma-Bhūta, or the Parāk-principle of the universe. Knowledge is not only 'Artha-prakāśah' but, 'Jñāturjneyāvabhāśah'.² Without the appropriation of the illumination of the objects by the conscious self there can be no experience of knowledge. The character of knowledge i. e. self-evidence takes its being from the character of the self-luminosity of the conscious self. It is self-valid in the

1. N. P. Page 47.

2. T. M. K. 1.7

illumination of an object as such. The illumination of an object by knowledge is conceived differently by different schools of epistemology and ontology. Whereas the ancient Nyāya means by it the correspondence of knowledge to external reality and the Mīmāṃsā takes it to be the characteristic of cognizedness produced by knowledge in the object, the Viśiṣṭādvaita understands by the conduciveness of the object to practical needs and activities.

What is right knowledge or wrong knowledge is but a change of the state of the Dharma-Bhūta-Jñāna. In Saṃsāra both the states of knowledge are experienced by the knower. But the transcendental consciousness has but the immutable state of all-pervasive immediate awareness. The most essential Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of knowledge as Vedānta Deśika elucidates¹ it is that knowledge is possible only in difference or distinction obtaining in the fact of knowledge, the knower and the known and that it can bear sublimation rather than sublation.

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 177.

NYĀYA-VEDĀNTA-SYNECTISM (LOGICAL)*Viśiṣṭādvaitic Logic.*

The term 'Viśiṣṭādvaitic Logic' means the reorientation of the ancient Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-logic in keeping with the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The analysis of the 'Pramāṇas' related to the 'Prameyas' has been the concern of the ancient Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians. Similarly, the analysis of the Pramāṇas brought into relation with the 'Prameya'¹—the Supreme Knowable, manifesting Itself in all the objects of knowledge is the sole concern of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians. The contribution of Vedānta Deśika to this cause of Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic is by no means negligible. We shall study Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic topic-wise with special reference to Vedānta Deśika's contribution to it.

I. Pratyakṣa or perception.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic studies the laws of knowing in the three-fold spheres of knowledge i. e. the perceptive, the inferential and the verbal including the recollective also. We take first, the perceptive sphere or the Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa.

Pratyakṣa or perception has been so defined by the Indian systems of philosophy as to bring out its epistemological, logical and psychological significance. It has been discussed by Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians also who, following the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-standpoint, finally prove the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thesis.

Viṣṇucitta's definition of perception.

Viṣṇucitta¹, the famous exponent of Rāmānuja, analyses Pratyakṣa in his Prameya Sangraha in these words--

‘साक्षादनुभवः प्रत्यक्षम्, साक्षात्त्वं जातिः ।’

what it means is that Pratyakṣa is immediate apprehension. By ‘immediacy’ is meant the characteristic feature of immediacy inherent in apprehension. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, consciousness is not a quality, pure and simple, but a substance or strictly speaking, a substance-attribute. When consciousness is characterised by its inherent feature of immediacy it becomes apprehension. The means for the manifestation of this immediate apprehension is Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa.

Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka's exposition of Pratyakṣa.

Further, Pratyakṣa has been studied by the celebrated Viśiṣṭādvaitin, Parāśara Bhaṭṭa in his Tattva Ratnākara² with a view to explaining the essential nature of immediacy in apprehension in the following way—

‘अपरोक्षप्रमाऽव्यक्षमापरोक्षं च संविदः ।

व्यवहार्यार्थसंबन्धिविज्ञानजत्वविवर्जनम् ॥’

Which means that the immediacy of knowledge in perceptive experience consists in the direct presentation of the object to the subject. Whereas inference and verbal testimony are mediate knowledge depending as they do on the knowledge of Vyāpti and Śabda as their cause, perception is immediate knowledge requiring solely the sense-object-relationship. The knowledge that does not depend upon another knowledge is immediate and that which depends upon another knowledge is mediate. That every kind of knowledge must depend upon its peculiar causal collocation is admitted but it does

1. N. P. page 71 (Chaukhamba).

2. N. P. page 72.

not mean that all knowledge becomes indirect or mediate. Directness or indirectness comes to knowledge from its independence from or dependence on another kind of knowledge.

Varada Viṣṇu Miśra's analysis of perceptive experience.

Perceptive experience has been explained by Varada Viṣṇu Miśra, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic teacher-philosopher, in his *Mānayaṭhātmya-Nirṇaya* with a view to bringing out the essential nature of the subjective-objective-configuration in the immediacy of apprehension or the direct intuitive experience.¹

‘अपरोक्षप्रमा प्रत्यक्षम् । प्रमाया आपरोक्ष्यं नाम विशदावभासत्वमिति ब्रूमः । किमिदं वैशद्यं नाम ? असाधारणाकारेण वस्त्ववभासकत्वमित्यादि ।’

Or that *Pratyakṣa* is direct intuitive experience or apprehension by virtue of the fact that it grasps the objects of sensation in their clear outline, bringing them immediately into the presence of the self-shining consciousness to be immediately appropriated by the self-conscious self. It means that the subject or the self-conscious knower allows its inherent faculty of self-luminous consciousness to reach out to the objects outside through the instrumentality of the ‘*Indriyas*’ or the sense-capacities. When the immediate configuration of the self-conscious soul, the self-shining-consciousness, the sense-instrumentation and the objects in space and time comes into being, what results is immediate intuitive experience, illumining the object so vividly as to be equally vividly appropriated by the subject, the knowing self.

Vedānta Deśika's approach to the problem of perception.

In the above analysis of perception by the three great Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophers what is not clearly given is the criterion of differentiation between perceptive and other types

of knowledge. In fact, knowledge derived from any of its means does not make any difference in the state of the self-conscious soul and its self-luminous consciousness. How can immediacy, which is essentially the nature of all kinds of knowledge, apply to perception alone and not to inferential or verbal experiences? If immediacy were the Jāti or the peculiar generic feature or structure or configuration of perception alone, then it means that it cannot characterise inference and verbal testimony. But the fact is that like perception, inference and verbal knowledge also bring into being objective illumination and direct intuitive experience of objects. Thus immediacy in the sense of vivid manifestation or clear presentation of objects will have to be taken as the characteristic feature of every knowledge-type and something else will have to be thought of as the differentia of perception from inference and verbal testimony, of inference from perception and verbal testimony, of verbal testimony from perception and inference and so on. Having all this in mind Vedānta Deśika defines perception as.¹

‘साक्षात्कारि प्रमा प्रत्यक्षम् । साक्षात्त्वं जातिरूप
उपाधिरूपो वा कश्चिद् ज्ञानस्वभावः विशेषः स्वात्मसाक्षिकः ।’

Or, that, the immediacy of intuitive awareness is indefinable in as much as it is the essential characteristic of knowledge in general as evidenced by one's own self-experience. What distinguished perceptual knowledge from types of knowledge is the peculiarity of conditions such as the immediate instrumentality of the sense-organs, the cessation of the operations of the sub-conscious impressions and the absence of the mediacy of other knowledge entities and so on. Thus, perception having the nature of immediacy of intuitive experience in common with inference and verbal knowledge

is specified through the special condition of the absence of the instrumentality of other knowledge types. All the other types of knowledge depend for their coming into being on some sort of knowledge or the other, as for instance, Anumāna depends on Vyāpti-Jñāna, verbal knowledge on Śabda-Jñāna and recollection on past mental impressions. It is only perception that does not depend upon any other knowledge and what it depends upon is but its own causal collocation. It is, thus, perfectly reasonable to take the immediacy of awareness as an Upādhi or a characteristic feature, under special conditions, rather than a Jāti or a generic feature in common with the other kinds of knowledge.

It is significant to note that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians do not define perception in the manner it is done by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika-systematists. When the sage Gotama, the first formulator of the Nyāya defines perception as¹

‘इन्द्रियार्थसङ्गिक्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षम् ।’

What he essentially emphasizes upon is the physical process of the sense-object-contact without which no perceptive aspect of consciousness can ever come into being. As consciousness, being essentially a quality, cannot have any motion or operation and as the self, the substance, with its inherent quality of consciousness, is the knower, so what is required for the phenomena of knowledge is the Canvas of the mind to reflect the objective impressions projected by the sense-organs on to it.

Now, With the above Naiyāyika-analysis of knowledge the Viśiṣṭādvaitin cannot agree. What the Nyāya-analysis points to is the psycho-physical configuration responsible for the origin of knowledge. But what the Viśiṣṭādvaitin wants to know is the subject-object-synthesis in our conscious ex-

periences. The subject, the self, according to the Nyāya, is conscious on account of its inherent quality of consciousness. Consciousness, on the other hand, is a quality more or less, adventitious. But for the self to be the real knower or the subject in relation to the objects of knowledge what is essential is its self-conscious being. Otherwise, it is impossible for the psycho-physical conditions to produce knowledge in the self. Even for the sake of 'Anuvyavasāya' or the fact of the subject appropriating the subjective impressions, what is needed is the existence of the self-conscious soul. Thus, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians differing essentially from the Naiyāyikas on the issue of the very being of the self, the knower, differ, therefore, in the analysis of the perceptive experience also. So far as the 'Indriyārtha Sannikarṣotpanna'—nature of perception goes, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins seem to agree with the Naiyāyikas. But as regards the subject-object-configuration, they cannot side with them. Consequently, the nature of the sense-object-contact also differs in the two systems. For Viśiṣṭādvaita, believing in the self-effulgent being of the soul, the 'Indriyas' are the emanations of egoism. But for Nyāya, postulating the self as conscious due to the inference of the quality of consciousness, the 'Indriyas' are only the psycho-physical appliances or capacities.

Hence, knowledge, in general, in Viśiṣṭādvaita, according to which the soul is self-conscious and self-luminous, is immediate apprehensiveness or awareness, and knowledge in particular, such as perception or inference or verbal testimony shows forth this essential apprehensiveness in and through the particular conditions or the causal collocations.

The later logicians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-syncretist-school, in fact, define 'Pratyakṣa' not in its psycho-physical-origin but in its subject-object-synthesis. As for instance, Varadarāja in his Tārikika Rakṣā (page 57) means by

'Pratyakṣa' that kind of knowledge which is 'Apārakṣa Pramā-vyapta' or essentially universally concomitant with immediate apprehension. Knowledge, accordingly, is held to be a quality inherent in the soul and the Oversoul (God). The Viśiṣṭādvaitins are opposed to this idea of inherence of consciousness in the Ātman and the Paramātman since it goes against their concept of the self-conscious Jīva and Īśvara.

The Advaitic analysis of 'Pratyakṣa' which presupposes an eternal, all-embracing, self-shining consciousness-continuum as the ground of the illusory manifestations of the subject, the object, and the subject-object-contact cannot but be unpalatable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic systematists. The fact of knowledge—if the Advaitic analysis is pursued—becomes, ultimately a fiction. When the 'Pramāṇa-Caitanya', the subject, is not the real knowing being, but, the limitation of 'Cit', the self-luminous pure consciousness, by 'Antahkaraṇa', when 'Pramāṇa-Caitanya' is nothing more than 'Antahkaraṇa' along with its Vṛtti, the product of Avidyā, super-imposed on the 'Cit' and when 'Viśaya-Caitanya', the object, is merely an illusory disfigurement of consciousness how can the common universal fact of 'I know this', embedded in common human experience, escape the charge of fictitiousness ?¹ The Advaitic teachers undermine the fact of all types of knowledge, let alone the perceptive, by their assertion of the identity of the illusory manifestations of the 'Pramāṇa' and the 'Viśaya-Caitanya' which, while emphasizing upon the oneness and the universality of pure undifferentiated consciousness, stamps illusoriness on each and every fact of knowledge.

Neither can the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy recognize the underlying unity of consciousness nor does it approve of the illusory multiplicity of the consciousness as avowed by the

1. Prakaraṇa pañjika.

Nirviśeṣādvaitic philosophy in the sphere of cognitive experiences. In its realistic approach to the problem of Reality and Knowledge the Viśiṣṭādvaitic system equates the logical and the epistemological subject with the metaphysical subject. The metaphysical subject being a metaphysical substance must exist prior to all cognitive experiences. And the object of knowledge also must be other than the subject. Otherwise, knowledge becomes an inexplicable mystery.

According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the epistemological and the logical subject in the phenomena of knowledge is a real spiritual substance, the knowing self. Knowledge is the inter-action of the knower with the knowable. The knowable also is a substance but of a different nature. Underlying the knower and the known, there is the 'Substance Supreme', manifesting Itself through the Knower and the Known. The essence of this underlying reality, this absolute ground of things is constituted by pure self-luminous consciousness. In this respect the cognitive experience resulting from the relation of the subject with the object is a direct awareness. It is this which is perception to all intents and purposes. It is 'Sākṣātkāra' or immediate intuitive experience.

Two-fold immediacy of awareness in perceptive experience.

As the logical subject or substance has the two-fold aspects of the super-sensible and the sensible, so, immediate awareness in perceptive experience also admits of the following two-fold characters—

- (i) The Nitya or the eternal, permanent.
- (ii) The Anitya or the non-eternal, the evanescent.

The (I) i.e. the 'Nitya Sākṣātkāra' is the characteristic feature of the Divine Consciousness.¹ It is also a feature of the knowledge of the eternally free selves. The (II) i.e.

1. N.P. page 91 (Chaukhamba).

'Anitya Sākṣātkāra' obtains in human perceptions. The permanence and the evanescence of immediate awareness depends upon the absence and the presence of the instrumentality of the 'Indriyas', and the causal collocations responsible for perception.

Human perception is of two kinds.

Human perception also is of two kinds :—

- (i) 'Yogi Pratyakṣa' or the extra-ordinary perception.
- (ii) 'Ayogi Pratyakṣa' or the ordinary perception.

The (1) i. e. the 'Yogi Pratyakṣa' is the Meditative insight of the Yogins due to their abnormal Yogic powers or their divine inspiration. In Yogic meditation the Yogins can sense objects ever through the operation of their manas or mind. In ordinary circumstances, they can apply their sense-organs, highly sensitive, to the sensuous experience of the objects. The Yogic perception has a comprehensive range reaching upto the Supreme Transendental Reality. In fact, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic realism and idealism stand on the basis of this Yogic intuitive experience. What Rāmānuja denies about the Yogins is not their divine insight resulting from spiritual realisation or divine inspiration¹, but their insight into the Divine through mere imagination or mental recollection.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic and epistemology, according to Vedānta Deśika, have to accept the authenticity of the Yogic perception on the authority of the sacred spiritual teachings. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-thinkers infer the fact of meditative insight after ordinary cognitive experiences. Vedānta Deśika strongly criticizes this view pointing out the flaw of redundancy in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems in recognizing 'Anuvyavasāya' and 'Yogic perception' at the same time. For instance, when 'Anuvyavasāya' is involved in every common human know-

ledge there is nothing to check it from trespassing into the territory of Dharma, Adharma and so on which have been looked upon as the objects of meditative insight alone. Every ordinary human being, thus, is capable of extra-ordinary superhuman sensibility. Moreover, there is no need of maintaining any distinction between the normal and the super-normal sense and insight.

‘Ārṣa-Jñāna’ a distinct knowledge-type according to others, is subsumed by Vedānta Deśika following Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, his early contemporary under ‘Yogi Pratyakṣa’. The mental perception of the Naiyāyikas is admitted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinkers as possible to the Yogins only. There is no mental perception for ordinary human beings. How can the soul be known without mental perception? Vedānta Deśika solves the problem by pointing out that the soul is ever self-conscious and does not require any mental perception for the awareness of its being.¹ Mental perception is not needed for other phases of consciousness also in as much as consciousness is ever self-luminous. For the explanation of the experiences of pleasure, pain, desire and aversion also, mental perception does not deserve acceptance, because, these are but the manifestations of consciousness caused by particular causal collocations. For the other essential aspects of the soul such as its immortality, its dependence on the Divine, and so on our guide is not our mental perception but the spiritually inspired assertions of the Ved and the Upaniṣads. Our past cognitive experiences are known to us through recollection, pure and simple and not mental perception. The exclusion of ‘Mānasa-Pratyakṣa’ from the sphere of normal perception is one of the contributions of Vedānta Deśika to the cause of Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic and epistemology. Rāmānuja

does not seem to deny 'Mānasa-Pratyakṣa' even in ordinary perceptions (vide his exposition of the Brahma Sūtra. Śāstra-yonitvāt). But Vedānta Deśika with a view to establishing Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic, contends that the assumption of mental perception amounts to undermining the Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of the self-luminosity of consciousness. So, even if Rāmānuja distinguishes between mental perception and non-mental perception what he means exactly, as Vedānta Deśika remarks, is but the reiteration of the Nyāya-view.¹

The (ii) i. e. 'Ayogipratyakṣa' is the common human perception brought into being by common causal collocations consisting of the normal organs of sensation assisted by requisite light for the observation of objects. It is five-fold as the causes peculiar to it are five-fold—consisting of the five sense-organs, having five corresponding objects of sensation :—

1. the Cākṣuṣa pratyakṣa or the visual perception.
2. the Rāsana ,, ,, palatal perception
3. the Ghrāṇaja ,, ,, nasal perception.
4. the Spārsana ,, ,, tactual perception.
5. the Śrotraja ,, ,, oracular perception.

Two kinds of sense-object-contacts involved in our perceptive experiences.

In common human perception the sense-object-contact is of two kinds :—²

1. Saṁyoga or simple conjunction. It holds good when a substance happens to be the object of perception.

1. N. P. page 77.

2. N. P. page 77.

2. Saṁyuktāśrayaṇa or complex conjunction. It takes place when the quality or attribute residing inalienably with the substance forms the object of perception.

It is evident from the above that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians do not believe in the six-fold sense-object-contact of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-theorists. Saṁyoga and Saṁyuktāśrayaṇa are enough to explain all facts of perceptive experience. The 'Saṁyukta Samaveta Samavāya' is inadmissible, in as much as, its percept i.e. the genus of an attribute subsisting in a substance does not exist as a distinct category of reality. The 'Samavāya' is not acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita as a kind of sense-object-contact to explain the experience of sound by the ear. The sound-phenomena are differently explained by Viśiṣṭādvaita and so the Naiyāyika-proposition of 'Samavāya Sannikarṣa' is inadmissible. What is 'Samaveta Samavāya' is also unnecessary as its corresponding percept i.e. the genus of sound in intimate union with ether has no foundation in fact. The 'Viśeṣaṇa Viśeṣya-Bhāva' also is superfluous as its corresponding entity i. e. negation is no separate category of reality according the Viśiṣṭādvaitic system.

Two fold Aspects of Perception :

(i) Indeterminateness and (ii) Determinateness,

The (i) i.e. 'the Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa' or indeterminate perception unmixed with any mental residual impression.¹ It amounts to 'sensation' in modern psychology. 'Indeterminateness' does not consist in the awareness of an undifferentiated and unqualified object. It means, on the contrary, awareness unaccompanied with the sub-conscious impressions of a differentiated and qualified object.

The Naiyāyika conception of indeterminate perception untenable.

What the Naiyāyikas mean by 'indeterminateness' of perception cannot be acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinkers. According to the Nyāya-school, 'Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa' means the 'Pratyakṣa' or the immediate awareness of an object undifferentiated in respect of its attributes, relations, generic features and so on.¹ The apprehension of an infant is a case of indeterminate perception. The 'sensum' present in the apprehension of an infant is akin to the bare thing in itself, devoid of any kind of mental construction. But Vedānta Deśika argues that even in the indeterminate perception of an infant or a dumb person,² what figures is the object in its essential characteristics as without this it cannot lead to a purposive activity as it essentially does. The grasp of an undifferentiated object in 'Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa' is against common human experience. The following are the three possibilities which may not allow the differentiation of characters to take place³

- (i) the absence of characteristics.
- (ii) the absence of the characterized thing itself.
- (iii) the inapplicability of the substance-attribute relationship either in the sense of natural relatedness or in the sense of inherence.

The (i) is ruled out by the Naiyāyika himself, because he does not take indeterminate perception to be the apprehension of the absence of the characteristics of an object.

The (ii) that 'Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa' grasps the absence of the characterized object, is an impossible proposition even for the Naiyāyika. The (iii) that the natural relatedness of 'substance-attribute' does not form the 'sensum' in indetermi-

1. *Tārikā Rakṣā*, Page 60 (Pandit edn.) 2. N. P., Page 78.

3. N. P. the *Nyāya Sāra* commentary, page 78.

perception is against our actual experience. As soon as our eyes contact the object in sight, say a jar, we carry the impression of the jar as characterised by its colour and the natural relatedness between the object 'jar' and the attribute, 'colour'.

But, however, the inherence of the attribute in the object is precluded from indeterminate perception as Udayana asserts, then, it may be pointed out that such an indeterminate perception is untrue to experience. The nature of the relation of inherence subsisting between an object and its quality is perfectly true to indeterminate perception. Like the essential character of 'jar-ness' and the object characterized thereby, such as the jar, the nature of inherence between the object—'jar' and the quality—'jar-ness' also is equally clearly sensed by Nirvikalpaka perception. The Naiyāyika cannot assert that inherence is outside the range of indetermination perception because, he cannot be able to introduce it anew in determinate perception.

The Naiyāyika cannot escape his defeat by joining inherence with the Mīmāṃsaka (of the Prābhākara-School) in regarding inherence to be a super-sensuous entity. In fact, inherence is nothing like an internal relation of inherence over and above the external relation of conjunction which the Nyāya is anxious to posit. What is meant by Samavāya' or inherence is but the natural and essential existence of the objects of the universe. The natural life of objects cannot be supposed to depend upon the hypothetical assumption of Samavāya' or inherence.

No scriptural evidence can be advanced in proof of the qualified thing being the object of Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa. This is meant by 'Pratyakṣa' in 'Nirvikalpaka Samādhi', in

Yoga-literature, is not intuitive transcendental experience of an undifferentiated reality, but, the realisation of the entire consciousness illuminated and absorbed by the Supreme Reality, in its entire spiritual essence.¹

Therefore, the Naiyāyika admission of the objective undifferentiatedness in 'Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa' is against all sense and reason.

The Nirviśeṣādvaitic speculation about Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa is unsound.

The Śāṅkara-school of Vedānta asserts that Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa apprehends 'Sanmātra' or the pure differenceless being and that the common human observation of the object, as this or that, here or there, is but a mental construction resulting from nescience. Vedānta Deśika strongly objects to this Advaitic view. 'Sanmātra' or the pure being cannot be the object of Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa. In fact our senses coming into contact with objects outside grasp in one sweep the being of the object as well as its essential character. The senses perceiving the pure being, the 'Svarūpa' of a jar, perceive also the generic and the specific properties of the jar at the same instant. Two perceptions, (i) primary i.e. Nirvikalpaka and (ii) derivative i.e. Savikalpaka are not required for the apprehension of the pure being of the object and its defining characters and attributes. The difference between 'Nirvikalpaka' and 'Savikalpaka' does not mean the difference between the apprehension of the pure being of the object and the observation of the object as this or that, here or there. It is the suspension of the sub-conscious impressions consequent upon the sense-contact with the object that distinguishes 'Nirvikalpaka' from 'Savikalpaka'. The contention of the Nirviśeṣādvaitins that the 'Sanmātra' or the 'Svarūpa' i.e. the pure being of the object is the object of

1. Śata Dīpāṇi, Vāda 11.

apprehension, the 'Bheda' or the difference, such as, this jar or that cloth and so on, being but the outcome of misapprehension is also unwarranted. In fact, the 'Svarūpa' and the 'Bheda' are both simultaneously perceived by our senses. The 'Bheda' is not suicidal to the 'Svarūpa' in objective apprehension. Whereas the 'Svarūpa' is the fundamental fact, the 'Bheda' is the defining detail of object.¹ If, the Śankarites assert that perception can touch only the 'Sanmātra' and not the 'Bheda', it may be pointed out that such a perception is not possible, the following being the reasons—

- (i) the pure being or the 'Sanmārta', being identical in the various objects of observation, will, if perceived, ultimately make the 'Bhedas' also identical.
- (ii) A single perception of the pure being to the exclusion of its defining characteristics, being enough, all subsequent perceptions will become recollective.
- (iii) Even ordinary human beings, who are supposed to perceive the pure being of an object in indeterminate perception, may as well be supposed to perceive the 'Brahman', ground of all illusory manifestations of differences.

Therefore,, the 'sensus' in Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa cannot be the pure being or the 'Sanmātra'. Like the generic or the specific properties the Sat and the Asat-aspects are the fundamental facts of the objects of experience.² The 'Svarūpa' of the object is not formed of its undifferentiated being alone but of the defining detail also. Thus, when Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa ceases to be the apprehension of the

1. Śata Dūṣaṇī, Vāda 12.

2. Śata Dūṣaṇī, Vāda 12.

pure being of objects, it cannot apprehend the Transcendental Being.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic analysis of Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophers assert that all consciousness becomes possible in and through some difference or distinction. There is no object of consciousness which is not characterised by some point or the other of difference or distinction. What happens in Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa, according to Rāmānuja, is that the object is apprehended in its few fundamental features and not in its defining details.¹ A differenceless object is unimaginable, let alone, imperceptible. Rāmānuja points out that 'Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa' may be analysed as the 'Pratyakṣa' of the first individual of the class as against 'Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa' which means the 'Pratyakṣa' of the second or the third individuals of the same class.² The perceiver, on perceiving the first individual, is not conscious of the associations of that individual with any other individual of the class. But, when he comes to perceive the second or the third individual he does become conscious of the associations referable to all the individuals of the class. Thus 'Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa', while apprehending the essential structural peculiarity, say, 'cowness' in the first individual 'cow' does not apprehend its association with the second or the third individual 'cow' at the same time. It is only at the next stage of perception i. e. the 'Savikalpaka' stage, that the structural characteristic, say, 'cowness' given in the first stage is apprehended as universally characterising all the members of the cow-class.

The later Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinkers gave a scientific interpretation to the above suggestion of Rāmānuja. They thought that Nirvikalpaka retained its essential nature even

1. Śrī Bhāṣya, Page 73 (Bombay Edn.)

2. " " " " "

in the apprehension of the second or the third individual of the class. Hence it was that Viṣṇucitta, analysed the suggestion of Rāmānuja regarding Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa in the following manner :—¹

“Whereas, ‘Savikalpaka’ is the apprehension of an object through the instrumentality of the senses essentially assisted by the arousal of the mental impressions, the ‘Nirvikalpaka’ happens to be the apprehension of an object through the instrumentality of the senses only without the play of any residual mental impressions.”

Later on, Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka the famous Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician interpreted ‘Nirvikalpaka’ in such a way as to exclude any reference to the first or the second individual object of the class. According to him² what happens in ‘Nirvikalpaka’ is that the essential characters appear as not unrelated to the objects of perception. And in ‘Savikalpaka’ what takes place is that no character of any other object appears to confuse the essential character of the object under observation. Thus, when the ‘Nirvikalpaka’ is the sensation of an object having some fundamental feature or the other, the ‘Savikalpaka’ is the full view of the object in its fundamental as well as defining characters.

Vedānta Deśika finds out the root cause behind the appearance of certain essential characters of an object in ‘Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa’ and gives the Viśiṣṭādvaitic idea of ‘Nirvikalpaka’ in consonance with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of knowledge, which recognizes all knowledge to be the knowledge of the real object, qualified by its essential character and differentiable from other objects. He analysis that it is the abeyance of the sub-conscious impressions at the moment of the operation of the senses that is responsible

1. N. P. page 82.

2. N. P. Page 82,

for appearance of only some essential features of the object in 'Nirvikalpaka'.¹ Just against this, what happens in 'Savikalpaka' is that the residual mental impressions help the senses grasp the object in its details, distinguishing it from other individuals of the same class, at the same moment.

The (ii) i.e. the 'Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa' or determinate perception is the apprehension of an object as qualified by its essential feature and as distinct from all other objects. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic does not differ from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic in the analysis of 'determinate perception.' Pratyakṣa or perception becomes 'Savikalpaka' when it grasps, in the same sweep, the object characterised by its appropriate name, its salient features, its material constitution, its essential qualities, its characteristic function and so on. As for instance, if one's senses contact an object moving (say a man), one may apprehend at once that it is Devadatta, the Brāhmaṇa, fair-complexioned, stick-in-hand who is going his way.² In 'Savikalpaka', therefore, the qualities, the qualified object and their mutual relatedness—all figure forming one 'percept.'

*The Buddhist conception of Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa
unacceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita.*

The Buddhist logicians do not recognize the 'Savikalpaka' as Pratyakṣa. According to them, the proper name, the defining details and the characteristic attributes do not form the true presentation of the object, the thing-in-itself, being as they are, but Kalpanās or mental constructions. Vedānta Deśika points out inconsistencies in the above assumption of the Buddhists. He says that when 'Nirvikalpaka' and 'Savikalpaka,' both, come into being on sense-contact with the same object or objects, technically termed the 'Ālambana-

1. N. P. Page 82.

2. Tārkika Rakṣa page 60 (Pandit edn.)

Pratyaya' and when they have the same senses as their instruments of cognition, called the 'Adhipati-Pratyaya' it is unreasonable to hold that the first (the Nirvikalpaka) becomes real perception and the second, unreal.¹

It is far from truth to say that the absence of imagination or recollection makes Nirvikalpaka real and the presence of imagination or recollection makes 'Savikalpaka' unreal. The Savikalpaka cannot shed its essential aspect of coming into being on the contact of the senses with the object simply on account of the accessory causality of recollection or imagination assisting it.² Immediate awareness cannot be eliminated from determinate perception. 'Nirvikalpaka' and 'Savikalpaka' are essentially but the two internal, though mutually exclusive, states or stages of immediate awareness. The one is as much real as the other. Without causal collocation, no Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa can take place. In fact, the 'Nirvikalpaka' is not possible simply on sense-operation on the object. It requires the accessory causality of sufficient light, human response and so on. Moreover, the thing-in-itself is not an abstraction. It is, on the other hand, an essentially qualified entity that may be so grasped as to be analysable into the qualities, the thing qualified and the natural mutual relatedness between the qualified and the qualifications.

It cannot, as well, be imagined that the object of perception is the thing-in-itself and that the proper name applied to it by the perceiver is an unreal illusory super-imposition. In fact, the proper name is a mere external feature of signification and does not constitute the essential being of the object. If the object as such and its signification were interchangeable realities, then, we could have done with the

1. N. P. page 80.

2. " " 80.

one and discard the other. Never can the proper name stand as the substitute for the object of knowledge. In 'Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa', the apprehension of the proper name does not mean the misapprehension of the object signified by the proper name.¹

The assumption of the grammarians concerning Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa is inadmissible.

The philosophers of speech such as Bhartṛhari and his exponents assert that any knowledge in which words are not involved is an impossibility in as much as the fact of consciousness is essentially interwoven with the fact of speech. Perception conforming to this fact of consciousness is real perception. That is why the 'Savikalpaka' is apprehension and the 'Nirvikalpaka', a vague stimulation of the senses by the object resulting in an indistinct impression of a something.

But the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic cannot acquiesce in the above assertion. Even when one were unconscious of the verbal signification, one becomes conscious of the object in sight characterised by its essential and defining characters. First, it is the object qualified by its characters that is apprehended and it is only next that the word signifying it is recollected. The grammarian's conception of the four-fold manifestation of speech such as Sūkṣmā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī does not mean that all that is present to consciousness is present in and through speech. The four states of speech-manifestation are analysed by Viśiṣṭādvaita as aids to spiritual meditative realisation.²

The verbal perception of the Sāṅkara-school of Vedānta is against common human experience.

The Nirviśeṣādvaitins postulate that the identity-texts

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 207.

2. T. M. K. 4.35.

such as the 'Tattvamasi' and so on, generate 'Tādātmya-Pratyakṣa' or immediate intuitive experience of the identity of 'Jīva' and 'Brahman' in the same way as the common human statement 'you are the tenth' generates in the hearer the immediate awareness of 'I am the tenth'. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinkers repudiate such a perception. It is, as they say, a confusion between the perceptive and the verbal elements of knowledge.¹ Moreover, if some causal collocation other than sense-object-contact or mental impressions-cum-sense-contact with the object were recognized as productive at 'Pratyakṣa', then, nothing is left imperceptible and there is no need of demarcation of the range of different kinds of knowledge. Although it is 'Brahma-Pratyakṣa' or 'Brahma-Sākṣātkāra' that culminates in the ultimate spiritual realisation, yet, it is not brought into being through the identity-texts as such, but, through the Divine Will to save the soul having self-effacing love for the Divine.

The significance of the Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa.

Pratyakṣa is the first means of our approach to the objects existing outside. All that is and that can be perceived is reality. But all reality is not within the range of perception. Pratyakṣa presents and represents that aspect of reality which stamps itself and its character on the senses. It means that the aspect of reality that is not captured by the senses cannot be perceptible. That is why Viśiṣṭādvaita lays emphasis on the Prasāda of Iśvara for the highest spiritual realisation. Our Pratyakṣa must stop somewhere giving place to Śabda, the record of intuitive realisation, left by the Yogins which alone can generate the experience of the Transcendental, the 'Brahman' in Its real essence.

1. N. P. Page 88.

2. N. P. page 89 and Śata Dūṣaṇī, vāda 7.

2. *Anumāna or Inference.**The nature of Anumāna.*

Although there is no difference, on the meaning of Anumāna, between the Nyāya and the Viśiṣṭādvaita-logic, yet there is a world of difference in the two schools as regards Anumāna being a fact of knowledge. Anumāna or inference is the knowledge of the particular from the general.¹ Psychologically speaking it is a mental process. Logically analysed, it stands for the mental product. Although the general includes the particular, yet for the explicit understanding of the particular a correct comprehension of the principle is extremely essential.² Although there is no qualitative difference in the three types of knowledge viz. perceptual, inferential and verbal, all being alike in the respect of the illumination of the object for the self, the subject yet, they all differ with the difference of the objects they correspond to.³ Inference differs from perception. While the former grasps the object out of sight, the latter apprehends it while it is in sight. It cannot be argued that inference, taking its being from the comprehension of the character of the general including the particulars, requires, at the moment of its inception the sense-object-contact and can, accordingly be included in perception. Whereas perception can arise on sense-object-contact, inference comes into being even after the cessation of the sense-object-contact. Perception does not require the intervention of the mental process of assimilation of facts in the event of the apprehension of its object. But, inference needs the help of the mechanism of the mind for the correlation of the general and the particular as previously perceived ⁴

1. T. M. K. 4 31.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi, Page 204.

3. N. P. Page 98.

4. N. P. Page 98.

Inference is distinct from mental apprehension also. That sub-conscious impressions are involved in inference does not mean that it is all mental and hence less real and objective. The residual mental impressions are involved even in immediate apprehension of things.¹ While the immediacy of the sense-object-relation keeps the mental impressions in the background in perceptual experiences the mediacy of the comprehension of the universal concomitance of the general with the particular brings out, in clear outline, the pre-eminence of the sub-conscious phenomena in inferential experiences.

To infer and to remember are two dissimilar things. Memory obtains in the knowledge of things previously experienced. But inference means the knowledge of something new altogether.

Verbal knowledge is entirely different from inferential experience. The factors giving rise to verbal knowledge cannot produce inference. Inference is an entirely distinct type of knowledge. It is as much valid as any other type of knowledge.

Anusandhāna or Parāmarśa is the essential element of Anumāna.

The psychological constituent of inference is technically called Parāmarśa by ancient Indian logicians. Parāmarśa is a kind of consideration or comprehension of the natural laws and their application as observed in day-to-day life. By an appeal to our previous experience of life we arrive consistently and correctly at other new truths. Parāmarśa, strictly speaking, is this appeal to our experience for the knowledge of objects out of sight. What is 'Parāmarśa' for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-logicians, is 'Anusandhāna'² for the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician. The term 'Anusandhāna' in

1. N. P. Page 98.

2. N. P. Page 97.

Viśiṣṭadvaitic logic clearly brings out the essential nature of inferential knowledge. It means that the range of inference is circumscribed by the past experiences of life. It is not quite clear as to why the ancient Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-logicians, who held 'Linga-Jñāna' or 'Vyāpti Jñāna' to be the Kāraṇa or the extraordinary cause of Anumāna, extend its scope so much so as to include super-sensuous and transcendental realities defying the application of the Law of invariable association. Most probably, they were guided by their zeal of destroying materialism, subjectivism, idealism and nihilism of the Buddhistic philosophers. The Viśiṣṭadvaitic school defines the sphere of inference with the result that inference can not grasp the ultimate reality transcending the senses. 'The Supreme Being is known through the inspired Vedic teachings'¹—this Vedāntic maxim clearly distinguishes the scope and the function of Anumāna from those of the Śāstra.

This 'Anusandhāna' or the digging into the sub conscious depths for the finding out of the fresh objects of consciousness, technically speaking, means the analysis of the 'Vyāpyatva' of the 'Vyāpya' in each and every case of inference. What is meant by 'Linga' and 'Hetu' in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology is meant by 'Vyāpya' in the Viśiṣṭadvaitic sense. There is a certain propriety in the term 'Vyāpya' as it clearly hints at the basic principle of 'Vyāpti' without which no inference is possible. The psychological process of 'Anusandhāna' is concerned with the knowledge of the 'Vyāpya'. The logical aspect of this fact is manifest in the expression of the 'Upanaya-Vākya' which combines the 'Vyāpya' with the particular point to be proved.

Anusandhāna is of the Vyāpya or the reason.

Anusandhāna, the prerequisite of inference, centres round the Vyāpya or the Hetu i. e. the Linga or the Sādhana.

What is Vyāpya ? From our actual experience we know objects existing together spatially, temporally as well as spatio-temporally. While one set of objects has wider sphere of existence, the other occupies a smaller range. For instance, fire, mostly coexisting spatially and temporally with smoke, has a greater sphere of existence than the smoke. Wherever smoke exists, fire exists. But wherever fire exists smoke may not exist. Thus, the sets of objects having smaller range of existence are termed 'Vyāpya' and those commanding greater sphere are called 'Vyāpaka'. There are, besides, certain other sets of objects whose spheres of existence are mutually equal and parallel in space and time. To characterise these also as Vyāpya and Vyāpaka, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic defines 'Vyāpya' and 'Vyāpaka' in accurate terminology. Accordingly 'Vyāpya' is 'Anādhikadeśakāla aniyata' or that which spatially, temporally and spatio-temporally does not cover greater range than the 'Vyāpaka' which is 'Anyūnadeśakālavṛtti' or such whose range in space and time is never lesser than that of the Vyāpya.¹ 'Vyāpya and Vyāpaka' are known in our actual experience of things. Putting these experiences together, we come to find the law of invariable association working everywhere in nature. Thus from the measurement of the spatial and the temporal spheres of objects we arrive at the truth of their coexistence and ultimately deduce the principle of invariable concomitance finding the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka together.² The Anusandhāna of the 'Vyāpyatva' of the Vyāpya, is, thus, the knowledge and the application of the law of invariable concomitance in a particular case.

Unconditional correlation between 'Vyāpya' and Vyāpaka' is necessary for valid inference

All the objects of experience are not 'Vyāpya' in the strict

1. N. P. page 100.

2. N. P. page 102.

sense of the term. Hence, it is that the Indian logicians lay, emphasis on 'Parāmarśa' or 'Anusandhāna'. It is Parāmarśa or Anusandhāna that clearly shows the nature of the Vyāpya. It is this again that points to the law of association applied and applicable to the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka. As nature cannot be bound down to laws of human deduction, the Indian logicians, of all schools of thought, find out, from actual observation and accurate analysis, the Upādhis or the counter-laws defying the law of association applying to each and every case of 'Vyāpya' and 'Vyāpaka'. 'Upādhi' is not a law or principle like 'Vyāpti'. As Vedānta Deśika thinks, Upādhi is a characteristic, which, while not extensively applicable to the Vyāpya, universally applies to the Vyāpaka¹. For instance, if one argues- 'Service of God is the cause of unhappiness, for it is service, like the service of a king,' we find no invariable association subsisting in the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka i.e. service and unhappiness. Only that service is the cause of unhappiness which results from personal satisfaction of evil desires. As the service of God never results from the personal satisfaction of evil desires, it can never be the cause of unhappiness. Thus, the characteristic of 'resulting from the personal satisfaction of evil desires' happens to be true to the Vyāpaka i.e. 'causing unhappiness' only and never true to the Vyāpya i.e. 'service'. Accordingly, the characteristic called 'Upādhi' vitiates the above inference as it does not allow the Vyāpti, the unconditional correlation between the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka to emerge.

Of all the Indian logicians, it is Udayana who has scientifically studied the problem of Upādhi. Vedānta Deśika accepts the authority of Udayana on the point of

1. N.P. Page 110.

2. N.P. Page 111.

Upādhi.¹ He also sides with the view of Varadarāja on the question of Upādhi.² Accordingly, he holds Upādhi to be a Dharma or a characteristic, other than the Dharma or the characteristic of the Sādhana, and takes it to be less extensive than the Sādhana and co-extensive with the Sādhya.³ Thus, in the presence of 'Upādhi', there is no 'Vyāpti' between the Vyāpya and the Vyāpaka. Upādhi, being the essential characteristic of the Vyāpak and consequently non-existent with the Pakṣa or the locus of inference, far removes the point to be proved from the Pakṣa and ultimately negates the correlation between the Hetu and the Sādhya, also⁴. For instance, in the above-quoted inference, the Upādhi viz. 'resulting from the personal satisfaction of evil desires' is the essential characteristic of the Vyāpaka viz. 'causing unhappiness', is non-existent with the Pakṣa viz. Divine Service, far removes the Sādhya i.e. 'causing unhappiness' from the Pakṣa i.e. Divine service and ultimately disallows correlation between the Hetu i.e. 'being service' and the Sādhya i.e. 'causing unhappiness' with the result that no such inference can ever take place.

Against Udayana's above idea of Upādhi, which, according to Vedānta Deśika, accounts for the etymological and the logical aspects,⁵ Vāḍindra⁶ thinks that Upādhi is any characteristic that is not 'Vyāpaka' of the Sādhana but of the Sādhya. Vāḍindra means that the characteristic called 'Upādhi'—whether it is co-extensive or more extensive with the Sādhya is immaterial—being non-existent with the Pakṣa

1. T.M.K. 4.43

2. Tarkika Rakṣa Page 66 (Chaukhamba) and Sarvārtha Siddhi page 212.

3. N. P. Page 108.

4. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 214.

5. " " 213.

6. " " 212.

takes away the Sādhya from the Pakṣa and consequently vitiates the inference. Vedānta Deśika accepts the contention of Vādiṇdra also which comprehends some other characteristics such as the non-existence of the Vyāpaka, the existence of something contrary to the Vyāpaka and so on which all disallow the point to be proved, as the case may be. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician will have to widen the scope of Upādhi for challenging the unśāstraic inference of super-sensuous realities. Logically termed, Upādhi is that Dharma, which, while being the 'Pratiyogin' of its absolute negation in the locus of inference, is not the 'Pratiyogin' of its absolute negation in the point to be proved.¹

What is the criterion that such and such a characteristic is Upādhi? On the authority of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, Vedānta Deśika says that Upādhi can be known, in a case of inference, in the following two ways:²

- (i) as disallowing the relation of Sādhana or the point to be proved.
- (ii) as an alteration of the nature of the Sādhana in the Pakṣa from that observed in the Sapakṣa.

'Upādhi' takes many a form to create discrepancy in the correlation of the Vyāpya with the Vyāpaka. It is to remove this factor of discrepancy that 'Tarka' or Reductio ad Absurdum is resorted to.

Ultimately, the Anusandhāna of the 'Vyāpyatva' of the 'Vyāpya' means the Anusandhāna of the unconditional correlation of the Vyāpya or the Sādhana or the reason with the Vyāpaka or the Sādhya or the point to be proved.

1. Savārtha Siddhi, page 214.

2. N. P. page 116.

The character of Vyāpya.

In the act of inference, the psychological activity called 'Anusandhāna' does not require much time to take place. A two-fold Anusandhāna, generic as well as specific, is necessary for any inference. One may, as well, say that Anusandhāna is of the Vyāpya or the reason which has two aspects essential for inference¹ i.e.

- (i) Vyāpti or invariable association having a subjective aspect.
- (ii) Pakṣa Dharmaṭā or the fact of the Vyāpya or the reason constituting the characteristic of the Pakṣa or the locus of inference (an objective aspect).

The (i) or the Vyāpti-aspect is ascertained in actual life, by many a unit of observation of the spatial, the temporal and the spatio-temporal co-existences of facts. A solitary case of observation cannot establish unconditional invariable association of one thing with the other.² On this point, Vedānta Deśika follows Varada Viṣṇu Miśra, who holds that Vyāpti, the essential constituent of inference, can only be known from numerous cases of observation.³ The assertion of Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, that Vyāpti may be known even by a single case of observation⁴ is too bold to be accepted as it presupposes the extraordinary perception called the 'Sāmānya-Lakṣanā Pratyāsatti', which is disallowed by Viśiṣṭādvaita. 'Sāmānya Lakṣanā Pratyāsatti', if accepted, means that every human being is an omniscient being.⁵ What Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka probably means by the ascertainment of Vyāpti on a single case of observation is that 'the

1. N. P. 118.

2. N. P. 103.

3. N. P. Page 104.

4. „ „ 104.

5. „ „ 105.

last unit of the prior observation, accompanied with the sub-conscious impressions of the prior observations, is enough for the knowledge of the co-existence of one thing with the other.'

The (ii) or the 'Pakṣa Dharmatā'-aspect, which is essentially objective, may be ascertained by normal perception.

In the Anusandhāna or the consideration of the essential nature of the Vyāpaka or the reason, the above two elements are involved. For any inference, the Anusandhāna of Pakṣa Dharmatā as qualified by the Anusandhāna of Vyāpti is extremely essential.

The Ist. i. e. the Vyāpti-aspect of the Hetu as in the stock example of inference viz. 'The hill is afire as it smokes, wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the kitchen' again be analysed into the following two phases :—

- (i) 'Sapakṣe Sattvam' or the presence of the Hetu in the Sapakṣa, as for instance, the 'existence of the smoke in the kitchen.'
- (ii) 'Vipakṣa Vṛtti Rahitatvam' or 'Vipakṣādvya Vṛttih' i. e. the absence of the Hetu from the Vipakṣa, such as, 'the lake'

The IInd. i. e. the Pakṣa Dharmatā-aspect of Hetu as in the above illustration of inference, may likewise be seen in the following two aspects :—

- (i) 'Pakṣa Vyāpakatvam' or the Hetu pervading the Pakṣa such as 'the hill' in the case.
- (ii) Abādhita Viśayatvam' or the non-contradictibility of the Hetu by other stronger reasons.

Both the above aspects of 'Hetu' have one common aspect only which is 'Asatpratipakṣatvam' or the absence of counter-balancing Vyāpti or Pakṣa Dharmatā or both disallow-

ing the point to be proved.¹

The above-analysed aspects are common, as Vedānta Deśika contends², to the 'Vyāpya' or the reason in the 'Anvaya Vyatirekin' or the positive-negative and the 'Kevala Vyatirekin' or the purely positive types of inference. As the Vyāpya or the reason admits of the above two aspects in the two kinds of Vyāpti so Anumāna or inference is divided into two kinds.

The two kinds of Anumāna

The two kinds of Anumāna, according to Vedānta Deśika are :—

- (i) Anvaya-Vyatirekin or inference having the positive-negative reason and its Vipakṣa as well, as in the stock example—

'the hill is afire,
as it is smoky.'

where, the positive reason, such as 'that which is smokey is fiery as is the hearth', and the negative reason, such as 'that which has no fire has no smoke, like the lake, are conspicuous by their presence.

- (ii) Kevalānvayin or inference having the purely positive reason and no Vipakṣa as in the case—

'the Absolute is verbally definable
as It is real.'

where, the reason, such as 'that which is verbally definable is real as is the jar'—is purely positive as there is no negative reason admissible here in the absence of the 'Vipakṣa.'

1. N. P. page 121.

2. N. P. page 121.

What is apparent from the above is two-fold classification of inference according to the two-fold character of the Vyāpya or the Hetu. The 'Anvaya-Vyatirekin Hetu' or the positive-negative reason is sufficiently justified in as much as it contains all the five aspects of the Vyāpti and the Pakṣa Dharmatā required for a perfect inference and is also corroborated by common human perception. The 'Kevalānvayi hetu' or the purely positive reason is also a faultless means of inference as it has five-fold constituents of Vyāpti and Pakṣa Dharmatā. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-syncretism the 'Kevalānvayi Hetu' may have only four aspects as in the absence of 'Vipakṣa', the aspect of 'Vipakṣādvya Vṛttih' cannot simply be attributed to it. But, Vedānta Deśika contends that the aspect of 'Vipakṣādvya Vṛttih' or 'Vipakṣa Vṛtti Rahitatvam' also necessarily characterises the 'Kevalānvayi Hetu'.¹ 'Vipakṣādvya Vṛttih' means 'the absence of defect in reason consequent upon the possibility of its presence in Vipakṣa.' And in this sense the purely positive reason does have 'the absence of the defect consequent upon the possibility of its presence in Vipakṣa'.

Both the above kinds of inference hold good in the sphere of common human experience which is the criterion for the justification of inductive and deductive reasoning. Some followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-syncretism, such as Vādindra² and others do not accept the validity of the Kevalānvayi-type of inference as it can have no Vipakṣa which means that its reason remains devoid of the characteristic of 'Vipakṣādvya-Vṛttih'. But according to Vedānta Deśika the Kevalānvayi-inference as such is never invalid. Only that kind of it is unjustified, where the opposite of the Sādhya or the point to be proved is not contradicted by other stronger

1. N. P. page 119.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi, Page 217 and N. P. page 124-125.

proofs. For instance, if one argues :—

‘the fire is cold
as it is an object
just as the jar.’

and ~~thinks~~ that the ‘Kevalānvayi-Hetu’—‘as it is an object’ cannot have ~~any~~ Vipakṣa to be counteracted, one is really lacking in the logical faculty of mind. Because as soon as the point to be proved i. e. ‘coldness’ in the case is contradicted by our factual perception, the inference in question gets demolished. But the following case of Kevalānvayi-inference is perfectly valid :—

‘The Absolute is verbally definable
as it is real, like a jar.’

In the above, ‘the opposite of the Sādhya or the point to be proved’ i. e. ‘verbal indefinability’ is at once contradicted by the usage of the expression—‘Absolute’.

The Kevalānvayi-type of inference helps philosophical speculations. If it were not accepted as valid, then, men of ordinary intelligence would be turned into sceptics by such scriptural statements as—‘the Absolute is beyond the range of speech and thoughts’ and so on.¹ Moreover, the ‘Kevalānvayi-Anumāna’ is essential for meeting the challenge of the Buddhistic that are out to destroy the stronghold of Vedic spiritualism.² The main principle underlying the above inference viz. ‘Vyāhata Sādhya Viparyayatva’ or the contradictability of the opposite of the Sādhya, must never be lost sight of. According to Vedānta Deśika the ‘Mahāvīdyānumāna’ that can destroy any proposition is that kind of Kevalānvayi-inference which becomes invalid on account of the absence of the above principle.³

1. T. M. K. 4.51.

2. T.M.K. 4.51.

3. N.P. Page 135-26.

Kevala-Vyatireki-Anumāna is inadmissible

As the Kevala-Vyatireki-Hetu or the purely negative reason does not exist, so the Kevala-Vyatireki-Anumāna. is an impossibility. A purely negative reason has no foundation in facts as it is devoid of the essential element of 'Sapakṣa Sattva' or simply speaking, has no other locus except the locus of inference in question. In fact, the Kevala-Vyatireki-character of Hetu is against the very principle of inference. What is inference after all? It is a means to a type of knowledge dependent upon the knowledge of Vyāpti. Now, Vyāpti, in turn, implies the correlation between the Sādhya and the Sādhana and thus the knowledge of Vyāpti presupposes the knowledge of the Sādhya and the Sādhana. In the case of Keval-Vyatireki-Anumāna, the Sādhya is not known, as for instance, in the example—

‘Consciousness is uncognisable,
As it is consciousness,
For that which can be cognized is not
consciousness as is the jar.’

the Sādhya viz. ‘uncognizability’ is not known and if it were held to be known at the locus of inference, then, it means it requires no proof at all. But if one holds that it can be known in the Sapakṣa, then it amounts to destroying the very character of the Kevala-Vyatireki-inference. Thus in the absence of any knowledge of the Sādhya, there can be no correlation between the Sādhya and the Sādhana, deduction being out of question.¹

It is necessary to note here that while the earlier Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians such as Varada Viṣṇu Miśra² and Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka³ accept Kevala-Vyatireki-Hetu and Kevala-Vyatireki-Anumāna, Vedānta Deśika argues vehemently for

their rejection. Why? Not because Yāmunācārya¹ and Ātreya Rāmānujacārya² reject them, but, because, as Vedānta Deśika asserts, such a Hetu and such an Anumāna cannot be logically consistent and practically possible. The contention, therefore, of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra and Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka will have to be taken as un-Viśiṣṭādvaitic and accordingly inadmissible.⁴ When Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka himself defines the 'Kevala-Vyatirekin' as 'Avidyamāna Sapakṣa' or that kind of 'Anumāna' which has no 'Sapakṣa' it can be easily seen that its 'Hetu' is invalid or a kind of Hetvābhāsa.

When the main Viśiṣṭādvaitic thesis is that inference can hold good only in the sphere of humanly sensible objects, it goes without saying that the Kevala-Vyatireki-inference is impossible in the scheme of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Nyāya-Vedanta-syncretism. While the Nyāya posits that inference can touch super-sensible realities and that the Kevala-Vyatireki-Anumāna can prove the existence of God and Soul, Viśiṣṭādvaita emphatically denies such assertions.

The only purpose left of the Kevala-Vyatireki-Anumāna, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-system, is that it helps us grasp the defining characteristics of objects. But this also is inadmissible. It is not the Kevala-Vyatireki-inference alone that defines a thing. It is the function of the other means of knowledge, such as perception and verbal testimony also to present their corresponding objects and their characteristics as clearly as possible. Moreover, all that is experienced cannot be defined. One may experience different sorts of sweetness residing in sugarcane, milk, honey and so on, but, one cannot define them. There is no use retaining the Kevala-Vyatireki-Anumāna for the sake of accurate defini-

1. & 2. N.P. Page 127.

3. N.P. Page 127.

4. N.P. Page 128.

tions, Even the Anvaya-Vyatireki-Anumāna can define the objects and their characteristics. As for instance, the inference—

‘the human body is earthy as it has smell,
for that which smells is earthy, as is the jar ; and,
that which is unearthy,
cannot smell as is the ether’—

which is ‘Anvaya-Vyatireki’ clearly defines the human body and its salient properties.

Anumāna should not be divided into ‘Svārtha’ and ‘Parārtha’.

Vedānta Deśika does not accept Praśastapāda’s classification of Anumāna into Svārtha i.e. one’s own and Parārtha i.e. another’s. Inference, in fact, is essentially Svārtha or one’s own, in as much as it is brought into being by one’s own ‘Anusandhāna’ or ‘Parāmarśa’ and leads to one’s own behaviour in practical life. It cannot be held that as the syllogism is used by A to help B infer something thereby, the syllogistic reasoning is ‘Parārtha.’ The syllogistic reasoning may present only the Sādhya accompanied with the Sādhana and not inference, as such. Inference is possible only through one’s own knowledge of the universal concomitance and the existence of the reason in the Pakṣa. The medium of language cannot change the character of inference. Otherwise even perception and verbal testimony, implying linguistic usage, as the case may be, would have to be taken as Parārtha.¹ The error of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-system lies in the fact that it does not classify all the pramāṇas into ‘Svārtha’ and ‘Parārtha’.² The classification of the ‘Pramāṇas’ into ‘Svārtha’ and ‘Parārtha’ is but perfectly justifiable. And the celebrated Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician, Parāśara Bhaṭṭa, does classify the means of knowledge into

'Svārtha' and 'Parārtha'.¹ In the presence of the requisite causal collocation all the 'Pramāṇas' become 'Svārtha', while they are all 'Parārtha', if brought into being through the verbal statement.

Component parts of the formal inference and their utility.

The Indian schools of logic differ, one from the other', on the issue of the component parts of formal inference or syllogistic reasoning. The Nyāya-school advocates the necessity of the five members of the syllogism viz. Pratijnā or proposition, Hetu or reason, Dṛṣṭānta or example, Upanaya or application and Nigamana or conclusion. That means that in any case of inference all the five parts must be present, as is clear from the stock example :

'The hill is afire (Pratijnā)
because it is smoking (Hetu)
that which smokes has fire just as
the hearth-(Dṛṣṭānta or Udāharaṇa)
so is the hill (Upanaya)
and hence it is afire (Nigamana)

The Mīmāṃsā-school supports the use of only three i. e. either the trinity of Pratijnā, Hetu and Dṛṣṭānta, or that of Dṛṣṭānta, Upanaya and Nigamana, for any compact syllogistic reasoning. The Buddhistic-school has curtailed the number to two only i. e. the Udāharaṇa and the Nigamana, taking the rest to be superfluous. Vedānta Deśika contends that there should be no hard and fast rule as regards fixing number of the component parts of inference. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic school removes all hard and fast restrictions with regard to the number and the method of usage of the parts of syllogism.² The standard Viśiṣṭādvaitic works such as

1. N. P. Page 156.

2. N. P. Page 108 (Annangaryārya's edn.)

the Śrī Bhāṣya, the Siddhitraya and so on, abound in all sorts of propositions—five-membered, three-membered, having no part, having only the affirmative universal concomitance and so on. The fact is that the five-membered syllogism is meant for people of immature minds, the three-membered, for comparatively mature minds and the two-membered, for the fully mature minds.¹ The significance of the syllogistic reasoning lies in clearly conveying the Vyāpti and the Pakṣa-dharmatā rather than in having the five or the three or the two component parts.² It is a different matter if the parties to a debate fix the number of the syllogistic members according to their convenience.

The science of logic need not attach any sanctity to the five-membered syllogism to extent that it becomes a matter of meditation before any reasoning starts.³ Many eminent Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians such as Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, Varada Viṣṇu Miśra, and Varada Nārāyaṇa have thoughtfully studied the structure and the significance of the syllogistic reasoning and have come to the conclusion that no restriction should be imposed on the number of the members of syllogism ⁴

As for the number, so for the manner and the method of the use of the component parts of the syllogism no hard and fast rule need be formulated. For instance, in Pratijnā, it is the common convention of logicians to state first the 'Dharmin' and then the 'Dharma' viz. the hill (Dharmin) is afire (Dharma). In Hetu, the linga or the characteristic mark is stated by the use of the appropriate case-ending such as the ablative or the instrumental, some verbal construction, reductio absurdum and so on. In Udāharaṇa, the Drṣṭānta

1. N. P. Page 108 (Annangaracarya's edn.)

2. N. P. Page 109.

3. N. P. page 108 (A. Edn.)

4. N. P. page 109 (A. Edn.)

is verbally expressed either affirmatively or negatively having in view the character of the Vyāpti and the Dṛṣṭānta. In Upanaya, the Hetu is mentioned as existing in the 'Pakṣa' positively or negatively. Similarly, in Nigamana also the Sādhya is stated to be present in the Pakṣa affirmatively or negatively.

One may have, as against the dogmatic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika assertion, the following form of syllogism¹—

'On this hill there is fire,
because smoke is coming out of it
everyone knows that things having
smoke have fire also.
As this hill is no exception
so it is afire.'

which is perfectly logical. If one has the capacity one may even give poetic touches to the form of the syllogism used. As there is no hard and fast rule for the use of other means of knowledge, there should be none for formal inference or syllogistic reasoning also.

Inference includes confutation or Tarka.

Tarka has been distinguished from Anumāna by the ancient Nyāya of Gotama, Vātsyāyana, Udyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-syncretist-school also gives it a separate place and advocates its use in the resuscitation of the other means of proof. Whereas, Anumāna requires both the Dharmin and the Dharma, Tarka needs only the Dharmin and Dharma extrinsic to the Dharmin.² Anumāna is a means of proof meant for the common man; Tarka, a device for disputants to argue things out.

1. N. P. page 162.

2. Nyāya Vārtika, page 142.

Vedānta Deśika is strongly opposed to this view of Tarka. He considers Tarka as a kind of Anumāna rather than a separate logical category. In the Viśiṣṭādvaitic literature, it seems, Tarka and Anumāna are not held to be identical. For instance, Rāmānuja himself distinguishes Tarka from Anumāna in his Śrī Bhāṣya.¹ The nature of Anumāna is—‘This happens on account of that’ and that of Tarka—‘This may happen if that were so.’² There can be no equation, hence, between inference and confutation. Varada Nārāyaṇa in his Prajñā Paritrāṇa³ differentiates Tarka, a kind of knowledge termed as Ūha, from Anumāna. Viṣṇucitta also in his exposition of the Śrī Bhāṣya and his independent treatise, the Sangatimālā⁴ has stated the difference of Anumāna from Tarka. Against this view of his elders, Vedānta Deśika equates Tarka with Anumāna. Tarka or cogitation is not an erroneous knowledge. It is as much valid as is Anumāna. In cogitative thinking as in deductive reasoning, it is the ‘Anusandhāna’ of the Vyāpyatva of the Vyāpya that remains the central fact. The difference between Tarka and Anumāna lies in the difference of the nature of the Vyāpya or the reason. Whereas, Tarka⁵ has its Vyāpya or reason, falsely imposed and assumed in difference to an absurd hypothesis with a view to ultimately establishing the contrary, the Vyāpya or reason in Anumāna happens to be of the real nature of things of experience and proves the right thing rightly. The principle of invariable concomitance equally obtains in both of them. To hold Tarka as a kind of ‘Smṛtipramoṣa’ or memory held in abeyance is simply absurd. The nature of Tarka viz. ‘This may happen if that were so’ really means a fact of certainty inversely realised through the assumption of an absurd

1. Śrī Bhāṣya, page 284 (Pandit edn.)

2. N. P. page 141.

3. N. P. page 142.

4. N. P. page 142.

5. N. P. page 143.

hypothesis.

The conclusion following from Tarka, even in its perfect syllogistic form, has no foundation in facts. But the conclusion in Anumāna which is the knowledge of the Vyāpaka through the knowledge of the Vyāpya, is a fact ascertained by observation. On analysis Tarka shows the following five elements of its constitution :¹

- (i) 'Prasañjakasya prasanjanīyena Vyāptih' or the invariable concomitance of the falsely imposed Vyāpya or reason with the falsely assumed Vyāpaka. For instance if A argues :

'The hill is a fire
as it has smoke'

observing smoke on the hill and thinking in his mind the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire, B may contend

'The hill is not a fire'

admitting no invariable association of smoke with fire. Now, A will accept, for the time being, the hypothesis of B, viz. 'the hill is not a fire' to deduce syllogistically 'there is no smoke on the hill' against actual observation. Pursuing B's absurd contention A will say 'If there be no fire on the hill, there will be no smoke also there' and will aim at the negative concomitance of 'the absence of fire' with 'the absence of smoke'.

Ultimatety, what will be proved will be—

'the hill has no smoke
as it has no fire

wherever there is no fire there is no smoke
as on the hill,
therefore the hill is smokeless'

1. N. P. page 144-45.

Now, it is clear to see that this conclusion is contradicted by the observation of the smoke on the hill by A as well as B. A has thus convinced B with the absurdity of the latter's assumption as he has proved an absurd hypothesis following the absurd assumption of B.

The first element of Tarka in the above stock example is the invariable association of the falsely imposed Vyāpya viz. 'the absence of fire' with the falsely imposed Vyāpaka viz. 'the absence of smoke'.

- (ii) 'Pratitarkenāpratighātaḥ' or no assailment of the Tarka in hand by other Tarka. For instance, in the above stock example, if B contends 'the hill is fiery', A's former assumed conclusion 'the hill is smokeless' is not assailed.
- (iii) 'Prasanjaniya Viparyaye paryavasānam' or the fact of the falsely assumed conclusion ultimately meant to be negated as in the above stock example, the conclusion, 'the hill has no smoke' is negated by the observation of smoke coming out from the hill.
- (iv) 'Prasanjitasyañiṣṭatvam'- or the absurdity of the falsely imposed conclusion viz. 'the hill has no smoke' when actually it has smoke.
- (v) 'Parapakṣāsādhakatvam' or the fact of the proof being incapable of ascertaining the adversary's assertion. As for instance, the conclusion 'the hill is not fiery' cannot be proved in the presence of the actually observed fact-'the hill is smoking'.

A faultless cogitation contains all the above elements. In the absence of any one of them cogitation becomes falla-

cious. As the imposed conclusion partakes of the following two characteristics, cogitation also becomes two-fold :—

1. 'Prāmāṇikaparityāgaḥ' or the disregard of the facts, ascertained from experience as when one argues 'the hill is not smoky' one disregards the actual fact of observation of the smoke.
2. 'Aprāmāṇikasvikārah' or the acceptance of that which is not sanctioned by other facts of experience, as when one argues :

'God is not immutable as He is essentially non-different from His manifestations'

One has indeed accepted something which is not sanctioned by the intuition of the Upaniṣadic sages and saints.

The five-fold varieties of Tarka viz. Ātmāśraya (Ignoratio Elenosi) Anyonyāśraya (Dilemma) Cakraka (Circle) Anavasthā (regressus ad infinitum) and Kevalāṇiṣṭa prasaṅga (Reductio ad absurdum) propounded by the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-syncretist-school are subsumed by Vedānta Deśika in the above two types of Tarka i. e. the 'Prāmāṇikaparityāga, and the Aprāmāṇikasvikāra.' The other subtleties of cognition termed as 'Prativandī', 'Samacarcā' and 'Ubhayata spāśā' etc. are all ultimately the varieties of false impositions indulged in by inveterate disputants to outwit the adversary.

Here, a question may be asked—when Vedānta Deśika discards the 'Kevala Vyatireki-Anumāna' why does he establish Tarka as a type of Anumāna and advocate its efficacy in human thinking? The answer is this: The negative character of the invariable concomitance or the 'Vyatireka Vyāpti,' implied in Kevala-Vyatireki-anumāna, cannot be ascertained in the absence of our familiarity with the charac-

ter of the Sādhya. But, the 'Vyatireka Vyāpti' in Tarka is such that it does obtain in the sphere of the imposed Vyāpya and the imposed Vyāpaka which means that it partakes of the character of 'Anvaya Vyāpti.' Whereas, the Kevala Vyatireki-reasoning does not help us in the ascertainment of any new truth, the Tarka deduction eventually aims at the right knowledg of things.

Invalid Reasoning.

'Vyāpya' or reason needs five-fold essentials of validity before it can give rise to any correct inference. In the absence of any one of the requirements, the reason becomes invalid and reasoning, fallacious. The ancient Nyāya recognizes the following five invalid reasons —

1. Savyabhicāra or the discrepant.
2. Viruddha or the contrary.
3. Prakaraṇasama or the inconclusive.
4. Sādhyaśama or the futile.
5. Atīta Kāla or the contradicted.

But Nātha Muni, the first Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician, takes the following three only as invalid reasons :¹—

1. Asiddha or the inconclusive (equivalent to the Sādhyaśama of the ancient Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika).
2. Anaikāntika or the discrepant (the same as the 'Savyabhicāra' of the Nyāya or the 'Sandigdha' of the Vaiśeṣika).
3. Viruddha or the contrary (the same as is held by the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems).

Other Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians such as Parāśara Bhaṭṭa-raka² and Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa³ classify invalid reasons

1. N. P. page 130.

2. & 3. N. P. page 189.

into 10 or 9 kinds. But Vedānta Deśika, from his scientific analysis of the Vyāpya or the reason comes to the conclusion that any number of invalid reasons can be subsumed under the following two¹ i.e.

1. The Avyāpta.
2. The Apakṣadharmā.

From the above terminology, it is clear that the Vyāpya that requires 'Vyāpti' and 'Pakṣadharmatā' in any deducting thinking, loses its character when any one of its elements becomes defective. Any defect pertaining to the Vyāpti makes the reason 'Avyāpta'; any invalidity clinging to the Pakṣadharmatā turns the reason 'Apakṣadharmā'. Hetu or valid reason and Hetvābhāsa or invalid reason, being mutually opposed, their characteristics also are consequently mutually opposed. Thus, as the Hetu has two constituent elements of 'Vyāpti' and 'Pakṣadharmatā', the Hetvābhāsa can be only of two kinds (i) Avyāpta and (ii) Apakṣadharmā. Accordingly the 'Asiddha' of Nāth Muni (the Sādhyaśama of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika) is no other than 'Apakṣadharmā' in as much as, it is characterised by the inconclusiveness of the residence of the Vyāpti in the Pakṣa¹. The 'Vyāpyatvāsiddha', the illustration being—

'The hill is afire'

as it has gold-coloured smoke coming out may be seen to be simply characterised by a non-existent concomitance as for instance the concomitance of the gold-coloured smoke (Vyāpya) and the fire (Vyāpaka.). The Anaikāntika (Savya-bhicāra) and the Viruddha are both included under 'Avyāpta'. As for instance the Pakṣa Traya-Vyāpaka-Sādhāraṇa-Savya-bhicāra-Hetvābhāsa², having the example—

'Earth, air, water etc. must need a creator,
as they are all knowable,

1. N. P. page 130.

2. N. P. page 132.

like a jar' is a kind of 'Avyāpta Hetvābhāsa', because the reason, say 'knowability is not concomitant but overwide including as it does the Pakṣa, the Sapakṣa and even the Vipakṣa,

The Viruddha³, with its different sub-kinds partakes of the essentials of 'Avyāpta', because, it is pervaded by the negation of the point to be proved. As for instance, if one argues—

'Both the earth and the soul are eternal
because they are created—'

one uses a contrary reason which pervades the Vipakṣa and does not reside on one of the Pakṣa (i. e. the soul here). That means that the reason-'the fact of being created', is pervaded by the negation of the point to be proved i. e. 'the fact of being non-eternal'.

The 'Bādhita' (the Atīta Kāla or the Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa³ of the ancient Nyāya) also shares the combined characters of the 'Avyāpta' and the 'Apakṣadharma.'⁴ For instance, the following reasoning :

'Fire is cold
as it is a substance,
like the jar.,

is a fallacious reasoning as it is rendered futile by our sense-perception which convincingly proves the fire to be hot. Why the reason (the fact of being a substance) is futile is that it pervades the Vipakṣa, and is not only concomitant with the Sādhya but with the negation of the Sādhya also.

The 'Prakaraṇasama' of the Nyāya logicians (Prakaraṇa-sama is that where one is unable to know the comparative

1. N. P. page 134.

3. N. P. page 136.

2. N. P. page 135.

4. N. P. page 130.

strength of the reason and the counter-reason))¹ can be easily subsumed under the Avyāpta or the Apakṣadharmā.

As for instance, if A argues—

‘Sound is non-eternal
as it is knowable,
like the jar’

and B counter-argues :

‘sound is eternal
as it is knowable
like the soul’,

there is nothing to ascertain the comparative strength of the ‘Vyāpya’ of the one against the ‘Vyāpya’ of the other. Although, the reason i. e. ‘knowability’, is the same, in the argument as well as the counter-argument, yet, it is so ambiguous that it can prove not only the Sādhya but the opposite of the Sādhya also :² Thus this Hetvābhāsa appears to be a kind of the ‘Avyāpta or the Apakṣa Dharma’. It is necessary, therefore, to classify the Hetvābhāsa’ into

- (i) Avyāpta, and
- (ii) Apakṣadharmā

and subsume all the possible varieties under the one or the other.³

The Supreme sense of Anumāna as a means of knowledge.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic, which recognizes the inter-relation of all modes and methods of knowledge, retains Anumāna as a Valid Pramāṇa, not with a view to displaying subtleties of contentions and cogitative argumentations, as is done by later Neo-logicians, but, with a view to enlarging the vistas of human mind in the search of truth and reality. Be it as it may, the Supreme Transcendental Truth and Reality

1. N. P. page 130.

2. N. P. page 138.

3. N. P. page 130 and 131.

remains beyond the reach of Anumāna. Anumāna cannot prove or disprove the Super-Sensuous Absolute Being. All the great efforts of argumentation of the great logician Udayanācārya to seat the Divine on His throne against the inroads of the Buddhist sceptics can prove no victory of Anumāna over intuition. What they can prove is but the validity of inferential thinking in the re-iteration of the reality of the Transcendental Supreme that can be grasped only in intuitive realisation or in the spirit of self-surrender to the Supreme.

3. *Śabda or Verbal Knowledge.*

The philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita advocates an all-round harmony of our experiences. Following it, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic accounts for all the avenues of our experience. Like perception and inference, words also are the means of knowledge. Like perception and inference, verbal knowledge also is a distinct type of knowledge. There is no object of our experience that is not expressible through words. As all the objects of experience ultimately mean their inner reality i. e. the Supreme Being, so, all the words ultimately express their central theme i. e. the Supreme Being or the immanent and the transcendental 'Brahman'. The Viśiṣṭādvaitins', advocacy of 'Śābdi-Pramā' is significant enough as it is interrelated with the ethical, the spiritual and the transcendental experiences of the Ālṅkāra and the Ācāryas. If perception is our first acquaintance with the Universe and reasoning, our attempt at transcending the boundaries of the senses, verbal knowledge is the means to store up all experiences and is one of the main factors behind the vast psychic phenomena of memory, recollection and recognition.¹

Verbal Knowledge is not inference.

Words grouped into sentences give rise to meaning which in turn gives rise to our activities, positive or negative as the

1. N. P. page 360.

case may be. No explanation of reality is possible without the words. The attempt of the Buddhistic logic to subsume verbal knowledge under inference, the effort of the Vaiśeṣika Analyst to do away with words as separate means and type of knowledge and the assumption of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā logic that Śabda-Jñāna from Non-vedic passages is 'Anumāna'—go, strictly speaking, against our actual experience. In the knowledge we get from a sentence we do not feel we are inferring anything. Nor do we feel that first we infer something and then we get at the sense of the sentence. Inference is out of the question in the sphere of verbal knowledge. As we do not know, beforehand, any relation between a word and its corresponding object and as we cannot establish any invariable association between a word and what it signifies, we are not justified in invoking the aid of inference in our knowledge from words. Hence, there is no ground to prove that after the sentence is heard, the inferential process gets going in the hearer's mind before the sense of the sentence is grasped. Inference is essentially different from verbal knowledge. The cause of inference is different from the cause of verbal knowledge. As there is a world of difference between 'Vyāpti' and 'Bodhakatva' so there is a world of difference between inference and verbal knowledge.¹

Verbal Knowledge is not Recollection.

Verbal Knowledge cannot also be called recollection. The knowledge produced by words is not memory dependent upon the revival of sub-conscious impressions. In the recollective experience it is only the previously experienced that figures. But in the verbal experience what figures is something new e.g. a particular relation between one word and another and a correspondence between signification and what

is signified. Memory is past experience, verbal knowledge being present acquaintance with reality. In spite of the subconscious impressions in some stage or the other 'Śabda-Jñāna' is 'Anubhava' or apprehension containing as it does a new content.¹

Verbal knowledge is valid knowledge.

Verbal knowledge is as much valid as the other types of knowledge. Invalidity is extrinsic to it. It does not mean that words awaken the consciousness of their signification. Words are not like the lamp that manifests things indiscriminatingly to one who knows or one who does not know them. The knowledge of the signification of words is essential in verbal knowledge. Words possess two-fold potentiality; first, the capacity of the manifestation of their meanings and second, the capacity of the manifestation of their forms. In the presence of the above potentialities words express their objects as much validly as the other means of knowledge.

Verbal knowledge does not require any pre-established convention that such and such a word means such and such a thing.

According to the Nyāya-view, it is the Divine or the human convention that decides the meanings of words. But Vedānta Deśika, a staunch believer in the universality and immortality of Sanskrit speech, contends that the words of the Vedas and the Sanskrit speech do not need any convention, God-made or man-made, to convey their meanings. The 'Vācya-Vācaka-Sambandha' or the relationship between the word and its meaning is eternal² so far, at least, as the Vedic and the non-vedic Sanskrit words are concerned.³

1. Sarvārtha Siddhī page 228.

2. Śeṣvara Mīmāṃsā page 32.

3. T.M.K. 4.71.

Thus, it is that verbal knowledge is a distinct self-valid consciousness. No invalidity can cling to verbal knowledge either in the stage of its origination or in the stage of its manifestation.¹ The invalidity of Verbal Knowledge, like that of other knowledge-types, is conditioned by external factors.

*The Vality of Verbal knowledge does not depend upon
Kāryārtha-Vyutpatti.'*

The Prābhākara-school of Mīmāṃsā contends that the meaning conveyed by the sentence, happens to be of the nature of 'an activity'. As the words indicate something to be accomplished or as they have their import in the issue of some behaviour on the part of the hearer, they are valid with regard to the signification of the 'Kāryārtha'. The Vedāntins cannot accept the above position. The Nirviśeṣādvaitins and the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, both maintain the significance of words in the sphere of the 'Siddhārtha' or the already accomplished thing such as the Brahman, the Supreme Being. Even if one upholds the validity of verbal knowledge in the domain of the 'Kāryārtha', one has to accept the view that Verbal Knowledge is valid in the sphere of the 'Siddhārtha' also.² Although the Veda, according to the traditional Mīmāṃsā, signifies 'sacrificial action' yet, it implies already accomplished things also such as the agent, the means and the result etc. of the 'sacrificial action.' Any watertight division of the Vedic and the non-Vedic words—the Vedic meaning 'Kāryārtha' and the non-Vedic, 'Siddhārtha' is but arbitrary. The eternal relation called the 'Bodhya-Bodhaka-Bhāva' between the words and their corresponding objects is the inherent potency of words by virtue of which they give rise to the consciousness of the 'Kāryārtha' as well as the 'Siddhārtha'.

1. Śeṣvara Mīmāṃsā, page 34.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 230.

Words primarily signify the Siddhārtha.

The authoritative scriptural statements and the authoritative human statements all ultimately imply the Supreme Being, the real existent in all existences. The spiritual realisation of the Divine is possible only through verbal consciousness. Even those who advocate the intuitive apprehension of the Brahman must accept the great help given by verbal knowledge to the spiritual seeker in his Anubhūti-Sādhana.'

Is the Jāti or the Generic Attribute the Imports of Words ?

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic does not accept the category of Jāti or the generic attribute of the Vaiśeṣika Analyst. In the Vaiśeṣika system, the objective reality of the universe depends upon the existence of generality which is an eternal entity and a distinct category. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, it is the Divine Being who is the support and the sustenance of all universal existents. As the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosopher cannot equate the 'Brahman' with any abstraction of existence, so the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician cannot uphold Jāti to be a separate 'Padārtha' underlying all objective reality. It is in a different way that Viśiṣṭādvaita accounts for the experience of the Jāti or the genus. Jāti or genus is the unique configuration of objects, responsible for the generation of the concept of similarity in the sphere of the same class of objects.¹ In fact, Jāti is a kind of attribute that gives objectivity and reality to objects.² Consequently, the Mīmāṃsaka view of words essentially signifying by the Jāti or the genus, cannot be accepted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic. That words mean the 'Jāti' or the general and not the 'Vyakti' or the individual cannot be upheld in the face of the utility of verbal knowledge. The words may imply the Kārya or the Siddha 'Artha', but

1. N. P. page 22.

2. N. P. page 22.

they must signify the individual, because, it is the concrete individual and not the abstract generic attribute that is conducive to our activity or behaviour.³

Vyakti or the Individual is the ultimate significance of Words.

In human speech words do not seem to have a unitary import. They possess, on the contrary, a many-sided signification. For instance, if words are classified on the basis of their import, they allow of the following categories. —

- (i) Certain words essentially mean the Sāmānya or the Jāti i.e. the generic attribute.
- (ii) Certain words mean only the Vyakti or the Svarūpa i.e. the individual.
- (iii) Probably the largest number of words signify the individual qualified by the generic characteristics.

On the above analysis, it can be maintained that the view of the economy of verbal implication as held by the Mīmāṃsakas leads to a confusion of things that stand out distinctly in our experience. Thus, words primarily mean the individual which is inalienably accompanied with its characteristic form or feature. The contention of the Kumārila-school of Mīmāṃsa that words directly mean the Jāti and indirectly the Vyakti is also superfluous. One is never conscious of the general as entirely devoid of the particular.¹ One can never know the 'Jāti' apart from the 'Vyakti' its substratum. For instance, 'Cowhood', the genus can be known only when 'Cow', the particular were known. Without the prior knowledge of the 'Go-Śabda' the knowledge of 'Gotva-Śabda' is impossible. From our experience we can say that we mean by the word 'Cow' the substratum of 'Cowhood' and by the word 'Cowhood' the characteristic

1. T. M. K. page 238.

2. T. M. K. 4.78.

3. T. M. K. 4.79.

subsisting therein. There is, thus, no two-fold import of words such as the primary meaning the 'Jāti' and the secondary meaning the 'Vyakti.' All the words meaning the Jāti or the Dharma or the Guṇa must imply the substance as the substratum. All the words ultimately suggest the 'Brahman.' All the words meaning the individual objects, essentially mean their inmost Being. And all the words that mean the material and the spiritual objects ultimately suggest the Super-subjects or the Immanent-Transcendent Brahman. Vedānta Deśika demolishes rival theories of 'Verbal Import' with a view to establishing Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of words ultimately meaning the 'Śarīrin', or the Supreme Divine. The Nyāya-logic also suggests that the words mean ultimately the indwelling conscious beings. But, the contention of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic is different. What it establishes is that the words for bodies, primarily meaning the indwelling conscious beings, ultimately mean the Transcendental Supreme, the Inmost Being. Whereas, the Nyāya-logic infers the overlordship of the Divine in relation to the Universe, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic intuits the immanence and the universal signification of the Divine in relation to the universe.¹ Verbal cognition, thus, has its supreme purpose fulfilled in the realisation of the absolute oneness of the Divine in the midst of the diverse conscious and unconscious phenomena of life. How is it, then, that everybody does not realise the Divine, despite the śabda-Jñāna? The deficiency lies with vision. As our physical eyes fail to reach the inner soul in the outer organism, so does our imperfect vision fail to reach the inmost being in the outer organism of the cosmos.² Given the perfect vision, the Divine Being is sure to be revealed as the very heart of the Cosmos. Words are being used every day, but they are not used in their real sense

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi page 238.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 237.

corresponding to the real reality. It is this pseudo-real sense, corresponding to the attribute¹ that the words of our daily usage convey to us.

*There is no 'Sphota' or sound-absolute as the ground of all Sound-Phenomena.*²

The Sanskrit grammarians, the ancient philosophers of speech, in their analysis of the phenomena of words and their signification discover the one, indivisible, eternal Sound-Absolute, the 'Sphota', manifesting Itself as words and sentences and so on. This Sound-Absolute (Śabda-Brahman) is held to be identical with the Transcendental Absolute (Para-Brahman). All the Universe, thus, becomes an illusory manifestation of the Śabda-Brahman. This philosophy of speech and reality cannot be acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitin. Vedānta Deśika vehemently criticises this view. The 'Śabda-Brahman' of the speech-philosopher, he says, if analysed, does not mean anything super-sensible or supracosmic. It is simply sound subject to our auricular perception.³ The whole conception of 'sphota' is illusory. The Śabda-Brahman' in scriptures does not mean the Sound-Absolute, but a subtle sound-form or a particular stage of sound-origin. 'Sphota' mentioned in authoritative texts means only the power of sounds by virtue of which they express 'meaning.' Ultimately the 'Sound-Absolute' appears to be a stage of matter characterised by sound-origination. How can the Supreme Divine Being, the inner ruler immortal, be held to be identical with 'Śabda-Brahman' or 'sphota' an aspect of material evolution? The assumption of sphota is combruous. Human speech essentially consists of sounds signifying their objects. There is no need of postulating 'sphota', intervening

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 237.

2. Śeṣvara Mīmāṃsā, page 41.

3. Sarvārtha Siddhi Page 239.

between the sound and the sense. The universe of 'Cit' and 'Acit' cannot be an illusory manifestation on the substratum of 'Sound-Absolute'

*The sentence and its meaning are not superimpositions on
Eternal Indivisible Consciousness.*

The philosophers of speech such as Audumbarāyaṇa and others who are under the influence of Buddhistic Illusionism and Idealism, hold the view that the human speech is unreal and illusory and the oral reality is the reality of eternal formless consciousness. All the words and their groupings into sentences and the objects they imply are but appearances on the substratum of the reality of consciousness. Although this ancient view was criticised by the Sphota-Vādins, yet, as the Viśiṣṭādvaitins do not side with the Sphota-Vādins, criticise it afresh and on other grounds. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins the sounds, the words and the sentences are not subjective realities, nor are their significations mental constructs.¹ Both of them are objective entities and perceptible realities. Śabda-Jñāna is a distinctive phase of the 'Dharmabhūta Jñāna' as it is so appropriated by the knower, the conscious self.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of Verbal Knowledge.

On the import of propositions, the Naiyāyikas and the Kumārila-Mīmāṃsists form one camp, the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsists being the rivals. The Kaumārīlas uphold the 'Abhihitānvaya Vāda' and the Prābhākaras, the 'Anvitābhidhāna Vāda.' It appears that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians before Vedānta Deśikā, were divided on the issue of verbal knowledge. Some sided with the Naiyāyikas and the Kaumārīlas, and others, with the Prābhākaras. Those Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians who hold the 'Abhihitānvaya-View' are mentioned

1: Sarvartha Siddhi, Page 240.

by Vedānta Deśika as 'anye' or 'itare' or Keci or ekadeśinah.¹ But those Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians who hold the 'Anvitābhīhāna-View' of Verbal Knowledge and who are mentioned by Vedānta Deśika are celebrities like Yāmunācārya,³ Parāśara haṭṭāraka,² Varada Viṣṇu Miśra,² Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka² and so on. Vedānta Deśika gives his full support to the 'Anvitābhīdhāna-View' of verbal knowledge and following the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors like Parāśara haṭṭāraka, Varada Viṣṇu Miśra and others contended that the 'Abhihitānvaya-Vāda' can never be the Viśiṣṭādvaitic knowledge.⁴

Why the 'Abhihitānvaya-View' does not suit the main Viśiṣṭādvaitic conceptions of logic and philosophy is that it cannot account for the real import of sentences, Vedic or non-Vedic, implying closely connected and mutually interrelated ideas and standing for entities related together as substances and attributes. The 'Abhihitānvaya-Vāda' is ambiguous. Firstly, it has to admit the power of word-units to express their own sense. Secondly, it has to believe in the power of the individual meanings of words to reveal their mutual connectedness. And thirdly, it has to postulate the power of word-units impregnating sense-connectedness in the individual word-meanings⁵ in a sentence. Coming through this roundabout process the sense of the sentence ceases to be directly and distinctively verbal. It is only the meanings of words and not the words as such that ultimately give rise to the meaning of the sentence. How can such a supposition be the true account of Verbal Knowledge?

1. N.P. page 371 (Chaukhamba).

2. N. P. Page 370.

3. N. P. page 370. (Chaukhamba).

4. N. P. page 372. (Chaukhamba).

5. T. M. K. page 241.

The right explanation of verbal knowledge is that which is given by the 'Anvitābhidhāna-View'. According to this view, the sense of the sentence is pre-eminently a unitary idea coming through the inter-relatedness of the diverse ideas of the syntactically connected word-units. A word in a sentence, Vedic or non-vedic, gives its own compatible meaning, essentially interconnected with the compatible meanings of the other words of the sentence.¹ The 'Kāraka-words' give their sense closely associated with 'Kriyā-words'. The Verbs likewise signify themselves as intimately inter-related with the sense of the words they govern. The words which mean substantives and the words which mean attributives are also closely connected in their individual significations in a sentence. As in life, so in speech, the subordinate elements have to subserve the supreme element. Until and unless things function in organic harmony and unity, the result is bound to be 'chaos' rather than 'cosmos'. Similarly, the words in a sentence, have organic unity before they can convey anything ; otherwise, the sense of the sentence will not be a unitary experience, but, a diversity of mutually conflicting concepts.

In 'Anvitābhidhāna-View' there is a certain simplicity and scientific precision of process of the sense of the sentence. The individual words of a sentence, recall to the hearer's mind, at first, a glimpse of their meanings not due to their denotational capacity but due to their inherent recollective capacity characterising all the words of human speech. After the process of recollection of meanings of words what follows in the mind of the hearer of the sentence is the process of the apprehension of such meanings consequent upon the operation of the factors of expectancy (Ākāṃkṣā), compatibility (Yogyatā) and juxtaposition (Āsatti), which,

1. T. M. K. 4 page 91.

indeed, are responsible for the making of a psychologically, logically and syntactically correct sentence. In this apprehensive process also there is no contribution made by the power of denotation of words. The power of denotation of words helps the inter-related sense of the sentence before it figures in the hearer's consciousness. Likewise, the power of indication of words also functions only after the recollective and the apprehensive processes have been gone through in the mind of the hearer of the sentence.

As the Viśiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics upholds the view of the unity of the Divine in the diversity of the 'Cit' and the 'Acit', so does the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic maintain the view of 'Anvitābhīdhāna' or the unity of the meaning of a sentence in the diversity of the meanings of its constituents. As the energy of the Divine holds together its manifestations so does the potency of the words of the sentence hold together the meanings of the various elements of the sentence to subserve the central sense which is directly conducive to our practical life.

Verbal knowledge is never about an unqualified and undifferentiated object.

Verbal Knowledge, like other types of knowledge, grasps the object in its essential form and feature. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of Verbal Knowledge i.e. 'Anvitābhīdhāna' which means inherent connectedness of the meanings of words forming the sentence implies intrinsic difference or distinction between one object of experience and its verbal signification from the other object of experience and verbal signification thereof. In absolute identity of signification mutual relationship of meanings of words forming the sentence becomes meaningless. The syntactical principle of co-ordination of words i.e. 'Sāmānādhikaraṇya' cannot hold good if non-difference or

difference-non-difference were the basic truth of reality and the verbal expression thereof. 'Sāmānādhikarāṇya' means the verbal signification of a thing through the signification of its attributes or properties.¹ As different qualities are found to exist in a thing, so different attributes are held to qualify one single substantive. The sense of 'Sāmānādhikarāṇya' is the co-ordination of the distincts rather than the co-ordination of the contradictories. Thus verbal knowledge from such scriptural texts as 'Satyam Jñānam Anantam' etc. implies the One Supreme Being characterised by real reality, self-luminous consciousness and infinite infinity. The verbal knowledge from such texts cannot mean the bare indivisible identity of Being. The text 'Tattvamasi' also cannot imply the undifferentiated, unqualified identity. It can only mean the One Reality characterised by distinct attributes, denoted by 'Tat' and 'Tvam' i. e. the Cause and the effect, the substance and the attribute, the soul and the body and so on. No denotation or indication or implication is possible about an object which has no attribute.² Attributes are the principles behind the differentiation of objects. Verbal Knowledge grasping the substantive grasps its attributes and its difference from other objects also. This difference is the distinctive feature of the object itself, the 'Vastu-Saṁsthāna' or the very form of the thing. Thus the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theory of 'Anvitābhīdhāna' is critical of the Nirviśeṣādvaitic concept of the qualITLESS 'Brahman'.

Even if the 'Abhihitānvaya-view,' of a section of Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians were held to be the traditional Viśiṣṭādvaitic view of Verbal Knowledge, it goes without saying that bare identity cannot be the signification of the scriptural texts.³ In fact, the 'Abhihitānvaya-view' em-

1. N. P. page 155.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 244.

3. Sarvārtha Siddhi, Page 242.

phasizing upon the meanings of individual words in a sentence and advocating the capacity of such meanings for ultimately giving rise to their mutual connectedness is but a step that leads to the 'Anvitābhīdhāna-view.' As the 'Anvitābhīdhāna' holds good in the sphere of the distinction between the substantive and the attributes, so 'Abhihitānvaya' obtains in the sphere of the distinction between the subject and the predicate. Whether the emphasis lies on the 'anvita'—aspect or the 'anvaya'—aspect of the signification of a sentence, the fact is that we grasp the qualified object and not the qualitless being.

Texts of Verbal authority according to Viśiṣṭādvaita.

Verbal authority as the means of Verbal Knowledge is the statement of a person not unreliable concerning objects, conducive to our life. The first authoritative statement is the Veda, the eternal sacred teaching, the 'Command of the Divine Being.' The eternity of letters is not the eternity of the Veda. The letters are not eternal. What is eternal is the order of the letters of the Vedic scriptures in the cyclic eternity of the cosmic creation. The Vedic statements are inherently reliable and authoritative and valid. The authority of the Veda does not depend, as the Naiyāyikas contend, on the authority of its Divine Author. The Veda is as much authoritative as the knowledge of the Divine Being.¹ Like Yāmunācārya who says² that verbal knowledge is essentially authoritative and that invalidity is extraneous caused by the imperfections of the speakers, Vedānta Deśika also contends that the Vedic statements are inherently infallible.³ The next authority is that of the Smṛtis of Manu and others which embody the

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi, page 247.

2. N. P. Page 380 (Chaukhamba).

3. T.M.K. 4.101

truths of the Vedic scriptures. The Smṛtis derive their authority from the authority of their original, the Veda. As the 'Śrūtis' are innumerable, consisting of Mantras, Vidhis and Arthavādas, so are the Smṛtis. Primarily, the 'Smṛtis', based on the 'Śrūtis', are of three kinds :—

1. The Dharma-Śāstras.
2. The Itihāsas.
3. The Purāṇas.

The 'Dharm Śāstras' are of diverse descriptions, as for instance, the Sāṃkhya, the Yoga, the Pāśupata, the Panch-rātra, the Vaikhānasa and so on. Their division is based on the division of their teachings. The Sāṃkhya teaches constant contemplation on the pure self. The Yoga teaches the practical control of the mind in meditation on the Divine. The Pāśupata teaches the worship of Paśupati. The Pānc-rātra teaches self-surrendering love and devotion to the Divine and so on. The mutual conflict, if any, of the above is removed or reconciled in the light of the Vedic statements. The Itihāsas and the Purāṇas are also varied and various. They are meant to appeal to different types of men. Statements, human or superhuman, are authoritative if they are not found to be otherwise by the tests and experiments of everyday life.

The supreme significance of Verbal Knowledge.

In the Viśiṣṭādvaitic system of life, Verbal Knowledge is supremely significant. 'Svādhyāya' and 'Yoga' are the lamps that light the path of the God-seeker. Although the daily Śāstra-jñāna is not necessary for those in whose heart the 'divine unrest' is at its intensest, yet, for the rest of the spiritual seekers, it is extremely essential. Out of all the knowables, the Divine Being is the supreme-most knowable. Verbal testimony is the only means to know the Supreme

Knowable.¹ The Brahman, the Lord Nārāyaṇa is the ultimate reach of Verbal Knowledge.² Verbal Knowledge is as much important in philosophical thinking as in practical spiritual living.

4. *A note on the number of Pramāṇas.*

The number of Pramāṇas differs with different systems of philosophy. The avenues of knowledge may be as many as there are types of knowledge. By the time of Vedānta Deśika, many a Pramāṇa, not accepted by the ancient tradition beginning from Manu, had come into being. According to Vedānta Deśika, any check on the increase of the means of knowledge in the face of the immense possibilities of human mind is but meaningless. The following is the list of 'Pramāṇas' according to the different schools of thought—

- (1) Pratyakṣa or perception is the only means of knowledge according to the Cārvakas or the Materialists.
- (2) Pratyakṣa and Anumāna (inference) are the two means of knowledge according to the Vaiśeṣika-systematists and the Buddhist logicians.
- (3) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda (Verbal Knowledge) are the three-fold means of knowledge for the Sāṃkhya philosophers and the Nyāya-logicians of the Bhūṣaṇa-school.
- (4) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda and Smṛti (memory) are the four-fold means of knowledge for a section of Vaiśeṣika Analysts and a sub-section of Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophers.
- (5) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda and Upamāna (comparison) are the four Pramāṇas for the Naiyāyikas

1. N.P. page 483 (Chaukhamba).

2. N.P. page 438.

of the ancient school of Gotama.

- (6) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda, Upamāna and Arthāpatti (presumption) are the 5 Pramāṇas for the Prābhākara-school of Mīmāṃsā.
- (7) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda, Upamāna, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi (non-perception) are the 6 Pramāṇas for the Kaumārila-system of Mīmāṃsā as well as the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara.
- (8) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śabda, Upamāna, Arthāpatti, Anupalabdhi, Sambhava (inclusion) and Aitihya (tradition) are the 8 means of knowledge for the Paurāṇikas.

In the above scheme, only three seem to be the most authentic and the most scientifically accurate of the means of knowledge. These three i. e. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda, are the means of all kinds of knowledge, material as well as spiritual. The rest may be easily subsumed under them for the sake of scientific brevity and precision. For instance,

1. Upamāna (Comparison) which, according to some Naiyāyikas and a section of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians such as Meghanādāri Sūri and others, means 'the knowledge of similarity in the object remembered which is caused by the knowledge of such similarity in the object previously perceived'¹ can be safely included in memory. Similarity is essentially a kind of organic or structural characteristic and as such it is subject to perception as well as recollection. Thus, Upamāna' is a kind of Smṛti. Otherwise, we may have to postulate a different means of knowledge to account for the experience of dissimilarity also.

If Upamāna means, as the traditional logicians believe, the recognition of the meaning of a directive statement

¹. N. P. page 175.

(Atideśa Vākya) such as 'Yathā gauh tathā gavayah' on the perception of an animal closely resembling the cow, then, it cannot go beyond the range of verbal testimony. In fact the directive statement 'Yathā gauh tathā gavayah', which is held by the Naiyāyikas to be the immediate cause of Upamāna, is simply a valid verbal knowledge of the relation of the denotation of the word-'Gavaya' with the object 'gavaya'. It cannot be held that the knowledge of similarity is the immediate cause of Upamāna and that this knowledge is not produced either by directive statement or by inference. The directive statement, as Vedānta Deśika maintains following Viṣṇucitta, his predecessor¹ is directly responsible for the knowledge of similarity in the yonder object i.e. the animal 'gavaya' which in fact is the substratum of the points of resemblance expressed by the 'Atideśa Vākya'. If, however, the directive statement is not taken to be enough for the knowledge of similarity and a separate Pramāṇa viz. Upamāna were postulated for the purpose, then, the knowledge of the supersensuous objects such as 'Indra', 'Upendra', 'Prajāpati', 'Paśupati' and so on from directive scriptural statements would become inexplicable.

2. Arthāpatti (presumption) of the Mīmāṃsakas can be safely included in Anumāna. According to Vedānta Deśika, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician Meghanādāri advocating the acceptability of Arthāpatti as an independent Pramāṇa, is an Ekadeśin amongst the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians. The ancient traditional Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians such as Viṣṇucitta and others hold 'Arthāpatti' to be 'Anumāna', pure and simple.² The view of Yāmunācārya as regards Arthāpatti being a separate Pramāṇa³ is dismissed by Vedānta Deśika with the remark that it is, strictly speaking, the Mīmāṃsa view which cannot be acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic. If

1 to 3. N. P. page 175.

Arthāpatti is meant to explain such an experience as 'Pīno Devadatto divā na bhuñkte' which is possible only when its incompatibility is removed by the experience-'crāṭrau bhuñkte'-then, it can be shown that this 'anupapatti' or incapability is nothing more than a kind of Vyāpti or universal concomitance. The incompatible or the irreconcilable is the 'Vyāpya', the Sādhana or the Liṅga and the factor of compatibility or reconciliation, is the Vyāpaka or the Sādhya. And following the rule of 'wherever there is Vyāpya, there is Vyāpaka', we may say 'wherever there is incompatibility manifest, there is compatibility immanent.'¹ The knowledge of incompatibility implies the knowledge of the factor of reconciliation. Thus, Arthāpatti really speaking, is a kind of inferential knowledge.

The view that 'Arthāpatti' is to be accepted as a separate Pramāṇa for the removal of conflict between two Pramāṇas is also dismissed by Vedānta Deśika with the remark that no real conflict can be possible between two valid means of knowledge. Moreover, if 'Arthāpatti' were the means of the removal of conflict between Pramāṇas, some other Pramāṇa must needs be thought of for the acceptance of one particular reconciliatory knowledge, in the midst of many conflicting ones, as the case may be.

3. 'Anupalabdhi' (non-perception) is not a separate means of knowledge as the Mīmāṃsakas and the Nirviśeṣādvaitins believe. 'Abhāva' or 'Anupalabdhi' or non-existence in Viśiṣṭādvaita amounts to a kind of Bhāva or existence. As such, it can be known through the three accepted means of knowledge. Even if non-existence were known as non-existence rather than existence, it could be easily known with the help of the three Pramāṇas having the requisite

ssories of the remembrance of the 'Pratiyogin' (the counter-
y) to non-existence and so on, as the case may be.
s the assumption of Anupalabdhi or Abbāva as a Pramāṇa
imbruous. As the sense-organs can sense the objects
t which they come into contact, they can also sense the
port or the substratum of Abbāva. If it were not so,
t, there can be no guarantee for the sense-organs in contact
a the objects to contact the qualities existing in the objects.
will mean, accordingly, the postulation of another Pramāṇa
ead of 'Sannikāṣa' for the knowledge of the qualities
he objects.

4. 'Aitiḥya' or tradition, if authentic, can be easily
sumed under 'Śabda' and if otherwise, under the semblan-
e of Śabda.'

5. Sambhava or Inclusion is no other than inference.

Following the inclusion of the above-mentioned Pramāṇas
their original sources, others also may be safely included
der them. For instance, Ceṣṭā or Sign, which according
some is a distinct means of knowledge, does not seem to
other than inference. If it is held, as is done by the
iśiṣṭādvaitic logician, Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka, that
eṣṭā² comes before 'Śabda' and helps clearing our ideas
one another or that it comes after 'Śabda' as in the art
: histrionics, even then, it can be shown that it is no other
ian 'Śabda'. Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, an eminent authority on
'iśiṣṭādvaitic logic, has included 'Ceṣṭā' in 'Śabda' with
re remark that 'Ceṣṭā' implies a denotative relationship
absisting between it and the object signified by it. The
ifference of opinion on the interpretation of Ceṣṭā does not
mean that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians take it to be a separate

1. T. M. K. 4.180

2. N. P. page 176.

Pramāṇa. The same is the case with 'Lipi' or the Alphabets. The alphabets are not independent Pramāṇa. Vedānta Deśika subsumes them under inference with the statement that there is an invariable concomitance between the sounds on the one hand and the alphabets on the other.¹ Similarly 'Saṃvāda' held to account for Saṃvāda, a distinct type of knowledge, is nothing more than a cumbrous assumption. The statement of Varada Viṣṇu Miśra that 'Saṃvāda is a kind of knowledge caused by the words and that it is meant to grasp the objects of apprehension² should not be construed to mean that 'Saṃvāda' is a distinct type of consciousness. In fact Varada Viṣṇu Miśra also, as Vedānta Deśika understands, would like to take 'Saṃvāda' as a type of Verbal Cognition. 'Pratisandhāna' is simply a kind of 'Pratyabhijñā' or recognition. While 'Pratisandhāna' accounts for the continuity of the subjective reality only, 'Pratyabhijñā' accounts for the continuity of the objective reality also.³ It is clear, therefore, that it is a type of recognitive experience. Some epistemologists contend that 'Pratisandhāna' is not the recognition of the subject, the self, but a unitary consciousness, apprehending two objects at a time. But Vedānta Deśika suggests that such 'a unitary consciousness apprehending two objects at a time' amounts only to 'a unitary. consciousness, belonging to one abiding individual subject, the self, that may grasp, at a time two or more than two objects of previous separate comprehension,⁴ 'Pratibhā' also has a similar case. 'Pratibhā' has been given an eminent and independent status as a means of knowledge in the science of yogic meditation. Although, it is not a common means of knowledge, yet, it cannot be denied in the case of men of greater self-control, of purer mental disposition and

1. N. P. Page 176.

2 to 4. N. P. page 174.

higher spiritual insight. Nevertheless, it cannot be held that it is a separate Pramāṇa and that it cannot be included what is called the 'supernormal perception' of the yogins. The position of 'Pratyabhijñā' also is similar in the respect of being included in the three Pramāṇas viz. Pratyakṣa, anumāna and Śabda. All the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians seem to hold the view that Pratyabhijñā, if authentic, is a type of knowledge and that a Pramāṇa called 'Pratyabhijñā' is to be recognised to account for it. But they all include it ultimately in the three means of knowledge. Viṣṇu Citta would like to maintain 'Pratyabhijñā' or cognitive experience to be a single psychosis, apprehensive in all essentials. According to him, the two mutually exclusive elements of 'anubhava' and 'smṛti' can never figure in the knowledge of an object. 'Pratyabhijñā', accordingly, is the apprehension of the indivisible unity' spatial or temporal or spatio-temporal of an object in view. Rāmānuja also holds the view that 'Pratyabhijñā' is that unitary consciousness which apprehends the continuity of an object in the world of space-time-causality.² According to him, cognitive experience results from the contact of the sense-organs with the object wherein the residual impressions of the previous perception of the object play a great part. But other Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians hold the view that 'Pratyabhijñā' is not a single psychosis, but, a double psychoses.³ For instance, in the experience of 'this is that jar' the 'this'-element is perceptual and the 'that'-element is recollective. Vedānta Deśika also takes 'Pratyabhijñā' to be a 'recollective-apprehensive' consciousness, having various types according to the varieties of the sub-conscious impressions.⁴

Smṛti is a valid means of knowledge.

The case of Smṛti, concerning its inclusion in or exclusion

from the three Pramāṇas, is somewhat different. Smṛti or remembrance is a distinct type of knowledge brought into being by the operation of the residual subconscious impressions of the prior apprehension of an object.¹ The residual mental impressions called 'Bhāvanā Saṃskāras' are revived through the triple agency of 'Sahadṛṣṭi', 'Sadṛśadṛṣṭi' and 'Adṛṣṭi' i. e, the law of association and individual predisposition and what results is Smṛti or remembrance.² Smṛti admits of three divisions according to the three causes of its generation such as apprehension, misapprehension and doubt—

- (i) right remembrance.
- (ii) wrong remembrance and,
- (iii) doubtful remembrance

The Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka-view that remembrance is invalid knowledge is not acceptable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians, Smṛti or remembrance is as much valid as Anubhava or apprehension, because, like apprehension, it also becomes conducive to our practical behaviour and leads to the fulfilment of our needs and desires.³ Smṛti cannot be an invalid knowledge simply because it grasps the object out of sight. If the presence or the absence of objects were the only factor of differentiation between 'Anubhava' (valid knowledge) and Smṛti (invalid knowledge) then, so many kinds of valid knowledge such as the inferential knowledge of the past or the future objects, verbal understanding, extraordinary perception and so on, will have to be taken as invalid on account of their corresponding objects being out of the range of the perceiver's sight.⁴ The fact is that, even when Smṛti cannot grasp its corresponding object as present in the present time, it does grasp

1. N. P. Page 171.

2 & 3. T. M. K. 4 124

4. Sarvārtha Siddhi, Page 257.

its object existing at the time of its previous apprehension. Accordingly, Smṛti cannot be called 'objectless.' The very fact that it grasps the identity of the object as in the experience of 'that jar' means that it grasps the object having a past existence. It cannot be held that Smṛti is invalid having no practical purpose to serve, because, then, even the immediate apprehension of such insignificant objects as a blade of grass and so on will have to be taken as invalid.¹ In fact, Smṛti or remembrance fulfils various purposes in life. By Smṛti alone we contemplate on the course of our every-day life. By Smṛti alone poets write poetry expressing, therein, the inmost feelings of their heart and embodying therein their observations of man and nature. By Smṛti alone the logician uses his syllogisms and the common man reasons out things and applies words to convey the idea of the objects of experience. And by Smṛti alone is possible that supreme self-surrendering love and devotion to the Divine which is the ultimate purpose of human life.²

It is but presumptuous to say that all the above is due to prior apprehension rather than remembrance. If one must have prior apprehension only to subserve all the needs of life, then it is better to hold the Divine will to be the only means of knowledge.³

Independence of Anubhava or dependence of Smṛti makes no difference whatsoever in the quality or the quantity of validity of these two Pramāṇas. Anubhava and Smṛti both depend on their invariable antecedent factors. Even when inference depends upon perception, it is held to be a valid type of knowledge. Verbal Knowledge depending upon inference is perfectly valid. Why should Smṛti, depending on Anubhava, be invalid ?

In the advocacy of the validity of Smṛti or remembrance by the invariable antecedent of 'Smaraṇa' or memorizing, Vedānta Deśika has contributed to the cause of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Nyāya-syncretism. The earlier Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians followed, in fact, the ancient Nyāya on the issue of Smṛti. For instance, Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka, the author of the 'Prajñā Paritrāṇa' did not accept the validity of Smṛti, thinking that Smṛti, being the knowledge of some past knowledge, did not present to the perceiver the corresponding object. Even the eminent Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician Viśiṣṭa Citta, could not convince himself of the validity of Smṛti. Varada Viṣṇu Miśra also excluded Smṛti from the sphere of valid knowledge as, according to him, it never grasped an object that was not grasped by other means of knowledge. The greatest of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic savants Yāmūnācārya also was not explicitly in favour of the validity of Smṛti.⁵ The statements of Rāmānuja on Smṛti may be construed as denial of Smṛti-Prāmāṇya. It is Vedānta Deśika alone who upholds the validity of Smṛti, without which, as he thinks, the main thesis of Viśiṣṭādvaita cannot be supported. It shows that the acceptance of Smṛti as a Prāmāṇa is the 'Siddhānta' or the final view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic in consonance with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics.⁶ Although he is not the first advocate of Smṛti-Prāmāṇya, as before him Nātha Muni the celebrated scholar-saint⁷ and Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, the eminent Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician,⁸ had expressed themselves in favour of Smṛti, yet he is the only Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician who has strongly championed the cause of Smṛti.

1. N. P. page 177.

2 & 3. N. P. Page 172.

4 & 6. N. P. page 173.

7. N. P. page 177.

8. T. M. K. 4.132.

In the advocacy of the validity of Smṛti or remembrance by the invariable antecedent of 'Smarāṇa' or memory,¹ Vedānta Deśika has contributed to the cause of Viśiṣṭādvaita-Nyāya-syncretism. The earlier Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians, followed, in fact, the ancient Nyāya on the issue of Smṛti. For instance, Varada Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭāraka, the author of the *Prajñā Paritrāṇa*² did not accept the validity of 'Smṛti' thinking that Smṛti, being the knowledge of some past knowledge, did not present to the perceiver the corresponding object. Even the eminent Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician Viṣṇu Citta, could not convince himself of the validity of Smṛti.³ Varada Viṣṇu Miśra also excluded Smṛti from the sphere of valid knowledge as, according to him, it never grasped the object that was not grasped by other means of knowledge.⁴ The greatest of the Viśiṣṭādvaitica savants Yāmunācārya also was not explicitly in favour of the validity of Smṛti.⁵ The statements of Rāmānuja on Smṛti may be construed as denials of Smṛti-Prāmāṇya. It is Vedānta Deśika alone who upholds the validity of Smṛti, without which, as he thinks, the main thesis of Viśiṣṭādvaita cannot be supported. He shows that the acceptance of Smṛti as a Pramāṇa is the 'Siddhānta' or the final view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic in consonance with the Viśiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics.⁶ Although he is not the first advocate of Smṛti-Prāmāṇya, as before him Nātha Muni the celebrated scholar-saint⁷ and Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, the eminent Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician,⁸ had expressed themselves in favour of Smṛti, yet he is the only Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician who has strongly championed the cause of Smṛti,

1. N. P. page 177.

2 & 3. N. P. Page 172.

4 & 6. N. P. page 173.

7. N. P. page 177.

8. T. M. K. 4.132.

raising it to the status of 'Anubhava' in the respect of 'Prāmāṇya'.

According to Vedānta Deśika, there are, thus, six types and means of knowledge as for instance, the 3 Anubhavas viz. Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda plus the 3 Smṛtis, based on them viz. Pratyakṣa-Smṛti, Anumāna-Smṛti and Śabda-Smṛti.¹ Or following the ancient tradition, one may have only the 3 Pramāṇas, such as Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda, but, one has to understand that the three Smṛti-types are implied in the three Anubhava-types.² That the great Rāmānuja does not fix the number of Pramāṇas and does not criticise the Pramāṇas accepted by other schools of thought does not mean that Vedānta Deśika's view is un-Rāmānujic or un-Viśiṣṭādvaitic. Rāmānuja's work is to explain the main Viśiṣṭādvaitic thesis,³ viz. that all knowledge grasps the qualified object. Accordingly, he is indifferent to the number of the Pramāṇas. Viśiṣṭādvaitic logic, according to Vedānta Deśika has 3 Pramāṇas. That other Viśiṣṭādvaitic logicians differ from him on this point shows that they possess the Viśiṣṭādvaita-Nyāya-syncretist-sense in a lesser degree than Deśika.

1 & 2. N. P. page 177.

3. T. M. K. 4.132.

NYĀYA-VEDĀNTA-SYNCRETISM (DIALECTICAL)**3. *Viśiṣṭādvaitic Dialectics***

The term 'Viśiṣṭādvaitic Dialectics' does not mean any new theory of controversy propounded and practised by the philosophers of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic school. We know that Dialectics forms one of the topics of the ancient Nyāya of Gotama. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic thinkers, like Nāthamuni, Varada Viṣṇu Misra and Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka take the problem of dialectics totally from the Nyāya Sūtras and the commentaries and discuss them in their own way. Vedānta Deśika, following in the footsteps of his predecessors, preserves the thoughts of the ancient teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita on the technique, the scope, the etiquette, the methodology and the intellectual and emotional values of dialectics. 'Viśiṣṭādvaitic Dialectics', accordingly, means the ancient canons of controversy, as elucidated by the Viśiṣṭādvaitic teachers. Although the old Viśiṣṭādvaitic scholars make no original contribution to the cause of ancient dialectical pursuit and the laws and possibilities thereof, yet, they, do not lag behind the Tārkikas in the game of dialectics, since we find them putting forth their philosophy, their theology their esotericism and their ethical theories through a vigorous dialectical argumentation.

As regards the theoretical treatment of dialectics, the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita and the view-point of Vedānta Deśika do not differ in essentials from the school of the ancient Nyāya and the view-point of Varadarāja (11th century A.D.) a logician of the traditional school of Nyāya. Rāmānuja, the great Viśiṣṭādvaitic teacher and philosopher maintains dialectics to

be a great achievement of the human mind, a real spiritual force, a divine impetus and a supreme possibility of intellectual freedom.¹ If dialectical pursuit can attain for man the freedom of his mind from the ties of prejudices, presuppositions and perversities of dogmatism, it is nothing short of a spiritual discipline that emerges in the freedom of the Self from the ties of the Not-Self and reaches its climax in the realisation of the communion of the Self with the Supreme Self—the 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam' actualised in its real essence.² And for Vedānta Deśika, dialectics is a 'a dear delight', the full flow of mental capacities, the outlet of erudition, the main-spring of intellectuality and finally the ideal interpretation of one's own system along with the criticism of the rival doctrines.³

What is Kathā or Dialectics

Dialectics, as Vedānta Deśika⁴ understands it, is a continued conversation on a thing or a thought or a theory between the Vādin and the Prativādin.

The Scope of Dialectics

Dialectics enters into almost all the conditions and circumstances of human life. All the problems, ethical, logical, literary, religious, political, social and individual presuppose the necessity of dialectics for their intellectual evaluation as well as clarification. It is in the conflict of diverse insights that systems are built up, theories are put forth and the possibilities of human mind realised to their fullest extent.⁵ Dialectics as a technique of conversation,

1. G. B. 10.30

2. G. T. C. 299

3. S. S. page 25

4. N. P. page 109.

5. T. M. K. page 5

is an essential form of philosophical thought. The Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-Sūtras and the Uttara-mīmāṃsā Sūtras are the crystallizations of the conflicts of opinions on moral as well as spiritual goods.¹ Even in the analysis of God-realization, the role of dialectics is a major one.²

What Occasions Dialectics ?

Dialectics is ingrained in the very nature of man. Intellectual and emotional differences never allow two men to be alike. All contentious conversations require parties in opposition. Dialectics flourishes in the atmosphere of partisanship.

Vedānta Deśika's View

The duality of mind is the first prerequisite of dialectics. It seems that Vedānta Deśika follows, here, the implications of the ancient traditional Nyāya-theory of controversy according to which the duality of mind is essential in any dialectical pursuit.³ But, what he understands by 'duality of mind' is not, disagreement between two contestants, but, the conflict of views in a single mind reflecting upon things and thoughts of life. One individual mind may think upon problems of Life and Being not inductively or deductively only, but, dialectically also. Vedānta Deśika is expert in such a dialectic of thinking. In fact, his momentous work, the Śata-Dūṣaṇī is a series of soliloquies in dialectics, a sustained argument of a single mind against the challenge of opposing views. Probably, it is his love of the traditional that does not allow him to formulate his theory of dialectics according to which a single mind in grip with a problem is no less dialectical than the duality or multiplicity of minds. Being

1. T. M. K. 33

2. S. S. 2.94

3. N. S. Page 70 (Chaukhamba)

a practical dialectician, he does not theorise on dialectics in the abstract. What he does is to accept the traditional Nyāya-view on dialectics as an art of conversation.

Nātha Muni's view.

In this connection, it will not be out of place to refer to the view of Nātha Muni, the first Viśiṣṭādvaitācārya according to whom dialectics does not necessarily, originate in the duality or the multiplicity of minds. A teacher, revolving in his mind the pros and cons of the subject he teaches may express himself dialectically for the edification of his students.¹

What is the Theme of Dialectics ?

The ancient Nyāya-logicians dilate upon the theme of dialectics. The dialectical theme is not reality, but, appearance. Reality is one. It appears different through different view-points. For instance, the Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vāda does not deny the oneness of Reality which the Advaita-Vāda accepts. Had there been no basic acceptance of the basic reality of Being, no Viśiṣṭādvaita or Advaita-Vāda could have come into being. Since a 'Ghata' or a jar exists—and all accept the existence of a Ghata or a jar—there are diverse views concerning the nature of the Ghata or the jar. According to A, the Ghata or the jar may be a component whole, according to B; an atomic integration, according to C; a conceptual existence, according to D; a material evolution, according to E; a divine manifestation, according to F; an illusory conception and so on.² But, so far as the basic reality of the Ghata is concerned, no two views can be found to exist. Reality, therefore, is a theme of universal acceptance. But for this basic universal acceptance of reality—whether reality be

1. N. P. page 109.

2. N. V. T. T. page 53 (Chaukhamba)

provisional or empirical or transcendental—the mind of man cannot reason out or rationalise anything. The ‘thisness’ of a thing or its reality is a ‘Sarva-Taṇtra-Siddhānta’ and as such it cannot form the theme of dialectics that presupposes opposition of opinions. In fact, dialectics as an art of debate does not come into being if the parties to it do not accept something as a ‘Sarva-Taṇtra-Siddhānta.’¹ It cannot be said that there is no ‘Sarva-Taṇtra-Siddhānta’ as such. To say that there is no Siddhānta, let alone a ‘Sarva-Taṇtra-Siddhānta’, is itself a Siddhānta. Although dialectics does not make ‘Sarva-Taṇtra-Siddhānta’ as its theme, yet, it presupposes, for its own existence and manifestation, a ‘Sarva-Taṇtra-Siddhānta’ such as ‘Pramāṇāt prameya siddhiḥ’ or ‘that a thing is known or proved through its necessary means of knowledge or proof.’

Now, what forms the theme of dialectics? As dialectics is a game of thought, a play of thinking, its theme is an idea or a theory or a tenet or a doctrine or a standpoint or an opinion concerning a thing objective or subjective. As regards the ‘thisness’ of a thing there is no discussion or debate. But there is all the contention and controversy in the world as regards the ‘whatness’ of a thing. And it is this that forms the theme of dialectics.

The Nyāya-view

What Akṣapāda in his Nyāya-Sūtras means about the theme of dialectics is not quite clear. Vātsyāyana, in his Bhāṣya, on the Nyāya-Sūtras does not seem to suggest, with any certainty or conviction, the exact theme of dialectics according to the first propounder of the Nyāya-dealectics. Had it not been so, no difference of views on the point could have existed between Vātsyāyana on the one hand and

Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, on the other.¹

Vatsyāyana's view.

Vātsyāyana understands by the theme of dialectics, the specification of an idea or an opinion about a thing. But he does not seem to distinguish between the opinions or ideas of basic universal acceptance (the 'Sarva-Tantra-Siddhānta') which are not dialectical themes and the opinions or ideas of individualistic acceptance or non-acceptance (the 'Pratitantra-Siddhānta') which originate and terminate in dialectics.

Udyotakara's view.

Udyotakara is more explicit as regards the theme of dialectics. The theme of dialectics is an opinion or an idea about a thing. But every type of opinion or idea cannot be treated dialectically. For instance, the 'Sarva-Tantra-Siddhānta' or an universally accepted opinion is not a dialectical theme, since, it cannot be made the exclusive property of a man or a sect or a school or a system. It is accepted by all - be he a Vādin or a Prativādin. Now, it may be asked as to why the 'Sarvatantra-Siddhānta' also is included in the four categories of the Siddhāntas or the acceptances and assertions of ideas or opinions. The answer is that it is not included there with a view to making it a them of dialectics, along with other Siddhāntas i.e. the Pratitantra-Siddhānta, the Abhyupagama-Siddhānta and the Adhikaraṇa-Siddhānta. It is with a view to categorising it separately from the other Siddhāntas or opinions for the sake of systematisation. that it is mentioned along with them.² That it is an acceptance is enough to make it a Siddhānta.³

1. N. S. I. I. 25-27, Vātsyāyana Udyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Udayana and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.

2. N. V. page 104

3. N.V.T.T. page 53

Vācaspati Miśra's view.

Vācaspati Miśra emphatically expresses the view that the theme of dialectics is an idea or an opinion of individual acceptance or assertion. An object as such demands universal acceptance. But it may appear different to X or Y or Z and it is this that gives rise to dialectics and is resolved or clarified by dialectics.¹

Udayana's view-

Udayana in his Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparya-TikāParīśuddhi is explicit enough on the theme of dialectics. According to him the Sarva-Tāntṛa Siddhānta cannot form the theme of dialectics.² But, since it helps the Pratitāntṛa-Siddhāntas to come into being it may be used indirectly as a dialectical theme.³ As a matter of fact, all generalisations, obtaining in the Sarvatantra-Siddhānta or the Pratitantra-Siddhāntas, when made into particularisations or 'Adhikaraṇa Siddhāntas' form the dialectical theme.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's view.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also seems to exclude the 'Sarvatantra-Siddhānta' from dialectical treatment. It is the Pratitantra-Siddhānta differing with different systems, that forms the theme of dialectics.⁴ The 'Adhikaraṇa-Siddhānta' stands on the super-structure of the Pratitāntṛa-Siddhānta. A Pratitāntṛa-Siddhānta may have many corollaries or Adhikaraṇas, depending on the main theory or hypothesis. These 'Adhikaraṇas', singly or collectively may form the theme of dialectics. The Abhyupagama-Siddhānta is always treated dialectically. It is in the criticism and counter-criticism of the 'Abhyupagama Siddhānta' which is a new idea or theory or hypothesis, that the dialectical skill of the debating parties finds its fullest scope and outlet.⁵

1. N.V.T.T. Page 53.

2. & 3. N.V.T.T.P. page 298

4. N.M. page 128

5. N.P. Page 130.

Varadarāja's View

Varadarāja, in his *Tārkikarakṣā*, mentions all the four categories of Siddhāntas as the theme of dialectics. But, he distinguishes, however, between the *Pramāṇas* (the means of knowledge) of epistemology and logic and the *Pramāṇas* (the means of knowledge) of dialectics. The *Pramāṇas* in epistemology and logic are the real and the essential means of knowledge. The *Pramāṇas* in dialectics are coloured by the visions of the *Vādin* and the *Prativādin*. The individual eccentricities contained in the make-up of the *Pramāṇas* in a dialectical discourse, emerge in differences of opinions about things and thoughts. Thus, even a 'Sarvatantra-Siddhānta' may form a dialectical theme, if its *Pramāṇas* are not of basic universal acceptance, but, of individual eccentricities, prejudices and presuppositions.¹

The View of Vedānta Deśika.

It may not be out of place to point out, in this connection, that in the absence of treatises by Viśiṣṭādvaitic theorists on dialectics, it is not possible to historically review what exactly had Viśiṣṭādvaitic theorists to say on the theme of dialectics. But it may be safely presumed that what Vedānta Deśika means by the theme of dialectics was meant by other Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians also.

That the theme of dialectics is an idea or an opinion or a theory is made abundantly clear by Vedānta Deśika in his definition of dialectics.² He discusses the theme of dialectics in connection with the discussion on the constituents of dialectics i. e. *Nirūpya Nirṇaya*.³ The ascertainment of the theme or 'Nirūpya Nirṇaya' and the other paraphernalia are essential in any controversy worth the name. What exactly is, then, the dialectical theme? Certainly, it cannot be an

1. *Tārkika Rakṣā* Page 170 (Chaukhamba)

2. N.P. Page 114. and T. M. K. page 225

3. N. P. Page 110.

idea of basic universal acceptance or basic universal non-acceptance. Can it be, then, a kind of idea or theory that emerges as a corollary to the main idea or theory? No. Although Akṣapāda, includes this kind of idea i. e. the 'Adhikaraṇa-Siddhānta', in the categories of dialectical themes, yet, Vedānta Deśika excludes it from dialectical treatment. The Adhikaraṇa-Siddhānta is subsumed under the three categories in as much as it is a side-issue to the Sarvatantra-Siddhānta or the Pratitantra-Siddhānta or even the Abhyupagama-Siddhānta. Now, what category of Siddhānta forms the theme of dialectics? It is the Pratitantra Siddhānta or an idea of individual acceptance and assertion and reiteration that is a fit dialectical theme. It is there that opposition is found between man and man, school and school, system and system, and postulation and postulation.¹

In the absence of the 'Pratitantra-Siddhānta' there can be no dialectics and no formulation of its rules and regulations. It is in the face of the Pratitantra-Siddhānta that the strength of systems and the courage of convictions are tested and recognised. Vedānta Deśika, as a dialectician, is bold enough to assert that even the contributions of the Rāmānuja Darśana, such as the organic conception of Reality and the conception of the Absolute as full of auspicious attributes and so on are Pratitantra-Siddhāntas² and as such they are not meant to be followed blindly, but reasoned out and rationalised before acceptance. It is a different matter that as a Viśiṣṭādvaitācārya, Vedānta Deśika does not or cannot accept 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' as a 'Pratitantra Siddhānta', with a view to making it a theme of dialectical treatment. 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' for him is a 'Sarva-Tantra-Siddhānta', or an idea and ideal of universal acceptance.

If the 'Pratitantra-Siddhānta' forms the main theme of

1. N.P. Page 114.

2. N. P. page 114.

dialectics, the 'Abhyupagama-Siddhānta' is a perennial dialectical theme. Generations after generations of theorists are making contributions to the first formulations, giving interpretational synthesis to the conflicting view-points and planning out constructive or destructive criticisms of ideas and standpoints, as the case may be. These innovations, these individual contributions, these criticisms and counter-criticisms, which are comprised by the term 'Abhyupagama-Siddhānta', form in fact, the perennial theme of dialectics.

So far what we have seen is that an idea or an opinion or a theory, admitting of opposition between acceptance and non-acceptance, is the theme of dialectics and the pivotal point in the universe of discursive thinking.

Now, we have to see to the principles and the regulations of dialectics. To theorize on dialectics in the abstract is meaningless. Dialectics in the abstract is beyond the reach of man, made up as it is of complexes-mental, moral, physical and even spiritual. The concern of the theorist on dialectics is the practical side of dialectics. Why and when is dialectics practised? What are the means and methods of the dialectical pursuit? What are the limitations of the practice of dialectics? Vedānta Deśika, following the ancient Viśiṣṭādvaitic authorities, studies the practical side of dialectics and formulates its rules and regulations. Some of his observations are as follows :—

1. *The Adhikārin of the practice of Dialectics.*

Although 'Kathā' or dialectics, as an art of debate, is the birthright of man, yet, every debate is not dialectics. To reach dialectical status, a debate must follow dialectical rules and must also be a privilege of the few who conform to the requirements of the Adhikārin of the dialectical discourse.

The View of the Nyāya and its Exponents.

Who is a Kathādhikārin? What are the qualities of a Kathādhikārin? A Kathādhikārin, according to Akṣapāda, is (i) a student or a pupil, an earnest and enthusiastic seeker after truth and knowledge, (ii) a teacher or a scholar equipped with sincerity and strength of exposition, (iii) a colleague, possessing evenness of temper, sympathetic understanding and sharpness of intellect and (iv) one, who is willing to rise above the din of life and is endowed with the philosophic attitude. The types of aspirants to discursive thinking are enumerated with a view to bringing out the aims and aspirations of dialectics. The teacher and the taught are aspirants to dialectical pursuit (Kathādhikārins), since, they aim at the acquisition of knowledge and the removal of misunderstanding about things and thoughts.¹ Colleagues and co-students are 'Kathādhikārins', since, they aspire after the strengthening of their intellectual grasp over things known and analyze and synthesize details acquired for the clarification of their respective standpoints.

The other types of aspirants to discursive thinking are those who possess dispassionate vision and are desirous of the liberation of their minds from shackles of pseudo-truths.

The View of Vedānta Deśika

To the above Nyāya-view concerning the 'Kathādhikārin', Vedānta Deśika gives his full support.² Other Viśiṣṭādvaitic authorities also such as Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka and Varada Viṣṇu Miśra are in agreement with the above Nyāya-view. Since discursive thinking presupposes dispassionate outlook and widening of sympathies, it is but

1. Tārkika Rakṣa with the Niṣkaṇṭaka of Mallinātha, page 211

2. Nyāyasāra on N.P. page 170

natural that its practice should be the right of those who happen to be 'अद्भुतनिर्भरप्रसरया बुद्ध्या परित्कारिणः'¹ or such who, according to the Dvaita-Vādācārya, Madhva, possess evenness of temper, presence of mind, zeal for knowledge, power of expression and the spirit of sportsmanship.

Do such 'Kathādhikārins' or aspirants to dialectical discourse, exist in reality or are they only in the idealism of the theorists? The Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya Act. II (the Vāda-act) is an unequivocal answer to the above question. Vedānta Deśika, here, finds a plea to harmonize the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Dialectics with Viśiṣṭādvaitic Metaphysics and Esotericism. A pupil, a Śiṣya—really speaking Vedānta Deśika himself, if we do not misunderstand the implication—is introduced as a character. He is the personification of Vāda or dispassionate discursive thinking. Another character i. e. a teacher—really speaking Rāmānujācārya, is introduced to guide the proceedings of the vāda or the debate. Here the spectator or the reader is justified in expecting the issue of a typical vāda or dialectical discourse undertaken by the real Kathādhikārins. But Vedānta Deśika does not show, here, the procedure of the Vāda between the student and the teacher or the two right aspirants to dialectical discussion. It seems that dispassionate discursive thinking exists only in theory. It is an ideal that vanishes as soon as it is tried to be realised. For instance, the Śiṣya (Vedānta Deśika himself !), the right person privileged to participate in the dispassionate dialectical conversation, starts pooh-poohing the opponent instead of showing equanimity of mind and evenness of temper—

‘वादाटोपमुपेयुषः प्रतिभटानासतुहैमाचलं

तूलायापि तृणाय वा न च तुषच्छेदाय मन्यामहे ।²

Although such a Kathādhikārin may pat himself on his back

or get himself patted on his back 'बलितं वावदूकस्य कृतिनः किं न शोभते' yet, the student of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Dialectics will never be able to recognize a dispassionate debator so highly enlogised by the ancient Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians and so anxiously meant to be exemplified by Vedānta Deśika in the role of the student (Vide the 'Saṅkalpa-Sūryodaya', Act II).

It seems, then, that man can never become 'Kathādhikārin'. His concern in a debate is always dialectical victory. Thus it is that he often indulges in vindictive vituperation. As we cannot find the real 'Adhikārin' of 'Vāda', we have to satisfy ourselves with the disputants as we find them. Be it as it may, the participants to a debate are men and as such they cannot rise over human limitations and can never have the philosophic outlook or the dialectical attitude while discussing anything.

For a second-rate or a third-rate debate, which takes the form of Jalpa or Vitaṇḍā, the election of the President or the Umpire or the Council of Judges is not unnecessary. It is the disciplined dialectical discussion aiming at the ascertainment of truth that requires no arbitration.

If a debate is a stern spiritual discipline and a moral obligation for the ascertainment of truth, it is called Vāda or discussion. If the aim of the disputants happens to be intellectual superiority, the debate is called 'Jalpa' or Wrangling or arguing for the sake of argument rather than the ascertainment of truth. If, however, the aim of the contestants is material gain, either in the form of popular applause or the show of witticism, the debate is called Vitaṇḍā or cavil.

With the difference of the aims of discussion the debating methods also admit of difference. The above Nyāya-classification of the methods of debate presupposes the difference

of the aims. But according to Vedānta Deśika, 'Kāthā' can be divided into—

- (i) Vītarāga-Kāthā, i.e. Vāda, and
- (ii) Vijigīṣu-Kāthā, i.e. (a) Jalpa and (b) Vitaṇḍā.

In this division, it is clear that the difference in the dialectical pursuit is due to the human factor. If the debators are guided by dispassionate attitude they discuss a theme or a thesis dispassionately. But, if they happen to be actuated by personal interests amounting to impatient and incurable egotism, they wrangle over or cavil at the theme or the thesis under discussion.

Before a debate starts, it is advisable that the persons concerned decide upon the method to be followed. What they have to decide is whether they want to discuss a thesis or show their skill of argumentation. Although Vāda generally turns into an Āhava¹ or a wordy warfare, yet, it does not mean that the ideal dialectical attitude or the attitude of dispassionate discussion is not to be kept before the mind. A debate may start in the vien of Vāda or discussion and lead to the ascertainment of truth and yet it may be chequered by the tactics of sophistical refutations. But if the debators keep the philosophic outlook, and clarify their view-points leading to some conclusion, the debate is a real dialectical discourse. Dialectics is the art of debate practised by men. It is not an esoteric discipline. The division of the Kāthā or debate into 'Vītarāga' and 'Vijigīṣu' Kāthā is but a theoretical consideration. The actual dialectical practice shows that these two types intermingle and coalesce.

The subject matter of discussion, according to the dialecticians of all the schools, has to be specified on the eve of dialectical discourse. Without this, there can be no discursive

1. H. S. 29.

thinking. Since the Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians were mostly concerned with formulations of rules and regulations for philosophical and theological controversies, they maintain even a fifth requisite of debate which is the agreement of the contending parties to follow a particular system or section of philosophy or theology.

The above pre-requisites of dilectical discourse, though not of universal application, are nonetheless applicable to certain types of argumentation. Hence it is that Varada-Viṣṇu Miśra¹, Vedānta Deśika's predecessor, thinks that it is Jalpa or wrangling that necessitates the ascertainment of (i) the Vādin, (ii) the Prativādin, (iii) the President and (iv) the Umpires. Vedānta Deśika is against any such hard and fast rule. Since Vāda or Vitarāga-kathā i.e. the debate par excellence, comes to an end either with the ascertainment of truth or with the sympathetic understanding by the parties of their relative strength or weakness and admits of no opportunity for the show of callousness of heart, it goes without saying that it does not require any rule or restraint or dialectical pre-requisite as such. Similarly Jalpa (wrangling) and Vitarāga (cavil) the two varieties of Vijigīṣu-kathā also do not require the above pre-requisites since they terminate as soon as the parties encounter the points of defeat—linguistic, logical, or psychological.² If however, the above pre-requisites are held to be essential for any and every debate, then, as Vedānta Deśika contends, the following also must needs be looked upon as the essential dialectical pre-requisites—

- (i) the specification of the use of a particular language or a particular dialect.
- (ii) the specification of the use of prose or verse in the course of argumentation.
- (iii) the particularisation of one or two or three or

four of the Pramāṇas or means of proof for the establishment of the thesis under controversy.

- (iv) the agreement to argue either orally or in writing.
- (v) the agreement not to exhibit signs of one's ignorance such as vacant looks, indifferent talk etc, and
- (vi) the imposition of any such condition, arbitrary or otherwise, for the sake of the show of superiority and so on.

But, for the practice of the art of debate in search for knowledge, all these and such other pre-requisites are not essential at all. If some debators on some occasions must have such pre-requisites before they argue, then, they are at liberty to do as they like.

Varadarāja's View

In this connection, Vedānta Deśika mentions the view of Varadarāja (11th century A. D.) who, in addition to the above four pre-requisites, admits the following two i.e.—

- (v) the determination of the points of defeat involved wholly or partly in a debate, and
- (vi) the agreement as regards the stage of termination of the debate.

Its criticism

But, he criticises Varadarāja's view and shows that the above are not essential pre-requisites to any debate since they are not compulsory but optional only. The determination of the points of defeat involved partly or wholly in a debate depends upon the choice of the disputants. The decision as regards the stage of termination of a debate rests either with the disputants or the audience or the council of debate or the president. Consequently, these pre-requisites need not be taken as essentials for a dialectical discourse. Now,

about the dialectical procedure and its consequences. According to Vedānta Deśika and other Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians also, the dialectical procedure centres round the following i.e.

- (i) thesis and its establishment, and
- (ii) counter-thesis and its elucidation.

These two are fundamental to any dialectical conversation. These two are enough to raise our thinking to a dialectical status. The first i.e. thesis and its establishment includes all that the Vādin or the debator for the thesis, does in the different states and stages of the debate. The second i.e. counter-thesis means the dialectical rejoinder of the Prativādin or the debator against the thesis. Other theorists on dialectics include, in addition to the above, the following also in the dialectical procedure :—

- (iii) re-iteration by the Vādin of his means of proof for the thesis ;
- (iv) elucidation by the Prativādin of his means of proof for the counter-thesis ; and
- (v) resolution by the Vādin of the discrepancy between the thesis and the counter-thesis and the means of proof for the rehabilitation of the thesis (vide Nyāya-Sāra on Nyāya Pārisuddhi, page 166) or avoidance by the Vādin and the Prativādin of the blemishes of speech such as equivocation, irrelevancy etc (vide Niṣkaṇṭakā, the commentary of Mallinātha on Tārkika-rakṣā—page 212).

But, Vedānta Deśika, although mentioning them in his Tattva Mukṭā Kalāpa, does not maintain them in the dialectics-section of the Nyāya Pārisuddhi. He resolves these i. e. (iii) to (v) into i and ii. He argues that if the iii, iv and v also be held to be forming dialectical procedure, then, a vi or a vii, such as-

(vi) criticism by the Vādin of the dialectical rejoinder of the Prativādin against the thesis, or

(vii) reiteration by the Vādin of the means of proofs for the criticism of the dialectical rejoinder of the Prativādin against the thesis and so on,

will have to be held as the essential elements of the dialectical procedure. But the fact is that all the ingenuities suggested by the iii, iv, v, vi or even the vii are included in the i and the ii i. e. thesis and its establishment and the counter-thesis and its elucidation.

As regards the practice of dialectics, Pārāśara Bhaṭṭāraka, the eminent Viśiṣṭādvaitic logician and dialectician sanctions the following order of procedure, which Vedānta Deśika also accepts :—

- (i) The Vādin should put forth his thesis in clear terminology.
- (ii) He should adduce the means of its proof.
- (iii) the Prativādin should advance his anti-thesis in criticism of the Vādin's thesis.
- (iv) the council of debate or the opponents themselves should decide the final issue.

Pre-requisites to dialectical procedure

According to Vedānta Deśika and other theorists on Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialectics the dialectical procedure presupposes the following four pre-requisites :—¹

- (i) the election of the president and the members of the council of debate,
- (ii) the specification of the person speaking for and the person speaking against the theme,

1. N. P. page 169 (Chaukhamba).

(iii) the ascertainment of the nature and the type of debate and

(iv) the specification of the subject of debate.

Now, as regards the (i) it may be legitimately held that it does not form an essential pre-requisite to a first-class debate. That one has to abide by the rulings of the President means that one has, knowingly or unknowingly, violated the rules of dialectical discourse. But a debate that mainly aims at the ascertainment of truth and takes place between the seekers of truth cannot and should not swerve from the dialectical discipline so as to necessitate the presidential veto. And to abide by the findings of the members of the council of debate is not necessary if the debaters are not likely to side-track. A debate having dispassionate disputants may go on without any arbitration by a president or an umpire or a majority of the members of the council of debate.

The above four pre-requisites are the four feet or the four stages of dialectical procedure. They contain the psychological, the logical and the linguistic elements of discursive thinking. The merits of the dialectical practice are the merits of the above stages, singly as well as collectively. And the demerits of the debate are the demerits of the above stages, singly as well as collectively.

The demerits of debate.

The demerits of debate are, properly speaking, the human limitations in the practice of dialectics as the art of discursive thinking. They defeat the very purpose of debate. The ancient theorists on Nyāya-dialectics have studied these limitations and suggested proper guidance for avoiding them. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians follow the ancient Nyāya-dialecticians in this respect. The name given by the ancient Indian theorists on dialectics to the demerits of debate or dialectical limitations is 'Nigrahasthāna'.

Vātsyāyana's View

Nigrahasthāna is 'पराजयप्राप्तिः' or 'vanquishment' brought about by misunderstanding or want of sympathetic understanding or lack of understanding, on the part of the debaters.

Udyotakara's View

In the actual practice of dialectics, the debaters fail to say what they want to or more often, forgetting the purpose of debate, indulge in the show of superiority of intellect or heat of emotions with the result that neither the Vādin or the person speaking for the thesis puts forth valid arguments nor does the Prativādin or the person speaking against the thesis advance sound criticisms. Such a tendency of the debaters resulting in the defeat of the aim, the etiquette and the procedure of debate is termed 'Nigrahasthāna.'

Vācaspati Miśra's View

Although 'Nigrahasthāna' is a dialectical defeat, yet, it is a dilectical device of some importance that differentiates Vāda or discussion from Jalpa and Vitanḍā or sophistic refutations. The seeker of truth does well to use it in contests with the sophists and the wranglers.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's View

The sophists and the wranglers who do not distinguish between right argument and wrong argument and are impelled only by the motive of carrying their point are fond of 'Nigrahasthāna. At times, persons engaged in Vāda or discussion also are defeated or defeat their purpose, on account of Nigrahasthāna in as much as they lose their ground against the dialectical batteries of the sophist or the wrangler.

Vedānta Deśika's View

According to Vedānta Deśika and the older Viśiṣṭa-

dvatic dialecticians 'Nigrahasthāna' means defeat in debate. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians hold the same view as the ancient Nyāya-dialecticians on this point. Vedānta Deśika, along with older Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians, maintains, that, since lack of understanding or misunderstanding of points of view in the course of debate is traceable to the lack of discrimination between what is right or worth doing and what is wrong or worth avoiding or simply to the lack of the grasp of the other's 'centre of vision' by one's 'act of imagination', 'Nigrahasthāna' stands for the defect of the insight, and the imagination of the debaters. In a debate, when one does not try to understand oneself in the context of one's opponent's ideas or when one does not attempt to understand one's opponent in the context of one's own ideas, one defeats the purpose of the debate or meets defeat in the debate. This fact, this lack of insight on the part of the debaters is called 'Nigrahasthāna'. Vedānta Deśika is in agreement with Varadarāja in maintaining that 'Nigrahasthāna' is a mark or an indicator of the fact that the debate has been spoiled as the debaters have started wandering without aim and aiming at cheap victory amounting to vanquishment.

The 'Nigrahasthāna' which is three-fourth, a psychological defect, and one-fourth, a logical and linguistic deficiency has the following three essential elements.

- (i) वक्तव्यावृत्ति or not stating what should be stated
- (ii) उक्तिदूषणम् or defective mode of statement and
- (iii) उक्तार्थदूषणम् or defective statement.

When the above elements combine together, new constituents are brought into being and the 'Nigrahasthāna' becomes manifold. The ancient Nyāya-dialectics mentions twenty-two kinds of 'Nigrahasthāna'. Vedānta Deśika, with some change of terminology, mentions the following twenty-

one varieties of Nigrahasthāna or points of defeat in a debate :—

1. Uktahāni or the alteration of the statement. Any statement regarding proposition, reason, example, application conclusion, perceptual cognition, verbal testimony and so on if professed to be altered or simply altered, in words or in meaning, as an expediency, at the point of criticism by the opponent, becomes a dialectical defect leading to the defeat of the person involved and is called Uktahāni. In the practice of dialectics, one should try to speak for or against that which one has carefully thought out. Simply to win one's point is nothing more than indulging in the dialectic of pride and prejudice rather than the dialectic of sense and sensibility. For example, when a debator of the Buddhistic persuasion argues : 'All is non-eternal, since the Great Buddha says 'Nothing abides', and when replied by a debater of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic persuasion with the counter-argument : "The statement—'nothing abides' is not infallible since, the Great Buddha, being a man, was fallible" changes the verbal testimony for inference—'All that is, perishes because it is produced, he commits the error of 'Āgamahāni', a type of Uktahāni. Uktahāni is of various kinds. While Varadarāja limits them to 22 Vedānta Deśika takes them to be as many as there are statements. The ancient Nyāya has 'Pratījñāhāni' instead of 'Uktahāni'. But according to Vedānta Deśika the term 'Uktahāni' is more appropriate than the term 'Pratījñāhāni'.

2. Ukta Viśeṣaṇa—or qualifying the statement or putting some condition to the statement. For the sake of substantiating a statement shown to be defective by the opponent, if one adds some qualifications either in the form of an adjective or in some other way, one commits the error of 'Uktaviśeṣaṇa' in as much as one tries to right the

wrong in a wrong manner. With a view to defeating the opponent one may use 'Uktaviśeṣaṇa'. If it is not known or pointed out as such by the opponent, it becomes the opponent's error of overlooking the censurable ultimately leading to his defeat.

Instead of 'Ukta-Viśeṣaṇa' the ancient Nyāya has two Nigrahasthānas such 'as Hetvantara' and 'Pratiñāntara' or shifting the reason and shifting the proposition. Vedānta Deśika criticises this view on the ground that the term 'Uktaviśeṣaṇa' may include both the types and even more. In this respect he rejects the view of the older Viśiṣṭādvaitic theorists on dialectics such as Varada Viṣṇu Miśra and so on who, like the Naiyāyikas, hold 'Hetvantara' and 'Pratiñāntara' as different types of Nigrahasthānas.¹

For example :

If a Vaiśeṣika philosopher contending —

'Sound is non-eternal,
because it is perceptible
as is the jar.,

is replied by a Mimāṃsaka —

'Sound is eternal
because it is sensible
as is genus (Sāmānya).,

whereupon, he retorts —

'Sound is non-eternal
because it is cognized by our sense of hearing
Just as 'genus' cognized by the yogic sense,

then he is liable to be charged by his opponent with the fault of 'Uktaviśeṣaṇa' because he has qualified his 'reason' (Hetu).

This Nigrahasthāna also is of many types.

3. Uktāpalāpa-or the renunciation of the statement. If the statement concerning proposition reason, example perceptual cognition, verbal testimony and so on, challenged to be defective by the opponent is tried to be renounced or altogether renounced in one way or the other, it becomes subject to the Nigrahasthāna of Uktāpalāpa. There are ways and ways of renouncing a statement ,as for instance—

- (i) one may say one has not made a particular statement,
- (ii) one may say one has made a different statement altogether,
- (iii) one may say one is being charged for the defects of the opponents' statement,
- (iv) one may say one has merely repeated the opponent's statement,
- (v) one may say one is unaware of one's statement,
- (vi) one may say one is not liable to be censured for a statement that cannot be understood by the opponent and so on.

Be it as it may, one should not take resort to such a mischievous device because it defeats the very purpose of discussion. In 'Jalpa' and Vitaṇḍā', one may use it for the vanquishment of the opponent.

The ancient Nyāya-theorists on dialectics termed this Nigrahasthāna as 'Pratijñā Sanyāsa'. But Vedānta Deśika thinks that the words 'Hāni' and Sanyās', as in 'Pratijñā Hāni' and 'Pratijñā Sanyāsa,' meaning the same thing, it is better to have a terminology that may differentiate 'Pratijñā Hāni' from 'Pratijñā Sanyāsa'. It is better, hence, to have the term 'Uktāpalāpa' instead of 'Pratijñā Sanyāsa' and 'Ukta Hāni', instead of 'Pratijñā Hāni.'

4. Uktavirodha or contradicting one's own statement. If one contradicts, knowingly or unknowingly, one's statement of proposition or reason or example etc. one is committing the error of 'Ukta Virodha'. All kinds of contradiction expressible in words or sentences are comprised by the term 'Uktavirodha'. Almost all the systems of philosophy contain contradictions, either expressed or implied. Any breach of rules or regulations accepted by the debaters comes under 'Uktavirodha.' For instance, one commits the error of Uktavirodha', if

- (i) one changes 'Apabbhraṃṣa' for 'Sanskrit' in which the debate was to take place and vice versa,
- (ii) one reiterates the opponent's part statement, i. e. the erroneous statement only for criticism and leaves the opponent's full statement untouched and vice versa,
- (iii) one makes gestures or gesticulations,
- (iv) one does not follow the rules of rhetorics previously agreed upon,
- (v) one simply refuses to abide by prior mutual understanding.

The ancient Nyāya-dialecticians termed it as 'Pratīpā Virodha'. But Vedānta Deśika, thinking the Nyāya-term to be narrow, gave it the term 'Ukta Virodha'.

5. Apasiddhānta—or deviating from the theme. Deviating from the theme means going against some particular system or standpoint to which one has given one's allegiance.

'Apasiddhānta' is different from 'Uktavirodha'. 'Uktavirodha' means the contradiction of one's own statement or one's own allegiance to some rule or the other. But

'Apasiddhānta' means the contradiction of a system or standpoint of philosophy to which one has avowed one's allegiance.

For example, if a Sāṅkhya philosopher argues—'the self is active' he is deviating from his system that says—'the self is actionless'.

6. Avācaka or incorrect expression. If the debaters, after agreeing upon the language of debate fail to use grammatically or phonologically correct expressions, they are committing the error of 'Avācaka' as they are defeating the purpose of the debate which means the resolution of differences of opinions in correct linguistic usages. 'Avācaka' differs from 'Uktavirodha'. Being a linguistic error, it is observable in the very expression of a statement.

While the ancient Nyāya-dialecticians meant by 'Avācaka' the meaningless utterances of the letters of the alphabet, Vedānta Deśika following Varadarāja and the older Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians means by it linguistic errors or inaccuracy of expressions.

7. Ananvita or the incoherent. This Nigrahasthāna means the lack of expectancy, compatibility and proximity of words and sentences in dialectical discussions. It may be analysed in the following three aspect :—

- (i) the impossibility of coherence as in such utterances of words as a pillar, a jar, a well, a granary etc. as a means to bewilder the opponent,
- (ii) the impossibility of coherence in the utterance of sentences and
- (iii) a difficult or far-fetched coherence.

The ancient Nyāya-dialectics had 'Apārthaka' instead of 'Ananvita'. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians prefer

'Ananvita' for the sake of precision. Vedānta Deśika is not in favour of any fanciful coherence, the absence of which may lead to another kind of incoherence as accepted by Varadarāja.¹

8. Aprāpta kāla or the absence of order. Absence of order in a debate may be of many kinds :—

- (i) lack of order of precedence of the pre-requisites of debate,
- (ii) lack of order of precedence of the five limbs of the syllogistic argument,
- (iii) lack of order of precedence of the use of proofs and confutations for the establishment of a given thesis,
- (iv) lack of order of precedence of the thesis and the counter-thesis and their respective means of proof etc.

The ancient Nyāya-dialecticians put a narrower interpretation on 'Aprāptakāla' and mean by it only the absence of orderly arrangement of the parts of argument such as proposition, reason, example, application and conclusion. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians following the ancient Nyāya-Prakaraṇas such as the Nyāyasāra and the Tārīkika Rakṣā included the above four and many such more under the term, 'Aprāptakāla' which means a point of dialectical defeat.

9. Avijnātārtha or the unintelligible. A debate has to be conducted in dialogues, having words of common usage, exact signification and proper accentuation. If it is conducted otherwise i. e. in dialogues having words out of vogue or of roundabout or far-fetched signification and impro-

per articulation, it is charged with the commission of the error of 'Avijnātārtha.' For instance, peculiar terminologies like 'Pañca Skandha', 'Astikāya' etc. of the Buddhists and the Jainas, roundabout expressions, word-puzzles, words not in common parlance and equivocal utterances do remain unintelligible to the parties to a debate. But Vedānta Deśika, presumably in memory of his own dialectical pursuits concedes to the use of word-puzzles in a debate if the parties concerned have so agreed upon.

10. Arthāntara or non-relevancy. Non-relevancy in a debate is due to so many causes, as for instance, concealing one's ignorance of the subject or anxiety to show more than what one knows or the habit of bamboozling the apponent. It is advisable to avoid it in discursive thinking.

11. Nyūna - or the incomplete. It is a defect of debate. It consists in the part procedure of dialectics and is bound to vitiate the trend of debate.

12. Adhika or the over-done. It consists in the over-doing of any or every dialectical detail or procedure.

13. Punarukta or repetition. The arguments that are advanced in a debate should be such as to serve the purpose. There may be re-inculcation. But repetition or saying things over again without any rhyme or reason is bad. For instance, such repetition as

'Sound is non-eternal', 'what is audible is perishable', etc points to the lack of circumspection of the debaters and does not allow the debate to run smooth. The ancient Nyāya-theorists on dialectics such as Viśvarūpa, Jayanta and Varadarāja differentiate 'Śabda-Punarukta' from 'Punarukta' But Vedānta Deśika contends that verbal repetition having similarity of meaning is sense-repetition rather than word-repetition.

14. Ananubhāṣaṇa or silence. A reply to a faulty statement, a superfluity of rejoinder, a malicious interpretation of the opponent's argument and an absence of reply or rejoinder to a statement—these are the ways and means of silence or sleeping over the matter that vitiate the course of a debate and are called accordingly 'Ananubhāṣaṇa'.

15. Ajnāna or confession of the lack of understanding of a particular statement. The show of ignorance with a view to fooling the opponent is a defect in the pursuit of dialectics.

16. Apratibhā or lack of ingenuity. It consists in one's inability to pursue successfully the dialectical procedure. The ancient Nyāya-theorists mean by it one's inability to hit upon a reply. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theorists make the term more comprehensive, including in it any kind of inability in practising the dialectical discipline from start to finish. Vedānta Deśika following Varadarāja does not regard physical expressions of lack of ingenuity as 'Apratibhā'.

17. Vikṣepa or evasion. One may evade a particular dialectical procedure on one thousand and one pretexts. It is a defect, an error of commission. It is not only a defect of the dialectical procedure. It amounts to leaving the arena for fear of vanquishment.

18. Matānujñā or retaliation. Retort or retaliation is no argument. Anxiety to find fault with the opponent amounts to admission of one's own fault. It is a common human defect. It arises in one's desire for victory over the opponent rather than in the desire for victory of truth over untruth.

19. Paryanuyojoyopekṣaṇa or overlooking the points of censure or neglecting the censurable. One may overlook the points worth censuring on account of one's inability to

understand the censurable. When a debater does not charge his opponent with any dialectical defect when the occasion arises, he is himself liable to be charged with the error of omission. According to Vācaspati Miśrā, it is the duty of the president or the council of debate to point out the defects in the course of discussion. But Viśvarūpa and Jayanta think that the Vādin or the Prativādin also may point out the Nigrahasthānas with a view to testing each other's alertness as the case may be. Vedānta Deśika, following Varadarāja takes a comprehensive view of this Nigrahasthāna. In the Vāda-type of controversy one may overlook the censurable, but, it is an error to do so in the Jalpa and the Vitaṇḍa-types of controversy.

20. Niranuyojyānuyoga or censuring the non-censurable. According to ancient dialecticians captious criticism or counter-criticism, in the course of dialectical pursuit, is called 'Niranuyojyānuyoga' a point of defeat in the debate. Finding fault where it does not lie, missing the right retort and wrongly retaliating and making a mess of dialectical errors and such other things are included under 'Niranuyojyānuyoga' that obtains in debates of all the three kinds in the following four ways :—

(i) Anavasara-grahaṇa or untimely retort. It means the retaliation, at the advanced stage of the debate, of the Vādin by the Prativādin, for the former's committal of dialectical errors in the very first stages.

(ii) Nigrahasthānābhāsavacana or pointing out a particular dialectical error at a wrong place, missing the right retort, charging the opponent with the commission or omission of errors not previously agreed upon and rebuking the opponent with pardonable error and so on.

(iii) Chala or quibbling. It means contradicting the statements of the opponent in the course of a debate. The ancient Nyāya-theorists on dialectics treat it as a category by

itself. It is a means of winning dialectical victory in the realm of debates of the Jalpa and the Vitaṇḍā-types. Its absence in the Vāda-type of debates distinguishes it from 'Jalpa' and 'Vitaṇḍā'. Whereas the theorists on dialectics of the ancient school of Nyāya maintain it along with 'Jāti' and 'Nigrahassthāna' as a distinct Nyāya-category, the medieval Naiyāyikas include it under 'Niranuyojyānuyoga'. Vedānta Deśika and the Viśiṣṭādvaitic theorists on dialectics, following the authors of the mediæval school of Nyāya such as Bhāsarvajña (10th century A. D.) and Varadarāja (11th century A. D.), treat it as a kind of 'Niranuyojyānuyoga'.

Chala has been defined by Vedānta Deśika as well as Varadarāja as a verbal contradiction of the opponent which means taking the words of the opponent in alternative sense or in a sense not meant at all or in a fanciful sense. It is of three kinds—

- (a) Vākchala or quibbling in respect of an equivocal word used in its primary sense.
- (b) Upacāracchala or quibbling in respect of a word used in its secondary sense, and
- (c) Tātparyacchala or quibbling in respect of the intended sense of a sentence.

(iv) Jāti or sophistical refutation. An argument which is not an argument in reality, but an argument in appearance, is called Jāti—a Nigrahassthāna of the 'Niranuyojyānuyoga' kind. It is a clever dialectical device of refutations. Although it vitiates a debate, yet it is indispensable as a dialectical expediency. Its presence or absence in a debate changes the nature and course of that debate. Although, it is a distinguishing feature of the Jalpa and the Vitaṇḍā-types of debate, yet its knowledge is necessary for the participants in the Vāda-type of debate also, as without it, it is impossible to tell an argument from a pseudo-argument. As a dialectical

device it has been responsible for the writing of masterpieces of dialectics, like, the Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khādyā of Śrī Harṣa (11th century A.D.) and the Pratyaktattvadīpikā of Citsukhācārya (12th century A.D.)¹ Vedānta Deśika is himself a past-master of the dialectical device of 'Jāti' as is abundantly evident in his Śata Dūṣaṇī, a polemical masterpiece of Viśiṣṭādvaita. What, after all, is 'Jāti' ? It is self-refutation- 'Svavyāghātakamuttaram'. Vedānta Deśika following Varadarāja believes in the utility of Jāti or sophistical argumentations for keeping the torch of truth aloft in the midst of arguments of wranglers and cavillers. He appreciates fully Varadarāja's eulogies of Jāti :—

कथासंभोगवैदग्धीसम्पादनपटीयसी ।

ध्रियतां जातिमालेयं जातिमालेव पण्डितैः ॥

'Let the wise adorn themselves with the wreaths of Jāti (sophistical refutations) like jesmine flowers, because it is only then that they will sport with dialectical ingenuity (Kathā)'.

The theory of Jāti is an old theory of Indian dialectics. According to Vātsyāyana (4th century A. D.) 'Jāti' is a rejoinder having no specific reason or having a mere analogue. Udyotakara (7th century A. D.) means by 'Jāti' a rejoinder, inefficient enough to refute the argument of the Vādin, involving as it does the self-refutation of the Prativādin also. Vācaspati Miśrā (8th century A. D.) defines 'Jāti' as the mentality of dialectical parity of the Prativādin with the Vādin leading to refutations and counter-refutations ending nowhere. Udayanācārya, (10th century A. D.) understands by Jāti all such self-refuting, destructive criticisms that make dialectical discipline a matter of mental gymnastics.

1. N. P. and its N.S. commentary page 226 (Chaukhamba).

2. Tarkika Rakṣa, page 311.

But according to Vedānta Deśika 'Jāti' may be analysed as—

- (i) a self-refuting argument advanced in support of a thesis, and
- (ii) a self-refuting rejoinder advanced in criticism of a thesis.

The (i) aspect of Jāti is implied in the 'Mahāvīdyās' containing all possible twists and turns of arguments in proving a thesis as the case may be. The (ii) kind of Jāti abounds in the Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khāḍya and such other works. What underlies 'Jāti' is essentially the violation of a principle, a rule, an accepted tradition or a methodology. A self-refuting argument or a self-refuting rejoinder is but the violation of a principle, a rule, a tradition or methodology of dialectics. This violation of the dialectical discipline may be further seen in the following two ways—

- (i) the non-acceptance of the ancillaries of dialectics and
- (ii) the non-acceptance of the essentials of dialectics.

The (i) may be, further, analysed into—

- A—the non-use of the right dialectical ancillaries, and
- B—the use of the wrong dialectical ancillaries.

The (ii) also may be seen in the following two aspects—

- A. the non-use of dialectical essentials, and
- B. the use of dialectical non-essentials.

The above analysis of 'Jāti' is a commonsense-view of the problem. It anticipates and pre-determines all the possible practical instances of the 24 Jāti-varieties of the ancient Nyāya. It also underlies all the different definitions and characteristics of the 24 Jātis. Besides, it hints at the psychological origin of the Jāti, either as—

- (i) unintended slip or

- (ii) as defect of insight and imagination (as implied in the ancient Nyāya-view) or
- (iii) as intellectual or emotional blockade of the Vādin or the Prativādin as the case may be.

Now, it is admitted on all hands that Jāti is a self-refuting refutation.¹ What does 'self-refuting refutation' mean? Does it mean, as the Nyāya-dialecticians believe, a statement involving its own contradiction? But then, the statement will land itself in 'Ignoratio Elenchi' or the fallacy of futile reason. Besides, self-contradiction of a statement, if final, means the utter invalidity of the statement itself.

Now, can 'self-refuting refutation' mean the possibility of refutation of the rejoinder refuting the thesis? Possibilities of refutation may be of three kinds—

- (i) creation of contradiction,
- (ii) indication of invalidation,
- (iii) a mere retaliation.

The (i) is out of the question as it is impossible for a self-refuting statement to contradict another statement. The (ii) is inadmissible, because the statement of the Vādin meant to beguile or bewilder the Prativādin cannot, in turn, beguile or bewilder the Vādin also, since, the words meant to denote one thing in one way cannot denote another thing also in another way. The (iii) also is impossible to maintain in as much as retaliations such as quibbling or extra-cogitative arguments are different from Jāti.

Now, what does the term 'self-refutation' mean? 'Self-refuting refutation' either involving an argument in proof of a thesis or involving a rejoinder in disproof of a thesis, means, that, after it is brought into being, it leads to regressus ad

infinitum to avoid which it is necessary to nip it in the bud. We know that Rāmānuja does not postulate Samavāya¹ or intimate relation subsisting in entities, because it involves regressus ad infinitum. Jāti involves regressus ad infinitum and is essentially a self-refuting refutation and as such it has to be avoided by all means if the aim of dialectics is to arrive at truth. As Jāti is a vicious process of argumentation, it is futile in the sense that neither can it invalidate the thesis nor does it strengthen the anti-thesis.

Although, the logicians of the ancient Nyāya-school and the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita, dwell, at great length, on the definitions and illustrations of the 24 varieties of the Jāti, yet, they seem to lack the synthetic sense following which, as Vedānta Deśika points out, all the Jāti-varieties can be subsumed under the following two² :

- (i) Pratipramāṇa Samā Jāti, and
- (ii) Pratitarka Samā Jāti.

The (i) i. e. 'Pratipramāṇa Samā Jāti' is a self-refuting argument and counter-argument involving reasons advanced for and against a thesis respectively, with a view to destroying opposition as the case may be. The (ii) i. e. 'Pratitarka Samā Jāti' is a self-refuting argument and counter-argument for and against a thesis respectively, which, involves confutations or Tarkas for assailing the opposition in dialectical encounters.

21. The last of the Nigrahasthānas is Pramāṇābhāsa, a dialectical blockade involving the defeat of the person taking resort to it in the course of a debate. The ancient Nyāya had, instead of this, 'Hetvābhāsas' or fallacies of reason only. But the later Naiyāyikas, widening the scope of fallacies

1. Śrībhāṣya, page 342

2. N. P. page 232. (Chaukhamba).

include in it the fallacies of reason, the fallacies of all kinds of means of proof, the fallacies of all kinds of examples, the fallacies of tarkas or confutations and the fallacies of fallacies also. Vedānta Deśika discusses all these various fallacies at great length with a view to showing the necessity of avoiding them in the Vāda-type of debate.

The elucidation of all these demerits of debate are essential in any theory of dialectics. It points out the difference of Kathā or dialectical thinking from mere 'Pañcāvayava vākya' or inferential thinking.

The merits of debate

All the types of debate i.e. Vāda, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā are good in their own way. If Vāda is the ideal of dialectics, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā are dialectics in practice. If Vāda is for the ascertainment of truth, Jalpa and Vitaṇḍā are for the protection of truth against the onslaughts of untruth. But, none of the above types of debate is an argument for the sake of argument, constituting as it does the general culture of man.

Now, dialectics as an art is not only concerned with the formulations of rules and regulations or indications of merits and demerits of the debate. It is concerned with the intellectual and the emotional being of man. A dialectician is a philosopher. Dialectics is a pattern of philosophical activity and intellectualism. According to the ancient Nyāya-dialecticians and the Viśiṣṭādvaitic dialecticians also 'Kathā' or dialectics is the intellectual realisation of the 'dear delight' of human life. It is in the practice of dialectics that the problems of dialectical demerits vitiating the course of debate crop up.¹ It is the clarity of vision and the love for truth that can make 'Kathā' or dialectical discourse a real discipline of the human mind in search for truth and knowledge.

1. N. P. and N. S. page 269.

EXPOSITION OF THE RĀMĀNUJA DARŚANA

Vedānta Deśika's interpretation of the Rāmānuja Darśana is not an intellectual discernment, but, a deep personal realisation amounting to a Darśana in itself. The springs of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita starting from Nātha Muni (9th century A. D.), gaining momentum in Yāmunācārya (10th century A. D.) and perennially streaming through Rāmānuja, (11th century A. D.) seem to meet their objective in Vedānta Deśika (1268 to 1369 A.D.) alone. Hence it is that many an exponent of Rāmānuja preceeding and influencing Vedānta Deśika has met, if not a total, at least, a partial eclipse from Vedānta Deśika.

The most outstanding conception of the Rāmānuja Darśana is the conception of 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' or the synthetic unity of God, man and nature. The most outstanding study—the Śārīraka Pravacana Vrata—of Vedānta Deśika in regard to the Rāmānuja Darśana is his insight into the real nature of 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' in its most comprehensive sense viz. epistemological, logical, ethical, religious, metaphysical, æsthetical and even transcendental. 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' is not the harmonization of the claims of dualism and monism.¹ It is not that since Madhva would put forth the anti-thesis of Dvaita, Rāmānuja suggests in logical and chronological priority the syn-thesis of Advaita and Dvaita. 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' is the only realisation of reality possible to human beings and willed by the Divine Being. It is the concentrated wisdom of the Veda, the Upaniṣad, the Vedānta, the Gītā and the seers. It is the 'Darśana' of the One Absolute

1. S. S. 5.12.

Being immanent as well as transcendent in Its diverse becomings.

Categories of Rāmānuja Darśana.

‘Viśiṣṭādvaita’, the supreme reality of Rāmānuja Darśana is the real reality, the real realisation and the real fact of attainment. The terms, ‘Viśiṣṭādvaitam’ and ‘Brahman’ and ‘Īśvara’ all mean the same Supreme Being,¹ the same Ultimate Reality. Darśana stands for Truth and Value and Beauty. Truth and Value and Beauty form one Reality called Viśiṣṭādvaitam. ‘Viśiṣṭādvaitam’ is the only ‘Prameya’ or the knowable that can be realised through the realisation of the aspects of reality. It is the only ‘metaphysical category’ the knowledge of which is most conducive to the summum bonum of man. Even the philosophers of the school of pluralistic realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who had long analysed reality into 6 or 7 categories, have, as a logical culmination of their thesis, felt for the inherent, constitutive unity of all reality. The Rāmānuja Darśana is not destructive of the 6 or 7 pluralistic categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. In fact it is intensely constructive in the sense that it gives a reorientation to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view in its postulation of the supreme category of ‘Viśiṣṭādvaita’. The polemic war waged by the Śāṅkara-school of monism² against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories seems to be pointless in the sense that it takes no account of the inner spirit of the pluralism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-systems ultimately pointing to a supreme monism as suggested by Bhāsarvajña and Vāsudeva, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-philosophers of the 9th-10th centuries A. D., who seem to have been thrown into oblivion by the succeeding generations of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas busy with Tarka to the exclusion of Darśana. The trends of the thoughts of

1. T. T. page 13.

2. Cf. Khaṇḍana Khaṇḍa Khadya.

Bhāsarvajña and Vāsudeva find reception from the metaphysics of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika. The following ideas of the above Nyāya-philosophers¹—

‘यद्विषयं ज्ञानमन्यज्ञानानुपयोगित्वेनैव निःश्रेयससाधकं भवति तत् प्रमेयम् । तदेव तत्त्वतो ज्ञातव्यम् सर्वदा भावयितव्यञ्च, न तु कीटकसंख्यादि तदज्ञानस्यानुपयोगित्वात् ।,

and the view of Vedānta Deśika²—

‘अत्र यद्यपि प्रमाणविषयः प्रमेयमिति व्युत्पत्त्या आरोपिताकारव्यवच्छेदार्थ-
तयानारोपितरूपं सर्वं प्रमेयं तथापि निःश्रेयसान्तरङ्गतया तदर्थिभिः प्रकर्षेण मेयं
प्रमेयमिह विवक्षितम् । तच्च यद्विषयेण भ्रमेण संसारो यद्विषयेण च तत्त्वज्ञानेना-
पदगंश्च तदिह नः प्रकर्षेण मेयं प्रमेयम् ॥,

are suggestive of the spirit of unity inherent in multiplicity.

Unity is the only Darśana. ‘Brahman’ is unity. All have to ultimately realise the One, the Brahman. Some realise It as irreconcilable with diversity; others intuit It as realisable in and through diversity. The Śāṅkara-school that cannot reconcile unity to multiplicity, Brahman to Brahmanāṇḍā, negates the many to posit the One. But the school of Rāmānuja realises Reality as unity in diversity or as the Being in the becomings. The Reality is not in conflict with appearance. It is, on the contrary, energizing the realities relational to It. The terms ‘Absolute Reality’ and ‘Reality in relations’ does not mean higher and lower reality. The Absolute is in the relations, the relations beings reconciled and composed in the Absolute.

Unity according to Śāṅkara is non-duality, a negative conception. It is undifferentiated. But according to Rāmānuja, Unity is synthesis, a positive conception, the elements of which can be differentiated. The Darśana of Rāmānuja is not ‘Viśeṣaṇādvaita’ but, ‘Viśiṣṭādvaita’ which means

1. Nyāya Sāra with Vāsudeva's commentary, page 81.

2. N. P. page 509 (Benares edn.).

that Brahman in Its attributes of matter and souls is one or that Brahman is a synthetic unity in which are composed the elements of matter and souls.

The knowledge of Reality as undifferentiated—'Nir-viśeṣa' and non-dual—'Advaita' is beyond the capacity of man's mind, and as such it means the negation of everything. But the realisation of Reality as unity distinguishable in Its constitutive elements and discernible in Its essence is possible to man's mind and as such stands for the affirmation of everything. The first may be a deduction from the limitations of the dialectic of reason, but, the second is the result of the faultless dialectic of intuition.

The highest category or the only Reality in metaphysical categorisation, according to the Rāmānuja Darśana, is Brahman. This Brahman is identical in essence with Īśvara or Nārāyaṇa or Śrīnivāsa. Hence it is that Its realisation forms the main concern of the Vedānta metaphysics.¹ If, however, It were an undifferentiated, one absolute existence, there could be no point, then, in Its inquiry or realisation. It is the Supreme knowable, the other objects of knowledge being but the parts, the adjuncts, the revelations of this Reality. Hence Vedānta Deśika suggests that it is the Brahman, the One Absolute Reality which is the only metaphysical category in Rāmānuja Darśana. According to him, there is absolutely no distinction between the assertion that Brahman is the One Reality and the assertion that Cit-Acit and Īśvara form the constitutive parts of the One Reality. Unity means the unity of the 'Viśiṣṭa' or the Being in its becomings and difference means the difference of the Viśeṣaṇas, the individual elements of the Being-in-Its-becoming.

The precursors of the Rāmānuja Darśana such as Nātha Muni and Yāmunācārya favour the first categorisation

1. N. P. page 510.

according to which the Tattvas are three, each different in itself, but harmoniously composed in the unity of the Being-in-Its-becoming. Rāmānuja shifts the burden from difference to unity and prefers the second categorisation according to which the Tattva i.e. Brahman or Reality is one, a unity amidst distinct elements of Its constitution. Vedānta Deśika takes both the above categories of Reality to be perfectly in keeping with the spirit of Viśiṣṭādvaita.

There is a third categorisation according to which the Tattvas are three viz. Bhoktā, the soul who enjoys, Bhogya, the objects of enjoyment and Preritā, the Being controlling the Bhogya and the Bhoktā. Although this categorisation is sanctioned by the scriptures, yet it does not point to the stuff out of which all comes into existence and the knowledge of which amounts to the knowledge of all that is and has its being. Much is implied in this categorisation as for instance Kāla or time, other than Bhoktā or Bhogya or Preritā is implicit in it, being the essential adjunct of the objects of experience. Moreover, the delineation of the nature of the above three Tattvas presupposes the delineation of the determining characters and the defining details i.e. the 'adravyas'. Thus, although the categorisation is Viśiṣṭādvaitic, yet, it is not so comprehensive as it ought to have been.¹

The fourth categorisation according to 'Viśiṣṭādvaitins themselves'² contains Tattvas numbering 25 or 26 or even 27 :

- (a) The 25 Tattvas including the 24 Tattvas of the Sāṅkhya (with somewhat different significance) such as Acit or Prakṛti or Avyakta, Mahat, Ahankāra, 11 Indriyas, 5 Tanmātrās, 5 Bhūtas and the Jīva implying its Antaryāmin i.e. the Brahman.

1. N. P. Page 510.

2. N. P. page 511 and N. S. page 86.

- (b) The 26 Tattvas including the 24 Sāṅkhya Tattvas, the Puruṣa and the Parama Puruṣa or the Brahman.
- (c) The 27 Tattvas including Kāla, besides the above 24 Tattvas and the Jīva and the Īśvara.

But, as Vedānta Deśika suggests,¹ the above categorisation is defective in as much as it contains such constituents cannot be 'Tattvas' or categories in the ultimate analysis, ing, as they are but the effects of their causes. Though e above is the number of categories in Rāmānuja Darśana, it, the Tattva underlying them as their ground and goal is ne, the Brahman, the Supreme Being –

‘क्षीरादिदं तत इदञ्च ततो दधीति ।

क्षीरादधीति वदतां किल को विशेषः ॥’

Even when the Tattvas number 25 or 26 or 27, they ave as their ultimate substance and sustenance, the aratattva, the Brahman alone. Thus the 36 Tattvas of the āivāgamas such as —

1. & 2 Tattvas of Māya and Puruṣa.

5 Śuddha Tattvas of Śiva, Śakti, Sadāśiva, Īśvara and Vidyā.

5 Tattvas of Kāla, Niyati, Kalā, Avidyā and Rāga and

24. Tattvas of Prakṛti, Mahat, Ahankāra etc.

are, as Vedānta Deśika³ says, superfluous, their categorisation being unscientific. ‘Māyā’ ‘Puruṣa’ and ‘Śiva’ of the Śaiva Āgamas are equivalent to Acit, Cit and Īśvara of Viśiṣṭādvaita in respect of their existence and essence with the only difference that the ‘Śiva’ of the Śaivāgama is not ‘Īśvara’ of Viśiṣṭādvaita in as much as the latter i.e. Īśvara of Viśiṣṭā-

1. N. P. page 511.

2. N. S. Page 75 (Madras).

3. N. S. Page 75-78.

dvaita is Śāśvataśiva' or simply speaking Nārāyaṇa. As according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Īśvara is realised as the only Tattva being the Śarīrin of Cit and Acit, forming the Śarīra, so is 'Śiva' in Śaiva-philosophy conceived of as the only Tattva having His Śakti manifestating itself as Māyā and Puruṣa i.e. acit and cit. 'Rāga' as a distinct Tattva in Śaivism is not justified because it is subsumed under Jñāna or consciousness in its aspect of affection or attachment. 'Vidyā' as a separate entity is likewise untenable as it is nothing else than the causal collocation of knowledge. What is 'Kālā' is but a state or stage of Prakṛti, called 'Akṣara' and as such it cannot be held to be the cause of the manifestation of creativity in the self. 'Niyati' of the Śaivāgama philosophy amounts to the will of the Being and thus it cannot be a material evolution. 'Kāla' or time is a material evolute. The number of the Tattvas cannot be more than 25 or 26 or 27. The Tattvas are not 36 as the Śaivāgamas recognise or as Varada Viṣṇu Miśra, the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosopher also admits.¹ Thus it is more philosophical to realise the one Reality – the Brahman – 'Brahmaikameva tattvam' – as it is this that includes all the other objects of experience. The existence and the essence of Reality form the object of our transcendental intuitive experience brought about by an intensive culture of our spiritual being.

Viśiṣṭādvaitins have a fifth categorisation of reality according to which the Tattvas number four or five —

- (i) Pradhāna.
- (ii) Puruṣa implying (iii) Parama Puruṣa)
- (iv) Vyakta and
- (v) Kāla.

But the supreme significance of this also is the 'Aikya' or

the 'Vaiśiṣṭya' of Reality otherwise no Darśana of the Tattva par excellence viz. Brahman can be possible.

In a way the 12 Tattvas of the Nyāya metaphysics are acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus comes into being the sixth categorisation in which are included the following 12 Tattvas¹—

1. Ātman meaning (i) Īśvara, the all-conscious, the all-powerful and the all-pervading reality, and
(ii) Jīva, the self-conscious soul.
2. Śarīra meaning (i) Karmaja or caused by Karma such as the Śarīra of all the living beings and
(ii) Akarmaja or uncaused by Karma, i. e. eternal such as the Śarīra of Īśvara.
3. Indriya meaning the 5 organs of sensation, the 5 organs of conation and the Manas i. e. the mind, all being the evolutes of the ego--the Sāttvika Ahankāra.
4. Artha or objects of sensuous experience.
5. Buddhi or consciousness i. e. the Dharma Bhūta Jñāna which means the illumination of the objects for the sake of the conscious being.
6. Manas, the extraordinary cause of memory and recollection—a sense-organ.
7. Pravṛtti or the functioning of the physical, the mental and the spiritual beings of all of us.
8. Doṣa or the causes of Pravṛtti such as attachment, aversion, inertia and so on.
9. Pretyabhāva or transmigration.
10. Phala, the result of Pravṛtti.
11. Duḥkham or pleasure and pain and

12. Apavarga i. e. the ultimate bliss resulting from the realisation of Brahman, the Being of our being, the ground and the goal of the cosmos.


According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the categories of the Vaiśeṣika atomism such as Dravya, Guṇa, Karma, Sāmānya, Viśeṣa, Samavāya and Abhāva are not of any immediate use, so far as Brahmanubhava or the ultimate realisation of the highest philosophical and spiritual truth and ideal is concerned.

Hence almost all the Viśiṣṭādvaitic writers of the post-Rāmānuja-period prefer a seventh categorisation which is in keeping with the spirit of the Vaiśeṣika-system. The underlying idea of this seems to be the advocacy of the realistic character of Viśiṣṭādvaita as distinguished from the idealistic and the absolutistic trends of Nirviśeṣādvaita. In fact, Vedānta Deśika's main contribution to Rāmānuja Darśana lies in the study—systematic and synthetic—of the ultimate principle or principles of the cosmic existence. Rāmānuja has succinctly propounded and elucidated 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' and Vedānta Deśika has systematized the Darśana of Rāmānuja. In scientific analysis, as Vedānta Deśika contends, the categories of the pluralistic realism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika have to give way to the categories of the monistic realism of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The seven categories of Dravya (substance), Guṇa (qualities), Karma (motion), Sāmānya (generality), Viśeṣa (particularity), Samavāya (inherence) and Abhāva (non-existence) which characterise the Vaiśeṣika-system and which are also implied in the Nyāya are subsumed under the following two categories of Viśiṣṭādvaita :¹

- (i) Dravya (substance).
- (ii) Adravya (other than substance).

Dravya i. e. substance is common to both the Vaiśeṣikās

and the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. But the conception of Dravya is not the same in the two systems. Both the systems acknowledge the essential character of Dravya. The essential character of Dravya means its substantiality realisable through the realisation of its character as the Samavāyin or the Upādāna (the material cause) of things coming into being. But they differ as regards the conception of causality and hence they put forth different conceptions of Dravya also. Whereas the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika analyses the Dravya as Samavāyi Kāraṇa and hence different from the effects, Viśiṣṭādvaita takes the Dravya, the Upādāna to be abiding in the effects which are no other than the changes of its states or stages. There are 9 Dravyas according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy—earth, water, light, air, ether, time, space, soul and mind and all of them are independent. How and why they work together to constitute the cosmos remains a mystery. But according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dravya is subdivided as follows¹ :—



1. N. S. Page 16 and T. M. K. 1.6 and 7.

It is clear from the above classification that the ultimate reality is the self-aware supreme transcendental Being and the six-fold substances such as Avyakta, Kāla, Jīva, Īśvara, Nitya Vibhūti and Mati are all composed in It. Īśvara as the self-aware substance or the Pratyak-principle is the same as the Brahman, the Supreme Transcendental Being, a unity in the twofold states of evolution and involution of the cosmos. Thus what finally emerges is Brahman, the Supreme Substance on which depend 'cit' and 'acit', the unconscious and the conscious substances. The rest i. e. 'Kāla', 'Dharma Bhūta Jnāna' and 'Nitya Vibhūti' merge their separate existences in Acit, Jīva-Īśvara and Īśvara respectively, being, as they are, but their Viśeṣaṇas or Prakāras or essentially inalienable adjuncts. As Kāla, Dharma Bhūta Jnāna and Nitya Vibhūti are the Viśeṣaṇas for acit, Jīva-Īśvara and Īśvara respectively, so, are Cit and Acit but the Viśeṣaṇas for Brahman, the Supreme Transcendental Substance, the Being, the Life, the All-in-all of the Universe.

The 24 Guṇas or qualities of the Vaiśeṣikas are not scientifically mutually exclusive. As for instance, the Guṇas of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition supposed to be inhering in the soul are in reality but the aspects of consciousness. The Guṇas of Dharma and Adharma are essentially the 'Divine will to protect' and the 'Divine will to punish' which in turn are but the aspects of Divine Omniscience. 'Buddhi' is not essentially exclusively a Guṇa in as much as it partakes of the character of a Dravya, being, as it is, an abiding entity in the changes of its states of expansion and contraction. Thus the category of 'Guṇa' in addition to the category of 'Dravya' as posited by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not acceptable to Viśiṣṭādvaita. Viśiṣṭādvaita accepts only 'Adravya' in addition to 'Dravya'. 'Dravya' in ultimate realisation means 'Brahman.' In metaphysical

categorisation Dravya is cit, acit and Íśvara. In scientific analysis Dravya is cit, acit, Íśvara, Dharma Bhūta Jñāna, Kāla and Nitya Vibhūti. And 'Adravya' stands for Sattva, Rajas, Tamas, Rūpa, Rasa, Gandha, Sparśa, Śabda, Saṁyoga and Śakti.

'Karma' or motion as a distinct category has been accepted by the Vaiśeṣika and some Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophers also.¹ But some Viśiṣṭādvaitins, the predecessors of Vedānta Deśika, contend that between the causal collocation of movement of things and the ensuing movement there is no need of postulating an entity called Karma or motion. In fact, it is Saṁyoga or conjunction alone that is responsible for our knowledge of movement at some place and mere contact, at another. Vedānta Deśika, who holds Karma or motion to be a perceptible entity, subsumes it, on the implied authority of Rāmānuja, under the category of 'Adravya'.

'Sāmānya' or generality, a separate category in the Vaiśeṣika-system is not at all acceptable to the Vedāntic schools. As the effect, say, the jar is but the change of state—real in Rāmānuja, apparent in Śaṅkara—of the cause, say, the clay, so, the conception of the jar as an 'avayavin,' a whole, composed of the 'avayavas', the parts is not acceptable to the Vedāntins. Consequently, the conception of 'Sāmānya', 'jarness', for instance, following from the conception of the 'jar' as an 'Avayavin', a whole, composed of 'avayavas' or parts is also un-Vedāntic.²

The experience of similarity in day-to-day life is not the experience of 'generality' or 'genus' as an entity other than the object it inheres in, but, the experience, at the most,

1. N. P. page 502.

2. N. P. page 497.

of an individualistic constitution or configuration of the object as such.

The 'Viśeṣa' of the Vaiśeṣika Analysis is a superfluous assumption according to Viśiṣṭādvaita. The Vaiśeṣikas speculate over Viśeṣa as a separate entity that explains inner distinctions in the eternal atoms and the other eternal entities. The Vedāntins do not take the cosmos to be an atomic configuration, nor do they recognize any eternal character pertaining to the ether and the space and so on. According to them the distinctive character of an object is self-constitutive and not the creation of a super-sensible Viśeṣa or particularity. The eternal entities such as 'Acit', 'Cit' and 'Īśvara' differ essentially due to the differences of their innate constitution. The 'Acit' differs from the 'Cit' and the 'Īśvara' by virtue of the fact that while the former is inert, the latter are self-aware. The 'Cit' differs from the—'Īśvara' on account of the fact that while the former is atomic and attributive the latter is all-pervasive, and substantive. Thus, there is no necessity of a 'Viśeṣa' to distinguish one eternal entity from the other.

The postulation of Samavāya is necessary for the explanation of the experience of the inter-relatedness of Dravya and Guṇa and so on which are essentially independent entities according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools. But the Vedāntins regard 'Samavāya' as an unnecessary assumption in as much as it leads to 'anavasthā' or infinite regress as when one wants to know the relation which relates, say, Dravya and Samavāya or Guṇa and Samavāya and so on, one has to postulate 'Samavāya' ad infinitum. Thus the Śāṅkara-Vedāntins explain the mutual relatedness of things and properties on the principle of 'Svarūpa Sambandha' or identity which means that the substance is one and the same manifesting itself in its attributes and that the substance is

1, the attributes being apparent in respect of being the forms the states of the abiding substance. Just against this, the mānuja-Vedāntins believe in 'Aprthak Siddhi-Sambandha', which is not an independent category like 'Samavāya' but a concept of dependence and subservience existing in the different units of the universe right from the humble insect to a Almighty Being.

Abhāva or negation in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as a distinct category of experience is vehemently criticised by Viśiṣṭācāyana. The theory of causality called the 'Ārambha Vāda' which presupposes Abhāva, gets a categorical denial from the Rāmānuja-school.

It follows from the above that the Brahman in its Brahmanhood means, in strict metaphysical analysis, Brahman Cit-and-Acit, or the Dravya abiding in and through the Adravyas. Thus for the theoretical Viśiṣṭādvaita, the 6 sub-categories of Dravya and the 10 main varieties of Adravyas are absolutely necessary. But the practical Viśiṣṭādvaita cannot allow itself to end in the sphere of metaphysical categories meant for mental analysis and intellectual discernment. The real categorisation of reality according to the practical Rāmānuja-Darśana, as Vedānta Deśika asserts, is something else.¹ What is the real nature of our experience, our realisation of Reality? It is deep love and devotion to the Ground and the goal of our experience. On its advent alone the Reality draws us nearest to itself. Thus the ultimate category of Rāmānuja Darśana is 'Deep Love and Devotion' which surrenders all its interests and even itself to the Ultimate Object, the Transcendental Divine, pervading every thing, everywhere. It is this which is the real category, the Tattva, or the Prameya. Anything else stands simply for its sake. All our wisdom and all our actions get their supreme

1. N. P. page 511-514.

value and importance through It alone. It is our constant, deep, loving meditation alone in which Reality is immediately intuited and what results is Bliss Eternal. In the height of love for Reality, it is called Bhakti; in the supreme climax of this love, it becomes Prapatti or Śaraṇāgati or Vaśīkaraṇa of the Parama Puruṣa. All the diverse systems and schools are but approaches to it. It is this which is the Darśana of the 'Vaiśiṣṭya' or the 'Aikya' or the 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' of reality. In its sweep it intuits Reality as a Unity which can be distinguished in its component parts of Īśvara or God, the Brahman to be sure, Jīva or Soul and Prakṛti or Matter. Now, we shall study, following Vedānta Deśika, the three distinct entities constituting 'Viśiṣṭādvaita'.

1. *Īśvara or God.*

The philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita means the philosophy of the oneness and the absoluteness of Īśvara, the Transcendental Divine Being in the universal becoming of man and nature. There is no attempt here at the reconciliation of the irreconcilable i. e. the unity of the diversities or the non-difference of the differences or the identity of the multiplicities. The supreme sense of Divine Unity is realised in the ontological, the spiritual and the super-spiritual subservience of mind and matter to God. God in His real transcendental essence and existence is not different from God as grasped by human mind in the respect of His cosmic immanence, His cosmic powers, His incarnations and even His images meant for the sensuous adoration of man. The Divine Personality as the conscious power of being, the conscious centre of knowledge and the Infinite Being enjoying eternally the bliss of multiple manifestations is the same as Brahman, the Impersonal Absolute Reality, the Infinite Existence—Consciousness—Bliss eternally pervading everything everywhere. There is no difference whatsoever in the Reality termed as Īśvara and Brahman, Nārāyaṇa and Vāsudeva and so on. The difference of

nomenclature is the expression of the realisation of the fulness of Reality through human avenues of religion and philosophy, theology and mysticism, æsthetics and poetry and what not. The Brahman of Philosophy and the Īśvara of religion mean the same Reality. The intuition of the Brahman and the devotion to God mean the same realisation of Reality. The 'Ghataka' Śrutis or the Antaryāmi-Śrutis contain the real insight into the significance of the 'Bheda'-Śrutis that analyse Reality and its revelations and the 'Abheda'-Śrutis that point to the Absolute Reality as 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्'.¹ Neither absolute non-difference nor absolute difference is the real nature of Reality. Reality is a Transcendental entity to which all the diversity is eternally and alogically related.

God can be known by intuition alone.

The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, as Vedānta Deśika following Rāmānuja understands it, precludes the possibility of human reasoning in the sphere of the realisation of God. The Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika and the Yoga philosophies resort to anumāna or reasoning and argumentation to prove the existence of God. The logical and dialectical demonstration of Divine Existence in the Kusumānjali and the Ātma Tattva-Viveka of the illustrious Udayanācārya is a great philosophical attempt, indeed, to uphold theism against materialism, subjectivism, nihilism and scepticism of all types and manners. But what it ultimately proves is not the real Being, the Transcendental Reality, but only an aspect of It viz. the fact of Its being the Instrumental cause of the cosmos.² God in His real essence and existence is the Primal Cause, the Material Ground, the very warp and woof of the cosmic evolution³ and as such He can be integrally intuited and lovingly contemplated upon by all of us who are essentially His becomings. He is not subject to transmutation in the

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi on T. M. K. 8, 29,

2 & 3. N S. page 230.

sense that He becomes the cosmos. He is ever immune from all changes and imperfections in as much as it is He who is ever the transcendental being and it is His becomings that happen to be subject to change and mutation.

Reasoning and argumentation cannot prove God. One argument may be counteracted by another argument and there may be no end to argumentation.¹ But the Śāstraic intuition has all the finality of vision and insight. And what is realised and realisable through Śāstra is not God as the instrumental cause but God as the ground and the guide and the goal of the cosmos or the Divine Personality in His fulness of powers.

God is the First and the Final Cause of the Cosmos.

The Vedāntic inquiry into God is the inquiry into the First Cause of all that is and has its being. Different exponents of the Vedānta approach the problem in different ways. Śaṅkara conceives of Reality as the ground of all revelations, which, in ultimate analysis, turn out to be but illusory. Thus the Brahman as the First Cause is intuited as qualified with Avidyā or the principle of individuation or the power of illusory manifestation. Bhāskara postulates Brahman, the First Cause as composed of two parts—the first, the spiritual or the Cit-part and the second, the material or the Acit-part. The Brahman undergoes transformation in the transformation of Its material elements. It is, like wise, subject to transmigration in the transmigration of Its spiritual element under the impact of limitations following from the mutation of matter, Yādava Prakāśa imagines Causal Reality to be pure universal Being, underlying its triple aspects or potencies of Cit-Acit-Īśvara or man-nature-God. Accordingly, it is the deep ocean of Being with foams, bubbles and waves of man, nature and God that becomes

1. N. S. page 232.

the cosmic phenomenon. What it means is that the human mind cannot conceive of Reality as the ground of the cosmic revelation without conceiving of its distinctive nature or feature or function or power of becoming. But what the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosopher Rāmānuja and his chief exponent Vedānta Deśika do is to bring out the real sense of Brahman or Īśvara, as the One Divine Absolute Reality and as the First and the Final Cause of all the cosmic effectualisations. What it means is that Brahman or Īśvara, the Reality, the principle of cosmic causality is essentially the immutable Substance eternally associated with Its attributes, Its powers, Its distinguishing features, Its media of expression. This Reality undergoes change or transformation not in the respect of the transformation of Its real transcendental essence and existence, but, in the respect of the transformation of the states of Its attributes, Its powers, Its distinguishing features, Its media of expression.¹ Any change of Reality in Its revelations is but figurative, symbolical, indirect. Reality is rich in expression, but, it never suffers any limitation through Its expressions.

The acit, the material attribute or the non-sentient medium of expression of the Brahman has two essential states, the subtle and the gross. The effectualisation of 'acit' is the passing over of matter from its subtle material state to its gross material state. Similarly the material involution is the passing over of matter from its gross material state to its subtle material state. The Cit or the spiritual attribute or the sentient medium of expression of the Brahman has no states in regard to its self-sentient spiritual being and essence. What it has by way of the change of its states is the contraction and the expansion of its attributive consciousness under the impact of its Karma, in the vortex of Saṁsāra. Thus what is spiritual effectualisation is but directly appli-

1. N. S. page 233.

cable to the attributive consciousness of the soul, and only indirectly to the self-sentient spiritual being. There is no evolution or involution, thus, of Reality, the Brahman, the *Īśvara* in Its real absolute divine essence. Directly evolution and involution apply to the states of the attributes of the Divine causal substance. It is only indirectly that they apply to the attributes of the substance as such. The substance in Its real spiritual essence ; may, however, be looked upon as subject to evolution and involution in a figurative sense only.

While Śaṅkara fails to analyse the real cause ; Bhāskara, the pure cause and Yādava Prakāśa, the divine cause, Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika grasp the real, the pure and the divine causal Substance, which immutable in Itself undergoes changes from the causal state to the effectual state, directs the cosmic principles of mind and matter in the evolution of the cosmos, rules over the elements of the cosmic manifestation, underlies the universe of nature and man and to crown all, becomes the ultimate goal of all spiritual realisation possible to us in our terrestrial as well as transcendental existences.

Creation is the spontaneous manifestation of joy in the heart of Reality.

God, the perfect personality or the perfection of impersonal existence—bliss-consciousness has unbounded joy as one of the permanent aspects of His essence and existence. It is this divine delight in the heart of Reality that is the real source and sustenance of creation. It is this that shines in the Omniscience of the Devine Being, in the self-sentience of the soul and in the multiple material becomings. It is this that is responsible for the 'Aprthak Siddhi' or the divine relation of God to God's creation. It is this that defies our

logical demonstration. It is only our integral intuitive love that can comprehend it and enjoy it.¹

God is overflowing with divine delight. In His cosmic expression He allows no restriction to the law of life—the Kārmic law—to have its full round. What He does is but to take on the full responsibility of the Kārmic Law, the Law of Life. The law of Karma is transfigured by the Law of Kṛpā. The creation is indeed the recreation and the rejoicing of the Creator.

Īśvara the highest of religion is identical with Brahman, the highest of Philosophy and He is knowable as well as nameable.

Although the mind of man cannot exhaust the Divine Content, which in any analysis remains ever the full Divine Essence, ever transcendently true and good and beautiful, yet, it can grasp It in the aspects of Its immanence and manifestation in and through the cosmic phenomena.² Human language, howsoever imperfect it may be, does contain the power of expression of Reality in its entirety. There is no need, thus, to twist and torture the sacred Vedāntic texts as Śaṅkara and Bhāskara and Yādava Prakāśa do. What is required is the synthetic sense, the supreme understanding of such texts before we can comprehend God, the Divine Reality and express the Divine Nature in our language. God in His universe and Brahman in Its transcendental existence mean the same Primal Divine Reality.

God is qualified with Divine Qualities.

The Nirviśeṣādvaitin's conception of Brahman as the qualityless Reality or the non-differentiated pure universal existence-consciousness-bliss is, according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, neither real nor realisable. What is 'qualitylessness'? A kind

1. T. M. K. 3.1.

2. T. M. K. 3.3

of quality, to be sure.¹ Brahman, characterised with 'qualitylessness', becomes the qualified Brahman. If, however, It were not so qualified, It remains essentially the Divine Being, qualified with the qualities of His essence and existence, His supreme transcendence and His absoluteness. All the Divine qualities of Omniscience, Omnipotence etc. follow from the transcendental Being of the Divine, which can be determined as the being of reality of consciousness, of infinity, of bliss, of perfection and never as the identity of the pure differenceless absolute reality. It is the being of God, which, in the fulness of its manifestation, is the presupposition of the Divine Life in the Divine Universe i. e. the Dayā-Līlā of the Bhagavān in the Vaikunṭha or the Parā Prakṛti or the Nitya Vibhūti.

The qualities of God such as cosmic causality, cosmic immanence, cosmic control and so on define His self-determining and self-determined transcendental essence. God is 'Divya-Maṅgala-Vigraha,' the most perfect spiritual personality having myriad means of manifestation. God, the Śarīrin of His Śarīra constituted by the universe of man and nature is the same as the Supreme Reality of intuition.

God is immune from all change and imperfection.

All the elements of matter and mind are conditioned by space, time and causality. It is only God who conditions space and time and causality in and through His Divine essence and existence. In the eternity of time, in the infinity of space, in the self-consciousness of the soul, in the self-luminosity of consciousness and in each and every conception of eternity and infinity it is God alone who is ever immanent and yet transcendent. Divine Omnipotence does not mean the possibility of the impossible, but, the spiritual guidance over the actualisation of the possible alone.²

1. N. S. page 227.

2. T. M. K. 3.77.

Īśvara as 'Cidacidviśiṣṭa' is the subject of Vedāntic inquiry and Vedāntic realisation.

The Vedānta does not and cannot inquire into the undifferentiated and the undifferentiable Reality of the Nirviśeṣādvaitic concept. The Absolute of Śaṅkara is immune from all relations or distinctions or differences. But according to Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika such an Absolute cannot be the ground and the goal of cosmic phenomena and hence. It can form no subject for the Vedāntic study, let alone, the Vedāntic Sādhana. Accordingly, the Absolute of the Rāmānuja Darśana and the God of Viśiṣṭādvāitīc Vaiṣṇavism is the same Reality which is the Perfect Personality as hinted at in the Ist Adhyāya of the Vedānta Sūtras, the First and the Final Cause as pointed out in the IIrd Adhyāya of the Vedānta Sūtras, the ultimate means of spiritual realisation as discussed in the IIIrd Adhyāya of the Vedānta Sūtras and last but not the least, the real goal of all life as intuited in the IVth or the final Adhyāya of the Vedānta Sūtras. There is thus a complete spiritual synthesis in the Vedānta which follows from the spiritual synthetic nature of Reality and leads to the spiritual synthetic experience of divine delight. It is the self-proved, self-sufficient, self-existent Reality that can be logically, ethically, spiritually and transcendently realised by all the conscious centres of the universe.

What is Māyā or Avidyā or Upādhi or Śakti is not the principle of illusion or limitation or imperfection, and does not, in any way, bind the being. It stands but as the real attribute, the real defining and determining beinghood, the *adravya*, the Aprthak-Siddha-Viśeṣaṇa of the transcendental Viśeṣya-Dravya, the Absolute or the Divine Personality-Brahman or Īśvara.¹

1. T. M. K. 5.1.

2. *Jīva or Soul.*

In Viśiṣṭādvaita as interpreted by Vedānta Deśika, the being of the soul (Jīva) follows from the being of the Supreme Soul.¹ The Omniscience of the Overself enriches the self-sentience of the self. The Omnipresence of the Infinite Being energizes the all-pervasiveness of the consciousness of the finite beings. The Omnipotence of the Absolute is the source and the sustenance of the free agency of the individual conscious centres of the cosmos. In every respect the soul is the Aprthak-Siddha-Viśeṣaṇa of its Viśeṣya, the Divine Personality.

The soul as the self-proved spiritual reality can also be psychologically known and experienced.

What Ontology of the soul presents of the soul-essence can also be grasped by human psychology. The existence of the intellectual, the emotional and the volitional self is a matter of psychological proof. The consciousness of the 'I' is a common experience possible to the conscious entities inhabiting the universe. None can ever doubt his own existence. Even in the doubt of the 'I', the doubting 'I' is involved. The 'I' at the outset is recognized as the perceiver, face to face with all the perceptions and all the perceptibles. Neither the individual elements of the psycho-physical organism nor the collectivity of all the organic elements can ever singly or collectively constitute the 'I'² the knowing, the doing, the feeling self, the spiritual body of the Transcendental 'I'. The 'I' experience in our terrestrial existence is but the part-experience of the real or the transcendental 'I' whose essence is infinite and eternal consciousness and bliss.

The Vijnāna Vāda-psychology is not psychology in the real sense as it does not point to the real 'psyche', but, simply

1. T. M. K. 2-6.

2. T. M. K. 2, 1 & 2.

dissects the psychic elements into the Pañca-Skandhas. Moreover, it cannot explain the 'I' that correlates, co-ordinates and co-exists with all the experiences of the 'I' such as recognition, recollection, reasoning, integral intuition, æsthetic experience and so on.

The Nirviśeṣādvaita-psychology also which speculates upon the 'I' as the appearance of the Absolute caught in the whirlpool of Eternal Ignorance or Individuation does not grasp the self-conscious 'I' whose being is constituted by the being of the Transcendental sentence.¹ The Being has no illusion, nor can the illusioned Being become the one soul in many bodies since the emancipation of the one 'I' will mean the emancipation of the cosmos which is against all sense and reason and intuition.²

The Bhedābheda Vāda-psychology, likewise, is a futile attempt at the reconciliation of the 'I' with the Supreme Being. If the 'I' were reconciled to the Supreme Being, the limitations of the 'I' must, in some way or the other, touch the perfection of Reality.³

Ultimately, the soul-psychology which derives its essence from the Ontology of the soul and which is the Viśiṣṭādvaitic psychology of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika is the real human psychology in which the 'I' is revealed as the knower, underlying all his knowledge; the doer, underlying all his deeds and the enjoyer, underlying all his enjoyment. Neither is the 'I' the momentary stream of consciousness nor is it the eternal universal consciousness. The 'I' is essentially the conscious being with the power of his consciousness revealed in the intellectual, the emotional

1. T. M. K. 2.12

2. T. M. K. 2.13

3. T. M. K. 2.11

and the volitional spheres.¹ The 'I' is, therefore, not to be proved from the 'I' experiences of desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and knowledge as is done by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-philosophy. The 'I' is the self-proved, self-conscious entity which can be realised in our common objective experiences, our subjective states, our intense discrimination of the subject from the object and to crown all, in the transcendental realisation of its real being.

The soul is eternally existent.

The 'I', the spiritual ego is not an adventitious feature of existence, but, an eternal inhabitant of the cosmos.² Its essential being is ever uncaused and cannot be conditioned by any causal collocation, spiritual or material. Its becoming is the becoming of its Dharma-Bhūta Jñāna, its attribute, its power of consciousness that may contract and expand in the Saṁsāra under the operation of the law of Karma. The soul does not change with the change of its knowledge as the Viśiṣṭavādins believe. Such a change will mean the end of all human endeavour, and all human achievement. The soul remains even after the dissolution of the body, since, it is not identical with the vital air. The soul is the spark from the Transcendental Effulgence. The existence of soul till the cosmic involution is a misconception, because, in that case the spiritual realisation cannot be shown to have any purpose or point. The soul is not lost in the Absolute in the event of its salvation as then spiritual realisation will amount to spiritual destruction. The soul is, finally, the eternal spiritual reality contained in the Timeless Transcendental Reality.

The soul is the knower, the doer and the enjoyer.

The 'I' is neither the substrate of the 'I' experiences nor is it the same as the subjective states. It is, in fact, the self-

conscious being expressing the power of his consciousness in the acts of knowing and doing and enjoying. It cannot, therefore, be identical with God, the Perfect Personality, the Universal Ground and Goal of all experience.

The soul is atomic.

The soul in its supreme essence of self-consciousness is atomic. It cannot be all-pervasive, since, in that case, there will be no meaning in its realisation of God or in its attainment of the Divine world. All its all-pervasiveness is through its power of consciousness operating in the cosmic sphere. The transcendental sphere is within the reach of the soul, the spiritual monad, but, never within the reach of the soul's power of consciousness. It is the soul, the atomic conscious spiritual centre that is the concern of the Supreme Soul, the attribute of the Absolute, the glory of the All-Glorious and the Apr̥thak Siddha-Viśeṣaṇa of the Viśeṣya-Dravya, the Divine Personality. Its Dharmabhūta-Jñāna has no relation with the Dharmabhūta-Jñāna of the Divine Being except in the sense of its operation under the sanction of the all-pervasive Divine Will.

Souls are of different categories.

The finite conscious being is not a unity in its media of manifestations. It is a plurality to all intents and purposes. There may be as many souls as there are psycho-physical organisms. But there is no difference in the real being of the souls in their myriad manifestations. The plurality of the soul is due to the difference in the operations of the power of its consciousness under the stress of the Kārmic law operating in the cosmos. Thus the following categories of souls may be discerned in the Divine Government of the Universe :¹

1: N. S. page 215.

1. The *Saṁsārin* or the soul bound by the law of Karma. It has the following two sub-categories :—

- (i) the 'Nitya Saṁsārin' or the *Baddha*, the souls in bondage, and
- (ii) the 'Bhāvi Saṁsāra Viraha' or the *Mukta*, the liberated souls.

2. The *Asaṁsārin* or the *Nitya*, the souls not bound in any sense by the Kārmic law of the cosmic life.

The souls being many, there is no identity of the soul with the Supreme Soul. Even in its ultimate spiritual state, the soul is essentially controlled by the Supreme Soul, the inmost being of all the conscious and the unconscious centres of existence.

The destiny of the soul.

In Viśiṣṭādvaita the being and the becoming of the soul are in perfect consonance with the destiny of the soul. The destiny of the soul is 'Mokṣa' or 'Mukti'. The atomic conscious centre of reality reaches the all-pervasive transcendental Divine Reality. The Eternal Home of the soul is, indeed, the Transcendental Divine Abode—the *Parama Pada*. The entry of the soul in the *Parama Pada* is not an adventitious event but the result of the soul's integral intuitive experience of the Divine in His real essence, possible only through an all-round perfection of the soul-nature in its ethical, moral, religious, æsthetic, spiritual and transcendental aspects. In the realisation of its ultimate spiritual destiny the soul realises supreme transcendence over the moral and the physical universe, the scene of its becoming.¹ It is one with its ground and goal in as much as it becomes the concern of the Divine. Beyond the space-time world, beyond the symbolism of the spiritual universe, even much beyond

1. N. S. page 220.

the reach of all intellectual, emotional and volitional activities, is the real home of the 'I' to which, it must, in the long last, return and be at rest with its Divine Maker and Master and Lover. All-Equality with the Divine Being is the destiny of the soul.¹ But the equality of its will with the Divine Will is never the aspiration or the attainment of the atomic conscious being. In the state of final emancipation, the soul revels in the same region with God, attains to the same nature as that of God, is ever in close communion with God and to crown all, realises its real Apr̥thaksiddhi, its Sāyujya with God.²

The destinies of the soul variously described in various philosophies are all realised in the realisation of its real destiny—its spiritual relation of Sāyujya with the Divine-Personality. Even 'Kaivalya' or self-realisation is not desired by the soul. Mokṣa is God-realisation, par excellence.³ Bhakti in the Vaikunṭha is the real Mukti for the spiritual 'I'. It is this which is the realisation of 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' in its real sense and essence.

3. *Jaḍa Dravya or Matter.*

All material evolution is a means to spiritual evolution in the scheme of the manifestation of Reality in its entirety. Prakṛti (Jaḍa Dravya) or Matter is the underlying principle of the material evolution of the universe. But it does not work out of its own accord and in accordance with the working of its own laws. It works, in fact, in the working of the Divine will and in the operation of the Divine Laws. It is this which is the Viśiṣṭādvaitic sense of Prakṛti (acit or Jaḍa Dravya) as the principle of material evolution.

Matter defying logical proof is integrally intuited.

Matter in Viśiṣṭādvaita is not the same as matter in

1. & 2. N. S. page 221.

3. N. S. page 222-224.

Sāṃkhya or Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or the Buddhistic philosophy. The Sāṃkhya argues out matter as the state of equilibrium of the three qualities of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika imagine matter as the atomic conglomeration. The Buddhistic philosophy conceives of matter as the sense-ultimates in perpetual flux. But the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy intuits matter as the non-sentient mode of Divine Manifestation—the screen against which God enacts the Cosmic Drama.¹ Matter is not the principle of unreality. It is, on the other hand, one of the elements of Reality. The equilibrium—state of the three qualities is not matter. Matter is that which is qualified by the three qualities or which is the substrate of the three qualities² all forming its inalienable attributes. Matter does not evolve by itself but in and out of the will of God. It does not also evolve for the souls but for the sake of the Divine, its Inner Ruler Immortal.

Matter is 'Dravya'

Matter is Dravya or substance in as much as it is the substrate of its attributes, its states, its transformations, its aspects of evolution. Matter, a Jaḍa Dravya i.e. a non-sentient substance has for its attributes—the Adravayas, standing in the relationship of Aprthak Siddhi with it. And with regard to the Divine Substance, the non-sentient material substance is but an attribute, a quality.

Mutation is the law of matter.

Matter is always subject to change. But it changes for the sake of the spiritual evolution of the universe. Its mutation is a medium through which works the law of Karma in the scheme of the working of the Law of Divine Life. The mutation of matter is not the actualisation of the potential or the creation of the new or the illusory manifesta-

1. N. S. 1—last stanza.

2. Sarvārtha Siddhi, Page 15.

tion of the unreal, but, the transformation of the states of the real material substance, abiding essentially in all the changes. The material change and the Transcendental, Immutable Divine may be grasped as effect and cause by the same sweep of spiritual intuition. As the effect is not different from the cause, being, as it really is but the change of the state of the cause, so is mutation not opposed to Immutability, being as it essentially is but its 'Aprthak siddha Viśeṣaṇa.' The law of material transformation is the law of spiritual evolution and as such it can be termed the Vedic, the Vedāntic or in fact, the Viśiṣṭhādvaitic Satkārya Vāda, to be sure.¹

Divine Energy is immanent in material evolution

In the Viśiṣṭhādvaitic philosophy of the evolution of matter, which means the real change of the real causal state of matter into the effectual state, the most important conception is the conception of the 'Āpyāyana' or the energizing of matter and the matter evolves by the Will of God. It is this which underlies the triplication or the quintuplication of the cosmic elements as suggested in the Śrutis. As this idea is conspicuously absent in the conception of the atomic conglomeration of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in the purposeless accumulation of the sense-ultimates of the Buddhists, in the uncalled—for cosmic creation of the Sāṃkhya and in the baseless objectivisation of Reality of the Nirviśeṣādvaitin, it can be held to be the differentia of the Viśiṣṭhādvaitic conception of matter and material evolution. It follows from the Transcendental nature of the Cosmic Creator, who remains immanent in His creation.

Viśiṣṭhādvaita, in fact, re-interprets the Sāṃkhya-idea of the evolution of matter. The Sāṃkhya fails to account for the evolution of consciousness. What it aims at is but an

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi 1-23.

ill-conceived idea of the non-sentient evolving out of itself the principle of sentience. But Viśiṣṭādvaita does not have to face such a paradox in as much as it takes material evolution to be but the means to the spiritual evolution of the cosmos in the sole guidance of the Divine Personality or Reality in Its richness of expression.¹

Time as the inert substance is experienced as the adjunct of the objects of experience.

Kāla or time, though eternal, is not identical with God. Time is but the temporal medium of expression of the Divine Reality. In the eternity of time is involved but the will of God. Like the 'Acit' or the 'Avyakta', Kāla or time also forms the paraphernalia for the Līlā Vibhūti or the play of God.² Time is perceptible in the perception of entities qualified temporally. God abiding in the Avyakta is the material cause and God pervading the eternity and the infinity of Kāla forms the accessory to the material cause of the cosmic creation. In His transcendental essence and existence, God is instrumental to all that comes into being. It is God alone who is the First and the Final Cause, immanent in the material causality for the sake of the divinization of the conscious centres of the Universe.³

‘वायुर्दोषयते यद् यद्यमुद्गुणो ब्रंघ्रमीति द्रुतं खे,
तेजो जाज्वल्यते यद् यदपि जलनिधिर्माधवीं दोधवीति ।
भूर्यद्वा बोधवीति स्थिरचरधृतये तच्छ तादृक् च सर्वं,
स्वायत्ताशेषसत्तास्थितियतनपरब्रह्मलीलोर्मिचक्रम् ॥’

Viśiṣṭādvaitam : The Unity of Reality

‘Viśiṣṭādvaita’ is generally understood to mean “qualified monism”. But Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika and their followers never thought that their philosophy of the

1. T. M. K. 1-16.

2. T. M. K. - 1-66.

3. T. M. K. - 1,70.

One Absolute Reality would make them the upholders of a qualified monistic view. On the contrary they hoped to be as purely and intensely monistic as their chief great rivals, the Advaitins. They would not brook the idea of their philosophy of Reality being labelled as holding good under certain conditions or qualifications. That God, the Abode of the highest and the most auspicious qualities is the same as the Brahman abiding eternally in the processes of universal evolution and involution is the only sense of their monism and it is in this sense that they are realistic Advaita-philosophers as contrasted with the idealistic Advaita-philosophers. Thus 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' means Divine Unity or the oneness and the absoluteness of the Brahman, manifesting itself in matter and souls as their immanent entity and yet transcending them. "There is only one substance, the Brahman, the Supreme, characterised by its attributes of all non-sentient and sentient substances."¹ The substance is real and its attributes are real. The real substance can have only real attributes. As our physical sense testifies to the objects of our experience as being always characterised by their appropriate, inalienable and inborn characteristics, so does our spiritual sense ascertain the ultimate object of our ultimate experience, the Brahman, as being always characterised by Its essential and inherent attributes of the non-sentient and the sentient life-principles, constituting the cosmos.² 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' does not mean that the Brahman and the world are one and identical. What it means is that the world which is constituted of the conscious and the non-conscious objects and which is real as certified by our sense and reason, is an attribute or state or quality in regard to the Brahman, the Supreme Substance as proved by our spiritual sense and reason. The dependence of the world on Brahman, the subservience of

1. M. S. page 2 (Madras Edition).

2. T.M.K. 5.1

the cosmos to the Cosmic Ruler, entirely changes the status of the world as a substance or substantial substance and makes it a substance-attribute or attributive substance in relation to the Absolute Reality. But the reality of the world is not affected by this divine dynamics-this spiritual transformation of the cosmic phenomena. On the contrary, the world is made spiritually united with its maker, a matter of concern for its architect, a visible attribute of the Divine. It is in such a world that there is a hope for humanity to reach upto Divinity with a view to realising the values of life, All that is and subsists is real and is really being eternally Brahmanized. A part-view of things may be devaluating to the extent of even negating the things themselves. A full-view alone can vouchsafe for the reality and the substantiality of the things as it is this that can co-ordinate, co-relate, synthesize and grasp their real being. The idealistic monism of Śaṅkara and his followers divides and disjoins Reality ; the realistic monism of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika and their followers synthetically grasp the absolute Reality. The goal is the same, but, while the Advaitins destroy the beauty of the wayside, the Viśiṣṭādvaitins try to carefully preserve it. In Advaita, the Absolute is Absolute because no relativities cling to it. In Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Absolute is absolute inspite of the relativities, abiding in the relative realities and being the main cause of their being and their sole support and sustenance.

Unlike the Advaita, the Viśiṣṭādvaita, does not negate the world to postulate the Brahman. The affirmation of the reality of man and nature is a greater and stronger affirmation of the Absolute Reality. The problem for the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is not that of a triadic configuration of God, soul and matter, but, of the unconditional unity of Brahman in and through the multiplicity of Jīva and Prakṛti. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin seeks the solution of the problem in the principle of 'Śarīra-

Śarīri-Bhāva', a spiritual principle, to all intents and purposes.
'Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva'

What is Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva? At the outset, it is essential to note that the terms 'Śarīra' and 'Śarīrin' in Viśiṣṭādvaita do not mean the same thing as in the Nyāya-Realism. 'Śarīra' in the Nyāya-sense means the organism by virtue of being the seat or the substrate of actions and sense-apparatus and sense-experiences. 'Śarīra, in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic-sense connotes any 'substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation.¹ The proof of 'Śarīra' in Nyāya is our perception. The proof of 'Śarīra' in Viśiṣṭādvaita is spiritual intuition embodied in such sacred texts as: 'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम् and so on.'² The 'Śarīrin' in Nyāya can connote only the Jīva or the sentient soul. The 'Śarīrin' in Viśiṣṭādvaita means the Supreme Brahman, the Transcendental Absolute. So it seems that Viśiṣṭādvaita begins where Nyāya ends.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin conceives of the 'Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva' on the analogy of the organism of biology. But the analogy does not go very far. The main thing in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception is a spiritual synthesis of the world and the world-maker. So argues Vedānta Deśika against the biological notion of organism of the Nyāya-realists—"Anything may be the seat of actions but it cannot become an organism for this very reason. For instance, a jar, which contains water, may be the seat of an action i. e. the action of containing water. But the Naiyāyika would not call the jar, śarīra or organism. And in characterising the śarīra further as the seat of sense-organs, the Naiyāyika

1. Śrī Bhāṣya-11.1.9.

2. Br̥ Up. III. VII.

may either mean that the sense organs inhere in the śarīra or that they are conjoined to it. The first alternative i. e. the inherence-idea is not acceptable to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-realists in the case of the body and the sense-organs, because, inherence, or intimate union can obtain only in the five-fold spheres of (i) the product and the parts thereof (ii) the qualified and the quality thereof (iii) the moving object and the motion thereof (iv) the individual and the common characteristics and (v) the eternal entities and their particularities. The second alternative i. e. the conjunction-idea is too ambiguous and unscientific. For example, a jar in conjunction with some sense-organ or the other may have to be called an organism, which is against any sense or reason or authoritative assertion. Moreover, an organism defined as the seat of sense-experiences is not necessarily an organism proper, because, one's home, where one experiences the mirth and the melancholy of life may thus be called an organism."¹ Therefore the Naiyāyika conception of 'Śarīra' or organism which is fraught with absurdities cannot explain the Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva or the spiritual synthesis of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of Śarīra is all-comprehensive. It holds good in every kind of Śarīra, be it chemico-physical, psycho-physical, spiritual or Divine. It seems that those who criticise² the organic unity of the Divine of the Rāmānuja Darśana and think that Brahman, the Absolute, cannot be regarded as an organic whole or as a system of integrated elements, probably do not quite follow the idea of organism in Rāmānuja's and Vedānta Deśika's philosophy. There is no touch of the sense of a biological organism in the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva. In Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, as expounded by Vedānta Deśika,

1. N. S. page 209-10 (Conjeevaram).

2. Dr. Raju : Thought and Reality. page 45.

the idea of 'Śarīra' or organism is true to Divine constitution or God's Biology ; It is strictly in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic sense of 'Śarīra' that material manifestations and sentient souls form the organism of Brahman, the Absolute Transcendental Being. Hence it is that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy finds fault with the Nyāya philosophy on the issue of 'Śarīra'.

'Śarīra', as defined by Rāmānuja, is a complete concern of the conscious soul who controls it, supports it and keeps it subservient to itself. The Cit and the Acit constitute the 'Śarīra' of Brahman who controls them, supports them and keeps them subservient to Itself. This differentia of Śarīra i. e. the fact of its being under the control and support and subservience of the conscious self, has been carefully thought over by the exponents of Rāmānuja. The celebrated Viśiṣṭādvaitic scholar, Ātreya Rāmānuja, regards the above differentia as holding good in a collective sense only, because, he thinks, that taken one by one, the three constitutive characteristics of Śarīra are liable to be defective. For instance, the characteristic of being controlled by the conscious self is not necessarily true to an organism only but other objects also, as when, an axe which is completely controlled by a man to serve his purpose of chopping the wood, fulfils the above characteristic. But to regard the axe as the Śarīra of the person wielding it, is against all sense and common-sense.¹ Following the line of the above arguments, Vedānta Deśika puts a scientific interpretation upon Rāmānuja's definition of 'Śarīra' and concludes that as the idea of 'Śarīra' being completely controlled, supported and subordinated by the conscious self is analogous to the idea of an 'Aprthak Siddha Viśeṣaṇa' or an inalienable attribute or adjunct, 'any substance which stands essentially in the relation of an 'Aprthaksiddha Viśeṣaṇa' to the Supreme

1. Nyāya Kulīa, page 188.

Soul is the latter's body or organism or Śarīra.¹ The above interpretation is perfectly in keeping with Rāmānuja's concept of Śarīra who holds that the very application and significance of the word 'Śarīra' means that anything supported, controlled and kept subservient by the conscious self becomes its Śarīra.² It is in such a sense of 'Śarīra' that the entire sentient and non-sentient creation stands to the Absolute in Śarīra-Śarīrī Bhāva-relationship. Thus it is perfectly philosophical to sum up, as Vedānta Deśika does, that any substance other than God and the Divine Consciousness is the 'Śarīra' of God.³

In Viśiṣṭādvaita, Īśvara and Brahman mean the same Immanent-Transcendent Absolute Reality. The Brahman is Brahman because It Brahmanizes Its self-determinations or self-manifestations i. e. the Acit and the Cit or the material and the non-material realities of life. The Brahman in Itself—'बृहति .. ब्रह्म'⁴ emphasizes Its aspect of transcendence, Its real essence as the Highest or the Para, Its 'Svarūpa-Nirūpaka-Dharma' constituted by absolute Reality and Consciousness and Infinity. The Brahman Brahmanizing Its self-projections, i. e. the Acit and the Cit-बृहयति ... ब्रह्म'⁵—lays stress on Its aspect of immanence, Its essence of ensoul-ing the conscious and the unconscious evolutes, Its 'Nirūpita Svarūpa—Viśeṣaka Dharma' constituted by all the highest and the most auspicious qualities-ethical, æsthetic, moral and spiritual. The Brahman is Brahman because of Its being the goal of life—'स्वप्नाप्तेः साधनत्वं हि बृहणत्वमिहोच्यते'.⁶ Thus in Viśiṣṭādvaita, the Absolute is 'Cidacidviśiṣṭa' or co-existing with the finite pluralistic universe, being the ground as well as the goal of the cosmos. The Absolute is not merely a transcendental infinite existence away from the 'I' and the

1. N. S. page 102 (Madras Edn.)

2. Śrī Bhāṣya 1.2.2.

3. N. S. page 103.

4. & 5. T. T. page 3 (Madras edn.).

6. T. T. page 4.

'mine' and beyond our sense and reason and intuition. Man may do without such a metaphysics that posits the Absolute as beyond the universe. In fact, the metaphysical inquiry is to know the universe, the universal being-becoming and the real ground and the real goal of the universe. And if the enquiry results in the postulation of the cosmos as a grand illusion and that of Reality as beyond humanity's reach, then, it means that man is moving in perpetual error and ignorance. That the Absolute of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika is a Personality and the Absolute of Śaṅkara and his followers has no touch of the personality does not mean that the formers' Absolute is lower and the latters' higher. As a matter of fact, if the Absolute Itself were to dictate what It was, It would ultimately approximate to Rāmānuja's spiritual insight and conception of Reality. And what the mind of man in its highest possible sweep can analyse and reason out and assert will just be equal to the Advaitic abstraction of the Absolute. Vedānta is the search after the Absolute of Rāmānuja. In Śaṅkara's system, Vedānta becomes Vādānta or dialectics. And what it does is to destroy to build or to build to destroy the Brahman, the Absolute Transcendental Reality.

The Absolute conceived as a Perfect Personality can only be the Śarīrin of Its Śarīra, the universe of 'Acit' and 'Cit'. The conception of the personality of the Absolute is probably the grandest idea of monotheism, the final reach of human religious aspiration, the acme of man's æsthetic sensibility, the supreme sense of ethical and moral perfection, the real object of mystic realisation and to crown all, the 'highest expression of the truth' of man's metaphysics. As the personality of a man evades our psychology, psycho-analysis and mental sciences, so does the Personality of the Absolute evade our mental and spiritual grasp. To say that the Absolute Personality is transcendental is to emphasize

upon Its real essence, or to submit that 'It is something larger and better than our thinking has room for'. But it does not mean that philosophical positing of It amounts to the philosophical negation of everything else. The conception of the Absolute Personality is the highest and the greatest wisdom that may dawn upon humanity. It is superbly satisfying to our knowledge, our arts, our sciences, our religion, our poetry, our mysticism, our metaphysics and our sense of the mystery of life.

The Absolute Personality is God in His real essence i.e. His transcendence and His supreme purpose i.e. His immanence in 'Acit' and 'Cit.' Absolute Personality, the Absolute, God, the Divine Personality, Īśvara, Brahman—all these terms denote the same Reality which 'comprehends all conceivable existence.' The statement—"God, spirits and matter are the Absolute and not God alone. Yet Rāmānuja identifies God with the Absolute beside which and beyond which nothing exists"¹—does not seem to be the full statement of facts of Rāmānuja's Darśana of Īśvara or Brahman or Śrīnivāsa² or the Śarīrin of the cosmos. Moreover, the point stressed against Rāmānuja's Absolute viz. "If the Absolute is supposed to be a transcendent changeless existence, it is a problem how such an Absolute, which has no history, includes the time-process and the evolution of the world"³ is not very critical in as much as the Absolute in Rāmānuja Darśana is not emptied of Its real essential contents by the time-process and the evolution of the world. The space-time-causality-factors are conditioned by It for Its purpose of creation. These factors can never condition It,

1. Radhakrishnan: *The Vedānta, according to Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja*, Page 280.

2. Śrī Bhāṣya 1st. stage.

3. Radhakrishnan: *The Vedānta, according to Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja* Page 282.

in turn. A rigorously reasoned out metaphysics should not destroy our sense of mystery in things. Human metaphysics cannot empty out the Absolute or the Brahman or the Brahma Hṛda. It can only enter into it, drink into it, leaving it, in the end, the same perfect, serene, depthless Reality full of infinite existence, infinite consciousness and infinite bliss. There seems to be a greater grain of wisdom, a keener sense of mystery and a profounder philosophical sense in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic solution of the metaphysical problem of the One Absolute Being, coexistent and coeternal with Its becoming, than in the Advaitic problem of the Absolute, sought to be solved by the more mysterious problem of Māyā, that ultimately leads to philosophical nihilism. In Viśiṣṭādvaita or in the supreme sense of Viśiṣṭādvaita i.e. its Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva-conception, there is no Māyā in the sense of cosmic illusion, but, there is enough of the Māyin, the wielder of Māyā. Māyā is the cosmic urge of manifestation or the inherent transcendental beauty of the Absolute.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitic Absolute or simply 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' is affirmed by spiritual intuition as strengthened by sense and reasoning. The supreme spiritual intuitive discovery embodied in such lines of greatest metaphysical wisdom as — 'यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो यं पृथिवी न वेद यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्' etc.¹ points only to the philosophy of Rāmānuja and Deśika. All that humanity can do is to apprehend and comprehend the above truth as it is this alone that can give proper place to everything in life conceived in its real comprehensive sense. The above philosophical intuition studied with the intuitions embodied in the lines — 'सदेव सौम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्, वाचास्पृशं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्' and so on can mean and suggest only 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam' or Divine Unity. Thus the Unity of Reality is not the negation of multiplicity or identity in

1. Br. Up. III. VII.

difference or difference-non-difference but the oneness and the Absoluteness of the Brahman in Its causal and effectual states, in Its subtle and gross personalities, in Its pre-creative and creative conditions and in Its aspects of potentiality as well as actuality.¹ Involution and evolution as the states of the Brahman, the Supreme Being cannot mean that the Being is ever in ceaseless flux and never in eternal immutability. The fact of facts is that the states are never externally caused or conditioned and they can never subsist outside and empty the Absolute. The Supreme Being embodied in the subtle 'Acit' and 'Cit' is the same as that embodied in the gross 'Acit' and 'Cit'. Evolution and involution simply mean the two states of 'effect' and 'cause' which the Absolute Personality holds in Itself and controls for the purpose of Its manifestation. It is this supreme fact of the Being of Brahman that the human mind comprehends in diverse ways. It is this that can be analysed in the following ways suggestive of the oneness and the absoluteness of the Brahman, the Viśiṣṭādvaita² —

1. Ādhārādheya-Bhāva.
2. Īśvareśitavya-Bhāva.
3. Śeṣaśeṣi-Bhāva.
4. Śarīraśarīri-Bhāva.
5. Kāryakāraṇa-Bhāva and so on.

All the above Bhāvas or standpoints of synthesis point unequivocally to the One Absolute, the 'Brahman', the Īśvara, the Infinite, the Adorable, the Perfect, the Bliss Eternal, the First Cause, the Final Goal. There can be no other 'Sanmātra' or Pure Existence over and above Īśvara or Brahman, abiding in the world of the 'Cit' and the 'Acit'³

‘सर्वो हि श्रुतयस्सस्मृतीतिहासपुराणास्सर्वेश्वरं सदैव सर्वज्ञ’

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1. Śrī Bhāṣya-Ārambhaṇādihikaraṇa & N.S. Page 227-8 (Madras Edn.)
 2. N. S. Page 228.
 3. Śrī Bhāṣya, page 314 (Chaukhamba Edn.)

सर्वशक्ति सत्यसङ्कल्पं निरवयं देशकालानवच्छिन्नानवधि-
कातिशयानन्दं परमकारणं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादयन्ति, न पुनरी-
श्वरादपि परमेश्वरांश्चिन्मात्रम् ।'

So far we have seen the Viśiṣṭādvaitic ontology affirming the unity of the Absolute Reality intact in Its causal as well as effectual states. What the above corollaries do is to re-affirm the same. The fourth corollary i.e. the Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva which is the real sense of 'Viśiṣṭādvaita' or Divine Unity is the differentia of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy and the supreme synthetic view of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophers, comprehending, as it does the Life of the Inner Ruler Immortal of man and nature.

The Viśiṣṭādvaitin anticipates a criticism of his metaphysical synthesis, i.e. the 'Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva'. It is this : No doubt Íśvara or Brahman is the real self of the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient phenomena of life. But, why should He, the Immutable Transcendental, allow Himself to ensoul the mutable matter and the imperfect souls ? Prakṛti (matter) is the principal of change. In its manifest state, its change is a matter of our day-to-day experience. In its unmanifest state or in the equilibrium-state of its constituents of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, it is discerned as change-potentiality. Prakṛti is an eternal potentiality-actuality of mutation. The soul which partakes of the Divine content is not identical with the Divine even in its state of perfection. The soul is driven by the law of Karma which leaves the Divine unaffected. Why does the changeless Divine live in the changing and the imperfect body of the 'Acit' and the 'Cit' ! How can the Divine soul escape the change and the imperfection of the Divine body ? How can the Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva between the imperfect world and the perfect God leave the God untouched by the ugliness of the tenement ? The answer to the criticism which

the Viśiṣṭādvaitin gives is quite conclusive to prove his main thesis viz. that the Divine and the world are organically co-related and co-existent and co-working for the supreme realisation of the supreme fact that all is Brahman, the Absolute Divine. The World does not become the body of God by any external agency, as for instance, Karma or chance. The tenement of the soul is caused by Karma, but, the tenement of the Supreme Soul is not caused by Karma. The world and all that it connotes is essentially the organism of the Divine. It is through the exigency of Karma that the soul has to inhabit the same worldly objects.¹ There is no spiritual synthesis between the soul and its material tenement. That is why the idea of 'Śarīra' in connection with the soul is reduced to the sum-total of a constantly changing combination of chemico-physical constituents. With regard to God, 'Śarīra' connotes an object of eternal co-existence, compliance and sub-servience. It is the Divine will working for the divinization of all that is and exists that is the only explanation of God indwelling the universe. God who is 'अवाप्तसमस्तकाम' or who cannot have any purpose, all His purposes being eternally fulfilled, allows Himself to be in the heart of the objects of his creation for the sake of the objects themselves. Prakṛti or the principle of change exists to help the operation of the Kārmic-potency which must act and react on the Jīva or the soul, who, though, of the Divine mould, is not of the Divine finish. The co-operation of Prakṛti and Karma of the soul result in the coming into being of the world as we find it. The Divine Being allows the Prakṛti and the Jīva to work together in the drama of life. The responsibility of successful acting lies with the Jīva, the individual centre of consciousness. If the responsibility for the imperfections also rested with God, the world, as we find it, could not have come into being. God could

1. N S. page 211 (Conjeevaram edn.)

never conceivably misrepresent Himself. It is the innate individuality of the soul or his karma-potentiality which is responsible for the world as it is. God is ever trying to make the soul realise its essential nature. It is for the release of the soul that God allows Prakṛti and Karma to work together. In a way, the imperfection of the soul's life in this world is an indication of Life Divine for which the soul must aspire ever and for ever. God does not over-ride the power of the Karma of the soul since he abstains Himself from encroaching upon the individuality and the independence of the soul and the soul's actions. As mutation and imperfection are connected with the Prakṛti and the Jīva, the body-part, so Īśvara, the soul-essence, ever remains the Imutable, Absolute Being. How 'Acit', the non-sentient mutable matter is supported by the Brahman, its inner soul, is to be understood not on the analogy of the snake and its coils or the stream and its foam or the moon and its light, but, on the analogy of the substance and its attributes or the whole and its parts. In the 'snake and the coils' analogy, the coils are the forms of the snake. But in the case of the 'Acit' and the 'Īśvara'—the 'Acit' is no formation of the Īśvara, it is, on the otherhand, totally different from Īśvara, the former, being a principle of change and the latter, a permanent principle of immutability. In the 'stream and the foam'—illustration, the foam is a change in the stream. In the 'Acit' and the Īśvara-analysis, the 'Acit' is never a change in the Divine as the two are essentially poles apart. In the case of the moon and the moonlight' the moon and the moonlight are different and yet identical, different in the sense that the moon is a substance and the moonlight, a quality and identical in the sense that the moon and the moonlight have the same characteristic of Tejas or lustre. But in the case of the 'Acit' and the Īśvara both the entities are essentially mutually different, no common characteristic, as for

instance, 'Brahmatva' subsisting in them. The Brahman is a concrete Being and no abstract genus or generality of 'Brahmatva' can be found pervading the Acit, the Cit and the Īśvara. The Brahman, the Īśvara, the Srinivāsa all connote the same Absolute Being. Thus the only sense of God supporting matter is that matter, an attribute, cannot exist and subsist without God, the substance. As the attribute is a part of the substance, which, in its existence and subsistence holds itself and the together fore this so Prakṛti or matter, is a part of Brahman as it cannot exist separately from and independently of Brahman. The Brahman, the One Substance is to be analysed as a Unity existing with Its attributes of Prakṛti and Jīvas. As the attributes are essentially different from the substance they subsist with, so there limitations can only touch them leaving the substance totally unaffected. Thus the Supreme Being supporting the changing 'Acit' and the imperfect 'Cit' which form Its 'Śarīra' is like a substance supporting its attributes or a whole supporting its parts. The 'substance-attribute' concept holds good between the Supreme Being and the finite beings characterised by freedom of thought and freedom of action. The 'Acit' is caused by the Brahma in the sense that the un-manifest changes into the manifest. The 'Cit' also is effected by the Brahman in the sense that its essential nature changes under the impact of Karma. Thus Brahman, the non-material cause becomes the material cause also in the sense that the One Brahman ensouling the 'Acit' and the 'Cit' in their unmanifest states, ensouls them even in their manifest states. The outer organism may change, the unmanifest may pass over to the manifest, but the Inner Self remains the same Perfect Divine Personality. God the Supreme Personality, having His essential personal trait of oneness and absoluteness intact, lives in the universe of matter and mind. The 'Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhava' concept of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy is a

grand conception of the One Absolute Reality related to Its dependent realities. Such an absolute reality is a Personality and not an abstract idea. Thus Brahman or the Absolute Reality is the same as Īśvara or the Divine Personality. Reality is not an indeterminable mere existence but a Supreme Being, determinable by its essential characteristics as well as its relation to the objects relative to it.

Ādhāra-Ādheya-Bhāva

The other four 'Bhāvas' or aspects of Divine Unity subserve this very 'Śarīra-Śarīri-Bhāva', which, in fact, is the supreme theme of the Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā of the school of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika. We have seen so far, how the original 'cause-effect'-synthesis of 'Acit', 'Cit' and 'Īśvara,' as propounded by the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, has culminated in the final 'body-soul'-synthesis of Reality and Its revelations as intuited by the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and Deśika. Now, we shall see how the 'Ādhāra-Ādheya'-synthesis, works out as a link in the chain and strengthens the concept of the oneness of the Divine Being embodied in matter and mind. While the 'cause-effect'-unity is the first explanation of Reality by sense and common-sense, the 'body-soul'-unity is the final explanation of Reality by intuitive realisation. The Ādhāra-Ādheya-Bhāva-concept is an intellectual explanation of the oneness of Reality. Indian logicians, headed by the celebrated Udayanācārya, have analysed God's existence on what is called the 'Dhṛti-argument'¹ which means that God, the Supreme Being, is eternally in a conscious, voluntary, all-embracing contact with the entire universe. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophers cannot approve of the above sense of 'dhṛti' or 'ādhāra'. The Naiyāyika 'dhṛti'-argument seems to suggest that the universe is self-existent or self-sufficient and that the purpose

1. *Kusumāñjali* 5-1.

of God is to contact it and energize it eternally. But according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the universe is a real stuff of the Divine in the sense that it is an aspect or an attribute of the Divine substance. As the attributes require the substance to support them, so does the universe of 'Cit' and 'Acit' require the īśvara as its support. The concept of the Divine Substance containing all its revelations is the inner necessity of all theistic thoughts. It means, therefore, that the universe, which, at first thought, is realised as a state of the Supreme Substance, becomes recognizable as an essential aspect of the Supreme Personality. Call the Being the Supreme Substance or the Supreme Personality, It is the same Īśvara or Brahman. Whereas the 'cause-effect'—relation between the Absolute Reality and the relational realities suggests the dynamic aspect of the Divine, the container-contained-relation brings out the static aspect, showing the Life of God being lived in the life of man and nature. If God were not the Ādhāra of His manifestations, then, no flight of aspirations of humanity could ever touch Him. The Ādhāra-Ādheya-idea is not the necessity of human mind in grip with the problem of the meeting of timelessness and time, infinitude and finiteness, cause and effect. It is in fact, the necessity of the Divine Personality in eagerness of self-revelation or, rather, the necessity of the Divine Mind in the respect of perceiving. Its constructions.

In the 'Śarīra-Śarīri-synthesis' which is the real sense of the cause-effect-synthesis, the Ādhāra-Ādheya-idea is necessarily implied.¹ The Absolute is Absolute in the sense that it is the ādhāra of the relativities. The Divine support of the universe is not gravitation by virtue of which the universe does not fall down. It is strictly speaking, the permeation of the Divine in each and every bit of existence. It is really speaking, an all-embracing divine-providence. And it is on

1. G. T. C. page 510.

account of this that God is called 'Brahman', the Great One, ever abiding in the many. Without the reality of the many, the reality of the Great One is a figment of fancy. The Great One is Absolute on account of being the sole container of all the contained i. e. matter and mind, which form, in fact, the panorama of life.

In the infinite possibilities of the Supreme Being 'ādhāratva' finds a prominent place. The First Cause, to be the Final Goal, must needs be the 'ādhāra' in all conceivable circumstance, of all that It causes into being. The Nyāya realism cannot introduce the Ādhāratva-idea into its philosophy, since, it conceives of the Divine only as the instrumental cause of the universe and never as the Supreme Substance, which, out of Its infinite possibilities, remaining unchanged in Its essence, undergoes the change of the states of evolution and involution, eternally and voluntarily. The Divine and the universe are internally, intimately and voluntarily related together as 'ādhāra' and 'ādheya'. As such the becoming is in the being; the activity, in the attainment; the multiplicity, in the unity and the 'Cit' and the 'Acit', in the Īśvara. The universe need not move an inch to approach its Maker. The goal of the universe is the same as the ground of the universe. The Master-Painter is Himself the canvas, presenting His myriad forms eternally and untiringly.¹

The Upaniṣadic intuition of the Ādhāra-Ādheya-Bhāva is contained in the line — ईशावास्यमिदं सर्वम्.² The Universe is 'वास्य' or 'व्याप्य' or 'सर्वाधारे स्वस्मिन् स्वेन वसनीय' i.e. spontaneously sustained by the Supreme Being, the self-sustained and the sustenance of all. The Divine, to justify Himself must needs be the 'ādhāra', the real sustainer or the substantial support

1. Y. 1.9.

2. Īsa. Up.-I, with Vedānta Deśika's Bhāṣya.

of all Its self-determinations. The 'ādhara'-idea is not a mental idealisation of God. It is involved, in fact, in the real being of the Great Being, who, intact in His essence, is interpenetrating and energizing all His forms and functions.

In Advaita, the 'Brahman' is the 'ādhāra' of the universe not in the sense of being the real ground of cosmic revelation, but, in the sense of being the substratum of the grand cosmic illusion, for no rhyme or reason. In Bhedābheda-Darśana also, the Brahman is the 'ādhāra' of the universe, not in Its real essence, but, as self-limited by Its self-willed limitations for no conceivable purpose. But in 'Viśiṣṭādvaita', which means in the present context 'the oneness of the 'ādhāra' and the 'ādheya', the Brahman in Its real essential being, essentially characterised by existence par excellence, consciousness par excellence and infiniteness unimaginable, is the solid, substantial 'ādhāra' of the universe composed of the reality of mind and matter, i.e. the 'cit' and the 'acit'. As the 'Ādhāra-Ādheya-Bhāva is an inherently internal, constitutive aspect of God in His world, so there is no problem, here, of relating the cosmos to its extra-cosmic designer or maker.

It is against the background of the changeless Absolute reality that all the changes of matter take place. It is the all-perfect Supreme Self who is the real home of all the selves and the kindly light to guide the selves to the Godly path avoiding the ungodly pastures. It is indeed the all-penetrating Infinite Being-Vāsudeva—who is the agent-in-chief for all the agencies of the cosmic show viz. space and time and causality.

Ontologically the substance and its attributes are found to exist inalienably together, in closest communion, in a most intimate embrace as it were.¹ The Brahman, the Supreme

1. Sarvārtha Siddhi on T.M.K. 5-2.

Substance is ever existing in a natural intimate union with the universe which is its attribute. The substance is the 'ādhāra', the attribute, the 'ādheya'. The substance, the 'ādhāra' is the subject, the attribute, the ādheya, the predicate. As we cannot think of a substance separate from its attribute or attributes and as we cannot speak about a subject, having nothing to do with its predicate or predicates, so we cannot think or speak of the Brahman as separate or as having nothing to do with the universe which essentially is Its self-definition, self-determination, self-predication and self-revelation.

The Īśvara-Īśitavya-Bhāva

This 'Ādhāra-Adheya-Bhāva' is, involved, in turn, in what is called the 'Īśvara-Īśitavya-Bhāva'. The Brahman, cannot be the 'ādhāra' unless It is the Īśvara of the cosmic manifestation. Dhāraṇa is concomitant with Praśāsana.¹ No other cause in the material world is found to be the 'ādhāra' as well as the Īśvara of its effects. But to be the First Cause and the Final Goal in the same instant is the beauty of the Brahman. The Śarīrin of the universe of 'Cit' and 'Acit' must needs be the ruler and the controller of His Śarīra in all conceivable ways. The 'Īśvaratva' of the Absolute does not land It in the midst of temporal becomings. In Its supreme sense and essence, Brahman is 'Sarveśvara' and hence Its enquiry is the sole concern of the Vedānta and Its realisation, the last refuge of the Vedāntin, the God-mad seeker, the seeker after Truth and Beauty and Bliss.

In relation to Brahman, the 'Īśvara', Its revelations i.e. the Cit and the Acit, are 'Īśitavya'. The idea of 'Īśvaratva' is a matter of experience for every common human being in

1. T.M.K. 5.3.

2. G.T.C. page 510.

some sense or the other. Every one hopes to have complete control over his own body in the state of activity or passivity. Everybody keeps in subservience his wife and children, his home and hearth, his lands and fields. But the control and mastery which constitute the 'Īśvaratva' of Brahman in the universe are essentially distinct from the control and mastery which human beings experience in small measures in this world. While the former, is a fact of the harmony of the Supreme Substance, existing and subsisting in Its causal and effectual states, the latter is the act or the exercise of the finite will asserting itself for a while and holding good under certain circumstances. While the former is an intimate, immediate, internal expression of Divine constitution, the latter is an external, mediate, conditional aspect of togetherness.

Although, on our analysis, Reality seems to be expressing Itself as matter and mind and Brahman, yet, it does not mean that It is a trinity. The Reality is one. The Brahman the eternal 'Īśvaratattva' and the 'cit' and the 'acit', the 'Paratantratattvas' exist together in complete unity and harmony which can be sensed and expressed as 'Īśvara-Īśitavya-Bhāva'. It is the 'Īśvaratva' of Brahman that co-relates, co-ordinates and co-regulates the 'cit' and the 'acit' which are in the Brahman rather than outside It. In fact the essential nature, the existence and the efficiency of the 'cit' and the 'acit' are all possible in the sanction of the 'Sūśkalpa' of the Brahman, or the will of the Divine. While it is the being of the Great Being that expresses itself as the ground of the universe, it is Its will that exercises itself in the control and the mastery of the universe. As the 'will' is not separate from the 'nature' of Brahman, so is 'Īśvaratva' not external to 'Ādhāratva' or 'Kāraṇatva', all being but corollaries to the great axiom of the 'Śarīritva' of Brahman in the Śarīra of the universe,

With regard to the acit or matter, the Divine Will manifests Itself in the sanction It gives to the material elements to evolve, in the guidance It accords them to arrange and rearrange themselves and in the allowance It offers them to actualize. With regard to the Cit or mind, the Divine Will acts Itself in allowing the freedom of acting to the individual finite personalities which are the authors as well as the owners of their own acts. The 'Inner Ruler Immortal' in the society of selves which is not exclusive to It, but included in It, wills the good of the selves, but, It never overrides their individual wills. Although the will of the self is the Will of God, yet, it does not and cannot function freely and abundantly, conditioned as it is by its past history and limited as it is by worldly limitations. In the eye of the 'Inner Ruler Immortal' who wills always the good of His creation, how does evil come into being? We cannot easily dismiss evil as means to a greater good. Nor can we stand pain and sin believing them to be but additional sources of æsthetic interest in the world-play of God enacted for His own entertainment. Is the 'good' in the world the product of Divine Providence? And does the 'bad' then mean the play of the freewill of the selves? Why then does the interplay of the good and the bad result, more often than not, in the defeat of the good and the victory of the bad? Is the Omnipotent Supreme circumscribed in the free exercise of His powers? The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Īśvara-Īśitavya-Bhāva comes to mean, then, 'the one good in the many bad' which ultimately means the impotency of the Being of our beings! But the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy explains the above discrepancies in the light of the mystery and the majesty of the Divine. Firstly, God who wills our world or worlds does not do so arbitrarily, because, He is not only the Ruler but the Redeemer also. The 'Līlā' of the Divine is not a childish play or a tyrant's pleasure

or something beyond sense and common-sense, but, the spontaneity of the creative urge in the heart of Reality. The fact of 'Līlā' is wedded to the function of 'Dayā'. It is rather the 'Dayā' or the infinite goodness of God which is the supreme sense of God-hood¹ by virtue of which the Supreme does not grudge the freedom of the soul either in the latter's entering the fire and the brimstone of hell or in revelling in the highest heaven of bliss and happiness. The 'Svarūpa' of God is such that it does not allow Him to temper with the 'Svarūpa' of his creation. Finally, all the evil is a play and interplay of matter and what seems to be good is also material, but, what is really spiritual, intensely good, is the very being of our being. All the sins and sufferings like pain and pleasure cling to our ego-sense. The soul never suffers. This is the greatest of consolations which the Divine Ruler sanctions to His subjects. As fire is essential for the gold to become pure, so is evil essential for the soul to become pure. The Divine nature is unaffected as it is the soul that enjoys the fruits of actions. To say that God could have created an all-perfect world means nothing. Then he could not have created the world at all. And then there could have been no intuition, no philosophizing, no talk of reality. But as the reality is the reality of *Īśvara-īśitavya*-synthesis we can always say that 'The Hand that made us is Divine.' And the Reality will ever be as It is or as It was—the eternal Reality, to be sure.

The universe, the 'īśitavya' is controlled by 'Īśvara', the Supreme substance, ontologically, ethically, aesthetically and in all other conceivable ways and manners. The 'Viśvarūpa' of the Gītā very poetically and philosophically suggests this 'Īśvara-īśitavya-Bhāva' of *Viśiṣṭādvaita*. Vedānta Deśika, in his 'Yādavābhyudaya' emotionally realises this

aspect of the Divine Unity. The Brahman, the wielder of *Aiśvarya*, will ever cause the universe to come into being. *Aiśvarya* and *Sṛṣṭi* are inseparable.¹

Śeṣa-Śeṣi-Bhāva

The purpose of the *Īśvara-Īśitavya-Bhāva* is really fulfilled in the *Śeṣa-Śeṣi-Bhāva* which is the ultimate realisation of Brahman, the highest pursuit and attainment of humanity, and the only sense of our highest wisdom and knowledge, ethics and esotericism, morality and spirituality, God-knowledge and world-knowledge. Brahman is the *Śeṣin*, Cit and Acit, the *Śeṣa*. The 'Śeṣa' is always the relational, the additional item. It is the 'Śeṣin' that is the real, the essential and the elemental thing. As the 'Śeṣa' is needed by the 'Śeṣin' so is the 'Śeṣin' needed for the 'Śeṣa'. The sense of subservience of man meets its reorientation in the sense of selfless love and devotion of man to *Īśvara* in *Samsāra* and it is this which is the meaning of the transition from the *Īśvara-Īśitavya*-synthesis to the *Śeṣa-Śeṣi*-synthesis.

The 'Tattva' meant for realisation is the *Ādhāra* of the knower and the known, the 'Hita' meant for achievement is the *Īśvara* of the achiever and the achieved and the 'Puruṣārtha' that is to be experienced is the 'Śeṣin' of the experienter and the experienced. While the Cit and the Acit are mutually exclusive as well as separately existent, they are not exclusive and separately existing from *Īśvara*, who is their support and sustenance and the very basis of their modal being and becoming. The Cit and the Acit do not lose their existence in the Ocean of 'Brahman'. They are not drowned by the 'Aiśvarya' of the Absolute. They only dip in the 'Brahma-Hrada' and take on a newer meaning, a better significance and a sublimer sense of being the revela-

1. Y. -1-9

tions of the One Reality. Brahman characterised as the 'Śeṣin' is defined by Vedānta Deśika as 'स्वशेषशेषार्थः' 'निरवधिकनिर्वाधमहिमा', and 'फलानां दाता यः फलमपि च'.¹ Why is the First Cause to be inquired into? Not, because It is the 'Ādhāra' or the 'Niyantā' or 'Īśvara' of Its effects, but because It is the final goal and the supreme attainment of all that is and has its being.

The Acit is the 'Śeṣa' of Īśvara as it is the unconscious medium of the manifestation of His creative urge. The Lord is infinitely and eternally satisfying Himself, without having any want of any nature while He is using and utilising the 'acit'-principle of Reality. For God-in-His-Grace, 'acit' is the element of His aesthetic realisation. So says the saint-scholar, Yāmūnācārya—'यवनिका माया जगन्मोहिनी'.² And our poet-philosopher, Vedānta Deśika,³ also assesses the aesthetic value of the above when he says—लीलाविभूतौ अचिदंशस्य प्रथमं तच्छेषतामाह etc. Does the 'acit' realise its supreme sacrifice for its Lord! Probably not. Otherwise it will not be the 'objectivity-principle' in the hands of the finite and the infinite subjectivity-principles of Reality.

The Cit, in all its multifarious activities and aspirations, is abundantly consciously yielding to the will and the wish of its Īśvara. Although the intuition of mystics and poets and philosophers has the following form⁴

‘गुणैः प्रधानं पुरुषः परं पदं
 परात्परं ब्रह्म च ते विभूतयः
 (विभूतयः = नियन्तव्याः शेषभूताश्च)

yet, its climax is reached in the fullness of 'Śeṣatva' or the

1. Catuṣṣloki Bhāṣya 1st. Stanza.

2. Catuṣṣloki - 1.

3. " Bhāṣya on Śloka 2.

4. Stōtra Ratna with Bhāṣya—17

fullness of devotion and dedication to the Divine as expressed in the memorable lines¹

‘पिता त्वं माता त्वं दयिततनयस्त्वं प्रियसुहृत्
त्वमेव त्वं मित्रं गुरुरसि गतिश्चासि जगताम् ।
त्वदीयस्त्वद्भृत्यस्तव परिजनस्त्वद्गतिरहं
प्रपन्नश्चैवं सत्यहमपि तवैवास्मि हि भरः ॥’

The deepening of the ‘Śeṣatva-Bhāva’ or the true realisation of the ‘Śeṣa-Śeṣi-synthesis’ thus resolves itself into very many varieties of the aspects of the unity of Reality, some of these being the following :—

- (i) Svāmi-Bhṛtya-Bhāva.
- (ii) Guru-Śiṣya-Bhāva.
- (iii) Pati-Patnī-Bhāva.
- (iv) Pitṛ-Putra-Bhāva, and so on.

All the above are the aspects showing how Īśvara, the Absolute Reality is intimately related to the ‘cit’ and the ‘acit’. Reality is one, not by virtue of contradicting relations, but, by virtue of comprehending and correlating all the elements related to It. It is then that freewill and predestination do not present any conflict in the Life of Reality. It is thus that the non-sentient ‘acit’ becomes the medium of expression of the super-sentient ‘Brahman’. The Being is ‘Viśiṣṭa’ or ‘Eka’ or ‘Advaita’ in as much as all its becomings are eternally being re-integrated into It. All life is a mighty expression of the Divine Life in all conceivable ways. To our intellectual analysis, the ‘Tattva’ or Reality ontologically presents the triple aspects of acit, cit and Īśvara ; but, to our integral intuitive experience, It is eternally infinitely one as Īśvara or Brahman. It is the ‘Śeṣin’ of the ‘acit’ and the ‘cit’ in the respect of their ‘Svarūpa’, their very being, their

'Sthiti', their space-time-existence and their Pravṛtti, their life-functions.

In our realisation of the reality of the 'एकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म' we may notice the following stages—

- (i) Our philosophical inquiry into the cause of all that is and becomes.
- (ii) Our leading the life of ethical and moral perfection with a view to making it the fit medium, for the Divine Personality—the Ādhāra, the Īśvara—to reveal Himself.
- (iii) Our constant contemplation and loving meditation on the source and the sustenance of our very being and becoming. and
- (iv) Our integral intuitive experience of the beauty and the sublimity of the Being—the Brahman, the Śarīrin, for the sake of the expression of His Bliss Eternal.

We, may realise Divine Unity—the absolute quintessence of all absolutes—in our soul, in our heart, in our will, in our intellect and in our every day activities of life, but, we cannot, by any stretch of imagination, become one with the Absolute Reality. Since the realisation of Divine Unity is a transcendental realisation according to Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika, it cannot be made a subject of logical demonstration. In fact, the material and the spiritual realities in their gross and their subtle states are always alogically intimately related to their ground and their goal. The Īśvara or the Brahman. The Transcendental Being in the Cosmic becoming is the real hope of humanity. The philosophy of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika is the philosophy of this hope of humanity, this Divine Unity, this Spiritual Transcendence in universal immanence and to crown all, this Life manifesting Itself in

all the diverse units of the life of the universe. It is only through our absolute love and adoration, that we can realise 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam' or the Oneness of the Divine, the Absolute, the Transcendental, the Īśvara, the Brahman. It is the Transcendental 'I' in all the spiritual 'Is' inhabiting the material units of existence that is the Reality for the Darśana of Rāmānuja and Vedānta Deśika and the realisation of Viśiṣṭādvaitism and Śrī Vaiṣṇavism.

Part III

VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA : HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO ŚRĪ VAISNAVISM

THE CONCEPT OF ŚRĪ VAIṢṆAVA DHARMA'.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion, being the logical and the psychological outcome of the ancient Vedic religion, means to fulfil the needs of the spiritual life of man. The Vedic sacrifices lay stress on the practical side of religion. The Upaniṣadic Sādhana's emphasize the contemplative aspect of religion. But, what Śrī Vaiṣṇavism aims at is to realise the deep harmony of life-human and divine—not through action or contemplation, but through self-surrendering love and devotion. The Ālvārs who lived in the very depth of such deep spiritual realisations unburdened their hearts in mystic melodies. The Ācāryas who followed them tried to realise the spirit of the Ālvārs' songs through their metaphysics, ethics, esotericism, cult and what not. Vedānta Deśika thought his life-mission fulfilled, if, following Rāmānuja, he could logically enunciate the spirit of harmony existing between our practical daily life on the one hand and our higher spiritual culture on the other. Thus it was that he made his poetry, his philosophy, his logic, his ethics, his cult, his ritualism and his very life but the means of expression of the spiritual bliss of the Ālvārs and the deep intuitive realisation of the Ācāryas. Rāmānuja, a great mystic himself, thought that his religion and mysticism could not conform to the practice of the Varṇa and the Aśrama Dharmas. But Vedānta Deśika who took Rāmānuja to be the greatest achiever of synthesis in all the aspects of life removed all conflict between the Vedic Vidhis or, the acts of commission and omission, on the one hand and the culture of self-sacrificing love and devotion to God, on the other. To perform the duties of daily life and at the same time to

keep the inner being ever God-imbued, means, according to him, the only all-round spiritual culture which lends glory to the seeker as well as the object of seeking. Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism for Vedānta Deśika centres round the practice of 'Prapatti'. There is no negation of Bhakti or Jñāna or Karma in the practice of Prapatti. Prapatti, in fact, is the sublimation of Bhakti and Jñāna and Karma. Now we shall see what Vedānta Deśika understands by the culture of 'Prapatti' which, according to him, is the supreme sense of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Dharma.

Bhakti Vs. Prapatti.

Although the term 'Bhakti Vs. Prapatti' means some conflict between the ideals of Bhakti and the ideals of Prapatti, yet, its real import is the deep divine harmony between the soul of Prapatti and the body of Bhakti. The 'Upāsana' of Vāsudeva, the immanent and the transcendental Supreme Being (येनावास्यमिदं सर्वं चेतनाचेतनादिकम्)¹—meets its fulfilment in 'Prapadana' or Bhara Samarpaṇa.

Bhakti is the contemplation of the glories of God and Prapatti, the realisation of Divine grace. The moment one intuits the nature of God, the purpose of the Divine flashes with full force upon one's heart and soul.²

‘नमो नमो वाङ्मनसातिभूमये
नमो नमो वाङ्मनसैकभूमये ।
नमो नमोऽनन्तमहाविभूतये
नमो नमोऽनन्तदयैकसिन्धवे ॥’

Like Bhakti, Prapatti is the culture of one's whole being in the sense of making oneself agreeable to the Divine Personality.³ Attachment to God in Bhakti as well as

1. Īśa-Bhāṣya 1st Stanza.

2. Stotra Ratna 21.

3. Śaraṇāgatigadya Bhāṣya, page 121.

Prapatti is the test of discrimination between the inner being and the outer organism and its insinuations and demands. The soul in its real essence belongs to God and God alone. What the Bhakta or the Prapanna does is to grow into Divine consciousness so that he may throw aside his egoism and egotism and remain face to face with the Eternal Lover having no craving, either for the immortality of existence in the high heavens or for the pleasure of union with Him.

Prapatti is the natural and the spontaneous culmination of Bhakti. The path of action i. e. Karmayoga merges, to reach its goal, in the path of knowledge i. e. Jñānayoga. The path of knowledge i. e. Jñānayoga serves its purpose when it loses itself in the path of devotion i. e. Bhaktiyoga. The path of devotion i. e. Bhaktiyoga in, its turn, culminates in the path of self-surrender i. e. Prapatti or Para Bhaktiyoga.¹ Being the culmination of Bhakti and Jñāna and Karma, Prapatti is their sublimation also. The spirit of Prapatti or self-surrender which results in the resignation of the ownership and the authorship of Karma transforms karma and the law of karma in Ākiñcanya and the law of Īśvarānugraha, respectively. The spirit of self-abnegating love which is involved in the intuitive realisation of Reality harmonizes the culture of the intellectual being with the culture of the emotional being. The supreme spiritual sense of subservience to God, which is the pride and the privilege of the soul, so works upon the culture of the feelings of love and devotion that what is aspiration or Bhakti is realised as attainment, or Mukti. The sage Yāmuna has suggested the secret of Prapatti in the sublimation of the Karma-Jñāna-Bhakti-Sādhana:—²

‘न धर्मनिष्ठोऽस्मि न चात्मवेदी
न भक्तिमास्त्वच्चरणारविन्दे ।

1. N. R. Page 40.

2. Stotra Ratna—22.

अकिञ्चनोऽनन्यगतिश्शरण्य !
 त्वत्पादमूलं शरणं प्रपद्ये ॥'

The action of soul-sacrifice, the intuition of soul-subser-
 / vience and the devotion of the selfless soul which are essential
 for the supreme realisation are fulfilled by Śaraṇa Varaṇa or
 self-surrender alone. Until and unless the realisation of
 the 'I' and the 'mine' does not give way to the realisation of
 the Divine, no real practice of religion can take place. One's
 whole being has to feel like what Deśika has realised¹—

‘याः काञ्चन कृतयो मम भगवति, न मम ममताऽस्ति तासु ।
 भगवत् एव ताः । अमसोऽहं भगवति । अहमपि न मम ।
 भगवत् एवाहमस्मि ।’

Thus Prapatti as the culmination of the Karma-Jñāna-
 Bhakti-Sādhana is the only means of God-realisation in
 Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism. It is, in fact, the sublime secret
 of our actions, our knowledge and our devotion. Technically,
 Prapatti is called ‘Angi-Prapatti’, in relation to which Karma,
 Jñāna and Bhakti are ‘Anga-Prapatti’. Prapatti in the sense
 of the main path or in the sense of the bye-path is the only
 road to the kingdom of God.

All the discussion on Prapatti in the Śrī Vaiṣṇava
 literature centres round the Vedic authority for Prapatti and
 the place of Prapatti in the Brahma Vidyās. If the philosophy
 of the Vedānta presents reality as ‘Cidacidviśiṣṭa’, the ulti-
 mate goal of the Vedānta being the ‘Kaiṅkarya’ of God in
 Mukti, the religion of the Vedānta must point to Prapatti as
 the secret of the Brahnavidyās or the only Brahnavidyā
 meant for the highest attainment. The Śrī Vaiṣṇava saints,
 in their ecstasy of God-realisation, could not tell whether
 they followed Prapatti or Bhakti. Yāmūnācārya in the

height of his experience of the bliss of divine communion felt like a Bhakta and a Prapanna both. His heart could cry out—'भगवन् भक्तिमपि प्रयच्छ मे'¹ and could soothe itself singing 'अहमपि तवैवास्मि हि भरः'² in the same moment. The great Rāmānuja for whom Bhakti and Prapatti were not the topics of discussion but the daily realisation of the yearnings of his soul for the embrace of the Supreme Soul had no incentive to propound Bhakti in the Gītā Bhāṣya as his first view and Prapatti in the Śaraṇāgati Gadya as his final view of God-realisation. For him 'प्रणम्य' and 'प्रसादये'³ or the self-less service of God and deep devotion to the Divine formed one Sādhana. Vedānta Deśika rightly understands him when he remarks⁴

‘भक्तिवत् प्रपत्तिरपि प्रसादनविशेषः ।’

or that Bhakti and Prapatti, both, are the means to make God agreeable and attached to the soul. It was much after Rāmānuja that the teachers of Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrīvaiṣṇavism started the controversy of Bhakti Vs. Prapatti. Vedānta Deśika, interpreting the trend of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism, leaned more towards Prapatti, but, at the same time he stood for Parābhakti as the supreme sense of Prapatti.

Bhakti or the culture of the emotional being of man has been the trend even of the oldest phase of the Vedic religion. The hymn 'नमो भरन्त एमसि' (R. V. 1.1.1.) suggests the consciousness of love and reverence to the deity as the only progress of man in the sphere of sacrifices. Without Śraddhā or the culture of faith and devotion, the realisation of Reality cannot take place.⁵ The 'Karma Mārga' of the Veda fulfils its real purpose when it is followed by men with feelings of

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1. Stotra Ratna—54.
 2. „ „ 60.
 3. Śaraṇāgatigadya—Śloka 9.
 4. S.G.B. page 121.
 5. R.V.X. 15

love and service and reverence to the Divine Reality behind all the multifarious manifestations. The Upaniṣadic stress on intuitive realisation means the one-pointedness of the mind and the sweetness and the tenderness of heart full of the spirit of love and devotion to the One Being in the many becomings. Bhakti thus finds a congenial soil in the sphere of Jñāna. In fact, Bhakti, which is 'परमातुरक्ति' or the intensest and the sublimest attachment of the devotee to God, as according to the Śaṅḍilya Sūtras, or 'परमप्रेम' i.e. an all-embracing love for the Divine Personality, as according to the Nārada Sūtras, or 'मनोगतिरविच्छिन्ना परं प्रेमपरिप्लुता अभिसन्धिबिनिर्मुक्ता' i.e. the trend of one's mind and heart towards self-less love for God, as according to the Pāñcarātra (Nārada) Saṁhitā, is essentially a constant life-long contemplation on God—the Supreme Reality. It is this Bhakti, the real immediate intuitive experience of Reality¹ which has been analysed as वेदन, ध्यान, उपासन and so on. It is this loving vision of God to which all our Karma and all our Jñāna lead. It is this which is the highest 'Hita' or the greatest good of human life.

As the practical philosophy of life and as the only universal religion of man, Bhakti has been contemplated upon and analysed in all its aspects by Indian saints and sages of all times. The Bhāgavata (7. 5. 23-24) enunciates the 9 essentials of Bhakti, which in its ultimate analysis is 'एकान्तभक्ति' or सर्वत्र तदौक्षणम्² i.e. the vision and contemplation of God in each and every unit of the universal existence and which is 'पुंसः स्वार्थः परः'³ i.e. the sole significance and the supreme purpose of each and every self. These 9 essentials are—

1. Śravaṇa.
2. Kīrtana.

1. N. R. page 1.

2. Bhāgavata 7. 7. 55

3. Smaraṇa.
4. Pādasevana.
5. Arcana.
6. Vaṇdana.
7. Dāśya.
8. Sakhya.
9. Ātma Nivedana.

The first 3 i. e. Śravaṇa, Kīrtana and Smaraṇa, form the contemplative side of the religion of the Vedānta and lay stress on the culture of our intellectual being for God-realisation. The second 3 i. e. Pāda Sevana, Arcana and Vaṇdana, present the active aspect of the Vedāntic religion and emphasize upon the culture of our volitional being in the attainment of the summum bonum which is the full-view of the immanent and the transcendent Divine. The last 3 i. e. Dāśya, Sakhya and Ātma Nivedana suggest the supreme realisation of that religious consciousness in which our entire being is attuned to the music of Divine Communion and bursts forth in ethereal melodies of selfless and self-surrendering love to the Divine. Devotion to God meets its consummation in the service of humanity. Thus the Bhāgavata (3.29-221) declares : 'One who loves the image of God verily offers oblation to the ashes. Without Adveṣa or goodwill to all, Maitrī or fellow-feeling for all and Karuṇā or universal tolerance, Bhakti remains unrecognized by the Bhagavān. One who has love and devotion for the Divine in his heart must needs have love and sympathy for man and nature, otherwise, he will fail to realise God and will naturally fail to regain the real nature of his own being.

‘स्नेहपूर्वमनुध्यानम्’ or loving contemplation on Reality, which is ‘Cidacidviśiṣṭam Brahma’ does include service and sacrifice for the good of humanity as the core of the religion of Bhakti. The Varṇa and the Āśrama put no restriction on love and

devotion to God.¹ Amongst the devotees of God, there exists no difference caused by caste and colour or social status and personal accomplishment.²

For the realisation of the philosophy and the religion of the Vedānta as propounded by the Upaniṣads, the Gītā, the Bhāgavata, the Prabandhams and so on, Yāmūnācārya, the celebrated Śrīvaiṣṇava saint—scholar lays stress on Bhakti and nothing else but Bhakti—³

‘स्वधर्मज्ञानवैराग्यसाध्यभक्त्येकगोचरः

नारायणः परं ब्रह्म ।’

Bhakti or love of God—the Cidacidviśiṣṭa Brahman—can be accomplished gradually (i) by the discharge of one’s duties of Varṇa and Āśrama, (ii) by the discrimination of one’s real being as the sole concern and possession of God from the outer encrustations of the psycho-physical organism and (iii) complete detachment from the demands of the self-centred life and all that it means.

Rāmānujācārya, the first philosopher to propound and popularise the Bhaktisādhana as the central truth of Viśiṣṭā-dvaitism and Śrīvaiṣṇavism brings out the quintessence of love and devotion to God which consists in the realisation of the following ideals :⁴

- (i) the ideal of self-resignation in the spirit of supreme love for God which transforms the everyday activities of life-preservation and the duties of moral and spiritual obligation into sheer service of the Divine for the working of the divine purpose alone in the end.

1. Gītā 9.32.

2. Nārada Sūtra—12.

3. Gītārtha Saṅgraha—I.

4. Gītā Bhāṣya 9.34.

- (ii) the ideal of self-surrender in the midst of the intuitive realisation of the Supreme Being as the ground and the goal of all existence and
- (iii) the ideal of supreme self-sacrifice for the sake of the Divine lover in the ecstasy of constant communion with Him.

It is this Bhakti which is the only Vedāna, the real Dhyāna and the supreme Upāsana. It is this Bhakti which the Divine Lover may acknowledge as 'मद्भक्ति', 'मद्यजन' and 'मन्मथ'. It is this indeed which is the human realisation of the intimate relationship of God with man and nature. When it dawns on our mind and heart, what is made manifest is the great sacrifice God is ever making for the sake of man and for the whole creation.

Vedānta Deśika makes an all-round intellectual analysis of the culture of Bhakti for the sake of its practice by men who deserve it. Not our desires but our deserts justify our pursuing the path of Bhakti as Brahma-Sādhana. The three higher castes, by virtue of being authorized to execute the Vedic injunctions, are naturally authorized to practice constant contemplation of the Great Being.¹

The three paths viz. Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti are not exclusive but inclusive of one another,² It is only the pre-eminence of certain distinguishing elements viz. the elements of volitional or intellectual or emotional culture that tell the one from the other. For Bhakti as the intimate intuitive awareness of Reality in all its aspects, the performance of the moral, the ethical and the social duties and obligations are extremely essential. Bhakti is the sublimest of the spiritual disciplines and demands the fullest exercise of the

1. G. T. C. on 9.32

2. G. S. R. on Śloka 24.

inmost being of man. But, for Vedānta Deśika, the supreme sense of Bhakti is the cultivation of the spirit of 'Atma Nivedana' or 'Ātma Nikṣepa' or 'Nyāsa' i. e. Śaraṇāgati or Prapatti. Bhakti and Prapatti may hence be looked upon as two distinct Sādhana's or Vidyās for God-realisation. In fact it is Bhakti, which emerging as Parābhakti is called 'Prapatti'.

Prapatti as the Brahmavidyā par excellence.

Prapatti is the sacrifice of the inner being which is done in deep love for the Divine Being.¹ 'I am not mine, but, of the Divine' is the real realisation of this self-detachment, and God-attachment. It is the great Vidhi or Divine Command² which man must obey out of the impulsive joy of his heart. All the requirements of its fulfilment (इतिकर्तव्यता) consist only in the devotee's unflinching faith in Divine Providence which requires complete soul-resignation for its full functioning. The 'Parityāga' or the renunciation of the 'dharma's' or duties as enjoined upon the spiritual seeker by the Gītā (18.66) simply means the renunciation of all self-centredness in clinging to this or that means of approach to the Divine. When this is done, what results is the all-embracing spontaneous yearning after supreme spiritual contrition and subservience.³

When one's soul is illumined by the consciousness that God alone is the sole means of Divine realisation, one is not doing any Sādhana, but strictly speaking, has already become a Siddha. In fact, Siddhōpāya and Ātma Samarpaṇa mean the same thing. The injunction for Śaraṇāgati or Prapatti i. e. 'मामेकं शरणं ब्रज' (Gītā 18.66) is, in its ultimate sense, but an excuse in God's

1. N. R. Page 18.

2. N. R. Page 17.

3. N. R. Page 19.

mind for allowing His spontaneous saving grace to work for the succour of man.

Although, Prapatti is 'Dhruvānusr̥ti' or continuous recollection of God, yet, it is required to be enjoined upon the spiritual aspirant by the Śāstra, in as much as, its content is not the full Being of the Divine, but, the Divine Providence that draws out the deep soul-sacrificing love hidden in the human heart for the sake of the Divine.¹ Even if it were regarded as 'Brahmānubhava' or an intimate intuitive awareness of the Being, it has to be ordained by the Śāstra not in the sense of its being sensed by man in respect of its practice or practical attainment, but, in, the sense of its being intuited by man in respect of the steady process of its accomplishment.

Prapatti is meant for one who wants it. In fact, every human being wants the cessation of the miseries of life and the promise of eternal bliss and happiness. But all cannot train themselves in the spiritual discipline of the Brahma Vidyās which means the greatest strenuous exercise of the mental and the spiritual faculties of man. Thus what is commonly accessible to man in general, as the means of Mukti or bliss eternal, is Karma yoga, which can be practised in many ways, such as the performance of the Nitya-Nairmittika duties, the Varṇa-Āśrama-Dharmas and so on. But, then, there are men who are unable to do anything demanding an uphill discipline and discharge of duties. Conscious as they are of their limitations they are not unconscious of the dignity of the Divine. What they can do is to simply make themselves responsive to the care of God who exists for the good of all He causes into being. Complete self-resignation to God does not depend on one's desert, but, one's mere desire. There may be degrees in the intensity of self-abandonment

and hence there are degrees in the Divine response to it.¹ The devoted soul who has so resigned himself to God need not wait to be received by God. The delay, if any, in the supreme attainment of the bliss of Prapatti called 'Mukti', in one sense and 'Kaiṅkarya' in the other or simply 'Brahmānu-bhava' is due to

- (i) the delay in the completion and the cessation of the working of the law of Karma, especially of the Prārabdha Karma, which will slowly but surely, exhaust itself and its potency in the face of the omnipotent law of Divine Mercy,
- (ii) the delay in the wearing out of the psycho-physical organism of the spiritual aspirant in the absence of its causal collocation such as one's Karma or Adṛṣṭa and
- (iii) the delay in reaching the intensity and the impetuosity of self-surrender which can brook no continuance of life without the touch and the kiss of the Divine Lover.

What is technically meant by the Prapatti of the 'Ārta' and the 'Dṛpta' types is simply the unbearableness and the bearableness of the mortal existence in the climax of the Divine response to the love of the devotee.

The spiritual aspirant to self-surrender or the Adhikārin of Prapatti need not swerve from his path in any sense and in any circumstance. If there is firm faith in Prapatti, the most cherished fruit i. e. Mukti is not far to seek. The only delay is the delay in receiving. In fact, one has to be unmindful of the delay in the Divine Award of Mokṣa, if one becomes a Prapanna in the truest sense of the term.

The Culture of Prapatti.

The intellectual discernment of Prapatti is of no use in the spiritual culture of Prapatti. As a matter of fact, the analysis of anything solely by intellect is bound to be imperfect. That the sweetnesses of sugar and milk and honey are not the same is a matter of common experience, but, who is there who can finally tell one kind of sweetness from the other ?

The Nyāsa Vidyā is different from the other Brahma Vidyās, but to tell the culture of Nyāsa from the culture of the other Vidyās is extremely difficult. Even then, certain workable suggestions may be followed. The supreme culture of Prapatti or Śaraṇāgati, as Vedānta Deśika understands it, is—‘अनन्यसाध्यस्वाभीष्टसाधनसमर्थवशीकरण’¹—or the supreme spiritual strength of man, the seeker after truth and beauty and bliss, to draw out loving responses from the heart of God who alone is the means of the highest realisation and who is Himself striving ever for the rescue of his votaries. As Prapatti is the human preparation of man meeting God, so is Dayā or Kṛpā, the divine preparation of God meeting man. In fact, all the means of spiritual emancipation are meant for appealing to the heart of God for the protection of the soul. Bhakti melts the Divine Heart for the sake of its Sādhaka. Prapatti is another name for the melting of the Divine Heart in response to the self-effacement of the Prapanna. Prapatti is the only hope for the helpless soul. To help the soul helpless in the meshes of matter in the very nature of the Divine Being. The ontological relationship of ‘Apṛthak siddhi’ between soul and God, Cit and Išvara, Śeṣa and Śeṣin, Niyāmya and Niyāmaka, Ādheya and Ādhāra and Śarīra and Śarīrin, meets its real correspondence in the supremely mystic relationship of ‘Apṛthak Siddhi’ between the inner being of

1. N. R. page 28.

man and the inmost being of God, the spirit of Prapattī and the supreme spirit of Dayā, the human sense of Ākīñcanya and the Divine promise of protection and so on.

Essentials of Prapatti

The practice of Prapatti-Vidyā does not depend upon the practice of Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti-Sādhana. It requires only the full realisation of its essentials which are—

- (i) Ānukūlyasya Sañkalpah.
- (ii) Prātikūlyasya Varjanam.
- (iii) Rakṣiṣyatīti Viśvāsah.
- (iv) Gopṛtvavaraṇam tathā.
- (v) Ātma Nikṣepa—
- (vi) Kārpaṇye (Ṣadvidhā Śaraṇāgatih).

The (i) i. e. 'Ānukūlyasya Sañkalpah' which Vedānta Deśika puts as 'नाथ ! त्वत्सर्वैकान्तधीः स्यात्'¹ is the will and the firm resolve of the spiritual seeker to dedicate himself to God in the spirit of love and subservience. He who has to offer himself to God must in the fitness of things offer himself for the service of humanity. Dedication to God is dedication to the cause of God i. e. the commonweal of all creation. All one does, all one thinks, all one feels will have to be for the sake of God and man and nature i. e. Nārāyaṇa or Puruṣottama or the Brahman. It is this culture of the will to love God and to serve the cause of God which the Gītā strongly suggests in the line—'सर्वभूतस्थितं यो मां भजत्येकत्वमास्थितः'. Without the practice of 'सर्वभूतानुकूलता' the practice of 'ब्रह्मानुकूलता' is impossible. The will to love and serve God's creation is the test of the will to love and serve God. It is in this sense alone that the 'Brahman' in Its 'Antaryāmin' aspect is intuited by the Brahma Vādin or the Prapanna. As the first essential of the constant loving contemplation

of God it is this which is symbolized in the first essential mark of the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra of a Śrī Vaiṣṇava.

The (ii) i. e. 'Prātikūlyasya Varjanam' or in the words of Vedānta Deśika 'त्वदपचरणतस्सन्नित्तः'¹ is the essential outcome of the culture of 'Ānukūlyasya Saṅkalpah'. The culture of abstinence from all kinds of disservice to God and humanity is the consummation of the culture of self-dedication and selfless love and service to God and humanity. If 'Ānukūlyasya Saṅkalpah' is the ideal of self-surrender 'Prātikūlyasya Varjanam' is the realisation of the ideal. Both go together. The heart which is overflowing with goodwill to all has no space for ill-will to any. All moral and ethical and religious and spiritual virtues meet their fulfilment in the practice of the greatest of the abstinences viz. 'Prātikūlyasya Varjanam'. The Gītā (16th Adhyāya) inculcates the spirit of this abstinence from disservice in its emphasis on the culture of the renunciation of all 'Ahaṅkāra' or egoism and 'Mamakāra' or egocentric insistences. The real Prapanna is one who ever searches within himself whether he is—'अनुचितचरितेष्वद्य शान्ताभिसन्निः'² or slowly but surely desisting himself from evil demands of selfishness.

The (iii) i. e. 'Rakṣiṣyatīti Viśvāsah' which according to Vedānta Deśika is 'त्वमसि शरणमित्यध्यवस्यामि गदम्'³ is the culture of unflinching faith in the providence of God in all possible circumstances. After the spiritual preparedness of self-dedication and abstinence from self-centredness, the spiritual aspirant naturally comes to cling to God having firm faith in Divine goodness manifesting itself as much in the trials and tribulations of the soul as in its bliss and happiness and immortality. Whereas 'Ānukūlyasya Saṅkalpa' and 'Prātikūlyasya Varja-

1. Nyāsa Vimsati—18

2. Nyāsa Vimsati—22.

3. Nyāsa Vimsati—18.

na' mean the realisation of the supreme 'Hita' in the Divine Government of the Universe, the culture of faith in the goodness of God or 'Rakṣiṣyatīti Viśvāsaḥ' suggests the ultimate experience of the 'Tattva' i.e. the Supreme Being in His essential nature, in His main purpose and in His real revelation. It is this indeed which is the 'anubhūti' of the 'Cidacidviśiṣṭa Brahman.' The function of this staunch human faith is to help God reveal His being, His Dayecchā¹ or His will to save the soul, which waits for some excuse, some golden opportunity in the guise of prapatti or self-surrender before its fullest manifestation. It is the spiritual realisation of 'Rakṣiṣyatīti Viśvāsaḥ' which the Śrī Vaiṣṇava theology tries to present in the concept of 'Śrī'. Without this 'Viśvāsa' (Śrī Prapatti), the Prapatti of 'Nārāyaṇa' is impossible to achieve. In the wake of this faith follows what is called 'Brahmānubhūti, or the experience of the being and the beauty and the bliss of Brahman, the experience, which, as Rāmānuja gives expression to in the 'Śaraṇāgati-Gadya' or as Vedānta Deśika analyses in the 'Śaraṇāgati-Gadya-Bhāṣya', presents Brahman as 'Satyakāma' or ever willing to give the seeker the bliss of self-surrender, as 'Satya Saṅkalpa' or keen on removing the obstacles to complete self-effacement, as 'Parabrahmabhūta' or the great spiritual democrat always ready to allow the devoted souls to discharge the duties of the Divine commonwealth, as 'Puruṣotama' or spontaneously indulging in the succour of the self-resigned souls, as 'Mahāvibhūti' or constantly actively controlling the circumstances of recrudescence of the evils of worldly life for the sake of the devotee, as 'Śrīmān' or working for the good of His creation more through Anugraha than Nigraha, as 'Nārāyaṇa' or the head of the world-family ever eager to bequeath to all the best of everything and even His own self-effulgent nature and to crown all, as 'Vaikuṇṭhanātha' or most anxiously awaiting in His supreme spiritual state for

the devoted souls to return after subserving His own purpose. Until and unless this 'Mahāviśvāsa', this 'Śraddhā' overwhelms the spiritual seeker, no real Prapatti can emerge. Hence it is that the Gītā is so eloquent in the suggestion of the culture of Śraddhā in lines—

‘तेषां नित्याभियुक्तानां-

योगक्षेमं वहाम्यहम् (9. 22).’

The (iv) i. e. ‘Gopṭṛvavarāṇam tathā, as analysed by Vedānta Deśika as ‘त्वं मे गोपायिता स्याः’¹ is the realisation of the fulfilment of the culture of ‘Mahāviśvāsa’ which shortens the distance between man, the beloved soul and God, the Divine Lover. The Gītā presents the ideal of this realisation in the words—‘यिताऽसि लोकस्य चराचरस्य (II. 43).’ It may be achieved by all of us in all conceivable ways. All the conceivable five-fold forms of God such as the ‘Para’ or the Transcendental, the Vyūha or the Cosmic, the Vibhava or the Incarnation, the Antaryāmin or the Indwelling and the Arcā or the Image can be intuited and made the basis of the culture of ‘Gopṭṛva Varāṇa’ or the spiritual yearning of the soul to take refuge in the Divine. What is called ‘Ācāryābhigamana’ or ‘Gurū-pasādana’ or the teacher-worship-cult is but the popular realisation of the ideal of ‘Gopṭṛva Varāṇa’ over which Vedānta Deśika gets so eloquent as to say²—

‘ईश्वरकृपा ह्यनादिरपि आचार्यकृपामपेक्षते, लीलारससहचरिता च । आचार्य-
कृपा तु तन्निग्रहमपि शमयति, अनुग्रहैकरसा च । ईश्वरस्य क्वचिदधोनिनीषाऽपि
वर्तते, असाधुकारयितृत्वञ्च । आचार्यस्य तु सर्वत्रोन्ननीषैव, स साध्वेव कारयति ।
....भगवतो दैत्यादिषु विपरीतोपदेशोऽप्यस्ति, अस्य तु सर्वत्र यथार्थवादित्व-
मेवेत्यादि वैषम्यमनुसन्धेयम् ।’

or that teacher-worship is a greater spiritual achievement than God-worship and that Prapatti done to the teacher is a surer spiritual success than Prapatti done to God.

1. Nyāsa Viṃśati—18.

2. S. R. B., page, 32

The Hindu saints of the medieval times practised 'Guru Gopṭṛva-Varaṇa' in their lives and propounded the same to their followers and disciples. The 'Guru' stepped in the place of 'Śrī' or the grace-constituent of the being of God to guarantee the welfare of the spiritual aspirant in the realm of spiritualism. The cultivation of the human urge to seek protection under God or Guru is the occasion of the Divine urge to promise protection to the devotee. In fact 'Nārāyaṇa' and 'Śrī' and 'Guru' and 'Mantra'-all have the same significance for the prapanna in the practice of 'Gopṭṛvavarāṇa'. The Tāntric teachers dwell at great length on human and divine contribution to the 'Gopṭṛva-varāṇa'-aspect of Prapatti. The seeking of protection by the Sādhaka under God or Guru or Mantra is itself the promise of protection by God or Guru or Mantra. It is this which is technically called 'Śaktipāta' or the spontaneity and the universality of Divine Grace.

The (v) i. e. 'Ātmanikṣepa' or the culture of the spirit of 'त्वयि निहितमरोऽस्येवमित्यर्पितात्मा' as Vedānta Deśika would have it, is the culmination of the culture of 'Gopṭṛvavarāṇa'. It is the same as 'Ātmanivedana' which is the climax of the culture of Bhakti. In fact, it is the real quintessence of self-surrender. Its cultivation means the renunciation of the efforts and the fruits of all selfless love and service done to God and man and nature. In the totality of 'Brahmānubhūti' it emphasizes upon the 'anubhūti' or the integral experience of the supreme purpose of the Brahman. 'Ātmanivedana', 'Ātmasamarpaṇa' 'Ātmanyāsa' 'Ātmahavis' 'Ātmasanyāsa' 'Ātmatyāga and 'Atmanikṣepa'-all mean the same thing i. e. 'फलेस्वाम्यवियुक्ता केशवार्पणपर्यन्ता' or the offering of the final fruit of Prapatti to God for His relish. Many teachers of spiritualism stop at 'Atmanikṣepa', which according to them,

is the last constituent or the real essence of the Pañcāṅga Nyāsa or complete self-surrender.

In the huge growth of Sanskrit devotional literature, it is the ideal of 'Ātmanikṣepa' or the spiritualism of 'तमेव चाद्यं पुरुषं प्रपद्येत्' (Gītā, 15.4) which has been tried to be realised in the most comprehensive manner. It has been analysed by different spiritual teachers in different ways. It is this which the Gītā characterises as 'Rājaguhya' or the secret of secrets of philosophy and religion and spiritualism. It does not mean the loss of the human soul in the depth of the being of God. It means, on the other hand, the finding of the real soul in the benign presence of God.

This 'Ātmanikṣepa' follows essentially from the nature of the supremely spiritual relation of God to man. Some of its essential manifestations may be seen in the various 'Bhāvas' or aspects of mystic realisation such as :—

- (i) the Kāntā-Bhāva.
- (ii) the Gopī-Bhāva.
- (iii) the Rāsotsava-Bhāva.
- (iv) The Rādhā-Bhāva and so on.

Ātma Nikṣepa or the resignation of the 'I' cannot be completely experienced until and unless 'Kāntā Bhāva' or self-effacement like that of a woman in love with her lover, is realised by the spiritual aspirant. There may be various shades of realisation of the spiritualism of the 'Kāntā-Bhāva'. But the ideal is the same in all of them. This ideal is the ideal of spontaneous surrender of the claims of all attainments-ethical, religious, aesthetic and spiritual. The great saint Nammālvār was steeped in the spirit of this 'Kāntā-Bhāva' of Ātmanikṣepa. Vedānta Deśika ever felt intensely for this kind of Śrī Vaiṣṇava religious aspiration. He has suggested this great ideal in his Nikṣepa Rakṣā

(page 32) in the memorable line —‘स्वयं निर्मरस्सन् अन्तःपुरपुरन्ध्री-
न्यायेनानन्यो वर्तेत’.

The other Bhāvas, as for instance, the Gopī-Bhāva, the Rāsotsava-Bhāva, the Rādhā-Bhāva and so on are the different degrees of realisation of the Kāntā-Bhāva. The medieval Indian mystics were adept in these spiritual realisations. Kabir was a past-master in the spiritualism of the Gopī-Bhāva. The saint Caitanya lived in the ecstasy of the Rādhā Bhāva. The Rāsotsava-Bhāva is the realisation of the scenes of Vaikuṇṭha or rather the realisation of the social life of the votaries of God manifesting itself in the day-to-day world. Vedānta Deśika lived in the times and in the surroundings when the culture of Ātmanikṣepa was regarded as the practice of Brahmavidyā par excellence. The ‘Kāntā Bhāva’ or rather the ‘Antahpura Purandhrī-Bhāva’ of ‘Ātmanikṣepa, the greatest of the ideals of Prapatti-culture meant for Vedānta Deśika the initiation of the spiritual aspirant into the secrets of the Śrī Tattva. Vedānta Deśika felt intensely for the culture of the Ātmanikṣepa-spirit of the great logician philosopher Udayana —

‘ऐश्वर्यमदमत्तोऽसि मामवज्ञाय वर्तसे ।

उपस्थितेषु बौद्धेषु मदर्थीना तव स्थितिः ॥’

The (vi) i. e. Kārpaṇya or the culture of the spirit of ‘अत्यन्ताकिञ्चनोऽहम्’¹ as Vedānta Deśika suggests, is the necessary outcome of ‘Ātmanikṣepa’ or self-surrender. •‘Akiñcanya’ or ‘Kārpaṇya’ or the culture of spiritual contrition is the real offering to God, the real intuition of the Godhead and the supreme love and devotion and service to the Deity. In ‘Ārta-Prapatti’, the consummation of the culture of the essentials of self-surrender is simultaneous as well as spontaneous. In the intensity of self-resignation and spiritual contrition, the Prapanna is unable to bear the strain

of divine despair. Consequently, he longs for the earliest extinction of his worldly existence. But, in 'Dṛpta-Prapatti' having successive stages of soul-surrender, the spiritual unrest for divine communion may not be so unbearable. Human life has to be lived in the best possible manner. Yet, in our inmost being, the deep current of divine love must never be allowed to dry up. The immortal flame of love in the human heart, the best and the sublimest of the aspects of the 'Caitanya' of the 'Cit', has to be kept burning in the 'Saṁsāra-Kāntāra', the dark and the dubious jungle of our worldly life. Very beautifully has the great mystic Caitanya embodied the ideal of the culture of Prapatti in our day-to-day life, in the following lines :

‘परव्यसनिनी नारी व्यग्रापि गृहकर्मसु ।
तदेवास्वादयत्यन्तर्नवसङ्गरसायनम् ॥’

The Supreme Significance of Prapatti.

In his conception of Prapatti, Vedānta Deśika has emphasized 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam' in its ethical and esoteric aspects. Prapatti, in fact is the spirit of all the Sādhanaś or the Brahma Vidyās. It is this which is the perfect realisation of the 'Āpṛthaksiddhi'-relation subsisting between the Paramātmā and the Ātman. The great sacrifice which the Divine Being is making for His creation can be appreciated by man only in his own self-sacrifice and in no other way.

Prapatti demands a triple renunciation—the renunciation of Lābha, of Bhara and of Svarūpa. The renunciation of Lābha or the great spiritual gain is the climax of Prapatti. Even the joys of 'Śaraṇa Varāṇa' are offered by the Prapanna to God, the Śaraṇya, the ultimate refuge. What is called 'Lābha-Samarpaṇa' is the 'absolute' of the universe of Prapatti. To it is related 'Bhara-Samarpaṇa' or the renunciation of the sense of the authorship of the culture of Prapatti. This 'Bhara-Samarpaṇa' in its turn has an intimate

relation with 'Svarūpa Samarpaṇa' or the spontaneous offering of the soul to God, the soul-proprietor, the soul-protector and the soul-refuge.

Prapatti is the real 'Tattvajñāna'. In the first stage, the spiritual aspirant or the Śrī Vaiṣṇava becomes a God-minded person—a Dhārmika, in the sense that he acquires the faculty of discrimination of the Tattva, the Hita and the Puruṣārtha from Atattva, Ahita and Apuruṣārtha. In the second stage, he is a Bñāgavata or God's own man, as he knows the glory and the grace of Bhagavān and knows, besides, his own dependence on God. The knowledge of the Paratattva or the love for God, lands him, in the third stage of the knowledge of the Puruṣārtha, which, ultimately makes him 'Ananyaprayojana' or one who has nothing to do with anything else except God. One who has become 'Ananyaprayojana' becomes 'Ananyasādhana' also, since, he realises that God alone is the Sādhana of Divine realisation. In all these four stages of Prapatti-realisation what is immanent is 'Bharanyāsa' or Śaraṇa Varāṇa, which, in fact, is the real revelation of God in the human heart. The ultimate experience is the experience of 'Nitya Kaiṅkarya' or self-less love and service to God and to all the Divine manifestations¹ :—

“प्रकृत्यात्मविवेकाद्धार्मिकः, परावरतत्त्वविवेकाद्भागवतः, परावरपुरुषार्थ-
विवेकादनन्यप्रयोजनः, स्वपराधिकारविवेकादनन्यसाधनः, पूर्वोक्तात् 'अस्तु ते'
इत्यनुग्रहविशेषात् प्रमितानुष्ठितभरन्यासः, ततश्च मया स्वीकृतभरः, नित्य
किङ्करो भवेति दत्तवरश्च त्वं मुक्तप्रायोऽसीति ।”

The 'Pañcakāla Kṛtya' is the practical spontaneous demonstration of the inner culture of Prapatti. The Śrī Vaiṣṇava cult is the symbolic representation of the spiritualism of self-surrender. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic metaphysics is perfectly realised in the practice of Śaraṇāgati, the real

Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic Ethics contains the 'Prapatti-potential' in each and every aspect of the evolution of ethical culture. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic Æsthetics which conceives of the supreme æsthetic realisation as the experience of the real being of one's being i.e. the subservience of the soul to the Supreme Soul, analyses, in fact, this realisation of self-surrender. It is the bliss of Prapatti that is immanent in all the joys of life—the delights of arts, the pleasures of poetry, the speculations of philosophy, the consolations of religion, and to crown all, the heavenly happiness of Life Divine.

The Universality of the Prapatti Dharma.

Prapatti is meant for all and is the birth-right of every living being. Although Vedānta Deśika imphasizes the institutionalism of Prapatti, yet, he clearly realises the universality of the Prapatti-Dharma. While Rāmānuja is for the free distribution of the choicest treasure of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism i.e. Prapatti as 'Sarvādhikāra Dharma', Vedānta Deśika is, first, for the inheritance of the Prapatti-treasure by the real Śrī Vaiṣṇavas, the choice few, and, then for the giving of the concession of Prapatti to those who desire it and deserve it. Hence Vedānta Deśika's imphasis on the institutionalism of Prapatti. People of all the three higher castes and even of the lowest caste could become 'Prapannas' and could get initiated into the 'Prapatti Vidya' through the ceremonialism of the Vaidika, the Tāntric and the other Mantras. The ceremonialism may differ, but the spirit of Prapatti remains the same. The Mantras may vary, but, the 'manana' or the meditation on the Divine remains the same.

The synthesis of the Vaḍagalai and the Tēngalai concepts of Prapatti

The Vaḍagalai conception of Prapatti as 'Yoga' brings

out the ideal of the culture of self-surrender of the whole being. The sublimation of consciousness for the sake of the soul-vision of God does require efforts on the part of the spiritual-aspirant. Prapatti is not the religion of passivity. It is rather the religion of activity which is to be realised in active love and service to God and man. The renunciation of the means and the goal and the authorship of Prapatti in its real sense is the perfection of the spiritual initiative of man which alone is the channel for the spontaneous grace of God to flow through. This ideal of Prapatti is the highest human ideal. The Jñāṭṛva, the Kartṛva and the Bhokṛva of the Ātman, the Seṣa are not meant to be sublated in the realisation of the Prapatti-ideal.

The Tēṅgalai stress on Prapatti as 'Ākiñcanya' or spiritual passivity is meant to keep the grace of God in the forefront. God wants no excuse from man in the form of the culture of Prapatti for the functioning of His redemptive grace. In fact, the grace of God cannot freely and fully flow if man is erecting his own barriers in the forms of his moral and ethical and spiritual perfections. This ideal of Prapatti is the sublimest Divine ideal.

What is the relation between the two ideals? How can Prapatti be 'Yoga' and 'Ākiñcanya' at the same time? How can 'Katakṣa' or the grace of God win the human soul and be won by the human soul, in the same instant? According to Vedānta Deśika, there is no conflict between 'Prapatti-Yoga', the human initiative in self-surrender and 'Nirhetuka Katakṣa', the spontaneous redemptive grace of God. God knows that His grace demands no qualification from man except his utter helplessness and deep spiritual despondency. Man also thinks that his self-gift is not his own doing but the doing of the deep upsurge of divine grace. Thus, both wait for some excuse or the other. The Divine excuse-

Vyāja-is the spiritual preparedness of man in the form of his self-sacrificing love and devotion ; the human excuse-Vyāja-is the inevitability and the spontaneity of Divine reponse. Looked at from the God's standpoint it is the perfection of Prapatti accomplished by man or the realisation of Prapatti essentially accomplished for man, the 'Aprthaksiddhā Viśeṣaṇa of God, that ultimately results in the supreme bliss of self-surrender which is the final emancipation of the soul. It is only in this sence that the inexorable law of Karma gives way to the omnipotence of the grace of God. But seen from the human viewpoint it is the 'Nirhetuka Katākṣa' or the spontaneous redemptive grace of God that is the sole significance of Prapatti, the attitude of deep spiritual distress and despondency. Whereas Vedānta Deśika, the Vaḍagalai teacher enunciates the principles of the Prapatti-religion having the first standpoint in view which is in close keeping with the Darśana of Viśiṣṭādvaita, Pillai Lokācātya, his elder contemporary, the Tēngalai teacher emphasizes the second viewpoint of Prapatti which is in conformity with the mysticism of the Aḷvārs or the God-embued saints. Both the ideals of Prapatti, in fact, are one and the same in as much as their source and sustenance is the same Heart of Reality, their spiritual value is derived from the same Eternal Home of Values and their practicability and accessibility are equally universally guaranteed by the same attainment of attainments. In fact, the human initiative in Prapatti, the 'Līlā' of God and the Divine initiative in the spontaneity of divine grace - the Dayā or Kṛpā of God-both are willed and directed to operate under the same Divine guidance.¹ The spiritual seekers do not will the Prapatti Yoga. Nor do they wait passively for the 'Nirhetuka Katākṣa.' They come, only, by the the way, in the path of the Divine will to save the souls exercising Itself eternally - 'निरुपधिककारुण्यघटितस्वतन्त्रेच्छा-

शक्तिस्वयमुपाधिसाधाय रमते ।¹ It is God alone who is the 'Nidāna', the uncaused cause of the Sṛṣṭi and the Mukti of all that is and has its being. The Prapatti, the ultimate 'Viveka' is essentially "बेलातीतप्रसर्पन्मधुपथनद्यादत्तसेकः"² or solely dependent on the nourishment it derives from the 'Kṛpā', the Dāya, the Nirhetuka Katākṣa or the Grace of God who finds an excuse, an opportunity, in the human endeavour for the revelation of His eternal and essential blissful being.

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1. S. S. 1.76.

2. S. S. 8.15.

THE ETHICS OF ŚRĪ VAIṢṆAVISM

The Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ethics which has been characterised as 'an ethico-theological classification or deduction of the duties'¹ as distinct alike from the socio-ethical classification of Manu and Praśastapāda and the ethico-psychological classification of the Mīmāṃsakas'², is really speaking, the ethics of self-surrender practicable in the five-fold duties or 'Pañcakāla kṛtyas' of a God-ward life or life given to God. Like Rāmānuja, Vedānta Deśika also is for the observance and performance of the Varṇāśrama Dharmas and the Sādhāraṇa Dharmas. Like Rāmānuja, Vedānta Deśika also treats the Varṇāśrama Dharmas and the Sādhāraṇa Dharmas as means to an end—the end being the realisation of Prapatti or Kaiṅkarya Dharma in the acts of the Pañcakāla-kṛtyas. Unlike the Prābhākara who regard the realisation of the Moral Imperative as Dharma, without any other extraneous end whatsoever, Vedānta Deśika regards the realisation of the inner spiritual imperative, the divine obligation of Nikṣepa, as the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Dharma which transforms and transfigures the external obligation of the Varṇāśrama and the Sādhāraṇa Dharma with a new sense—the sense of self-less service not only to the Transcendental Divine, but, to the Divine in man, in nature and in the entire creation. We may say that the Prābhākara school of Mīmāṃsā has influenced the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's conception of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ethics with the proviso that while the Prābhākaras regard Dharma as the transcendental Apūrva, the Rāmānujists and Vedānta Deśika regard it as transcendental love and devotion to God,

1. S. K. Maitra. *The Ethics of the Hindus*, page 23.

2. S. K. Maitra. *The Ethics of the Hindus*, page 24.

as viewed from the human standpoint and Nirhetuka Prasāda, as viewed from the Divine standpoint. 'Duties are to be discharged disinterestedly'—this is as much the assertion of the Prābhākaras as of the Rāmānujists. As there is a rigorous ethical disinterestedness in the ethics of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, so there is a rigorous ethical-cum-spiritual disinterestedness in the ethics of Śrīvaiṣṇavism. Like the Prābhākaras, the Rāmānujists also believe in the two accompanying factors of the Moral Imperative viz the 'Niyojya' or the ethical person and the 'Viśaya' or the ethical duties, to the utter disregard of the Phala. The only difference between these two systems in this respect is that while the Prābhākaras regard the imperative as intrinsically absolutely self-authoritative, Vedānta Deśika regards it as¹

‘चोदनेति विधिनिषेवात्मकश्रौतः विध्युद्देशसंगृह्यते । सहीश्वराज्ञारूपतया प्रवृत्तिनिवृत्तिरूपपुरुषव्यापारप्रयोजकत्वात्तदाकारविवक्षया चोदनेत्युच्यते ।

or as 'the Divine will meant to be worked out by man, Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka puts it in a poetic way²—

‘आज्ञा ते सनिमित्तनित्यविधयस्स्वर्गादिकाम्यद्विधिः

सोऽनुज्ञा शठचित्तशास्त्रवशतोऽपायोऽभिचारश्रुतिः ।

सर्वीयस्य समस्तशसितुरहो श्रीरङ्गसर्वस्व ! ते

रक्षाकृतनिवेदिनी श्रुतिरसौ त्वन्नित्यशास्तिस्ततः ॥’

which means that the real imperative is the divine promise to save the soul.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇavas Ethics, accordingly is the ethics of Prapatti which can be realised in and through the performance of the Pañcakāla Kṛtyas. It is not the negation, but, the sublimation and the spiritualisation of the other Dharmas and Ācāras. It may seem that the Śarīra-Śarīrin-relation holds good here also—the Śarīrin or the soul of ethics being

1. S. M. 21-12.

2. Śrī Rāṅga Rāja Stava Pt. II, 21.

the Pañcakāla Kṛtyas and the Śarīra or the body, the Varṇāśrama Dharma, the Sādhāraṇa Dharma and all kinds of ceremonialism and ritualism.

In all essentials, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ethics seems to be individualistic. But the social and the communal ethical values are also involved in it. Although, in reality, the Pañcakāla kṛtya or the practical Prapatti-Sādhana aims at individualistic love and devotion to God, yet, the ideal of Śrī Vaiṣṇava Ethics is social and communal self-surrender or the founding of a fraternity of self-less servants of God working for and carrying out the will of God in the world. The sole meaning of the residence of God in man and in the world is the realisation of Vaikuṇṭha here and now, which, for the fact of its bliss being beyond human imagination is shown to exist in some other Divine Land (!) and is meant to be gained after the extinction of the mortal life.

The statement that 'Caitanya preached the religion of devotion and love to all men irrespective of caste or class. In South India, on the other hand, Vedānta Deśika emphasized ritualistic religion¹, does not seem to be fully justifiable. Although Vedānta Deśika is conservative with regard to caste and creed, yet, the religion he has in his mind and wants to preach and propagate is not ritualistic religion, but, the non-ritualistic religion of faith in love and devotion to the Divine or simply faith in the Divine, the Prapatti-potential²

Now we shall study the Prapatti-ethics or the ethics of the Pañcakāla Kṛtyas of Abhigamana, Upādāna, Ijyā, Svādhyāya and Yoga.

1. Sir Radhakrishnan : The Vedānta according to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, page 275.

2. S. S. 10.32.

Abhigamana

The life of a Śrīvaiṣṇava is a strict spiritual discipline. It is not dull and prosaic and painful as that of a Hathayogin. It is enlivened, on the other hand, by the playful hide-and seek going on between Īśvara the lover and Jīva the beloved. The surrender of soul and the caresses of God form the beginning and the end, the ambition and the achievement of this life. Abhigamana is the start of the day-to-day life of a Śrīvaiṣṇava, the start on the way to a godly life, the start which is as much important as the end of the journey. It is the urge of divine omnipresence, divine providence and divine love in the heart of a Śrīvaiṣṇava that finds expression in the first and the foremost of the Pañcakāla Kṛtyas i.e. Abhigamana. As a woman goes to meet her lover, so goes the devoted soul to meet the Supreme Soul the lover. As the mind and heart of a devoted woman are drawn towards her lover, so are drawn the mind and heart of a true Śrīvaiṣṇava towards the Divine lover. Happiness in life is to live with God. Misery in life is to live without God.¹ Abhigamana is the earnestness of the spirit of prayer of a Śrīvaiṣṇava and for that matter, of any true lover of God. It is a call to humility. It is a call to self-purification, to self-searching, to God-finding. It is through this alone that the self melts into the Supreme Self.

All the Śrīvaiṣṇava teachers regard the welfare of the body, the house of soul and the temple of God as the very first duty of a real Śrīvaiṣṇava. The right Abhigamana can be done not by the sickly and the diseased but by those who are sound in body. The sickly body of the devotee is a matter of great concern for the Divine Lover. Hence it is that Vedānta Deśika is emphatic enough in suggesting the great care a Śrīvaiṣṇava has to give to his body. The Śrī-

vaiṣṇava votary cannot disregard the common laws of healthy life. 'Early to rise', to get up before the 'Brāhma Muhūrta', is the first pre-requisite to the performance of 'Abhigamana'. A Śrīvaiṣṇava getting up early from bed is awakened from the stupor of sleep and lethargy by the illumination of his consciousness with the help of the divine light that shines brightest at the moment. It is this moment that is most suited to Abhigamana. It is this moment which is free from all worldly care and may be spent in seeing God in the very chamber of one's heart.¹

Getting up for Abhigamana, a Śrīvaiṣṇava, according to the state of his health and general well-being, has to do Ācamana with clean water. In the absence of water, the custom prevalent is to touch the right ear² which signifies alertness and preparedness for the auspicious duty of Abhigamana.

Another item of alertness is the Āsana or the mode of sitting for divine meditation. Here also a Śrīvaiṣṇava has been given much freedom and choice. He may prefer a convenient posture to a rigorous one. The main idea is the offering of the self to the great self. The posture of the body is immaterial. Abhigamana is a supreme yoga. It is the union of man with God. This union does not lead to the complete identification of man with God or to the wholesale submergence of man in God. What it leads to is continuous, complete surrender of the soul to God. If the idea of yoga be the unity of soul and God,³ what is the sense of Abhigamana with regard to Lord Nārāyaṇa?³ In Abhigamana man reveals his complete subservience to and reliance upon God. There is no place here for the unity of the soul and the Over-soul. The real spirit of Abhigamana is the realisation of the relationship between the self and the

1. P. R. 120.

2. P. R. 121.

3. P. R. 122.

overself, the servant and the master, the bride and the bridegroom.

According to Gṛdhrasāromuni, a Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher, one has to revolve the name 'Hari' in his mind seven times.¹ But according to Vedānta Deśika and his early contemporary Nārāyaṇa Muni,² there can be no such hard and fast rule. Once or seven times or as many times as possible, the Divine Comrade has to be recalled before mind, revived in meditation and re-installed on the throne of the heart.

After the recollection of God follows a sort of divine despair. The shadow of separation from the Divine chases the devotee even in the very bliss of recollection. The fear of being snatched away from Him by the demon of Saṁsāra does not die down soon. This state of the soul is the state of 'Nirveda' and it should be welcomed cheerfully. It is essential for Abhigamana in as much as it sets into motion the faculties of divine realisation and is a half-way-house to the Bliss Eternal. To forget to practise it shows the great arrogance of the devotee. It should be practised everyday. Everyday, the miseries of birth, of death, of old age, of disease, of sins and sorrows have to be recalled to the mind with a view to completely eradicating them.³ Here it may seem that Nirveda or Avasāda or dejection of spirit, which is enjoined upon a Śrī-Vaiṣṇava, goes against Anirveda or Anavasāda or freedom from dejection which according to Rāmānuja is one of the essentials of self-surrender⁴ and hence a moral obligation for a Prapanna or one going to be a Prapanna. 'One who is dejected in spirit, cannot realise the self'⁵—is the motto of spiritualism. Hence

1. P. R. 122.

2 & 3. P. R. 123.

4. Śrī Bhāṣya (Thebaut) page 17.

5. Śrī Bhāṣya—page 9 (Chaukhamba).

it is that soon after Nirveda, 'Sattvika Dhṛti'¹ or the firmness of mind in its purity is to be practised as a rule. It is then that Nirveda changes into Dhruvā Smṛti or the steadiness of remembrance of God or Prapatti, to all intents and purposes. This Dhṛti, this firmness of the pure mind finds expression in the daily life of a Śrīvaiṣṇava in the form of his firm resolve to meditate on God, to love God and to serve God and God's people. This Dhṛti as Nārāyaṇa Muni² suggests, is a necessary consequence of Nirveda. A Śrīvaiṣṇava who has this Dhṛti always thinks of worshipping God, meditating on God, praying to God, chanting the names of God, propitiating God, contemplating God and falling at the feet of God in utter reliance and dependence and self-forgetfulness. To love God is an end in itself. It is not a means to any other end. Even a householder who performs Abhigamana ultimately has the same spirit, though mixed up with the Dharma of self-surrender, the Artha subservient to Prapatti and the Kāma in consonance with Dharma such as conjugal love, filial affection and so on. It means that the Abhigamana of a Prapanna is for Prapatti itself. The Abhigamana of a Śrī Vaiṣṇava householder may be for Dharma, Artha, Kāma and Mokṣa.

How can Abhigamana lead one to God against so many obstacles i. e. the sins of the past, the sins of the present, the sins of the future and so on? One who is a Śrīvaiṣṇava in spirit³ has to depend on the mercy of God. It is but constant contemplation on Divine providence, the import of the Prārthanā Mantra³ that can destroy, root and branch, the sins of omission and commission, check the sprouting up of fresh sins and keep the onerous obligation of Prāyaścitta at arms length.

1. Gītā 18-33.

2. & 3. P. R. page 124.

Whether Abhigamana to God should precede or succeed Abhigamana to Guru is one of the points of difference between the Vāḍagalai and the Teṅgalai schools of Śrīvaiṣṇavism. But to say that Vedānta Deśika is the cause of discord is meaningless. He is as clear and emphatic as possible on the point that the first place should be given to Ācāryābhigamana.¹ What is Ācāryābhigamana? It is the surrender of the self before the teacher, the spiritual guide. It is the teacher who, in fact, is responsible for the creation of spiritual unrest in the heart of a Śrīvaiṣṇava aspirant. What is Abhigamana to God? It is meditation on the Dvaya Mantra² which results in the melting of the soul and the surrender of all egoism and egotism. After surrendering oneself to the teacher, one has to surrender one's self to God. Abhigamana done to the Divine becomes Abhigamana to the spiritual teacher. One may do Abhigamana in the silence of one's heart. Others may chant aloud, in the fullness of their heart, the glory of Divine Incarnations, the greatness of Divine Vyūnas, and the beauty of Divine Being. Here, Vangi Vaṅgeśvara, a Śrīvaiṣṇava teacher, thinks that one has to recall to one's mind all the names of all the Vyūhas, Avatāras and so on. But Vedānta Deśika is more liberal when he suggests that since the main purpose of Abhigamana is soul-sacrifice, one may recall to one's mind the name of the Lord alone.

After this Abhigamana is done, the few hours of the morning are mostly to be spent in the preparation for 'Upādāna.' For instance, getting up from the bed, getting ready for bath, doing morning ablutions, cleansing the teeth, bathing in pure water, besmearing the head with the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra, giving offerings to the Sun-god, performing the Prāṇāyāma, reciting the Gāyatrī or the Aṣṭākṣara Mantra, completing the

1. P. R. 124

2. P. R. page 112.

Saṁdhyā, going to the temple, worshipping the Divine in the image, retiring to one's residence, adoring the deity of the household and so on are but the various obligatory duties of a Śrīvaiṣṇava, be he a householder or a Saṁnyāsin. In all the above duties the mind has got to be fixed on the Divine Being ; the heart, on Divine mercy and the soul, on the Divine Indweller. Even while getting up from the bed, a Śrīvaiṣṇava has to invoke in his mind the Goddess Earth, the Divine bride, before, he lays his foot on the ground. The earth is called Priyadattā,¹ the idea being that a worshipful attitude towards it in the devotee's heart is a matter of great pleasure to Lord Trivikrama, the Divine lover of the earth and all that is earthly. In the same way, the act of going to the temple is not a physical movement of the body, it is, on the other hand, a spiritual progress of man, though slow but sure and steady. The mere sight of a temple generates, in the heart of a devoted Śrīvaiṣṇava, the will to feel meek and humble before the mighty power, pervading everywhere. Thus it is that a Śrīvaiṣṇava has to pay homage to the sacred shrine in any one of the ways of reverence such as Maṣṭiṣka, Saṁpuṭa, Prahvāṅga, Pañcāṅga, Daṇḍāṅga Aṣṭāṅga and so on.² To raise only one hand before the shrine or the image is a great sacrilege and shows nothing but

1. P. R. page 125.

2. Maṣṭiṣka—Homage done to a superior with folded hands touching the forehead.

3. Saṁpuṭa—Doing homage with folded hands lying on the chest.

4. Prahvāṅga—Doing homage with folded hands lying on the chest, the body drooping low.

5. Pañcāṅga—Doing homage touching the ground with the fingers of the feet, the knees and the head.

6. Daṇḍāṅga—Doing homage stretching the body, like a staff, on the ground.

7. Aṣṭāṅga—Doing homage, laying down egoism and egotism, along with the chest, the head, the speech, the mind, the cheeks, the feet, the hands and the knees on the ground.

haughtiness of spirit on the part of a Śrīvaiṣṇava. The sacred shrine is the place for the practice of the culture of self-effacement. Hence it is that the 32 kinds of acts of desecration are meant to be scrupulously avoided. These acts of profanation are entering the shrine with shoes on, throwing bones etc. in the temple, chewing beetle leaves before the image, spitting on the temple-floor and so on. All the minor rites prescribed by the Vaiṣṇava Saṃhitās for the purification of the body and the consecration of the mind are meant to be practised by a Śrīvaiṣṇava. But the central idea of Abhigamana :—¹

‘अभिगच्छेद् जगद्योनिं

तच्च अभिगमनं स्मृतम्’

should always be kept before the mind and should never be mixed up with the preliminaries and the accessories such as the morning ablutions which also are accompanied with Mantras, or the entrance into the shrine which requires to be associated with Mantras and so on. The first and the foremost Mantra is the Abhigamana mantra—the sacrifice of the self for the Supreme Self, the firm resolve of reliance on God as the means and the end, the Upāya and the Upeya, the offering of a chance to God to sacrifice Himself for the sake of the soul and finally the self-complacency of self-realisation which is no other than Self-realisation. The spirit of Abhigamana has to be preserved in mind and speech and action. A life planned on Abhigamana is in itself a Divine life. It is better to take care of the religion of Abhigamana and leave the ritualism of Abhigamana to take care of itself.

Upādāna

Upādāna comes after Abhigamana. It means the appropriation of things necessary for divine service. The

1. P. R. page 136.

things which a Śrīvaiṣṇava worshipper of the Arcā-form of God requires are flowers to be placed at the feet of God, sandal to besmeare the image with, fruits to offer to the image as a sign of Kaiṅkarya, milk, curd, honey, water etc to be used in the worship of the image and so on. This kind of Upādāna—the appropriation of material objects—can be practised only by the Śrīvaiṣṇavas. But what about the others? How can this spiritual discipline of a Śrīvaiṣṇava life be practised universally? Here Vedānta Deśika, who, always stands for a universal Śrīvaiṣṇavism, suggests that Upādāna is not the acquisition of material goods, but, the acquisition of the qualities of mind and the virtues of the soul.¹ The Upādāna of spiritual goods is more desirable than the Upādāna of material goods. The smell of a flower may vanish soon, but, the sweetness of soul will remain for ever. It is better to possess the eternal sweetness of the soul than the evanescent smell of the flower. God will be pleased more with the sweetness of soul than with the sweetness of flowers. As a matter of fact, these externals of Upādāna should serve as symbols for the essentials such as humility of spirit, forgiveness to all, internal and external purity, universal love and so on.

Although the Śrīvaiṣṇava ritualism lays more stress on the Upādāna of the material things for the worship of the Arcā, yet, the Śrīvaiṣṇava religion unmistakably points to the symbolism of such an Upādāna which means the appropriation of the soul which is in daily danger of being snatched away by the wiles of the Saṁsāra. Even the Śāstraic injunction for the plucking of flowers for image-worship either from a forest or from one's own garden, suggests righteous acquisition rather than misappropriation.² One's seeing to the smell, the colour, the surroundings and

1. P. R. page 138.

2. P. R. Page 137.

the general suitability of the flowers of offering signifies one's concern in giving the best of everything to God in the Arcā,¹ or in the heart of the universe. The first and the foremost way of acquiring the objects of Upādāna is one's personal labour in the right direction.² Appropriating something which is no man's property is not so desirable as the reaping of the reward of one's own labour.³ Begging things for worshipping God is undesirable.⁴ But what is most undesirable is stealing or misappropriating something belonging to somebody else.⁵ In the act of Upādāna, Vedānta Deśika's idea is to follow the dictates of the Īsopaniṣad—'मा गृधः कस्यस्त्विद नम्'.⁶ Hence it is that one who misappropriates a thing to give it to God is called a wretch rather than a Śrīvaiṣṇava or a votary of Vāsudeva.⁷ Rightful Upādāna is a step to detachment from the world and all that is worldly and attachment to God and all that is godly.⁸ So long as a Śrīvaiṣṇava lives, he has to do the acts of Upādāna in the right spirit.

Ijyā

After Upādāna, comes Ijyā. Ijyā is the act of worshipping God with all the eight elements of worship called the Aṣṭāṅga Yāga.⁹ The eight elements of divine worship are :

- (i) Abhigamana—This Abhigamana which is an Aṅga or limb of Ijyā differs from that Abhigamana which is the first of the five-fold Śrīvaiṣṇava duties. The central idea behind this Abhigamana is the will to consecrate the self and all that belongs to the self for the adoration of the Adorable Divine.¹⁰ But the Abhigamana which is the first of the Śrīvaiṣṇava duties and moralities means a change of mind and heart and soul, a prayerful attitude of the

1. P. R. Page 137.

2 to 5. P. R. 137.

6. Īsopaniṣad—1.

7 & 8. I.B. page 9.

. P. R. page 109.

10. P. R. Page 109.

whole being, a melting into the Divine Being in daily meditation and a Smṛti-Santāna of love and devotion to God.

- (ii) Bhoga—Bhoga is the offering of the best and the choicest of the material objects such as flowers etc. at the feet of God.¹ Without internal offering, external offering has no meaning. Here the purity of the material objects of offering testifies to the purity of the intentions of the votary.
- (iii) Pūjā—By Pūjā is meant the offering of curd mixed with honey and ghee.² Animal-offering, here, is a symbolism which stands for the offering of one's own self.
- (iv) Pūjana—Pūjana is the offering of cooked meal to the deity.³ It signifies the sense of dedication of everything to the Divine.
- (v) Saṁpradāna—Saṁpradāna is to give away to others the objects offered to the deity.⁴ It means sharing with the other members of the family, the society, the community, the state or for that matter all humanity or creation in the blessings of God and Divine Bliss.
- (vi) Vahni Samtarpaṇa—It is oblation poured into fire for the sake of the deity.⁵
- (vii) Pitryāga—It is offering made to the manes. It signifies the idea that devotion to God is an inheritance and an acquisition both. It is the Divine in the manes who is the real object of worship.⁶
- (viii) Anuyāga—Anuyāga is Prāṇāgnihavana or the offering of the vital force⁷ for the propitiation of the

1 to 5. P. R. page 109.

6. P. R. page 114.

7. P. R. page 109.

deity. It suggests the importance of internal sacrifice.

In this Ijyā-kṛtya, the essentials of the other Śrī Vaiṣṇava kṛtyas or duties are included. It is the yoni¹ or the source and sustenance of other duties. The Ijyā or the worship of God is the means as well as the end. It is no means to any other end. It is in this spirit that it has to be performed by a Śrī Vaiṣṇava. The worshipper is a Paramaikāntin or one for whom God is both the Prāpya or the end and the Prāpaka or the means. The purpose of worship is worship itself. Even the bliss of self-realisation is not looked upon as the purpose of Ijyā.² The feeling of self-complacency that may arise in the bliss of God-realisation is also to be shunned as sacrilege.

This Ijyā is enjoined upon a Śrīvaiṣṇava who is a Paramaikāntin and as such is conscientious enough to avoid anything that does not befit him. As a Śrīvaiṣṇava is scrupulous to select the best of the flowers, the best of the fruits, the best of the waters and so on, for the worship of the deity, so, he should be equally or more scrupulous in selecting the best of his feelings, in introspecting his own being and in scrutinizing his own mind and heart, since, he is a precious thing of offering to God, much more precious than the flower, or the fruit.³ A Paramaikāntin has to seek refuge in the forgiveness of God for all his acts of omission and commission, done consciously or unconsciously. He should so conduct himself as to avoid all conflict between Divine justice and Divine mercy for the sake of his poor humble self. In suffering, it is more ennobling to be silent than to be shouting. Thirty-two crimes against the deity are enumerated in the Śrīvaiṣṇava scriptures.⁴ All these are to be avoided or if

1 & 2. P. R. page 140.

3. P. R. page 111.

4. P. R. page 142.

committed inadvertently, are to be done away with by seeking refuge in God's mercy and by the practice of self-penitence. One who is so well disciplined can best perform the Ijyā of God.

In this connection, the Sāttvata Sūhitā, as Vedānta Deśika points out,¹ holds a somewhat different view which is this : The Ijyā of the Indwelling Divine can be performed by those alone who perform the sacrifice of their soul for the Supreme Soul. The Ijyā of the cosmically manifesting Divine can be performed with Mantras by those who perform the Aṣṭāṅga yoga in parts and are Vedavit and Brāhmaṇa by caste. The Ijyā of the same cosmic form of God can be done without Mantras by those who are Kṣatriya or Vaiśya or Śūdra by caste and have entered upon the life of self-surrender or Prapatti. But the Ijyā of the Divine Incarnations can be performed by the Śrīvaiṣṇavas of all the four castes. But Vedānta Deśika does not give his support to the above castewise Ijyā of God. According to him, a Paramaikāntin, irrespective of caste or class, can enter upon the course of Ijyā prescribed for a true Śrīvaiṣṇava. Singleness of purpose is the secret of the Śrīvaiṣṇava life. A 'Paramaikāntin' is the real performer of the Ijyā, the third of the five-fold Śrīvaiṣṇava duties of life.

Svādhyāya

Svādhyāya is one of the essentials of Śrīvaiṣṇava culture. It is the fourth of the Pañcakāla Kṛtyas. Svādhyāya in common parlance means reading or study. The inclusion of Svādhyāya in the duties of a Śrīvaiṣṇava is significant. It has been responsible for the preservation of the ancient Tamil and Sanskrit Śrīvaiṣṇava lore against great odds, political and social and economic. It has been responsible for the

1. P. R. page 143.

preservation of the works of Śrī Vedānta Deśika. It is through this that any Śrīvaiṣṇava can commune with the master-minds of his faith and persuasion. It keeps the torch of knowledge burning bright amidst the gloom of ignorance and despair and disillusionment. In raising Svādhyaṃya to a regular moral and spiritual duty, the Śrīvaiṣṇava teachers have done a real service to the cause of Indian culture. Everyday the lamp of knowledge will have to be kindled, kept burning and filled with the oil of Svādhyaṃya. Svādhyaṃya is thus one of the essential elements of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

What are the items of Svādhyaṃya of the Śrīvaiṣṇavite ethical and spiritual discipline? The first is the hearing of the exposition of the sacred scriptures with a view to replenishing one's knowledge day by day. The second is the thinking upon the Śāstraic learning so that fresh strides may be made into the field of knowledge. The third is dissemination of learning. The fourth is discussion or Vād, which, when done in the spirit of personal disinterestedness is the best means of Svādhyaṃya. The last is the Japa of the Mantras that embody the essence of all knowledge. The above four items of Svādhyaṃya apply to those Śrīvaiṣṇavas who have gone through the proper discipline of education in their early life. The fifth item i. e. Japa is the universal Svādhyaṃya which is meant for each and every God-minded person.

The main purpose of Svādhyaṃya is not knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but, for the sake of progressing in the sphere of Śrīvaiṣṇava spiritualism. What is emphasized in this Svādhyaṃya is contemplation rather than a mere revolving of the Mantra in mind. It is contemplation rather than mechanical repetition of the syllables of spiritual wisdom which is the real purpose of Svādhyaṃya¹—

1. P. R. page 143.

‘यच्छ्रुतं न विरागाय न धर्माय न शान्तये
सुबद्धमपि शब्देन काकवाशितमेकं तत् ।’

The Svādhyāya, like the yoga, the fifth of the Pañca-kālakṛtyas, is in a way, involved in all the rest of the Śrī-vaiṣṇava ethical and spiritual duties. Done in the proper spirit, the Svādhyāya is the best of the disciplines of human life.

Yoga

Yoga, is the natural culmination of all the other Pañca-kāla kṛtyas. All Pañcakāla Kṛtyas suggest the impulsive love of a Śrīvaiṣṇava towards the Cosmic Divine and the Transcendental Supreme. The Yoga, the climax of this impulsive love is defined as :¹

‘आत्मप्रयत्नसापेक्षा विशिष्टा या मनोगतिः
तस्याः ब्रह्मणि संयोगो योग इत्यभिधीयते ॥’

This Yoga, thus, is the unbroken attachment of one’s devoted mind to the Divine Supreme. This yoga is the complete self-surrender of the Soul to the Supreme Being.² It means detachment from world and attachment to God.

According to the Sampradāya of Śrīvaiṣṇavism, the yoga which is equivalent to Prapatti is to be practised not only with regard to the Para or the Transcendental, the Vyūha or the Cosmic, the Vibhava or the Incarnate and the Antaryāmin or the Indwelling, but with regard to the Arcā or the Image also. The Divine in the image is accessible to all. As food is essential for the health of the body, so is yoga essential for the health of the soul.

So far we have seen what the five-fold Śrī Vaiṣṇava duties mean and stand for. A life so planned and disciplined

1. P. R. page 146.

2. P. R. page 119.

or Śrīvaiṣṇavised has been idealized by Vedānta Deśika in the following glowing terms¹

‘एवं वर्तमानस्य सर्वः कालोऽप्यवन्ध्यो भवति, सर्वे व्यापाराः कैङ्कर्यरूपाः भवन्ति, सर्वोऽप्यानुषङ्गिको भोगः क्रीडाशुकक्षीरास्वादन्यायेन स्वामिभोगशेषभूतो भवतीति भगवत्कैङ्कर्यरतेः परमैकान्तिनोऽनादिमायानिशावसाने अनन्तमोक्ष-वासरप्रारम्भे च प्रत्यूषवदास्थितोऽयमायुःशेषकालः’

Or ‘the life of a real Prapanna is the Dawn of Life Divine. It suggests the extinction of all ethical interestedness. This life is the real mystery of life, the only practical mysticism.’²

‘अहो हरिं ब्रुवन्नेवं मुक्तिमैत्यप्यहो अहो ।

अहो अहो सुलभता कृपा चैयमहो अहो ॥’

Those who lead this life are the practical men of the practical world and what they offer is their pure mind or their purest inner being.³—

The guiding star of this life is implicit faith in Divine Goodness and an undying hope of realising God in man and man in God. This life is the real promise of life Divine⁴—

‘अतो यथाधिकारं यथाशक्यमत्र श्रद्धधानैर्दयार्द्रहृदयदेशिकोपदेशपूर्वकमनु-प्रविश्य देशकालदशाद्यानुगुण्येनाच्छिद्रं यथाक्रमं समाहृत्य वाऽनुतिष्ठद्विरनन्य प्रयोजनैः परमैकान्तिभिरनवधिकपरमपुरुषचरणपरिचर्यारूपमपवर्गैर्द्वयं यथारोग्यं यथामोग्यं चात्रैव भोक्तव्यमिति सिद्धम् ।’

1. P. R. page 149.

2. P. R. page 153.

3 & 4. P. R. page 154.

THE ŚRĪ VAIṢṆAVA CULT AND RITUALISM

‘One adequate support
For the calamities of mortal life
Exists—one only ; an assured belief
That the procession of our fate,* howe'er
Sad or disturbed, is ordered by a Being
Of infinite benevolence and power ;
Whose everlasting purposes embrace
All accidents, converting them to good,

The underlying idea of the above approximates to the idea of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism as religion as well as cult and ritualism. The sacraments of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism which look unæsthetic to us at present have been justified on their own grounds by their preachers and performers. Be it as it may, the one sense that stands out supreme in the Śrī Vaiṣṇava cult and ritualism is that the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas want to be marked out as votaries of God. It is strange how the religion of Rāmānuja which stands for Divine Unity, labels the whole world as un-Śrīvaiṣṇavite. It is all the more strange how Śrī Vaiṣṇavism, the religion of heart for Nammālvār, the religion of head for Rāmānuja and the universal religion of man for Vedānta Deśika could ultimately take on so much of sacramental appendage as to conceal the real religious spirit.

But the cult of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism was the need of the day. It has outlived its utility now. At its inception, it was necessary for more reasons than one i. e. social, religious, political and so on. In the times of Vedānta Deśika it

was all the more necessary in as much as it preserved the social Śrī Vaiṣṇava order against Moslem vandalism. Why it was solemnly enjoined upon the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas was that the Śrī Vaiṣṇava teachers thought of some sort of religious externalism as necessary for the inner religion of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Although these sacraments did not—and how could they!—win the political war of India at the time of Vedānta Deśika, yet, they, somehow or other, helped the Hindu community hold against the common enemy. In the midst of social disintegration due to the rigidity of the caste system, the cult of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism was a great unifying factor for the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas. Besides, the lower castes also were given a status equal to that of the higher castes by the cult and the ritualistic externalism of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion.

The Śrīvaiṣṇava cult is of a social and communal character and significance. For instance, the 'Sudarśana Dhāraṇa' and the 'Pāñcājanya Dhāraṇa' as prescribed for the Śrī Vaiṣṇava fraternity, aim at the symbolic presentation of the Vaikuṇṭha on earth where each and every man is a servant of God with the visible signs of voluntary service. The disc and the conch have been prescribed, as Vedānta Deśika thinks, with the following ideas.¹

- (i) That the Sudarśana or the disc and Pāñcājanya or the conch, the marks of the Arcā of Gōḍ, the Divine lover of the human soul, if carried by people on their person will symbolize their love and affection for God.
- (ii) That they remind their receiver of the ideal of detachment from Saṃsāra and attachment to God.
- (iii) That they are necessary for certain other Śrī

1. S. R. page 42 and 60.

Vaiṣṇava duties such as the worship of Viṣṇu in Śrī Vaiṣṇava shrines. ,

- (iv) That they are conducive to some unseen good.
- (v) That they add internally and externally some unseen merit to the spirit of religion.
- (vi) That there is a spontaneous urge for them in the heart of people.
- (vii) That they have been coming down like spiritual inheritance from the ancient seers.
- (viii) That they distinguish a Śrī Vaiṣṇava from a non-Śrī Vaiṣṇava.
- (ix) That they suggest the ideal of intrepidity even in the circumstance of death and deadly torture, and,
- (x) That they remind a Śrī Vaiṣṇava of the ideal of peace and good-will and final release.

To us, none of the above 10 reasons except probably the (iii) and the (viii) can appeal. Do the Śrī Vaiṣṇava teachers believe only in the worship of the image of God and not in the worship of the Transcendental Divine? But Viśiṣṭādvaita cannot be established until and unless the Transcendental were duly loved and worshipped. Even the (III) and the (VIII) are mere cult and ritualism, without any moral or spiritual significance. Śāstraic imperative may be found for them but, how can such a Śāstra teaching such a cult and ritualism be regarded 'मातापितृभ्योऽपि वत्सलतरम्' or dearer than parents, more charitable than parents and more concerned about our moral and spiritual welfare than even the parents?

Yet there is enough sense in the sacramentalism of the branding of the disc and the conch on the right and the left arms, respectively, of a Śrī Vaiṣṇava, if it is regarded as a

symbol for the service of God and man and if the few who have it do not decry the others without it.

Thus it is not enough to say¹—

ततश्च सर्वान्तरात्मत्वेन सर्वशेषिणं बासुदेवं विशेषतो यथावस्थितं जानन्
ब्राह्मणः स्वात्मनः शेषत्वानुरूपं शेषिणो बासुदेवस्य लाम्छन् चक्रं शङ्खं च
विभृयादिति वेदवित्तिद्वान्तः ।

The Sudarśana and the Pāñcajanya-branding may be looked upon as the Kaiñkarya-sign suggestive of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava ideal of self-less service to God and man²—

‘चक्रादिधारणं पुंसौ परसंवन्धवेदनम् ।

पतिव्रतनिमित्तं हि वलयादिविभूषणम् ॥’

After the branding of the disc and the conch what is ritualistically enjoined upon a Śrī Vaiṣṇava is the Ūrdhva-Puṇḍra or the Śrī Vaiṣṇava caste-mark. The Ūrdhva-Puṇḍra is the symbolic expression of a Śrī Vaiṣṇava’s resolve to lead spiritual life.³ It is the common sign of all the Śrī Vaiṣṇavas of all the castes.⁴ Much emphasis has been laid on its daily practice by the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Saṁhitās. The human body without the symbol of the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra has been decried as a carcass⁵, an ugly sight to look at. One who puts on the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra has been declared the votary of God, the object of Divine endearment, the abode of virtues and the fit receptacle of final beatitude.⁶ Any doubt concerning the supra-sensuous verity of the ritualism of Ūrdhva Puṇḍra has been regarded as anathema. In spite of all this, one cannot understand any symbolic sense in the differentiation of the caste-mark of a Vaḍagalai from that of a Tēngalai.

It seems that saint Ṇammālvār, in moments of mystic rapture, saw no difference in the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra done with

1. S. R. page 48

2. S. R. page 54.

3. S. R. page 65.

4. S. R. page 61.

5. S. R. page 62.

6. S. R. page 61.

sacred dust and the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra done with ashes. But Vedānta Deśika did not like any ambiguity with regard to the above. He would rather interpret the Tamil word for 'ashes' to mean either the dust underneath the Lord's feet or the sacred powder, if any, than have anything to do with the practice prevalent in Śaivism.

The Ūrdhva Puṇḍra is of the shape of the flame of a lamp. But the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra which is enjoined upon a Śrī Vaiṣṇava is of the form of the foot-print of Viṣṇu. There must be some space left between the three lines of the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra. If there is no space left it means that Viṣṇu and Śrī have been given no space to live in the human body ! If there is space left, it means that the human body is fit to enshrine Viṣṇu and Śrī.¹ It is strange, indeed, how the human body, which the Viśiṣṭādvaitin metaphysically conceives of as the Śarīra of the Śarīrin, changes its nature if it does not have the Ūrdhva Puṇḍra !

Vedānta Deśika prescribes as many Ūrdhva Puṇḍras as one may choose to have or afford to have.²

Another important item of the Śrī Vaiṣṇava cult and ritualism is the use of the offerings to the deity by the devotees. It may be remembered in this connection that Manu³ does not prescribe the use of the Devāṇna and the 'Haviṣ'. The Śaiva ritualism also prohibits, likewise, the use of the 6 kinds of Nirmālya⁴ viz 'Deva-Sva' or the immovable property dedicated to the deity, 'Deva Dravya' or the movable property belonging to the deity, 'Naivedya' or objects of offering, 'Nivedita' or objects offered, 'Caṇḍa Dravya' or charities from the offerings and Nirmālya or what is left of the offerings to the deity. In opposition to the

1. S. R. page 71

2. S. R. page. 76

3. & 4. S. R. page 77, 83.

above, the Śrī Vaṣṇava Saṁhitās sanction the use of the objects consecrated to the deity. This practice is symbolic of the spiritual discipline suggested by the Īsopaniṣad that man must not appropriate anything that is not an offering to God—‘तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथाः’¹

But the Īsopaniṣad does not preach any hatred towards the Śaivite practice of not using the offering. Here the symbolism is of a different nature and means that no object offered or meant for offering to the deity should be appropriated as the devotee has no right to do so and as it shows avarice and attachment lurking in his mind and heart.

The above three main points of Śrī Vaiṣṇava ritualism, which have met Vedānta Deśika’s consideration reach up to the worship of the arcā or the image of Viṣṇu. What about the worship of the Indwelling Divine, the Transcendental Divine and the Absolute Divine? Even the Śrī Vaiṣṇava teachers will not admit the establishment of the ‘Arcā-Viśiṣṭādvaita’ or the conception of the image as the Śarīrin and the Divine Indweller and the Transcendental Divine as the Śarīra!¹

One may say, as Vedānta Deśika probably likes to suggest, that the worshipful attitude towards the image is symbolic of the constant contemplation of the Divine Indweller in the human heart and the Transcendental Divine inside and outside the cosmos. But the actual practice is so much apathetic towards the symbolic suggestion that one forgets the real in the midst of the unreal.

For Vedānta Deśika, who has the sense and the sagacity to suggest the ideal of the worship of the Divine in the lines²

1. Īsopaniṣad-1

2. S. S. 10.95.

किं विज्ञानैः किं तपोदानयज्ञैः
 किं वान्यैश्च त्वत्परित्यागदीनैः ।
 ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं तत्त्वतश्च प्रवेष्टुं
 शक्यं ब्रह्मानन्यभाजा त्वयैव ॥'

which mean to universalise the Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion, such ritualistic bickerings¹ —

‘शमितभवभयानां शङ्खचक्रादिचिह्नै
 दिविषदधिकभूम्ना दीप्यतामूर्ध्वपुण्ड्रैः ।
 प्रथितगुणगणानां प्रापणप्राशनाद्यै,
 रयमहमनघानामस्मि पात्रं दयायाः ॥’

seem simply undesirable. It seems Viśiṣṭādvaita and Śrī Vaisnavism have not been realised as forming one compact whole, one philosophical unity or one religious sythesis. Although the first teachers of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and the few great Rāmānujists, Vedānta Deśika occupying a great place amongst them, were for the spirit of religion, yet the common man was for the letter of religion only. One cannot blame Vedānta Deśika for this. It is the Śrī Vaiṣṇava Samhitās to blame, which, while containing the essentials of the religion of self-surrendering devotion to the Divine, beguiled the common man with ritualistic externalism and show.

CHAPTER IV

LIFE DIVINE : THE ULTIMATE IDEAL

In Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism, as has already been stated, it is Prapatti or intuitive selfless love and service alone which is the only philosophy and the only religion of human life. In all the human attainments, the attainment of the spirit of Prapatti is the real attainment. The life of Prapatti in the mortal world is the glimpse of the life of God in the immortal divine existence. As the sense of the cosmic evolution is the revelation of the Divine purpose, so the sense of human life is the revelation of Life Divine. In fact, all the cycles of the cosmic creation are contained in the eternity of the spiritual evolution which alone is the meaning of Divine Reality. As the Being is immanent in the becoming, so is the life of the Being immanent in the life of the becoming. Still the transcendental essence remains all intact and is the source and sustenance of all that is and becomes. It is this which is the supreme sense of the Absolute, the Brahman, the Great Reality.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion presents a pure and perfect universe with everything pure and perfect. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy analyses the universe of our sense and imagination as the real expression of the Divine Being ; all the material and the non-material entities, as the modes of God and all that is, as the outpouring of the depthless Brahma Hrada. Where is the meeting ground for the religion of the Bhāgavatas and the philosophy of the Vedānta ? If both the universes run parallel, does it not mean that religion can never meet philosophy and Brahma Darśana can never result from Brahma Jijñāsā ? Vedānta Deśika is fully conscious of this paradox,

which appears to be defying all sense and reason, but which is easily solved in the supreme sense of the Divine omniscience. The problem has been presented by Vedānta Deśika¹ in the following manner :—

- (i) Śuddhasr̥ṣṭi Vs. Aśuddha Sr̥ṣṭi.
- (ii) Śuddha Vibhūti Vs. Aśuddha Vibhūti.
- (iii) Nitya Vibhūti Vs. Anitya Vibhūti.
- (iv) Dayā Vs. Līlā², and,
- (v) Life Divine Vs. Human Life.

The problem is of a unitary nature ; its presentation as shown to be five-fold, is also, in fact, a unitary one, the only differing being the difference of terminology or symbolism of suggestion. To the human mind, the cosmic existence may appear to be the imperfect expression of the Divine Reality. But to the Divine mind, all the material and the spiritual manifestations must remain ever perfectly divine as it is the Divine will which is the primal cause and which operates for Its own sake and in Its own way. In the Divine Integration all the factors of such seeming conflict are subsumed as productive of real concordance.

The Sr̥ṣṭi or the cosmic creation, which according to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic philosophy is the effectualisation of the Prime Causality, the Brahman, the Transcendental Reality means in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism, the Vibhūti, or the glory of the Bhagavān, the Divine Being, the Śarīrīn or the soul of the cosmos. 'Śuddha' and 'Aśuddha' as its two different characters mean only the difference of vision. For God all His creation is divine and essentially 'Śuddha' in as much as it is His Will which is the force behind the material and the spiritual evolution. But for man the real spiritual universe must ever remain the Great Beyond—the Vaikuṇṭha, the abode of the Divine

1. T. M. K. 3.61-64 with Sarvārtha Siddhi and N. S. page 235-236.

2. Dayā Śataka.

in His full state. And it is for the glimpse of this that man requires his philosophy, his theology, his arts, and what not. All human religion is a means to the attainment of this which in human phraseology may be expressed by diverse names—Parama Pada, Tripād Vibhūti, Parama Vyoma, and so on. As a matter of fact, God in His full divine state in the Divine Abode is the same as the immanent Divine in the material world of ours. Even if the Divine Abode be transcendental, it is essentially immanent in our terrestrial existence. Ultimately, the life of God, howsoever divine it may be, is being lived, though partly, in the life of man and all the cosmic creation. Otherwise Viśiṣṭādvaita will remain a mere philosophical speculation. But the fact is that it is the real realisation of Reality. Until and unless all the aspects of the life of man and nature find their reintegration into the bosom of the Infinite Reality, there can be no meaning of man, nature and God and no sense of the ultimate unity of all reality—‘एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्’.

Why, then, the differentiation between the ‘Ekapād Vibhūti’ and the ‘Tripādvibhūti’ in Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism? Vedānta Deśika offers the explanation that God being immanent in all conceivable manner in the universe of matter and mind is yet not exhausted, but, remains ever the inexhaustible Great Being—the Transcendental Absolute in whom all that is and has its being is eternally contained and composed. In the realisation of the Transcendental Being—the Eternal Reality—in all Its manifestations, the spiritual seeker, who has to offer his contrite heart and soul, believes that the world around is the world of trials and tribulations, the imperfect abode of the Being, the darkness enveloping the immortal light and that the real spiritual world of his dreams, the fit abode of God, must necessarily be beyond the reach of the vast universe. It is the spirit of spiritual

contrition, the consciousness of 'Ākiñcanya' which forms the angle of vision to look at the Land of Immortality beyond this mortal world. But to imagine the Divine Abode to be exclusive of our cosmic existence is simply combrous and unfounded.¹ The Parama Pada is meant for devout meditation alone.² The fulness of love and devotion and service which must be the guiding principle of the Parama Pada can and does find an expression, though incomplete, in our this very every-day world. The perfect arts and sciences, the sublimest literature and philosophy, the purest ways and means of the realisation of Reality which all are essentially possible in the real home of God—'दिव्यं स्थानमजरं चाप्रमेयम्', can, yet, be similar to their ill-done copies as existing in the world of mortals. The purest matter which must constitute the Divine Land has still allowed some of the minutest ingredients of its spiritual effulgence to enter into the constitution of the cosmos. The self-luminosity which is the essential nature of the spiritual universe remains untained in its immanence in our terrestrial existence. The 'Acit' or the material principle of our universe is nonsensient for the evolution of the Cit or the spiritual principle of life in the supreme guidance of the Omniscient Being. But the 'Akṣara', the Parama Vyoma or the Divine principle of the Divine world can be characterised with self-revelation for the sake of the fullest revelation and realisation of the Divine in His glory and grace.³ It may not be self-conscious, otherwise, it will not remain as 'Parama Pada' but will become, instead, the Paramātmā Himself. As it constitutes the Divya Maṅgala Vighraha of the Bhagavān—the really true, the eternally effulgent and the infinitely beautiful, its own constitution must needs be really true, eternally self-effulgent, infinitely beautiful.⁴ Even then it is solely depen-

1. T. M. K. 3.61 with Sarvārtha Siddhi.

2. N. S. page 235.

3. T. M. K. 3-62 and N. S. page 235.

4. N. S. page 235.

dent on the Divine Will as it is only a medium of Divine manifestation. As such it can have no agency and no means of enjoyment of anything else. It is itself the means of eternal enjoyment for God and the devout servants of God. Even in its sublimest state it is eternally spiritually related to the material constitution of our universe which cannot be explained except in the sense of the imperfect emergence of the Abode of Light and Love and Bliss and Beauty. With the perfect emergence of the 'Parama Pada' in the 'Saṁsāra' on the eve of the universal divinization of all the elements of existence, one may even hope that the real or the apparent duality of the Anitya Vibhūti and the Nitya Vibhūti will be so superbly synthetized that what will result will be simply transcendental, superbly etherial, one Divine Deluge in which all lose their materiality and gain supreme spirituality. The spiritual aspirant has no need to run from this world of woes and worries to take shelter in the Divine Land. He has to strive for the regeneration of the society or the state or the universe of men in the undying hope of the ultimate purpose of God in His creation. In the perfection of such striving, such activities done in the spirit of Prapatti, the everyday world will change into the Parama Pada and the human life will start responding to and corresponding with the Divine life. So long as the millennium of such universal spiritual regeneration does not dawn, the Prapannas will have to die before they become Muktas and the votaries of God must pass through the ordeal of mortality before they enter into the land of Immortality.

The Advaitic 'Mukti' called 'Jivanmukti' is not palatable to the Viśiṣṭādvaitins. But in the supreme spiritual find of the Parama Pada of Viśiṣṭādvaitic Vaiṣṇavism, in which all life, all the elements of our universe, will, some time or the other, have to participate, the ideal of 'Jivanmukti' will

naturally become a regular universal practice, the real force of Prapatti working everywhere through the superbly suitable medium of the Parā Prakṛti. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of 'Mokṣa' as the departure of the Prapanna from his material abode and tabernacle and his arrival at the Divine Abode of Bliss Eternal, through a spiritual and symbolic journey, in the midst of the Divine Scenes of divine joy and inspiration, is the presentation of the highest ideal of spiritual liberation possible to all of us before we all become the subjects of the Divine State or the Parama Pada.

The journey as well as the goal of human life is the same Life Divine. Human life and Life Divine are the two aspects of the same will of God. Our life lived in the Life of God is our aim and attainment, our ideal and realisation, at the same time. 'Viśiṣṭādvaitam' accordingly is the universal reality and realisation.

Part IV.

**VEDĀNTA DEŚIKA :
THE POET OF BHAKTI AND
PRAPATTI**

HIS HYMNS AND DEVOTIONAL POEMS

Vedānta Deśika's hymns contain sprinklings of fine poetry. It is his intense religious faith that has raised his hymns to the heights of poetry. They are not mere sentimental effusions. They are his very life-blood and have a virile and constructive nature. The poetry of the hymns is due to the sincerity of his devotion and the intensity of his love towards God.

The first and the foremost of his hymns, a fine poem of love and devotion, is—

1. *The Pādukā-Sahasra.*

Vedānta Deśika says that he sees the fulfilment of his dream as a poet of love and devotion to God in his hymn—the Pādukā-Sahasra.¹ In fact, the Pādukā-Sahasra is a poetic idealization of the doctrine of self-surrender or Prapatti, the chief contribution of Vaiṣṇavism to the religious lore of man. The common human love in the poet's heart issues forth in devotion and love towards God.

In the Pādukā-Sahasra, we hear the unmistakable voice of the soul of our poet. All his Srīvaiṣṇava religious aspirations, all his Viśiṣṭādvaitic spiritual contemplations find a poetic articulation in this hymn. The origin of this hymn on the Pādukā lies deep in the life of the poet. The Pāduka is the great symbol of Divine Grace. It has a singular significance for Vedānta Deśika. He thinks that if man is only submissive and surrenders all his egoistic demands before God, he solves all the tortuous problems of life. His actions,

1. Pa. S. 32-27.

his thoughts, his feelings, his sentiments—all combine together in the composition of the hymn.¹

The Pādukā-Sahasra is not a systematic Kāvya but a composite poem², a collection of poetic stanzas, having devotion and divine love as their source of inspiration as well as their main subject of treatment.

In the first-eleven Paddhatis of the hymn, the poet follows the Rāmāyaṇa and derives his inspiration from Vālmiki's poetry. The verses of these Paddhatis have a distinct ring about them which is conspicuous by its absence in the remaining Paddhatis. The poet, in a happy mood of contemplation, broods over the poetry and the philosophy of the Rāmāyaṇa. To him the vision of Vālmiki is the vision of a saint, a poet and a philosopher.

The will to capture the vision of Vālmiki becomes his all-absorbing concern. He analyses the whole of the Rāmāyaṇa to find the Pādukā-episode as the central episode. The 'Pādukā' of the Rāmāyaṇa has a spiritual significance for him. It means two things, first intense love and devotion of the devotee and second, inevitability of Divine response.

As Vālmiki conceives of the perfection of humanity in the character of Rāma, so does Vedānta-Deśika conceive of the perfection of divinity in the symbolism of the Pādukā.³

In the sketch of Sītā's character, the poetry of Vālmiki shows blooms of great spiritual loveliness. Vedānta Deśika sees a striking resemblance between the beauty of Vālmiki's 'Sītā' and the beauty of his 'Pādukā'—the symbol of God's providence. In fact, the Rāmāyaṇa exercises a great influence on Vedānta-Deśika in his conception of the Pādukā-hymn. It allows him to move on the lofty spheres of

1. Pa. S. 32.26.

2. Pa. S. Commentary, page.

3. Pa. S. 1.18.

and sing in undying tunes the glory of humanity
 the skirts of Divinity out of sheer ecstasy of love
 ity of service. Anybody who reaches those spheres
 e to his heart's delight, that, the One Principale.
 all its diverse manifestations and that the potent
 n, the strong yearning of love, the positive light
 nbracing intuition of the conscious mental being
 be negated by any intolerant asceticism of philoso-
 arch and research. Truth, Power and Love are
 atever is visible to the eye of devotion, whatever
 ble in austere contemplation, whatever is spiritually
 in the scriptures, and, finally, whatever is emoti-
 fying and invigorating in poetry and art—all stand
 ie reality, Viśiṣṭādvaitam,¹ to be sure.

e is another aspect of the emotional trend of the
 ymn. We know that Vedānta-Deśika ever felt the
 of the wave of spiritual emotionalism set in motion
 ālvār, the great Tāmil saint. In fact he was steeped
 iments of Ṇammālvār's songs. Whenever he had
 philosophy, he took Rāmānuja with him. But with
 s, and his aspirations it was only Ṇammālvār who
 s associated. He was a devout follower of Ṇam-
 eligion and philosophy—the personal religion of love
 ilosophy of the unity of love and duty. Whenever
 heart being flooded with such feelings he would
 rything excepting Ṇammālvār and begin to sing.
 that the 'Pādukā' of Vālmīki, the 'Pādukā' of the
 e shrines and the saint Ṇammālvār, the personi-
 the Pādukā—all these form a unity in the poet's
 he expresses this unity in the devotional effusions
 ukā-Sahasra. The main influence of Ṇammālvār's
 he Pādukā-hymn consists in the latter's emotional

realisation of the feelings of a votary of God. The poet forgets that he is to sing the glory of the All-Glorious and the mercy of the All-Merciful. He starts offering, instead, his sincerest regards to the devotee of God.

The love of God crystallises in the love of God's creation. This indeed is real Prapatti or self-surrender. We feel this happy transition in the Pādukā-hymn.

The Pādukā-hymn views the Great God, the unknowable of the Upaniṣads, as Grace incarnate. But it does not mean that man has to be always full of tears at the door of the Divine. Those who understand Prapatti as an inactive, pessimistic way of God-realisation, do not understand it at all. They must know that Providence does not nurse the inefficient weakling. Prapatti is a state of mind and soul and the whole being, in which, all one thinks ; all one does, all one feels, is for God and God alone. The Pādukā-hymn sings of this Prapatti to us.

Our poet is a Pādukā-Sevaka. His readers are Pādukā-Sevakas. The music in the poet's heart, the music of love and life and service and sacrifice creeps in upon the readers' heart and keeps reverberating there.

2. *The Hayagrīva Stotra*

As its name suggests, it is a hymn on Hayagrīva, the presiding deity of learning in Śrivaishnavism. Vedānta-Deśika worshipped Hayagrīva throughout his life. For him the God of learning is the Indweller of his heart, the Soul of his soul, the Inner Ruler Immortal.

There are many ways in which the poet worships Hayagrīva, in this hymn. He pictures to his mind the God of Learning as a Divine Light given to man to lead him on to the path of virtue, truth and happiness.¹

1. H. S. 2.

Then he sees Him in the form of a Guru or teacher who lights the lamp of knowledge in the heart of the student with the spark of his own wisdom.

With much emotion and imagination, the poet writes this hymn on Hayagrīva. With it, begins his literary career. It has always remained a torch of light with him.

Reading this hymn on Hayagrīva, we read in, fact, our poet's personal life-story which begins and ends in the worship of Light and Learning.

3. *Bhagavaddhyāna-Sopāna.*

Vedānta-Deśika was a great lover of Kālidāsa's poetry. To him, each and every word of Kālidāsa, was pregnant with poetic significance. His soul enjoyed a perfect communion with the soul of Kālidāsa. It was under the impact of Kālidāsa's inspiration that he was able to produce many gems of poetry. The Bhagavaddhyāna-Sopāna is one of them. It is a remarkable instance of his creative as well as appreciative genius. It seems he had long occupied himself with the contemplation of the Kumāra Saṁbhava line 'आरोहणार्थं नवयौवनेन कामस्य सोपानमिव प्रयुक्तम्'¹. The context of the Kumāra Saṁbhava i.e. the description of Umā's beauty, seems to have gone out of his mind and in its stead, had stepped in, the physical charm of the Lord Raṅganātha. He thinks within himself on the steps of meditation—'द्व्यस्तस्व सोपानम्' following Kālidāsa's vision of the steps of love 'कामस्य सोपानम्'. In his meditation, Divine Love reveals itself as the sublimation of worldly love. In this meditation it is that he writes the Bhagavaddhyāna-Sopāna, a fine devotional poem, to be sure.

It is evident from the internal references that the hymn is meant to glorify the deity Raṅganātha of Śrīraṅgam. The

1. Kumāra Saṁbhava

Ālwārs had also sung many rapturous songs of Raṅganātha. Our poet follows in their footsteps. He is drawn towards his Raṅganātha. He is drunk in the divine beauty of the deity. In this mood of a lover, he visualises the beauty of his Beloved. It is a Rāja Yoga, pure and simple, which he is out to practise. He fails to analyse whether his Beloved is inside his heart or outside it. In fact, he is enjoying 'चित्तलय' or merging of the mind in the beauty of the Beloved. It is this that results in the melodious poetry of this hymn and reveals the æsthetic susceptibilities of our poet.

Our poet, it seems, realises, in this hymn, the truth of the following ideal of Parāśara Bhaṭṭārya. "It is a common experience that our eyes rivetted towards one side of a beautiful object do not like to go over to the other. Beauty is simply captivating. But we are not satisfied with seeing the parts only. We want to see the whole. What should we do? We have to make ourselves responsive to the vibrations of beauty wherever they come from. If we abandon ourselves to our sense of beauty we are made keenly observant and spiritually enlightened. Apart from the fact that a beautiful object thrills us, it makes us, slowly, but, surely, men of meditation and Yoga".¹

It is the above æsthetic principle that guides Vedānta-Deśika in his vision of the beauty of Raṅganātha. And he says that his contemplative mind is a reservoir of pure water to reflect the beauty of his Lord Raṅganātha.² Thus he sees Beauty in its entirety. The parts vie with one another in the show of their splendours, but the whole is simply graceful and arresting.

The first view of a beautiful object is the impression of its indescribable charm. So very indescribable is the charm

1. Śrīrangarajastava—I. 89

2. B. S. 3

of Raṅganātha that the poet cannot exactly say as to what impresses him most at the first sight. Does he see the features? The springtide of beauty sways over them and he is denied their complete view. So he can only see grace and splendour in the abstract. Ultimately his eyes are invited to a grand feast of light and colour. "Sometimes his Raṅganātha shines bright light a lamp of lustre. Sometimes He appears dark with the excess of light. But He is ever charming. He shines as if He were a gem of great beauty and universal appeal. He is, in fact, the light of lights, the eye of eyes."¹ With much pleasure, the poet tries all his chromatics to suggest to us the first view of the beautiful Raṅganātha. Through this poetry of colours, the poetry of the hymn, looks all the more fascinating.

Then appear, by and by, the individually beautiful features of Raṅganātha. First come the lotus-like feet. The poet's reflective mind mirrors forth the resplendent beauty of the deity's feet. He tries similes and metaphors to express it but gives them up. He takes resort to bare statement of facts. So he says that the feet of Raṅganātha are the grace of grace, the symbol of forgiveness and the favourite resort of the votaries. The beauty of the feet recommends the poet to the sight of the beauty of the thighs. Sanskrit poets have written much by way of description of the thighs of the hero or the heroine. In search of happy metaphors they have travelled, far and wide, in the fairyland of imagination. But we are not fully satisfied with all that they imagine and express. In fact, they seem to restrict the vision of beauty by erecting standards of comparison. Vedānta-Deśika is well aware of this fact. He discards all standards of similarity, the conventionalities of comparison. And how can comparison be possible with the Incomparable! He

describes, therefore, the stream of fascination running down Raṅganātha's face and flowing into the reservoir of the charm of His thighs. Beauty is playing like a bird on the limbs, but it rests only on the thighs.¹

The poet looks on the upper part of the thighs of Raṅganātha's statue. All of a sudden, he gets steeped in the spirit of the great Vaiṣṇava saint, Nammālvār, who, always felt like a blushing bride before Raṅganātha, the bridegroom. He thinks that intensity of divine love is best comparable to the impetuosity of the love of a newly-wed bride for the bridegroom. He approaches Lord 'Rangayuvā' thinking himself to be His ladylove.² Love flows forth like a stream from his whole being. By and by, the navel strikes the eyes of the poet. As soon as he sees the beauty of the navel, he feels he is caught in the whirl-pool of beauty. After the navel, the chest of Raṅganātha, lying in a sleeping posture in the Śrīraṅgam Temple—presents itself to the vision of the poet. At the mere sight of it, he is filled with deep, divine joy. The sweet smell of Tulasī-wreaths encircling the neck of the deity makes him forget himself. It seems it is he alone who can smell the sweetness of Tulasī-leaves and consider it sweeter than the sweetest rose or jasmine. Out of love, the poet, wants to kiss the Lord. He feels like a newly-wed bride silently creeping to the bedside of her lover to make sure if he were awake or asleep, before kissing him. He is simply charmed away. He realises the truth of the Yogic maxim—'देशबन्धः चित्तस्य धारणा'—for, he feels his mind to be at rest before the beauty of Raṅganātha.³ At last, the poet, looks at the face of Raṅganātha, beaming with the smile of welcome to all. He does not follow the ancient poets who lavish their wealth of poetry on the description of face and

1. B. S. 3.

2. B. S. 4.

3. B. S. 7.

facial expressions. He is simply filled with joy when the eyes of Raṅghanātha embrace his inmost being.¹

Our appreciation of the Bhagavaddhyāna Sopāna is not complete unless we analyse the beauty of the expression 'राजन्वत्यः स्थितिमधिगताः वृत्तयश्चेत्तसो मे'² The poet walks on the steps of meditation and as soon as he approaches the Divine Lover he swoons away in His loving embrace. The poet loves Raṅghanātha in the spirit of 'प्रेयसीपारतन्त्र्य'. His poetry kisses the lips of the Divine.

The Rasa of the composition is 'Śṛṅgāra'—the love of the self for the Great Self.

4. *Śrī Stuti.*

In the Śrī Stuti, Vedānta Deśika expresses his idea of Divine Energy. While the Vedic seers were struck with awe at the sight of the powers of Nature, our poet feels an inward impulsive joy at the contemplation of the perceptible and the imperceptible energies of the Divine.

To the Hindu mind Śrī is prosperity. Our poet also glorifies Śrī as prosperity. He is jubilant over the idea of prosperity as a manifestation of Divine Energy.

What the poet wants to emphasize is the inalienability of Śrī or Grace from Viṣṇu or the Divine. All learning, all prosperity, all victory in our life is but the outcome of this Energy, the very essence of God.³

By and by, the poet feels startled when he thinks that even his thoughts are not his, but, Śrī's. Śrī is the cosmic force.⁴ Think of this energy and you will get energetic. Think of the ever-presence of Śrī and you will not sin and suffer. Energy cannot be separated from the source of

1. B. S. 8.

2. B. S. 9.

3. S. 13.

4. S. 12 & 24.

energy. Our poet does not mean this hymn to glorify any particular image of Śrī in a shrine. He suggests, thereby, that Śrī can be best worshipped in one's heart. All the divine attributes of goodness, greatness, beauty, sublimity, power and virtue are but the aspects of Śrī.

The Śrī Stuti is interesting to us because it contains Vedānta Deśika's poetic conception and clarification of the mystery of Śrī.

5. *Abhīti-Stava*.

The Abhīti-Stava reads like a piece of patriotic poetry. In the sweep of its stanzas, we hear the voice of the poet, his heart full of agony, at the sight of devastation raging in the city of Śrīraṅgam. The Moslem invaders, led by Malik-Kāfur (1310-1351 A. D.), the general of Alāud-din, the Delhi emperor, invaded the centres of culture in Southern India and plundered rich cities like Śrīraṅgam, Madura and Conjeevaram. Our poet was an eye-witness to the scenes of spoliaion in Śrīraṅgam. What else could he do in such a plight but pray to the Almighty Providence for help and protection.¹

Apart from the regeneration of spiritual life, the poet longs for the regeneration of political life. How can one commune with the Spirit of one's spirit when one's very person is unsafe and one has to run for life here and there ! A settled government is a condition for the moral and the spiritual betterment of the people. The poet's heart yearns for such a government.²

The personal loss of the poet at the Mohammedan invasion of Śrīraṅgam is so great that he cannot forget it even when away from Śrīraṅgam. Far away in his hiding place

1. A. S. 22.

2. A. S. 20.

at Satya Maṅgalam, he passionately longs for the intervention of the Divine Power to right the wrong.¹

With an unshaken and unshakable faith in the grace and glory of God, the poet believes that his yearnings and prayers will meet their due response. He imagines that his countrymen have overthrown the Mohammedan invaders. He sees through his mind's eye, the revival and the rejuvenation of the centres of learning and culture.

We cannot say that the poet forecasts any political future for his native land in his Abhīti-Stava, but, we may be sure that he has a firm faith in the providence of God and considers the Hindu Sovereignty of Vijayanagar as the Divine response to the meek prayers of his countrymen. The Abhīti-Stava is a poetic relic suggestive of the cultural efflorescence of India of the 13th-14th centuries.

6. *Varadarāja Pañcāśat.*

The Varadarāja Pañcāśat or the fifty stanzas on Varadarāja, the Śrīvaiṣṇava deity of Conjeevaram, appeals to the reader of poetry for two reasons. The first is, that, it entwines the tendrils of its ideas round the Arcā—a form of divine manifestation. The second is, that, it projects the contemplative mind of the poet busy analysing the appeal of the Arcā to the devotee. Not only this, the entire hymn is a monument to the glory that was Kāñcī, the very birth-place of the poet. The deity Varadarāja, Kāñcī and Vedānta Deśika are inseparably associated. It is this association that accounts for the verity and the vigour of the Varadarāja-Pañcāśat.

The Śrīvaiṣṇava scholars, old and new, regard this hymn as the elucidation of the philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita. In

this hymn the poet aims at the suggestion of a devotee's love and reverence for the deity. This Stotra has met the appreciation of the illustrious Appayya Dīkṣita, who, more than once, tried to capture its poetic beauty and devotional intensity, in his own Varadarāja-Stava, a century of verses on the deity of Śiva-Kāñcī.

While analysing the worshipper's outlook on the Arcā of Varadarāja, our poet is carried away by the surge of devotional ecstasy. The beauty of the Varadarāja image is expressed in one stroke of imagination as—‘अस्पृष्टचिन्तापदमामिहृष्यम्’. Try as we might, we fail to analyse the full charm of the expression—‘अस्पृष्टचिन्तापदमामिहृष्यम्’. These words of Vedānta Deśika had moved the famous Advaitācārya Appaya Dīkṣita so much so that he tried to capture their ethereal poetic charm in the composition of his own Varadarāja Stava. We cannot imagine more than Appayya Dīkṣita on the expression ‘अस्पृष्टचिन्तापदमामिहृष्यम्’. It is pure poetry. Its charm will never fade away. The whole of the Varadarāja Pañcāśat, it seems, is hallowed by the presence of this single expression of the Inexpressible.

7. *Devanāyaka Pañcāśat.*

The Devanāyaka Pañcāśat is one of the poetic hymns of Vedānta Deśika. It seems that the poet wrote it under a deep devotional inspiration. In the very first stanza we see the poet in a mystic trance¹. He feels a passionate love for the Arcā. The very thought that he may have to leave the Devanāyaka shrine at calls of duty, turns him mad. He finds himself being tugged by love and duty in opposite directions.²

The statue of Devanāyaka stands, to-day, as strong and magnificent, as, it stood in the days of Vedānta Deśika.

if it were spoiled and smashed to pieces, a sculptor of imagination could carve it out again following the details in the Devanāyaka Pañcāśat. Three words the poet — 'गंभीर-पूर्ण-मधुर',¹ all throbbing with life and quivering emotions. They sum up and hint at the central effect of the Arcā. It is interesting to note here that our poet compares his impressions of Devanāyaka with the impressions of Brahman of the Upaniṣadic seers and feels as if his soul goes out of his body and comes back having dipped in the shining, refrigerated reservoir—the Brahma-Hṛada.

How can the poet forget the image of Devanāyaka? Each and every cut of the sculptor's chisel, in each and every feature of the statue, he feels the fulfilment of art realises, to his utmost delight, the unity existing between the dream of sculpture and the dream of poetry. To commemorate this revelation, this vivid vision of beauty, he writes many a verse. He merges himself in the serene, divine beauty of his Devanāyaka. His mind is at rest, he is happy with himself. Can he feel such madness in the form of a woman that leads to utter disillusionment in the end? A beautiful statue does not appeal to the carnal eye. It appeals only to the ecstatic vision of the votary of God. It is the sublimation of passions which is the aim of the artist and the ambition of the idol-worshipper. And it is the ideal worshipper alone who can enjoy the beauty of the Formless.²

The most impressive aspect of the sculptured Devanāyaka, the one, for which the artist, the art-critic, the artist, the poet and the devotee have the same feeling, is the expression of the eyes. The eyes are the eyes of a sculptured

The poet longs to see these eyes and lingers to see through them, till they beckon him towards the Ideal.

1. Cf. 1. De. P. -9.

2. De. P. 17.

The Devanāyaka Pañcāśat is a devotional piece of poetry. On the one hand, it suggests the sweetness and tenderness of our poet's feelings and on the other, it demonstrates the sensuous qualities of his descriptive art.

8. *Acyuta Śataka.*

The Acyuta Śataka is a century of Prākṛit verses dedicated to the deity of the Tiruvāhīndrapuram Temple in the Arcot district of the Madras Presidency. Its importance lies in the poetic exposition of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic ideas and ideals. It has its leanings towards Viśiṣṭādvaitic emotionalism. Our poet says that our faith and our self-sacrificing love are the eyes which help us see the Divine Being inside as well as outside the Arcā.

In a number of verses of this hymn, the worshipper, is presented, full of longing for union with God. Sometimes he wants to meet God as a bride meets the bride-groom. Sometimes he wants God to accept him as a king accepts his son who has returned from exile.¹ Such feelings of union and separation in Divine love have long been expressed by the Ālvārs or the ancient Tāmil saints. In the Acyuta Śataka it is the songs of the Tāmil saints that reverberate, singing forth the mutual wooings of God and man.

Since the ideas are simple and the feelings are pure, the style of the Acyuta Śataka is simple and sweet. The poem does bear witness to the sincerity of the poet in the expression of his love for the Arcā.

9. *Dehaliśa Stuti.*

It is an ode to the deity of Tirukkoilūr, a place of Śrīvaiṣṇava pilgrimage. An interesting story runs about the shrine at Tirukkoilūr. It is this: 'In the good old days,

1. Ac. S. 100.

there were three saints, Mahat (Peyāl̥wār), Bhūta (Pudatāl̥wār) and Kāsāra (Poigai) who were all divinely inspired. In the course of their respective wanderings they all chanced to visit Tirukkoilūr. One night, there was a heavy down-pour of rains. So they all came, one by one, and sat together on the threshold of a house. To their surprise, they felt as if somebody was sitting in between them and pressing against them. At first, they did not see the fun of it. But ultimately, they realised that it was the Divine Being sitting along with them and pressing them out of love and affection. Suddenly, deeply inspired from within, they burst forth in the praise of the Divine Presence and the providence of God. Each one of them composed one hundred devotional stanzas at that very spot. From that time onwards, the threshold of the house became an object of veneration to all who happened to visit Tirukkoilūr. A shrine sprang up and the deity was called Dehaliśa or the God of the threshold'.

While Vedānta Deśika was young and burnt with the zeal of propagating the ideas and ideals of Śrīvaiṣṇavism, he came to Tirukkoilūr. He knew the story of the shrine. He was there to draw inspiration for his own life. He thought he saw the whole story of Dehaliśa represented in dramatic scenes before his eyes. He was beside himself with joy. He wrote a poem to commemorate that event of his life and he named it the 'Dehaliśa Stuti'. By composing this ode, he did a great service to the Sanskrit-knowing people. In a nutshell, this ode presents the entire strain of the Tāmil songs of the saintly trio of Śrīvaiṣṇavism.

In an almost divinely inspired mood, the poet writes stanzas after stanzas. They all seem to come to his mind without any effort. The ideas of the Tāmil songs of the ancient trio of Ālvārs throngs in upon his mind. He pictures to his mind a splendid divine scene. The All-gracious God

is like a sugar-cane always full of lively and lovely juice for all His lovers. To squeeze the juice of Divine Bliss, the genius of saints and poets is like a cane-crushing machine. The juice that is thus drawn out is a veritable drink of immortality and when it crystallizes like sugar-candy in the form of songs and poems it becomes a perennial source of deep, divine universal joy.¹ What a fine tapestry of imagination and intuition it all is ! We seem to drink, in the same cup with the poet, the drink of sweet poetry, so purely preserved and so generously offered. It is in the alchemy of our poet's imagination that the songs of the three ancient *Ālvārs* are crystallized and taste of Divine Grace and Divine Union. The emotional intensity of the poet is felt when we realise the intensity of his imagination.

In a similar strain, the poet presents the ideas and emotions of his own mind and heart. He says he hopes the Divine Personality to appear before him and clasp him closest to the entire satisfaction of his whole being. The bliss of Divine Union far exceeds the bliss of the clasp of the lover or the bliss of the lap of the mother.

We cannot be satisfied with our appreciation of the *Dehalīśa Stuti*, unless we see the eagerness of the poet in expressing the 'spiritual' unrest lying deep in the songs of the three *Tāmil* saints and deeper still in his own heart of hearts. It is in spiritual life alone that tears from the depth of some divine despair, well-up. The mystics have expressed this 'spiritual' melancholy. In fact, 'spiritual happiness' tastes all the more sweet when it is mixed with this 'spiritual sadness'. Why this unrest in union ? It is because man never thinks himself fit for a permanent partnership in Divine Life. Our soul never thinks itself worthy of the Supreme Soul, worthy

1. *De. S. 6, 7.*

of His love, worthy of His Bliss and worthy of the Divine Inheritance.

X. *Bhū-Stuti.*

The Bhū-Stuti is a piece of poetic composition with many undertones of meanings. It may mean a hymn on Divine Forgiveness. It may suggest a love for realism in the poet's heart, which is expressed, here, in the glorification of Prakṛti, a Divine mode in the Viśiṣṭādvaitic system. It may also be read as a patriotic poem written on Bhāratavarṣa. It may have had as its subject the Arcā of Bhū in the Śrīvaiṣṇava shrine, situated at Idvaindai, a few miles from Madras.

The Bhū-Stuti reads like a hymn on Divine Forgiveness. The Śrīvaiṣṇava religion lays the responsibility of action on man. The Supreme Soul is ever infinitely merciful. The sorrows and sins of man are not the visitations of Divine wrath. It is God's kindness that the sin is realised as sin, and acknowledged with repugnance and chance for a purer life offered as a result of repentance. The Divine Being has the will to save those who seek Him in distress. In our poet's imagination, Divine Forgiveness is 'विश्वम्भरा'¹ the mother of all that was, is and will be. It nourishes the whole creation on its lap. What a wife is to her husband, Divine forgiveness is to God. As a creeper is to a flower, so is Divine Forgiveness to God. What a mighty shore this forgiveness is to stop the surging sea of Divine rage!² On the wings of devotion the poet soars high. He sees the panorama of Divine Forgiveness, encompassing the Supreme Being.

With an equally delicate touch of the brush, the poet paints Prakṛti. Prakṛti is 'Viśvambharā', the sweetheart of God, the 'Viśvambhara'. God cannot move till Matter moves.³

1. Bh. S. 1.

2. Bh. S. 13.

3. Bh. S. 5.

The more does the poet think upon Prakṛti, the more he feels for her undeniable existence.¹ Prakṛti has a fine personality. It is not a mere category of metaphysics that some accept and others reject. It is not fiction but a solid fact. The Absolute or Brahman, a mighty ocean, heaves at the sight of Prakṛti and then begin the tides—the pulsations of Life. The Absolute is an ocean ; the earth, the most visible aspect of Prakṛti, its shore.

The hymn is also suggestive of the poet's patriotic feelings for Bhārata-Varṣa. Much poetic imagination has been lavished by our poet to adore Bhāratavarṣa. The sky up above is imagined to come down below to worship the feet of Bhāratavarṣa. It brings with it the clouds, the jars of gems ; fills them with waters of the seas and the rivers ; puts in them the auspicious leaves of rainbows of diverse hues and worships Bhāratavarṣa in fulness of adoration and joy.²

CHAPTER II.

HIS LYRICS.

1. *Haṁsa Sandeśa*

Vedānta Deśika has written some lyrics of real poetic value. The first of such lyrics is the 'Haṁsa Sandeśa'. As its name suggests, it is a composition on the lines of the *Megha Sandeśa* (i.e. the *Megha Dūta*) of Kālidāsa. Many a Sanskrit poet has imitated the immortal lyric of Kālidāsa. Even a casual glance at the bibliography of *Sandeśa-Kāvya*s in Sanskrit reveals to us the earnestness of Sanskrit poets in writing something matching the *Megha Dūta*. For the Sanskrit poet, the echoes of the hills, the murmuring sounds of the trees, the cooings of the cuckoos and the hummings of the bees – all such sights and sounds appear as messengers of love. There is no difficulty in imagining a messenger of love. The real difficulty lies in finding out the message of love to be transmitted. Vedānta Deśika has a message. His message is the message of Love Divine. His messenger, accordingly, is the 'Haṁsa' the swan, the emblem of purity of mind and heart in ancient as well as medieval or modern Indian literature.

Kālidāsa has chosen the 'Megha', the cloud, as the messenger of human love. The 'Cloud' in Sanskrit poetry stands for the 'Uddīpana' or the excitant of love in human hearts. According to the 'Kavi-Samaya' or the Sanskrit poetic traditions, the 'Haṁsa' (the swan) and the 'Megha' (the cloud) cannot go together. Vedānta Deśika defies this 'Kavi-Samaya' in the sense that he composes his 'Haṁsa Sandeśa' as a complement to the *Megha Sandeśa* of Kālidāsa.¹

In fact, it is our poet's sense of admiration for the Megha Dūta that is mainly responsible for the poetic quality of the 'Haṁsa Sandeśa'. Sanskrit poetry contains only one lyric of human love, which is the 'Megha Sandeśa' and one only of Love Divine, which is the 'Haṁsa Sandeśa'.

The Haṁsa Sandeśa presents Rāma, as the lover, languishing in separation from Sītā, the beloved. Rāma and Sītā symbolize God and the God-mad soul. The Haṁsa stands for the poet or the seer or the saint, who can carry the message of God, the lover, to the soul, the beloved and work selflessly for the union of the lovers, pining in separation caused by the cruel and the wicked Rāvaṇa of Saṁsāra.

The separation of the Divine Lover from His beloved, the human soul, has been a great realisation for the saint Nammālvār. Vedānta Deśika is imbued with the spirit of the great Tamil saint. Very poetically does he present the feelings of the love-lorn Rāma, symbolizing God, for Sītā, the beloved soul, in the following lines¹.—

‘बेलतीतप्रणयविवशं भावमासेदुषोर्नौ
भोगारम्भे क्षणमिव गता पूर्वमालिङ्गनाद्यैः ।
संप्रत्येषा सुतनु शतशः कल्पनासङ्गमैस्ते
चिन्तादीर्घैरपि शकलिता शर्वरी नापयाति ॥’

‘Rāma and Sītā, the God and the God-given soul, have lived together in perfect blissful union in the state of Sāketa, the Vaikuṇṭha. But now, in great agony of separation from his sweetheart, Rāma is restless and in constant contemplation of the bliss that was his. Time hangs heavily on him, for whom it did not exist, while he lived in Sāketa, the abode of Love Eternal.

Though the source of inspiration for the above, is the following Megha Dūta (II.39) verse—

‘अङ्गेनाङ्गं प्रतनु तनुना गाढतप्तेन तप्तं
सास्नेगाश्रुद्रुतमविरतोत्कण्ठमुत्कण्ठितेन ।
उष्णोच्छ्वासं समधिकतरोच्छ्वासिना दूरवर्ती
सङ्कल्पैस्तैर्विशति विधिना वैरिणा रुद्धमार्गः ॥’

but, our poet is not copying from Kalidāsa's original. While Kalidāsa is lamenting over the unfulfilled passions of love, swaying the human lover, our poet is jubilant over the eternal longing for re-union, swaying the heart of God, the Divine Lover.

The lover in the ‘Megha Dūta’ feels as if he is the only desolate person in the world full of merrth and merriment¹—

‘तस्याः किञ्चित् करधृतमिव प्राप्तवानौरशाखं
नीत्वा नीलं सलिलवसनं मुक्तरोधोनितम्बम् ।
प्रस्थानं ते कथमपि सखे लम्बमानस्य भावि
ज्ञातास्वादो विवृतजघनां को विहातुं समर्थः ॥’

but, the Lover in the ‘Hamsa Sandeśa’, though Himself aggrieved at heart, is rejoicing in the universal rejoicings of Nature²—

‘भारक्तानां नवमधु शनैरापिवन् पद्मिनीनां
कालोन्निद्रे कुवलयवने घूर्णमानस्सलीलम् ।
स्विन्नो दानैर्विपिनकरिणां सौम्य सेविष्यते त्वा-
मामोदानामहमहमिकामादिशन् गन्धवाहः ॥’

The concept of God languishing in love for the soul is a mystic concept of Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and Viśiṣṭādvatism. It is this which finds expression in the following memorable lines³—

1. Megha Dūta 1.41

2. H. S. 1.11

3. H. S. 2.40.

‘देहस्पशं मलयपवने दृष्टिसंभेदमिन्दौ
 धामैकत्वं जगति भुवि ज्ञाभिन्नपर्यङ्कयोगम् ।
 ताराचित्रे वियति वितर्ति श्रीवितानस्य पश्यन्
 दूरीभूतां सुतनु विधिना त्वामहं निर्विशामि ॥’

The *Haṁsa Sandeśa* is thus the lyric of love of God for the soul, Its ‘apṛthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇa’. It is a philosophical lyric touched with our poet’s experiences of the mystic bliss of ‘divine despair’.

There runs throughout this lyric the deep under-current of the philosophy of ‘Ācāryābhimāna’ or self-surrendering love for the teacher. The ‘Haṁsa’ represents the Ācārya, the spiritual teacher, whose sole mission is to bring into realisation that bliss of union for which the Divine Being and the devoted soul are always aspiring. Even when God Himself is the means of His attainment, the help of the Ācārya is essential. It is the teacher who tells the human soul about the ardent desire of the Divine to meet the devotee¹—

‘अप्येतत्ते मनसि निहितं साह्यमव्याजबन्धो
 प्रत्याख्यातुं प्रभवति न खल्वानुशंस्यं त्वदीयम् ।
 प्रागप्येवं परिणतगुणां नैषधे वीक्ष्य वार्ता-
 मार्तत्राणं व्रतमिति विदुर्हसं ! शुद्धात्मनां वः ॥’

Besides, the esotericism of the ‘Dvaya Mantra’ may be difficult to comprehend, but, its elucidation through the *Haṁsa Sandeśa* can be relished by all with profit, along with the relish of the lyrical fervour of the poem.

2. *Dayā Śataka*

The *Dayā Śataka* is a devotional lyric on Divine Providence. It is the spontaneous outpouring of the poet’s heart. The mystery of Divine Mercy seems to have possessed the poet when he bursts forth.²

‘विश्वानुग्रहमातरं व्यतिषजत्स्वर्गापवर्गा सुधा-
सग्रीचीमिति वेङ्कटेश्वरकवि भक्त्या देयामस्तुत ।
पद्यानामिह यद्विधेयमगवत्सङ्कल्पकल्पद्रुमात्
संज्ञामारुतधूतचूतनयतः साम्पातिकोऽयं क्रमः ॥’

‘Just as, at the gust of wind, fall the ripe mango-fruits on the ground, so drop, at the call of Divine Grace, the melodious stanzas from the mouth of the poet.

The subject-matter of the poem is the cry of the soul given to self-surrender. It is the song of a Śaraṇāgata or one, whose self-consecration is self-made, whose life is a veritable sacrifice and who has no egoistic demands and insinences.

The poet conceives mercy, an abstract entity, as the inner being of God. With all the power of vision and visualization at his command, he tries to capture the beauty of Divine Grace. The Tamil saints have sung the songs of the grace of Śrī Veṅkateśa. Whenever they speak of Śrī Veṅkateśa, they speak of Divine mercy. Coming after these saints, our poet feels a great poetic impulse. He views the entire block of the Tirupati-Tirumalai hills as the crystallization of the grace of Śrī Veṅkateśa.¹ We know that Kālidāsa depicts the great Himālayas as the देवतात्मा or the Abode of God. But Vedānta Deśika goes a step further when he says that the Tirupati-Tirumalai block of hills is the crystallization of the grace of God. That is why the poet longs to make a permanent abode for himself on the Tirupati-hills, where he may sing, in full-throated ease, the songs of the mercy of God²:—

‘अशिथिलकरणेऽस्मिन्नक्षतश्वासवृत्तौ
वपुषि गमनयोग्ये वासमासादयेयम् ।

1. D. S., 1.

2. D. S., 81.

वृषगिरिकटकेषु व्यङ्ग्यत्सु प्रतीतै-
र्मधुमथनदये त्वां वारिधाराविशेषैः ॥'

Taking his stand on the Tirumalai-peak, he addresses Divine Goodness. Justice is the sceptre of God and mercy, his crown. God is no God if He is not merciful.

Many have been our poet's predecessors as well as successors who have lavished their poetic faculty on the glory of the All-glorious God. But a very few have thought of composing on the grace of the All-gracious God. Although the saints and sages sing of the All-Kind Divine, yet, what they sing is not all poetry, but prayer or hymn or mystic effusion. But what Vedānta-Deśika attempts here is a lyric of Divine Grace which may read as a supplement to his lyric on Divine Love viz. the *Haṁsa Sandeśa*. We know that our poet's ideal of life was love and devotion to God. Here we are to know that God is the Great Gracious Being.

Metaphors upon metaphors come thick and fast on the poet's mind as he thinks upon the grace of God. It is difficult to say whether his emotions colour his imaginations or his imagination colours his emotions.

In a devotional ecstasy, the poet dwells upon the mercy of the All-merciful. Mercy which is only an attribute of the Divine, becomes all-in-all for the poet. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Personality becomes an attribute of Mercy—the Mother, to be sure. God appears all subservience before Her. All the Divine powers and possibilities look like docile attendants ready to serve Her. The Mother is seen fondling Her animate and inanimate creation :¹

‘अनुचरशक्त्यादिगुणामप्रेसरबोधविरचितालोकाम्
स्वाधीनवृषगिरीशो स्वयं प्रभूतां प्रमाणयामि दयाम् ॥’

The Mother controls the movements of God, the world-controller. All the glory and grandeur of God is but the manifestation of the beauty of the Mother.

There is something in God which we may call the Mother. It is His kindness. In showing the Mother in God, the poet feels a deep delight.

What homely comparisons does the poet make between Divine Mercy and Nature ! He establishes a resemblance between the goodness of God and the rain-heralding monsoon :¹

“The whole universe constitutes the field belonging to God, the Farmer. All the beings, conscious and unconscious, are the sprouts of the seeds of Divine utility and value. When the monsoon of Divine goodness comes and rains its blessings, the Divine Farmer dances with joy. The richness of His harvest consists in the growth of people in godliness.”

‘समयोपनतैस्तव प्रवाहै-
रनुकम्पे कृतसंभवा धरित्री ।
शरणागतसस्यमालिनीयं
वृषशैलैश्चक्रीबलं धिनोति ॥’

His imagery of Divine Grace as a jeweller is simply unique :—²

- “The scriptures are the jewel-market and God, a precious gem. One may miss this Priceless Gem in the glitter of various shining stones. But it is the Grace Divine that spots out like a jeweller, the Priceless Ruby, to offer It to the Prapanna, the humblest of the humble.”

‘परिमितफलसङ्गात् प्राणिनः किंपचनाः
निगमविपणिमध्ये नित्यमुक्तानुषक्तम् ।

1. D. S. 21.

2. D. S. 73.

प्रसन्नमनस्कम्पे प्राप्तवत्या भवत्या
वृषगिरिहरिनीलं व्यञ्जितं निर्विशन्ति ॥'

A fine example of the philosophy of religion expressed in the conception of Divine Grace is the following :—¹

'स्वयमुदयिनः सिद्धाद्याविष्कृताश्च शुभालयाः
विविधविभवव्यूहावासाः परं न पदं विभोः ।
वृषगिरिमुखेष्वेतेष्विच्छावधिप्रतिलब्धये
दृढविनिहिता निश्रेयसस्तवं दये ! निजपर्वभिः ॥'

'Many people with a religious bent of mind visit shrines of sanctity. It is not the image of stone that attracts them. They believe that God reveals Himself even through the medium of the most insentient of objects such as the stone or the wood or the clay. To the eye of the devotee, the image is all omniscience, omnipresence and omnipotence. How to account for such a transcendental experience? We have to look to Divine Grace alone for explanation. It is the Divine Grace that compels God to reveal Himself through the image. The image is full of the milk of human kindness. Divine Goodness forms the steps and the more we climb up, the more we partake of Divine Consciousness.

In all this imagery, there is no theological or philosophical dogma. No doubt the poet believes in Image-worship. But he does not propagate his faith in image-worship here. He simply sings the glory of Divine Grace. He makes all the images in the world's shrines the steps of Divine Providence leading to the Divine Palace, the human heart.

Even the art of painting suggests to our poet the infinite goodness of God¹ :—

'त्वद्दुदयतूलिकाभिरमुना वृषशैलजुषा
स्थिरचरशिल्पिनैव परिकल्पितचित्रधियः ।

यतिपतियामुनप्रभृतयः प्रथयन्ति द्ये
जगति हितं न नस्त्वयि भरन्यसनादधिकम् ॥'

Here the poet regards God as a master-painter, working on the vast canvas of Nature and portraying the grand theme of the manifestation of life in all its levels. Divine Grace is the brush to draw the outlines and to give as well, the finishing touches.

What follows is a fine lyric' :—

‘प्रणिहितधियां त्वत् संपृक्ते वृषाद्रिशिखामणौ
प्रसृमरसुधाधाराकारा प्रसीदति भावना ।
दृढमिति द्ये दत्तास्वादं विमुक्तिबलाहकं
निभृतगरुतो निध्यायन्ति स्थिराशयचातकाः ॥’

Here the poet imagines Divine Grace as the rainy season. God is like a peacock dancing out of joy in the sight of the beauty of his Grace.

The poet takes Divine Grace to be ‘the only panacea for the treatment of the anger of the Almighty God’—

‘अतिलंघितशासनेष्वभीक्ष्णं
वृषशैलाधिपतिर्विजृम्भितोष्मा ।
धुनरेव द्ये क्षमानिदानैः
भवतीमाद्रियते भवत्यधीनैः ॥’

‘Sin is disobedience to God. We stifle the voice of conscience when we sin. The master gets angry over our sins, our actions subversive of Law and Order. The fever of our passions and the venom of our sins, seem to touch the soft-hearted God and make Him feverish. What is the remedy? It is the balm of Divine Forgiveness. Divine Grace is the physician and the cure is extremely effective.

1. D. S. 80

2. D. S. 27

Even the art of pleading helps the poet capture the beauty of Divine Grace :¹—

‘फलवितरणदक्षं पक्षपातानभिज्ञं
प्रगुणमनुविधेयं प्राप्य पद्मासहायम् ।
महति गुणसमाजे मानपूर्वं दये त्वं
प्रतिवदसि यथाहं पाप्मनां मामकानाम् ॥’

‘God occupies the seat of judgment. He is not alone. He has His Divine Nature to assist Him. He cannot make or mar the cases of the culprits at His own sweet will. Man is the greatest of culprits. On his side stands Divine Mercy. What Mercy pleads is not forgiveness. If it were so, man would be held responsible for all his sins.,

What does Mercy plead then ? She invokes the Almighty to season His justice with forgiveness² :—

‘अमीषां निम्नत्वं वृषगिरिपतेरुच्चतिमपि
प्रभूतैः श्रोतोभिः प्रसभमनुकम्पे समयसि ।’

Behind all this lyrical effusion, the reader can easily see the simple, matter-of-fact theme, viz that God is God not because of being the Absolute, but because of being is good and kind, graceful and merciful. The poem identifies God with His Grace. All that God does is but to reveal His goodness. The rhythm of the life of man and nature is the rhythm of God walking, hand in hand, with His Grace.

Before Divine Grace, our poet stands penitent. Believing in the boundless goodness of God, he pleads³—

‘औत्सुक्यपूर्वमुपहृत्य महापराधान्
मातः प्रसादयितुमिच्छति मे मनस्त्वाम् ।
आलिङ्ग्य तान्निरवशेषमलव्यतृप्ति-
स्ताभ्यस्यहो वृषगिरीशधृता दये त्वम् ॥’

1. D. S. 93

2. D. S. 65

3. D. S. 97

‘O Mother ! I stand before thee. I have nothing to offer but my own sins and sufferings. Wilt thou accept them ? Or wilt thou shudder to look at them ? Thou art too good to disappoint thy son. Thou wilt gladly accept my offerings. Thou wilt caress me for my repentance.’

It seems that the author of the *Dayā Śataka* is a mystic living up to his mysticism, a philosopher practising his philosophy, and a poet enjoying his poetry.

Many poets have written on Divine Grace. But the *Dayā Śataka* of our *Deśika* stands out as an inimitable model. A *Śaiva* poet of the South, *Śrīdhara veṅkatārya* has written a *Dayā Śatakam*. But there is a world of difference between his verses and the poetry of the *Dayā Śataka* of *Deśika*. As for instance, the following lines of the *Śaiva* poet¹—

‘सर्वज्ञत्वादिगुणाः स्वात्मत्राणैकलम्पटाः बहवः
शर्वस्य शङ्कराख्यानिर्वहणं तद्दये । त्वदायत्तम् ॥’

pale into insignificance before *Deśika*’s poem²—

‘वृषगिरिगृहमेधिगुणाः
बोधवलैश्चैवैशक्तिमुखाः ।
दोषा भवेयुरेते
यदि नाम दये । त्वया विना भूताः ॥’

Such compositions of poets of different faiths after the *Dayā Śataka* of *Deśika* suggest the popularity of the *Dayā Śataka* as a lyric of Divine Grace. *Veṅkatādhvarin* (17th century A. D.) is very fond of this lyric of *Deśika* when he sings in its vein³—

‘भगवतः प्रतिघो हृदि मा स्म भूत्
समुदयद्बृजिनेषु जनेष्विति ।
अवहिता जगदम्ब हिताय नो
हृदयमेव हरेरधिष्ठसि ॥’

1. *Śrīdhara Veṅkatārya* : *Dayā Śataka* 63.

2. D. S. 15.

3. *Veṅkatādhvarin* : *Lakṣmī Saheeta*

The Dayā Śataka occupies a prominent place in the galaxy of Sanskrit lyrics. The poet seems to feel the fingers of the Unseen Being touching his heart-strings and playing the tunes of Divine Grace for him¹—

‘कामं सन्तु मिथः करम्बितगुणावयानि पद्यानि नः
कस्यास्मिन् शतके सदम्बुकतके दोषश्रुतिं क्षाम्यति ।
निष्प्रत्यूहवृषाद्रिनिर्झरत्कारच्छलेनोच्चलन्
दीनालम्बनदिव्यदम्पतिदयाकल्लोलकोलाहलः ॥’

3. *Godā Stuti*

“Hearken,” ye happy dwellers in the world,
The deeds that we must do to keep our vow,
Singing the feet of him, the Lord supreme.
.....Bathing at break of day,
Nor ghi nor milk we’ll eat; we will not paint
Our eyes with black, flowers shall not deck our hair;
No deeds unfit we’ll do; no evil words
We’ll speak; but give kind alms, and muse with joy
Upon this way”²

The spirit of self-abandonment as expressed in the above translation of the Tiruppavai stanza of the saint Āṇḍāl is suggestive of the real spirit of Śrī Vaiṣṇava religion. Āṇḍāl was self-resignation incarnate. It is this that strikes Vedānta Deśika in the character and the utterances of Āṇḍāl or Godā. And the Godā Stuti which seems to be, as its name implies, a hymn on Godā or Āṇḍāl, is essentially a lyric of self-resignation. The self-sacrificing love which Godā had towards God is the only Prapatti which saints and seers aspire after and which makes them sad when it is denied them.³

1. D. S. 108

2. Hooper : Hymns of the Ālvārs, Tiruppavai -2.

3. G. S. 8.

‘भोक्तुं तव प्रियतमं भवतीव गोदे । भक्तिं निजां प्रणयभावनया गृणन्तः ।
वच्चावचैर्विरहसंगमजैरुदन्तैः शृङ्गारयन्ति हृदयं गुरवस्त्वदीयाः ॥’

The greatest of the Ālvārs i. e. Nāmmālvār always languished in love for the Divine¹—

“Like days, months, years, and ages-crowding nights
Have come, to make me pale for tulasī
—Sweet garland on the head of heaven’s Lord
With the curved discus ! Now to destroy me quite
Comes this one night, a thousand ages long !”

But Āṇḍāl, the favourite of God caused pangs of separation in the Divine Heart Itself.²

‘धन्ये समस्तजगतां पितुरुत्तमाङ्ग त्वन्मौलिमाल्यभरसंभरणेन भूयः ।
इन्द्रीवरस्रजमिवादधति त्वदीयान्याकेकराणि बहुमानविलोक्तानि ॥’

Āṇḍāl, who ‘ascending the soft Śeṣa-bed of the Lord, more and more pressed on to His side³, stands as the ideal Praṇaṇṇa for whom God claims a kinship⁴.

रङ्गेश्वरस्य तव च प्रणयानुबन्धादन्योन्यमाल्यपरिवृत्तिमभिष्टुवन्तः ।
वाचालयन्ति वसुधे रसिकाखिलोकीं न्यूनाधिकत्वसमताविषयैर्विवादैः ॥

In this lyric, embodying the mutual love of Āṇḍāl and God, the Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet suggests his own yearnings for such a life of love. The sentiment of self-resigned love which seems to choke the heart of the poet in the Godā Stuti, overflows in tears in the ‘Hamsa Sandeśa’.

The Śrī Vaiṣṇava votaries of today perform the routine worship of the Tamil saints. But the Godā stuti of our great Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet is the real worship, the real offering, the real Pañcakāla-kṛtya and the real service of poetry to life.

1. Hooper : Hymns of the Ālvārs, Tiruviruttam -70

2. G. S. 20

3. A. Govindaācārya. The Holy Lives of the Azhvars, page 54

4. G. S. 21.

HIS DRAMA—THE SAṆKALPA SŪRYODAYA

“Kṛṣṇa Miśra's example has caused the production of numerous dramas of the same type, but of much less value. The Saṅkalpa-Sūryodaya of Veṅkaṭa Nātha (or Vedānta Deśika) of the 14th century is excessively dreary, but, it is better than the famous Caitanya Candrodaya of Kavi Karṇapūra which is an account of Caitanya's success, but which wholly fails to convey any suggestion of his spiritual power¹.—this is how the Late Dr. Keith looked at the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya. No doubt, this drama is the product of the period of decadence of Sanskrit plays. Its plot is unwieldy. It contains in lieu of action long speeches narrating the events. So far as the construction of plot and movement of action go, the Saṅkalpa-Sūryodaya, strictly speaking, is a failure as a drama. But almost the same is the case with its prototype, the Prabodha-Candrodaya, the first available allegorical play in Sanskrit. And Dr. Keith points it out when he says further ‘None the less it would be ideal to pretend that the play (Prabodha-Candrodaya) has any dramatic force. Its chief merits are in effective and stately stanzas of moral and philosophical content’². It seems strange that the learned critic does not see the Saṅkalpa-Sūryodaya in the light in which he sees the Prabodha-candrodaya. It is probably of such criticism as Dr. Keith's, that Vedānta Deśika expresses his disapproval when he says³—

‘स्तोतुं निन्दितुमस्मदुक्तमथवा सोढुं समूढं जगत्.

किंनिदिच्छन्मनन्तचित्तनरसे सुस्थे सुखं तस्थुषाम् ।

1. & 2. Sanskrit Drama (Keith)

3, S.S. 10,90.

शिष्याः शिक्षितबुद्धयः श्रुतिपथे येषां वयं ये च नः ।
तत्संतोषसमर्पणक्षममिदं साङ्गम्बरैः किं परैः ॥'

Leaving aside any criticism of the Saṅkalpa-Sūryodaya which is based solely on plot-action-characterisation theory of drama, we shall see how and why it is a fine dramatic poem of philosophical import. As a matter of fact, the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya is no exception to the rule. And its author frankly states, as in the above quoted verse, that the play caters for the mental and spiritual palate of those who have grown into Divine Consciousness and who like to analyse the phases of the blissful consciousness of self-surrender and selfless love and service to God. Why should we, then, misunderstand the author? He does not claim any dramatic force for his play. He writes a philosophical and devotional poem applying to it the technique of the playwright. All he says in the prologue to his play regarding his ability in dramaturgy and dramatic technique is nothing more than the record of conventions coming down from his predecessors. Besides, he is meek enough to submit to the critic that he wrote the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya with a view to presenting the Viśiṣṭādvaitic ideas and ideals following the technique of the dramatist¹ :—

‘श्रुतिकिरीटविहारजुषा घिया
सुरभितामिह नाटकपद्धतिम् ।
मुहुरवेक्ष्य विवेकमुपपन्नम्
मतमपश्चिन्मयामि विपश्चिताम् ॥’

He is a poet and a philosopher. He wants to use the technique of the dramatist in a poem which expressly means to suggest the glories of the philosophy of Rāmānuja and the beauties of the mysticism of the Ālvārs.

We shall see how far he succeeds or fails in presenting the ideal of Prapatti or selfless love and devotion to God.

Prapatti or self-surrender is a blissful emotional consciousness in which one feels one is in constant touch with God, in love with God, an object of Divine caresses, a mere plaything for God. Prapatti and Bhakti are not opposing Sādhana's. Prapatti is the consummation of Bhakti. A prapanna lives and dies for God. He asks nothing from God. It is God's business to feel for the prapanna who has sacrificed his soul for Him. In this high-strung state of his soul, a prapanna realises perfect peace and harmony with the Divine. It is not easy to attain to such a state of one's being. It is wellnigh impossible to picture it in poetry or present it in a play. Almost all the æstheticians are of opinion that the Śānta-Rasa cannot be properly presented in a play. One who has tasted it cannot tell what it is like. And one who has not tasted it cannot tell what it should be like. What can our poet do with such a subject? Our poet suggests the successive stages and phases of the one ineffable Bliss—the bliss of self-surrender, the bliss of selfless love and devotion to God, and the bliss of Divine Unrest which make God pine away for the devoted soul, His sweetheart. And his stanzas of moral and philosophical content are no less stately and effective than the stanzas of Kṛṣṇa Miśra (1065 A. D.), the author of the Prabodha Candrodaya.

So the Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya should be studied and appreciated as a poetic representation of the philosophy of Prapatti. To develop the facets of the central theme of Prapatti, our author has worked into the play the poetry of 'Divine Unrest' or Divine response to the love of the votary, the beloved. It is in this subtle study of the emotional consciousness of self-surrender that the justification of the play lies.

Now, we shall see how Veānta Deśika suggests the emotions, incipient as well as consummate, in the realization of the bliss of Prapatti. The basic or the consummate emotion of Prapatti consists in an implicit faith in Divine goodness and Divine mercy. It is calle'd 'Mahāviśvāsa'. That God will protect is not the philosophy of weakness, but the art of perfect living in God. This world of trials and troubles will have to go on from eternity to eternity. In the bitter cup of this world one has to taste the sweetnees of Divine love and Divine service. One is not a true lover of God until and unless one has an unflinching faith in the providence of God. In the depth of Divine love one has to forget one's individuality for ever. One has to be so much steeped in love and service that one remembers and recalls and recognizes nothing but God and God alone. It is this which is the beginning of the spiritual life for the soul. A devoted soul, strengthened by the spirit of Mahāviśvāsa, if wooed by God who regards all the preparedness of the soul but a sad delay in union. Very effectively has our poet put this idea into the poetry of the following lines.¹

दुरासेधस्थेम्ना दुरितपरिपाकेन भविनः
प्रमाथी संसारः प्रशमरहितोऽयं प्रभवति ।
निरोधे तस्यैका निरुपधिककारुण्यघटित
स्वतन्त्रेच्छाशक्तिः स्वयमुपधिमाधाय रमते ॥'

The idea of the above is so sweet that the imagination of the poet comes to relish it :²—

'मिथः कलहकल्पनाविषमवृत्तिलीलादया
परिग्रहणकौतुकप्रथितपारवक्ष्यः प्रभुः ।
स्वलक्षितसमुद्रमे सुकृतलक्षणे कुत्रचित्
धुणक्षतलिपिक्रमादुपनिपातिनः पाति नः ॥'

1. S. S. 1-76.

2. S. S. 1-68.

So the Divine Being is always restless to rescue the devoted soul. Just imagine the perplexity in the Divine Mind. God has created a world which is full of sin and sorrow. He has infused the human soul with His love. How can both go together, the devoted soul and the world? God is careful to maintain the balance between the world and Divine love. If the world is the beauty of Divine Play or *Līlā*, Divine love is the beauty of God's Grace and mercy. As two ladies, not on good terms with one other, may still love one and the same person, so *Līlā* and *Dayā*, apparently conflicting together, reside in the heart of God. As soon as the Divine Being sees that the soul has started loving Him, He finds an excuse to love him passionately. It is this that is the sense of *Mahāviśvāsa*. Complete faith in God's kindness is the foundation of the life of *Prapatti* or self-surrender.

We have said that *Prapatti* or *Bhakti* is a *Rasa* or a blissful consciousness of Divine love and Divine life. Here the basic emotion is *Mahāviśvāsa*. What are the subsidiary emotions? These are (i) the resolve to act up to the impulses of Divine love, (ii) the resolve to shun all that check the flow of love and devotion in human heart, (iii) the resolve to become a bond-slave to the Divine Master, and (iv) the resolve to give up all egoism and egotism in the presence of the Divine lover. This *Prapatti* is a great mental and spiritual discipline indeed. Our poet is careful in bringing the basic emotion of *Prapatti* to its highest pitch. He presents the subsidiary emotions of *Prapatti* equally well. Let us realise for ourselves how he suggests the divine impulse to be dutiful to God. He says :¹—

‘सत्त्वस्थानिभृतं प्रसाधय सतां वृत्तिं व्यवस्थापय
त्रस्य ब्रह्मविदागसस्तृणमिव त्रैवर्गिकान् भावय ।

नित्ये शेषिणि निक्षिपच्चिजभरं सर्वसहे श्रीसखे
धर्मं धारय चातकस्य कुशलिन् धाराधरैकान्तिनः ॥'

At first sight, it may look like a moral precept. But the fact is that it is the expression of divine impulse in the human heart to be God-minded and God-fearing. A further stimulus to this emotion is embodied in the poetry of the following stanza :¹—

‘शमधननिधिः संविद्वल्लीसमप्रफलीदयः
श्रुतपरिणतिश्शुद्धिस्थेमा सुखप्रतिभूरसि ।
भवभयतमः प्रातःसंध्यापरावरदीपिका
भगवति हरौ भक्तिर्दिव्या परिष्कृतिरात्मनः ॥’

So the resolve to follow the dictates of divine conscience floods the devoted heart with so many divine emotions. It brings about mental peace and tranquillity. It brings to fruition the desire to grow into Divine consciousness. It is the wisdom of all wisdoms, the purity of all purities, the joy of all joys. It lights the path that leads from the earthly to the etherial, from the temporal to the spiritual, from world to God.

When this sort of feeling gathers force it leads to another kindred feeling which consists in giving up all that is prejudicial to divine love and divine service. With all the emphasis at his command, our poet mentions this crisis in divine love :²—

‘विषमधु बहिष्कुर्वन् धीरो बहिर्विषयात्मकं
परिमितरसस्वात्मप्राप्तिप्रयासपराङ्मुखः ।
निरवधिमहानन्दब्रह्मानुभूतिकुतूहली
जगति भविता दैवात् कश्चिज्जिहासितसंभ्रुतिः ॥’

1. S. S. 10-27.

2. S. S. 2.25

Or 'one who is initiated into divine love has to give up the pleasures of the senses, which are like honey mixed with poison. One has to give up even the pleasures of self-realisation if one wants God-realisation. To receive the rewards of spiritual life one has to reject the rewards of the worldly life. Divine love accepts no compromise, no condition, no higgling and bargaining. If you welcome it in your heart you have to drive out from your heart all that is against it'

When this stage of Divine love and devotion is passed, there comes the stage in which one wants to fall prostrate at the feet of the Lord and remain subservient to Him in mind, heart and soul. Service of God and service of humanity are not mutually conflicting ideals. Our poet emphasizes this when he says :¹—

‘किं विज्ञानैः किं तपोदानयज्ञैः किं बाडन्यैश्च त्वत्परित्यागदीनैः ।
ज्ञातुं द्रष्टुं तत्त्वतश्च प्रवेष्टुं शक्यं ब्रह्मानन्यभाजा स्वयैव ॥’

The last stage in the culture of self-surrender is complete self-abnegation in the love of the Supreme :²

‘स्वापोद्बोधव्यतिकरनिभे भोगमोक्षान्तराले
कालं कञ्चिज्जगति विधिना केनचित् स्थाप्यमानाः ।
तत्त्वोपायप्रभृतिविषये स्वामिदत्तां स्वनिष्ठां
शेषां कृत्वा शिरसि कृतिनः शेषमायुर्नयन्ति ॥’

In the height of this supreme realisation, the service of God and the service of humanity become one and the same thing.

But until and unless the Sun of Divine will to save the soul rises, the horizon of humanity cannot be brightened with the hue of devotion and self-surrender. The ‘Sāṅkalpa

1. S. S. 10.95

2. S. S. 9.27

Sūryodaya' which our Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet-philosopher hopes to see rising.¹—

‘यस्मिन्विस्मयनीयभूमनि मनागुत्तमीलितेनैकधा
सिद्ध्यन्त्यस्य सितासितस्य जगतः स्वर्गापवर्गादयः ।
ऐशस्सोहमवाधरात्ययभवन्मायामैहायामिनी
सत्ताशेषसुषुप्तबोधनपटुः संकल्पसूर्योदयः ॥’

is a greater assurance of universal weal than the ‘Prabodha Candrodaya’ which the Advaitic philosopher Kṛṣṇa Mīśra views rising up.²

‘किं वाप्तं किमपोहितं किमुदितं किं वा समुत्सारितम्
स्यूतं किं नु विलायितं नु किमिदं किञ्चिच्च वा किञ्चन ।
यस्मिन्नभ्युदिते वितर्कपदवीं नैवं समारोहति
त्रैलोक्यं सहजप्रकाशदलितं सोऽहं प्रबोधोदयः ॥’

Devotion to God, the preparation for the rise of the ‘Saṅkalpa-Sūrya’:³

‘प्रकृतः क्रियया धिया च योगः परमैकान्त्यपरिष्कृतस्य पुंसः ।
निधिदर्शनवन्निरुद्धहृषं प्रणिधत्ते विशदं परप्रकाशम् ॥’

is a greater strength of the human heart than the sudden onrush of knowledge :⁴

‘एषोऽस्मीति विविच्य नेतिपदतश्चित्तेन सार्धं कृते
तत्त्वानां विलये चिदात्मनि परिज्ञाते त्वमर्थे पुनः ।
श्रुत्वा तत्त्वमसीति बाधितभवध्वान्तं तदात्मप्रभं
शान्तं ज्योतिरनन्तमन्तरुदितानन्दः समुद्योतते ॥’

The ‘Saṅkalpa Sūryodaya’, thus, is a great rival of the ‘Prabodha Candrodaya’ in the spheres of poetry as well as philosophy. Amidst the types of allegorical plays, it ranks perhaps second only to the Prabodha Candrodaya.

1. S. S. 10 21

2. Prabodha Candrodaya 6.29

3. S. S. 10.29

4. Prabodha Candrodaya 6.27

HIS MAHĀKĀVYA, THE YĀDAVĀBHYUDAYA.

The Yādavābhyudaya in the words of its poet is a Kāvya-Ratna (vide Y. 24.97) i.e. a gem of poetry. Before we accept the propriety of this epithet we have to ask ourselves : Is the Yādavābhyudaya a gem that shines most in the treasury of Śrī Vaiṣṇava Sanskrit poetical literature ? Or is it such a thing in the great heritage of classical Sanskrit poetical literature ? So far as the first question is concerned there is no difficulty in replying it in the affirmative and assigning to the work the eminent position it occupies in the midst of Śrī Vaiṣṇava Sanskrit poetical works, a circumstantial proof in this connection being Appayya Dīkṣita's high note of appreciation embodied in the lines :¹

‘इत्थं विचिन्त्याः सर्वत्र भावाः सन्ति पदे पदे ।
कवितार्किकसिंहस्य काव्येषु ललितेष्वपि ॥’

With regard to the second we have to recall to our mind the classical Sanskrit poems of the Mahākāvya-genre as such and try to find the place the Yādavābhyudaya may legitimately have therein. But for both of these possibilities to be accepted what is important for us, is to grasp ‘the Kāvya’—‘the real epic poem’ in and through the length and breadth of the Yādavābhyudaya. It is in the light of this real epic poem—this Mahākāvya-Prabandha-Dhvani, that the significance of the mass of materials used by the poet and the æsthetic appeal of the structure of the whole can be understood by us.

Now, the ‘Kāvya’, the ‘poem’ in the Yādavābhyudaya consists in the conception and the presentation of the emotion

1. Y, page 14 (commentary).

of love—प्रेयसीपारतन्त्र्य—strictly speaking, for Kṛṣṇa, the hero, so far as the poet is concerned and its corresponding æsthetic response and re-creation in the reader's mind, so far as the reader is concerned. In the respect of the heroin-Rādhā, the emotion of love—‘रतिस्थायिभाव’ is given an epic treatment, justifying the nature of the poem as a Mahākāvya; but, there is running throughout this epic the deep under-current of the poet's own love for Kṛṣṇa, the Divine Lover, which vouchsafes for the lyrical fervour of the presentation of the entire epic theme. And the lyrical manner of treatment is not tabooed in the presentation of the epic-theme. We have only to remember in this connection the considered opinion of eminent Sanskrit literary critics like Bharata, Ānanda Vardhana, Abhinava Gupta and so on who all appreciate the lyrical treatment of the theme of a Mahākāvya, when they like the inclusion of the Kaiśikī-Vṛtti as much in the drama as in the epic. Our poet probably means this when he says¹.

‘प्रवृत्तामनघे मार्गे प्रमाद्यन्तीमपि कश्चित् ।

न वाचमवमन्यन्ते नर्तकीमिव भावुकाः ॥’

or that he is approaching his object of contemplation just as a dancing girl approaches hers. For the full significance of the poet's ideas here we have to refer to the following Pādukā-Sahasra (1.17) stanza wherein the Kaiśikī-Vṛtti along with the other ones is suggested to help the presentation of the Pādukā-theme—

‘वृत्तिभिर्बहुविधाभिराश्रिता

वेङ्कटेश्वरकवेः सरस्वती ।

अथ रङ्गपतिरजपादुके

नर्तकीव भवती निषेवताम् ॥;

Now, the poetry of the Yādavābhyudaya, consists in the poet's presentation of his own रतिभाव, his own deep spiritual

love for Kṛṣṇa, the Divine¹ Lover. Inspite of Appayya's remark¹—

‘वन्दे इति वर्त्तमाननिर्देशेन प्रायुक्तीत्या कवेर्भगवद्विषयो रतिभावो व्यज्यत इति भावश्च निः ।’

that what is supremely significant here is the Rati Bhāva-Dhvani of the poet for the hero, we may venture to suggest that it is rather this that turns out to be the centre of æsthetic enjoyment and edification, the Prabandha-Rasa-Dhvani of the whole composition, to all intents and purposes. It is probably the convention of Sankrit literary criticism according to which the love of man for woman alone, can, strictly speaking, be presented to develop into the erotic sentiment that stands in the way of Appayya's relishing the Rasa of Rati of the poet's heart for Kṛṣṇa, the great lover. And hence it is that the celebrated critic-commentator expresses himself in the favour of the heroic sentiment as the ‘poem’ in the Yādavābhyudaya—‘तत्र वीररसः प्रधानभूतः भूभारावतारणार्थत्वादवतारस्य’. But, the fact stands that the poet's presentation of Kṛṣṇa has no suggestion of the Kṛṣṇa of the Bhāgavata theology and mythology, but, instead, of the Kṛṣṇa of Śrī Vaiṣṇava spiritualism. The poet makes no secret of his intention when he expresses himself in the last canto of the epic²—

‘एकोभवद्विरयुतैरपि मन्मथानां
यत्कान्तिसिन्धुपृषतानुकृतिर्न शक्या ।
संप्रेक्ष्य तं यदुपति यमिनोऽपि नूनं
स्त्रीभावमेव मनसा विभराम्बभूवुः ॥’

or that the only feeling possible for the votary contemplating upon Lord Kṛṣṇa, the abode of infinite beauty and bliss, is the feeling a woman has for a man.

1. Y. 1. 1 (Commentary)

2. Y. 24.82.

Now, it is this emotion of the poet which reverberates through the entire length and breadth of the Kāvya. The very first stanza of the first canto—

‘वन्दे वृन्दावनचरं वल्लवीजनवल्लभम् ।

जयन्तीसंभवं धाम वैजयन्तीविभूषणम् ॥’

attunes the reader's mind to the sweet spiritual melody of the love-epic that follows. Here, the poet meditating upon the character of Kṛṣṇa, the hero, in the light of his Śrī Vaiṣṇava philosophy, cannot help expressing his joy and admiration for the quality of universal love inherent in the inmost being of the Divine. Hence the adjective ‘वल्लवीजनवल्लभम्’. For a Śrī Vaiṣṇava poet, God is no god unless He is Love universal. Here the Bhāgavata concept of Kṛṣṇa as Govinda is sweetened by the Ālvār's philosophy of Kṛṣṇa as Tadvanam, the One Adorable Being, the Lover and it is this that has emerged in the divine passion of our poet's love for Kṛṣṇa, as embodied in the above lines. The poetic concept of Kṛṣṇa as ‘Vṛndāvanacara’ i. e. God in the Divine garden, the place where God descends towards man and man ascends towards God, presents the perennial excitant (उद्दीपन) for the devoted souls to fall in passionate love with the Divine Lover.

The poet makes no secret of the sources of his poetic inspiration in the conception as well as the execution of his epic poem.¹ The Dhvani-theorists i. e. Ānanda Vardhana and Abhinava Gupta regard poetic genius-‘Pratibhā’—alone as the first and the foremost essential of poetic creation and cast no aspersion on a poet's getting his ideas and ideals from any source available to him. The poetry of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata, the two national epics of India, consists in the æsthetic creation and recreation of the Karuṇa

and the *Sānta* Rasa respectively and there is no harm if our poet taking his inspirations from these originals, develops, through the epic presentation of the similar events and incidents, the Rasa of *Śṛṅgāra* of a unique type.

The *Śṛṅgāra* of the *Yādavābhyudaya* is unique in the sense that it has no touch of the flesh and yet it is vibrant with the passions and emotions of love. Our poet longs for union with God when he says¹—

‘अपि नाम निशमयिष्यते
निगमान्तैरिव निर्मिता स्थली ।
रमयिष्यति यत्र मे दृशौ
रसभूमा रमणीयमातृका ॥’

Here, tears seem to gush forth from the heart of the poet. It is divine unrest that is trying to find an outlet in the above. The poet is yearning after the company of the Divine Lover. He is trying to realise the bliss of love in union, but, seems to be sinking deeper and deeper in the depth of sorrows of separation, since, he considers the Divine too beautiful to be the object of his love, too blissful to be his partner and too high to come down to his level.

With tearful eyes, suggestive of divine communion our poet catches the glimpse of *Kṛṣṇa*, the Divine Lover²—

‘अतिरोधिरसौ निधिः श्रुतेः
अविमेषत्रतदेशिनी दृशोः ।
तनुते तनुरीश तावकी
स्मरणं विस्मरणं च दुःशकम् ॥’

Here is an experience of ecstasy in the presence of the beauty of the Divine Being. The poet does not know how to perpetuate the moments of his bliss.

1. Y. 9.32.

2. Y. 9.63.

But divine despair again sits on his heart!—

‘धमुना शशितेज कल्पित
खिरमस्मानु शरजदौण्डिकः ।
प्रणयः प्रतिभ्रमसजीवितः
प्रतिमाचन्द्र इव प्रलीयते ॥
अहमस्मि तव त्वमेव वा
ममदृष्टिस्त्वमिति प्रलोभयन् ।
विजहाति स एव वल्लवी-
रलमेतावदतः परेण किम् ॥
अयमेवमशुल्कदासिकाः
स्वपदोपगताः स्वयंप्रभुः ।
बहुमत्य जहाति निःस्पृहः
कथमालेरव्यगता इवाथ नः ॥’

Here, the poet thinks that his love and longing for the Divine will ultimately end in disappointment. But, soon, his faith in Divine Goodness reminds him of the promise of the Divine Lover to come to him¹—

‘करुणाभरितैः कदा पुनः
स्वयमुल्लासयिता स एव नः ।
अपरस्परपातिभिः शनै-
रसादङ्कारनिभैरवेक्षणैः ॥’

And, ultimately, He comes and the poet in the guise of Rādhā enjoys the bliss of union with Him²—

‘भियोयुर्नैस्तन्मिथुनं निबद्धं
त्रियोगवैदेशिकसम्प्रयोगम् ।
अजायतान्योन्यलिङ्गीनभारं
सखीदृशा सादरदर्शनयम् ॥’

All the other emotions and sentiments which find expression in the Yādavābhyudāya derive their being from

1. Y. 9. 87-89.

2. Y. 9. 105.

3. Y. 13. 26.

the Rati Bhāva of the poet for Kṛṣṇa as Para, as Vyūha, as Vibhava, as Antaryāmin and even as Arcā. The poet looks at his poetry as 'Antarvatī Sūkti'.¹ His poetry is indeed 'Antarvatī Sūkti' i.e. pregnant with the supreme suggestion of his 'Bharanyāsa' or his selfless love and devotion to the Divine.

Vedānta-Deśika, the poet is essentially Vedānta-Deśika, the man. The all-absorbing passion of his life, which he has expressed in :²

‘सत्कारकौर्तिघनलब्धिषु निर्व्यपेक्षः
प्रश्नोचितेषु परया कृपया प्रसीदन् ।
सत्कर्तृन्त्रपरिकर्मितमाशरीरात्
शारीरकप्रवचनव्रतमाद्रियेथाः ॥’

is also the all-absorbing passion of his poetry. As a man he loves God, intellectually, emotionally and spiritually. As a poet also he loves God intellectually, emotionally, and spiritually. As the head of the Vaḍagalai Śrīvaiṣṇavas, he fights for “the throne and monarchy of God”. And as a poet also he champions the cause of Divine Glory and Divine Greatness. His devotion to religion, to learning and to the ascetic purity of life finds its reflex in his Mahākāvya also.

His conception of life here is a preparation for life hereafter. He infuses a deep religious patience into his poetry. We may hail his poetry as the “God-gifted organ voice of Śrīvaiṣṇavism”. In his hands, Śrīvaiṣṇavism becomes a trumpet to blow soul-animating strains.

While concluding, we must say that the two great formative influences on Vedānta-Deśika, the poet, are, first, his deep and loving study of Kālidāsa, and, second, his rapturous love

1. Y. 20-48.

2. S. S. 2.102.

: songs of the great Tamil mystic, Nammālvār. If he gives him ideas and emotions, Nammālvār gives him inspiration and insight. But for Kālidāsa there could have been no Vedānta-Deśika, the poet. And had there been Nammālvār there could have been no Vedānta-Deśika, the vaiṣṇava poet.

The taste of his poetry is 'Nārikela-Pāka'. We have to wait and wait for sometime before we drink the delicious fruit of his poetry. We cannot forget Appayya Dīkṣita, the scholar, who has shown us the way to appreciate Vedānta-the poet¹ :—

‘इत्थं विचिन्त्याः सर्वत्र भावाः सन्ति पदे पदे ।
कवितार्किकसिंहस्य काव्येषु ललितेष्वपि ॥’

Now, where shall we place him in the galaxy of Sanskrit poets? There are Sanskrit poets, but, they are not vaiṣṇavas. There are Śrīvaiṣṇavas, but, they are not poets. Vedānta-Deśika is a Śrīvaiṣṇava poet. There is no question at all of placing him here or there. Vedānta-Deśika laughs at us as he had laughed at the contemporary assessors of his poetry² :—

‘स्तोतुं निन्दितुमस्मदुक्तमथवा सोढुं समृद्धं जगत्
किं नदिदृशमनन्तचिन्तनरसे सुस्थे सुखं तस्थुषाम् ।
शिष्याः शिक्षितबुद्धयः श्रुतिपथे येषां वयं येचनः
तत्सन्तोषसमर्पणक्षममिदं साढम्बरैः किं परैः ॥’

We can say about him :—

‘Thou indeed derive thy light from Heaven
then, to the measure of that heaven-born light
thine poet I in thy place, and be content.”

¹. 1.9 (Commentary).

². 10-99.

APPENDIX

Major Textual Authority indicated by foot-notes

पृष्ठ ३

१. वेङ्कटनाथेन त्वित्थं निरटङ्कि पदार्थविभागः—
'द्रव्याद्रव्यप्रभेदादित्यादि' (तत्त्वमुक्ताकलाप १. ६) ।
'तत्र द्रव्यं दशावदित्यादि' (तत्त्वमुक्ताकलाप १. ७) ।
२. देवादिशब्दानां परमात्मपर्यन्तत्वमुक्तं तत्त्वमुक्तावल्यां चतुर्थसरे—
'जीवं देवादिशब्दो वदतीत्यादि' (तत्त्वमुक्ताकलाप ४. ८२) ।

पृष्ठ ४

१. अस्ति खलु सकललोकसम्भावनीयस्य विश्वातिशायिनो विश्वामित्रगोत्र-
भूषणस्य विशुद्धविद्याविहारपुण्डरीकस्य पुण्डरीकाक्षसोमसुत्सम्भवस्या-
नन्तगुणशेवधेरनन्तसूरेरात्मसम्भवः..... ।

पृष्ठ ५

१. विनासिनी विबुधवैरिवरूथिनीनां पश्चासनेन परिचारविधौ प्रयुक्ता ।
उल्लेख्यते बुधजनैरुपपत्तिभूम्ना घण्टा हरेः समजनिष्ट यदात्मनेति ॥

पृष्ठ ७

१. प्रतिष्ठापितवेदान्तः प्रतिक्षिप्तबहिर्मतः ।
भूयास्त्रैविद्यमान्यस्त्वं भूरिकल्याणभाजनम् ॥

पृष्ठ ८

१. विंशत्यब्दे विश्रुतनानाविधविद्यः
त्रिंशद्द्वारं श्रावितशारीरकभाष्यः ।
श्रेयः श्रीमान् वेङ्कटनाथः श्रुतिपथ्यं
नाथप्रीत्यै नाटकमर्थं व्यधितैतत् ॥
२. गुरुप्रसदनस्फुरद्गुणगरिणि यन्मानसे
सकृत् स्फुरति वस्तु तन्न हि किमप्यपभ्रश्यति ।
ऋषिस्तदितरोऽपि वा यदि गृणाति गत्यन्तरं
विकल्प्य तदपि क्षणात् विलयमभ्युपैति क्षणम् ॥
३. वाक्छुरगर्हितं वादाहवादपसरणं न कुर्यादिति समयः ।

४. पर्याप्तं पर्यचैषं कणचरणकथामाक्षपादं शिशिचे
मीमांसामांसलात्म्, समजनिषि मुहुस्साख्ययोगौ समाख्यम् ॥
इत्थं तैस्तैर्यतीन्द्रुटितबहुमृषातन्त्रकान्तरपान्थै-
रन्तर्मोहक्षपादघैरहह किमिह नश्चिन्तनीयं तनीयः ॥

पृष्ठ ९

1. तर्कव्याकृतितन्त्रशिक्षितधियः पक्षेषु बाह्येष्वपि
प्रत्यक्षीकृतपौरुषा वयममी मध्येसमं ब्रूमहे ।
वादादोपसृपेयुषः प्रतिभटानासेतुहैमाचलं
तूलायापि तृणाद्य वा न च तुषच्छेदाय मन्यामहे ॥

पृष्ठ १०

१. अस्मदाचार्यैर्न्यायिकुलिशे प्रपञ्चिताः प्रस्पष्टमनुसन्धेयाः ।
२. शक्तिसमर्थनसंरम्भश्चाचार्याणां न्यायिकुलिशे निपुणमनुसन्धेयः ।
३. नानासिद्धान्तनीतिश्रमविमलधियोनन्तसूरेस्तनूजो
वैश्वामित्रस्य पौत्रो विततमखविधेः पुण्डरीकाक्षसूरेः ।
श्रुत्वा रामानुजायां सदसदपि ततस्तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापं
न्यातानीदं वेङ्कटेशो वरदगुरुकृपालम्भितोद्दामभूमा ॥

पृष्ठ ११

१. निष्कण्टं कश्चिदन्यः प्रभुरिह भगवत्तदमणाचार्यमुद्रा-
मञ्जुद्राचार्यश्चाशतगुणितमतेरप्रमत्तान्न भक्तः ।
२. किमपि मिथः स्यूतजीवितं मिथुनम् ।

पृष्ठ १३

१. वागर्थसिद्धिहेतोः पठत ह्यग्रवीरसंस्तुतिं भक्त्या ।
कवितार्किककेसरिणा वेङ्कटनाथेन विरचितामेताम् ॥
२. निरवधिगुणजातं नित्यनिर्दोषमाद्यं नरकमथनदत्तं नाकिनामेकनाथम् ।
विनतविषयसत्यंवेङ्कटेशः कविस्त्वं स्तुतिपदमधिगच्छन् शोभते सत्यवादी ॥
३. इति कवितार्किककेसरिवेदान्ताचार्यवेङ्कटेशविरचितम् ।
सुभगमच्युतशतकं सहस्रद्वयद्वयेषु शोभतां समग्रगुणम् ॥

पृष्ठ १४

१. सैकां पञ्चाशतं यामतनुत विनतानन्दनं नन्दयिष्यन्
कृत्वा मौलौ तदाज्ञां कविकथकघटाकेसरी वेङ्कटेशः ।
२. कविकथकसिंहकथितं कठोरसुकुमारगुरुफगभ्रीरम्
भ्रमभयभेषजमेतत् पठत महावीरवैभवं सुधियः ॥

१. मन्दाभूतात्तदनुमहितो निस्सृतश्चूतषण्णत्
 पार्वे तस्याः पशुपतिशिरश्चन्द्रनीहारवाही ।
 दूरात्प्राप्तं प्रियसखमिव त्वामुपैष्यत्यवरयं
 कम्पापाथः कमलवनिकाकामुको गन्धवाहः ॥

२. तुरगविहगराजस्यन्दनान्दोलिकादि-
 स्वधिकमधिकमन्यामात्मशोभां दधानम् ।
 अनवधिकविभूतिं हस्तिशैलेश्वरं स्वा-
 मनुदिनमनिमेषैर्लोचनैर्विनिर्दिशेयम् • ॥

१. विष्णोर्वासादवनिवहनाद्भरन्नेशिशरोभिः
 शेषः साक्षादयमिति जनैस्सम्यगुच्यमानः ।
 अभ्रैर्युक्तो लघुभिरचिरोन्मुक्तनिर्माकल्पैः
 अग्रे भावी तदनुनयने रञ्जयन्नञ्जनाद्रिः ॥
२. निष्प्रत्यूहवृषादिनिर्झरझरत्कारच्छलेनोज्ज्वलन्
 दीनालम्बनदिव्यदम्पतिदयाकल्लोलकोलाहलः ।

१. एते पुनर्यवनतुरुष्काद्युपप्लुताः प्रत्यन्तदेशाः । अमी च पशुमृग-
 पक्ष्यादिकल्पैरनाद्यैरधिष्ठिता नास्मद्दृष्टिगोचरतामहन्ति ।
२. अलमिह जडभृशृत्पीठमदैरमीभिः ।
३. हन्त ! सूत ! सुरभिदुपभुक्तमुग्धगोपिकावृत्तान्तमुद्धाटयति संप्रति मथुरा-
 इमामधर्मेण विभाव्य विप्लुतामुदन्वता द्वारवतीमिवाधुना ।
 न भावये संयमसंपदास्पदं न कालतः कस्य गुणव्यतिक्रमः ॥

१. हरिचरणनदीनिपातघोषैः मुखरितकाननगह्वरो हिमाद्रिः ।
२. सा काशीति न चाकशीति भुवि सायोध्येति नाध्यास्यते
 साऽवन्तीति न कल्मषादवति सा काञ्चीति नोदञ्चति ।
 धत्ते सा मथुरेति नोत्तमपुरां नान्यापि मान्या पुरी
 या वैकुण्ठकथासुधारसभुजां रोचेत नो चेत्तसे ॥
३. श्रद्धायाजी षड्ब्रह्मवादी कामैकान्ती काकिणीनिष्कदासः ।
 मार्जारानां कुक्कुटानां बकानां छात्रा एते सिद्धचार्याकतन्त्राः ॥

पृष्ठ २१

१. दृश्यतामसौ भगवतो भार्गवस्य दिव्यप्रायो निवासदेशः । अत्र हि—
.....शेते पन्नगसार्वभौमशयने श्रीपद्मनाभः श्रिया ।
२. जहसुर्जागरूकास्ते जङ्गलगुणशालिनाम् ।
दृष्ट्वा द्रमिडयोधानामवस्कन्दमनोरथम् ॥

पृष्ठ २२

१. गङ्गासेतुसरस्वतीरविमुत्तागोदावरीनर्मदा-
तुङ्गाशोणमरूद्वृधाप्रभृतिभिः तीर्थैरलं प्रार्थितैः ।
निस्थान्नमशेषपापशमनं निःश्रेयसप्रापकं
ग्रीष्मे शीतमिव हृदं बहुगुणं ब्रह्म प्रविष्टो मुनिः ॥

पृष्ठ २३

१. अस्ति श्रीरङ्गभर्तुः किमपि दधदहं शासनं तत्प्रसज्ये
सत्यैकालम्बि भाष्यं यतिपतिकथितं शश्वदध्याप्य युक्तान् ।
विश्वस्मिन्नामरूपाण्यनुविहितवता तेन देवेन दत्तां
वेदान्ताचार्यसंज्ञामवहितबहुवित्सार्थमन्वर्थयामि ॥

पृष्ठ ३०

१. यदुक्तेरुज्ज्ञासः कविकथकदर्पप्रशमनो
यदीयाङ्गिभ्रद्वा प्रगुणयति तत्त्वं व्यवसितम् ।
प्रतिष्ठा तर्काणां भवति च यदुक्तेः करणतः
स वेदान्ताचार्यः शमयतु ममाद्यं बहुमुखम् ॥

पृष्ठ ३१

१. शरीरपतनावधि प्रभुनिषेवणापादना-
दविन्धनधनञ्जयप्रशमदं धनं दन्धनम् ।
धनञ्जयविवर्धनं धनमुदूढगोवर्धनं
सुसाधनमबाधनं सुमनसां समाराधनम् ॥
२. सिलं किमनलं भवेदनलमौदरं बाधितुं
पयःप्रसृतिपूरकं किमु न धारकं सारसम् ।
अयत्नमलमल्लकं पथि पटञ्जरं कञ्जरं
भजन्ति विबुधा मुधा ह्यहह कुक्षितः कुक्षितः ॥

३. तुण्डीरं मण्डलं मे कुलपतिरपि च स्कन्दभूपालबन्धः
क्षेत्रं सत्यव्रताख्यं चितितलतिलकं क्षुद्रकाञ्च्यग्रहारः ।
प्रख्यातः शिष्यभूम्ना दिशि दिशि भवता कूपकूर्मोपमेन
स्थाता वादाहवेषु स्थविर कथमहं न श्रुतो नापि दृष्टः ॥

पृष्ठ ३३

१. नाथः स एष यमिनां नखरश्मिजालै- •
रन्तर्निर्लीनमपनीय तमो मदीयम् ।
विज्ञानचित्रमनघं लिखतीव चित्ते
व्याख्यानकेलिरसिकेन कराम्बुजेन ॥

२. वृषगिरिगृहमेधिगुणा बोधबलैश्वर्यवीर्यशक्तिमुखाः ।
दोषा भवेयुरेते यदि नाम दये त्वया विनाभूताः ॥

पृष्ठ ३४

१. यथाधिकरणं प्रभुर्यजनदानहोमार्चना- •
भरन्त्यसनभावनाप्रभृतिभिस्समाराधितः ।
फलं दिशति देहिनामिति हि संप्रदायस्थितिः
श्रुतिस्मृतिगुरुक्तिभिर्नयवतीभिराभाति नः ॥

पृष्ठ ३५

१. आवापोद्वापतस्स्युः कति कति कविधीचित्रवत्तत्तदर्थं-
पत्रानन्त्यादस्तिनास्त्योरनवधिकुहनायुक्तिकान्ताः कृतान्ताः ।

पृष्ठ ३७

१. इत्थं शारीरकोक्ते पथि समुपनतास्त्रगधराश्रद्धधानं
पारे मायापयोधेः प्रहितमभिमुखैः सूरिभिश्चुद्धभावैः ।
ब्रह्मालङ्कारकल्पैर्बहुभिरुपनिषत्सूत्रतात्पर्यशिल्पै-
र्देवार्हत्वाय दिन्याप्सरस इव परिष्कृत्य सम्भावयन्ति ॥

पृष्ठ ४३

१. श्रुत्या स्मृत्यादिभिश्च स्वयमिह भगवद्वाक्यवर्गैश्च सिद्धां
स्वातन्त्र्ये पारतन्त्र्येऽप्यनितरगतिभिः सद्गिरास्थीयमानाम् ।
वेदान्ताचार्य इत्थं विविधगुरुजनप्रन्थसंवादवत्या
विंशत्या न्यासविद्यां व्यवृणुत सुधियां श्रेयसे वेङ्कटेशः ॥

२. श्रुतिस्मृत्यादितात्पर्यनिरुद्धा न्यासविंशतिः ।
स्वयं व्याक्रियतेऽस्माभिर्दिङ्मात्रेण सदिच्छया ॥

पृष्ठ ४४

१. वेदान्ताचार्य इत्थं विविधमुनिमतां यज्ञसूत्रप्रतिष्ठां
व्यातानीद्वैदिकाध्वस्थितिर्विहितमतिः वैधनिष्ठां गरिष्ठाम् ।

पृष्ठ ४८

१. अंकुरत्परभक्तिकुङ्कुमलताकाशमीरकेदारिकां
जीवातुं जरदन्धपङ्खुबधिरप्रायात्मनां प्राणिनाम् ।

निष्प्रत्यूहषडङ्गयोगनिगमप्रासादनिःश्रेणिकां
नित्यं चेतसि धारयन्तु सुधियो नित्येपरस्वामिमाम् ॥

२. अनन्यसाध्यस्वाभीष्टसाधनसमर्थवशीकरणं शरणागतिरिति ।

पृष्ठ ४९

१. ऐक्यान्यप्युक्तानि सात्यकितन्त्राहिर्बुध्न्यसंहितालक्ष्मीतन्त्रादिषु पृथक्त्वेन
प्रपञ्चनेन निरस्तानि ।

पृष्ठ ५०

१. अतो यथाधिकारं यथाशक्यमत्र श्रद्धधानैर्दयार्द्रहृदयदेशिकोपदेशपूर्वक-
मनुप्रविश्य देशकालदशाद्यानुगुण्येनाच्छिद्रं यथाक्रमं समाहृत्य वा
अनुतिष्ठद्भिरनन्यप्रयोजनैः परमैकान्तिभिरनवधिकपरमपुरुषचरणपरि-
चर्यारूपमपवर्गैश्वर्यं यथारोग्यं यथायोग्यं चात्रैव भोक्तव्यमिति सिद्धम् ।

२. ततश्च सर्वान्तरात्मत्वेन सर्वशेषिणं वासुदेवं विशेषतो यथावस्थितं जानन्
ब्राह्मणः स्वात्मनः शेषत्वानुरूपं शेषिणो वासुदेवस्य लाञ्छनं चक्रं शङ्खं
च विभृयादिति वेदवित्सिद्धान्तः ॥

३. अथोर्ध्वगतिकामानामूर्ध्वपुण्ड्रस्य धारणम् ।

४. अयमनवमसूक्तैरादिभक्तैर्यथावद्विदितनिजसुतत्वं विश्वमव्यादभव्यात् ।
रथचरणनिरुद्धव्यञ्जनानां जनानां दुरितमथनहेलादोहली देहलीशः ॥

पृष्ठ ५१

१. शोकः श्लोकत्वमभ्यागत इति वदतः शुद्धबोधार्णवोद्यन्
नानाकल्लोलनाथानुभवरसपरीवाहतः श्राव्यवेदात् ।
वेदान्ताचार्यकश्रीबहुमतवहुविद्वेकेशोद्धृतेयं
रम्या तात्पर्यरत्नावलिरनघगुणा रञ्जनी रङ्गभर्तुः ॥

पृष्ठ ६१

१. कविकथकसिंहकथितं कठोरसुकुमारगुम्भगम्भीरम् ।
भवभयभेषजमेतत् पठत महावीरवैभवं सुधियः ॥

पृष्ठ ६३

१. उपशमितकुट्टिचिह्नवानामुपनिषदामुपचारदीपिकेयम् ।
कवलितभगवद्विभूतियुग्मां दिशतु मतिं यतिराजसप्ततिर्नः ॥

पृष्ठ ६८

१. सहैवेऽङ्कुरयातवैभवलताशोभ्युच्चनानागमे
भव्यं कर्म सदाचिंतोद्भवनदीयादःसनाथीकृते ।

चित्राटव्यनुवाहिवातवलनश्रेयःप्रचेयोस्सवे
वेदोक्तया समये भजेः शुचिगिरौ मेरुन्नतेऽस्मिन्ध्रुवे ॥

पृष्ठ ७४

१. ऋष्यन्तरवाक्यस्यापि समानन्यायस्य निर्वाहार्थं परस्परविरुद्धेषु प्रमाण-
वाक्येषु तात्पर्यविशेषपरिकल्पनया परिहार एव हि पण्डितकृत्यम् ।

पृष्ठ ७५

१. अतो वरद्विष्णुमिश्रोक्तमेकदेशिमत्तम्, परमतानुसारेण चोक्तम् । तत्त्व-
रत्नाकरेऽपि अष्टपादछैधमसूत्रयदित्युपक्रम्योक्तं न तु स्वमततया ।
२. सर्वं प्रमाणं सामग्रया स्वत एव प्रवृत्तया ।
जन्यते परवाक्येन वृत्तया चेति हि द्विधा ॥
अतोऽनुमानं द्विविधं स्वपरार्थत्वभेदतः ।

पृष्ठ ७६

१. वयं त्वनियमं ब्रूमः । नियमवदनियमस्थाप्याभिमानिकतया सिद्धान्तस्वो-
पपत्तेः । '.....'इदं च वादिनोः परस्परसंवादानुरूपम्, यथाभिमतन्य-
वहाराभ्यनुज्ञालिङ्गम् ।

पृष्ठ ७७

१. तर्कस्यानुमानराश्यपृथग्भावात् । न्यायस्तर्कश्चोभयमनुमानमिति मीमां-
सकाः ।
२. एषां स्वारस्यमन्विताभिधाने । '...नन्वभिहितान्वयद्योतकान्यपि वाक्यानि
विद्यन्ते....' ।
३. अतोऽन्विताभिधानं सिद्धान्त इति ।

पृष्ठ ७८

१. स एव परमपुरुषो वशीकार्यकाष्ठा परमप्राप्यश्चेत्यर्थः । तस्य च वशीकरणं
तच्छरणगतिरेवेति ।

पृष्ठ ७९

१. यन्न्यायपरिशुद्धयन्ते संग्रहेण प्रदर्शितम् ।
पुनस्तद्विस्तरेणात्र प्रमेयमभिदध्महे ॥

पृष्ठ ८०

१. कान्तां प्राप्य विचित्रकर्मरचितां पर्यायतो भूमिकां
केनाप्यद्भुतनाटकेन कमपि श्रीमन्तमानन्दयन् ।
कृत्वा शास्त्रमुखे मनःप्रतिमुखं गर्भाधमर्शात्परं
विद्यानिर्वहणेन लब्धविभवो हृद्येष विद्योत्तरे ॥

२. ततः सिद्धं सूक्ष्मचिद्विद्वस्तुशरीरकं ब्रह्मैव स्थूलचिद्विद्वस्तुशरीरतया परिणमतीति वेदान्ताः प्रतिपादयन्तीति । तेन च तद्व्यतिरिक्तस्य निस्त्रि-
लस्य आधारधेयभावेऽशेषितव्यत्वशेषशेषित्वशरीरशरीरिभावकार्यकार-
णभावादयो यथाग्रहणं सम्बन्धाः ।

पृष्ठ ८१

१. यत्तु 'द्रव्यं षड्विंशतिविधं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि' इत्यादिना सत्त्वरजस्तमसां
द्रव्यत्वमुक्तं वरद्विष्णुमिश्रैस्तत् सांख्याधिकरणसूत्रभाष्यादिविरोधाच्चा-
सङ्गतम् ।

पृष्ठ ८३

१. यन्नास्मिन् कापि नैतत् क्षममिह कुहकैरिन्द्रजालं न तैस्तै-
रेकं तत्सर्वसिद्धयै कलयत हृदये तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापम् ।

पृष्ठ ८५

१. तेन नारायणायैःसूत्राणामन्यथाकरणं प्रौढिप्रकाशनमात्रमेव । वयं तु साम-
गाचार्यसूत्राणां व्याख्यादोषं प्रतिक्षिप्य सम्यञ्चमेवार्थं प्रतिपादयिष्यामः ।

पृष्ठ ८६

१. उपमानार्थापत्तिसम्भवादीनि तु प्रमाणान्तराणि न सन्त्येव, यथायथं
त्रिविन्तर्भावादिति न्यायपरिशुद्धौ तत्त्वमुक्ताकलापे च समर्थितमस्माभिः ।
२. अर्थसाधनमन्त्रार्थशब्देन प्रतिपादयन् ।
फलतुल्यमुपायं च नैःश्रेयसमसूचयत् ॥
चतुर्वर्गफलोपायविषयैश्चान्यदीदृशम् ।
छतिसाधनशब्देन मोक्षेऽपि प्रीतिमत्तताम् ॥
३. धर्मैराराधनीयं पितृसुरमुखतश्शाश्वतं धर्ममेकम् ।

पृष्ठ ८९

१. शास्त्रितः शतदूषण्यां शङ्करादिमुधाग्रहः ।
शरीरकशरीरं तु व्यक्तमत्र प्रदर्श्यते ॥

पृष्ठ ९२

१. अतः कृत्स्नमिदं गद्यं द्वयविवरणमिति साधीयान् सम्प्रदायः ।
२. आर्तोपच्छन्दनं गद्यं भाष्यं तु पररञ्जनम् ।
इत्याविलिधियोप्येवं प्रसीदेयुः प्रमाणतः ॥

पृष्ठ १०६

१. तथा हि—खिलानां तावत् किं खिलत्वमात्रादनाश्वसनीयत्वम् ? अथ
तद्विशेषत्वात् ? नाद्यः, यज्ञोपवीतादिमन्त्राणामप्यनाश्वासपदत्वप्रसङ्गात्
न द्वितीयः, वैषम्यासिद्धेः ।

पृष्ठ ११०

१. इति वरदराजीयस्मृतिसंग्रहे यमस्मृतिमाठः संगृहीतः ।
२. शेषं च स्मृतिचन्द्रिकादिषु द्रष्टव्यम् ।
३. विष्ण्वक्त्रेणनिवेदिते च विकल्पभेदास्तत्संहितानुसारेण प्रयोगपद्धतिरज्ञा-
वल्यादिषु भोजराजादिभिः स्थापिता द्रष्टव्याः ।
४. त्वत्पक्षपातिना विकल्पवादिना विज्ञानेश्वरेणानाघ्रातां तत्पक्षं विस्तरेण
प्रतिक्षिपद्भिः भास्कराचार्ययाद्वप्रकाशमस्करिप्रभृतिभिर्दृष्ट्यापरिह-
तामन्यादृशीं श्रुतिं द्रष्टुमिच्छसि ।
५. यानि च पाद्मपारमेश्वरादिष्वतिवादकचनानि, तानि नूनमिदुभक्तकर्तृ-
चिकीर्षुभिः प्रक्षिप्तानि परस्परस्थानाक्रमणलोलुपैः वदुभिर्वा पूजकाधमै-
र्निवेशितानि ।
६. यथोक्तं साक्षाद्भगवन्मुखोद्गततया रत्नत्रयमिति प्रसिद्धेषु जयाख्यसात्वत-
पौष्करेषु ।

पृष्ठ ११४

१. भगवन्नाथमुनिमिन्यायतत्त्वसमाह्वया ।
अवधीर्याक्षपादादीन् न्यबन्धि न्यायपद्धतिः ॥
२. अत्र न्यायतत्त्वानुसारात् क्रमनियामकसङ्गत्यभावाच्चाक्षपादं क्रममुल्लङ्घ्या-
स्माभिर्हेत्वाभासा निरूपिताः ।

पृष्ठ ११५

१. न्यायतत्त्वे च प्रमातृपादे चेतनस्यैव कर्तृत्वप्रतिपादनप्रकरणे 'ननु वायुर्भू-
रेणूनां सङ्घातं करोति' इत्यादिना परिचोद्य दत्तमुत्तरम्...

पृष्ठ ११७

१. अथर्वशिरश्चेताश्चतरादीनां निर्वाहः पुरुषनिर्णये प्रपञ्चितः ।

पृष्ठ ११८

१. उक्तं च विवरणकारैः—'संवलितमत्र विशेषणम्, जातेष्टिवत्, यथा जातेष्टौ
पुत्रजन्मनो निमित्तत्वेऽपि आर्थवादिकानां पुत्रगतपूतत्वादीनां फलत्व-
कल्पनम् । न च गौरवम्, फलस्य विशेषणत्वे प्रवृत्तिसौकर्यात् । फल-
मात्रे तु गर्हानुपपत्तिः । न हि काम्याकरणे गर्हः' इति । विवरणं त्वन्या-
रोहेऽपि विशेषदार्ढ्यपरम् ।
२. तत्रैवमुक्तं जन्माद्यधिकरणे विवरणकारैः—'वस्तुपरिच्छेदो वस्तुपरिमाणम् ।
देशपरिच्छेदस्तद्वेतुकः ।' अयमेवार्थो वेदार्थसंग्रहविवरणेऽप्युक्तः ।
३. यत्तु षडर्थसंक्षेपे श्रीराममिश्रैरुक्तम्—'सत्यं स्वतःसिद्धिः । सा सुषुप्तावपि
नास्फूर्तिः...' । एवमप्रकारमेव विवरणेऽप्युक्तम् । तदेतद्वैभववाद इति
मन्तव्यम् ।

पृष्ठ ११९

१. व्याख्यातं भाष्यादिकमन्वितपरतया विवरणे, श्रीराममिश्रैः । तथा संचेषेऽपि ।

पृष्ठ १२०

१. अत एव हि श्रीमद्भट्टारकैरुक्तम्—‘प्रातरुत्थाय’—‘तर्पयेत् ॥’ इति गुरुभिः श्रीवत्साङ्गमिश्रैरपि वटुकपूर्णाभ्यर्थनया अभिगमनसारशङ्करादाबुक्तम् ।

पृष्ठ १२१

१. भट्टपराशरपादैरपि अध्यात्मखण्डद्वयविवरणे स एव पक्षः सूचितः ।
२. ‘चेतनाचेतनयोरविशिष्टं तं प्रति शरीरत्वम्, स्वेच्छया नियच्छता २ व्याप्यत्वाविशेषात् । इदमेव भौतिकस्य शरीरस्यापि शरीरत्वम् कस्य लक्षणतया उपपादनात् । तत्रैवं लक्षणत्रयनिष्कर्षः ।

पृष्ठ १२२

१. अधिकर्मतया प्रकाशमानत्वज्ञानात्मसम्बन्धप्रतिसम्बन्धित्वादीनि अबाधितानि विष्णुमिश्रोक्तानि ।
२. यच्च वरदविष्णुमिश्रैरुक्तं ‘प्रत्यक्षाश्रयवर्तिसंख्यापरिमाण’.....’तथाभिमतमित्येकदेशिमतं मन्तव्यम् ।
३. वरदविष्णुमिश्रैस्तु—‘स्वव्याघातिप्रसङ्गे जातिः । सा च चतुर्विंशतिर्युक्त्वासाधर्म्यादिसूत्रमुपादाय यथोदयनं प्रायो लघ्यलक्षणादिव
४. वरदविष्णुमिश्रैस्तु ‘द्रव्यञ्च षड्विंशतिविधं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि’ इति दिग्द्रव्यं पृथगेव संख्यातम्’.....’अत्र पृथक्त्वं भाष्यविरुद्धसत्त्वापरिगणनवत् अन्यपरतया निर्वाह्यमिति ।

पृष्ठ १२३

१. प्रज्ञापरित्राणे तु वरदविष्णुमिश्रोक्तानुसारेणैवमुक्तम्—
परार्थमनुमानस्य प्रयोगेऽवयवास्त्रयः ।
प्रतिज्ञा चाथ हेतुश्च तथोदाहरणं मतम् ॥

पृष्ठ १२४

२. अपितु तद्विरुद्धसन्मात्रब्रह्मभेदाभेदनिष्णातैर्यादवप्रकाशैरपि भगवाण्येऽष्टमेऽध्याये; तथा तन्मतानुसारिभिर्नारायणाचार्यैरपि तत्र श्रुतितात्पर्यनिर्णयाधिकारे..... ।
२. एतौ च स्वाध्याययोगौ आह्निकानुयागात् पूर्वमेव केषुचित् संहितसमाहृत्योपदिश्यते, यथा संगृहीतं नारायणमुनिभिः..... ।
क्रमो विस्तरेणोक्तस्तद्गुरुभिर्वर्द्धिबंशेश्वरैः ।

३. नारायणमुनिभिस्त्वेवमिह व्याख्यातम्—स्वेतरसमस्तैः स्वरूपस्थिति-
प्रवृत्त्यर्थं याश्रीयते सा श्रीः, तस्याऽपि तथाश्रयणीय इति ।
४. अथोपादानं व्याख्यास्यामः—तच्चैवं संगृहीतं वज्रिवंशेश्वरैः..... । तदेतद्
व्याख्यातं नारायणमुनिभिः ।

पृष्ठ १२६

१. उक्तं च श्रीविष्णुचित्तैः प्रमेयसंग्रहे..... ।
२. यच्चोक्तं श्रीविष्णुमित्रैः.....तथा तैरेव सङ्गतिमालायामुक्तम् ।
३. उक्तं च श्रीविष्णुचित्तैः गद्यव्याख्यानारम्भे—‘मातृत्वैकरूपां श्रियं प्रपद्यते ।
माता हि हितादपि पुत्रस्य प्रियमेव पश्यति ।

पृष्ठ १२७

१. श्रीमद्भ्यां स्यादसावित्यनुपधि वरदाचार्यरामानुजाभ्यां,
सम्यग्दृष्टेन सर्वसहनिशितधिया वेङ्कटेशेन क्लृप्तः ।

पृष्ठ १२९

१. एवं तु व्याख्यातं व्यासार्थैः—पारमार्थिकीति तमः कार्यव्युदासः..... ।

पृष्ठ १३२

१. शिखाव्यतिरिक्तमुण्डनविषयतां शिखासम्बन्धमात्रविषयतां च यतिलिङ्ग-
समर्थने परमाचार्या प्राहुः ।
२. एतेन ‘समाप्तं पञ्चदशोऽध्याये शास्त्रम्, उत्तरैस्त्रिभिः खिलाध्यायैः परिशिष्टा
नानाधर्मा निरूपिता’ इति यादवप्रकाशकल्पनापि निरस्ता ।
३. यादवप्रकाशमते ‘सर्वापेक्षा’ इति सूत्रमङ्गाङ्गिभावपरम् ।

पृष्ठ १३३

१. तत्र दमिष्ठभाष्यम्—‘गहने हीयं विद्या सञ्जिविष्टा’ इति । तस्य च वामन-
टीका—‘गहने ब्रह्मणि उपनिषण्णा’ इति ।
२. प्रपञ्चितञ्च वरदराजपण्डितैः सन्मार्गदीपिकायाम् । तदनुसारेणास्माभिरपि
नातिसंक्षेपविस्तरमुपपाद्यते ।

पृष्ठ १३४

१. इदञ्च वेदभेदं भोजराजबलदेवाचार्यादयश्च विविञ्चते ।
२. भगवद्यानुनवानुदेवस्वामिप्रभृतिभिः स्थापितप्रामाण्ययोरविशेषवैष्णवसम-
यपरिग्राहयोः..... ।
३. अत्र हरिशब्दसंकीर्तनं सप्तकृतव इति श्रीमद्गुप्त्रसरोमुनिभिर्नित्यकर्मसंग्रहे
निबद्धम् ।

पृष्ठ १३५

४. भाष्यकारान्यवहितशिष्यैर्वर्द्धिवंशेश्वरैः श्रीरङ्गनारायणाचार्यैः ब्राह्ममुहूर्त-
प्रभृतिदिनचर्या प्रपञ्चयद्भिः..... ।

५. उक्तञ्च श्रीविष्णुवैभवाधिकारैः—

‘त्वं यादृशोऽसि कमलामपि तादृशीं ते
दारान् वदन्ति युवयोर्न तु भेदगन्धः ।
मायाविभक्तयुवतीतनुमेकमेव
त्वां मातरं च पितरं च युवानमाहुः ॥’

६. त्वदेकोपायता याञ्चा प्रपत्तिश्शरणागतिरिति भरतमुनिप्रणीतं लक्षणमपि
सङ्गतम् ।

७. अकिण्णिन इति किणित्वनिषेधो ज्याघातास्फोटनछूतासिलतादिजन्यकिण-
विषयतया भवस्वामिप्रभृतिभिर्व्याख्यातः ।

पृष्ठ १३६

१. उक्तञ्च षाड्गुण्यविवेके—

तवानन्तगुणस्यापि षडेव प्रथमे गुणाः ।
यैस्त्वयैव जगत्कुत्तावन्येऽप्यन्तर्निवेशिताः ॥

२. उक्तञ्च कुट्टष्टिमतोपन्यासमध्ये परकालसूरिभिः—
स्तुतिजपनिजबिम्बालोकनध्यानेत्यादि ।

पृष्ठ १५३

१. ज्ञातुरविनाशिस्त्वादेव ज्ञानस्यापि अविनाशित्वमुपपादयन्ती श्रुतिरियं
ज्ञातृस्वरूपप्रयुक्तं ज्ञानमिति दर्शयति ।

पृष्ठ १५७

१. अस्ति तावत् सर्वसिद्धान्तिनामिदमहं वेद्मीति कर्मकर्तृघटितक्रियाविशेषाव-
भासः ।

२. अर्थप्रकाशो बुद्धिः ।

३. यदज्ञानात् संसारो यज्ज्ञानात्तन्निवृत्तिस्तत् प्रमेयं सुसुष्ठुभिः प्रकर्षेण मेय-
त्वात् । एकं वेतरविशिष्टं प्राधान्यतः प्रमेयं परं ब्रह्म । इतरेषां स्वनिष्ठ-
ब्रह्मैकनिष्ठत्वात् ।

पृष्ठ १५९

१. ज्ञानप्रसारणशक्तमिन्द्रियं ज्ञानेन्द्रियम् । तत् षोढा मनःश्रोत्रादिभेदात् ।

पृष्ठ १६०

१. ज्ञानमेव च संयोगादिमत्तया द्रव्यम् । तदेवात्मनः प्रत्यक्तया निरूपित-
स्वरूपस्य विशेषकतया गुणः ।

पृष्ठ १६१

१. सर्वप्रसरणेष्वपि स्वात्मनि प्रत्यक्षप्रवृत्तशक्तिर्नैव । निरतिशयवेगित्वात् निरतिशयसूक्ष्मत्वाच्च सहस्रैव विप्रकृष्टसम्बन्धः । अप्रतिघातश्च ।
२. बुद्धिरेवोपाधिभेदात् सुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नरूपा । सुखादिजनकतयाऽभ्युपगतज्ञानातिरेके प्रमाणाभावात् ।

पृष्ठ १६२

१. तदेवमात्मस्वभावभूतस्य चैतन्यस्य विषयसंश्लेषविशेषगोचर एव निश्चयः संशयादिष्ववहारभेदः, तद्विशेषभाजि चैतन्ये वा ।

पृष्ठ १६३ •

१. एवमदृष्टमपि ईश्वरप्रीतिकोपात्मकमेव । तद्विषयत्वप्रतिनियमादेव च क्षेत्रज्ञानां कर्मफलनियमोपपत्तिः । शास्त्रगम्यत्वाच्चास्य तथात्वमवसीयते ।

पृष्ठ १६६

१. ननु नाङ्गुल्यग्रं स्वात्मानं स्पृशति, न कुठारः स्वात्मानं छिनत्ति, न बह्विः स्वात्मानं दहति, तद्वद्बुद्धेः स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात् न स्वयं प्रकाशत्वमित्याह—स्वस्यामिति । उक्तदृष्टान्तनीत्या—स्वपरनिर्वाहकवर्गन्यायेनेति यथा चात्मा ग्राह्यश्च ग्राहकश्च, यथा प्रत्यक्षविषयः स्वयं बोध्यः स्वगोचर-बोधजनकश्च एवं यथादृष्टि सर्वम् ।
२. धीत्वाद्वेद्मीति सिद्धा स्वयमितरमतिर्बुद्धिलक्ष्मादिधीवत् ।

पृष्ठ १६७

स्मृत्या शब्दानुमानप्रभृतिभिरपि धीर्वेद्यते स्वप्रकाशा धीत्वादेस्तामवेद्या-
मनुपधि वदतः स्वोक्तिवाधादयः स्युः ।

३. धियः स्वयंप्रकाशत्वे वेद्मीत्याद्युपलम्भनम् ।
मानसाध्यक्षभङ्गादिरपि मानमितीष्यताम् ॥

पृष्ठ १६८

१. बुद्धेरर्थप्रकाशादनुमितिरिति चेत्तन्न साध्याविशेषात्,
साध्याद्भेदेऽपि बुद्धिर्यत उदयति ते स्यात्ततोऽर्थप्रकाशः ।
२. तत्रैवैतत् करणवत् तस्यैवास्तु प्रकाशकम् ।
प्राकट्यजन्मभूतैष्यदभावज्ञाततासु किम् ॥

पृष्ठ १६९

१. प्रकाशश्च चिद्विचिदशेषपदार्थसाधारणं व्यवहारानुगुण्यम् । तदेवं न बुद्धिः प्रकाशानुमेया । किं तु स्वतःसिद्धैव ।
२. घटोऽस्तीति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । तत्र विषयास्तित्वमेव प्रामाण्यम् । तत्तु तेनैव ज्ञानेन प्रतीयते । अतः स्वतःप्रामाण्यं प्रतीयते ।

३. यत्र पुनः शुक्तौ रजतज्ञानमुत्पद्यते तत्रापि रजतमस्तीति रजतास्तित्वमेव प्रतीयते, न पुनर्नास्तित्वं तेनैव ज्ञानेन प्रतीयते अतो विषयास्तित्वं स्वेन, नास्तित्वं बाधकेन प्रतीयत इति स्वतःप्रामाण्यप्रतीतिः ।

पृष्ठ १७०

१. द्विप्रकारे स्वरूपनिरूपकधर्मे निरूपितस्वरूपविशेषकधर्मे चेत्यर्थः । इदं रजतमित्यत्र स्वरूपनिरूपकधर्मवैपरीत्यम् । पीतशङ्ख इत्यत्र निरूपितस्वरूपविशेषकधर्मवैपरीत्यमिति विभागः ।

पृष्ठ १७१

१. प्रामाण्यस्वभावत्वे सार्वत्रिकत्वं हेतुः, अप्रामाण्यस्य पुनरसार्वत्रिकत्वात् किंशुकाद्युपाधिकारूप्यन्यायेनौपाधिकतामेवाश्रयते, अतोऽप्रामाण्यस्य स्वाभाविकत्वे हेतुर्नास्ति ।
२. सर्वज्ञस्य प्रमाया न खलु न विषयः स्यात् स्वकीयं प्रमात्वं निर्बाधा धीः प्रमेति प्रमितिरपि निजं गाहते मानभावम् ।
३. अर्थान्यथात्वमेव ज्ञानस्याप्रामाण्यम्, तदन्यैरेव बाधकैरवबुध्यते । न हि रजतज्ञानं रजतज्ञानस्यान्यथात्वमावेदयति । अतोऽप्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्वम् ।

पृष्ठ १७२

१. प्रमाणज्ञाने घटोऽस्तीति सद्भावविशिष्ट एव घटः प्रतीयते, स एवार्थसद्भावो घटज्ञानस्य प्रामाण्यम् । अतः स्वतो गृह्यते प्रामाण्यम् ।
२. निर्विकल्पकस्य वासनोपप्लवाभावेन स्वभावत एव प्रामाण्यात् सविकल्पकस्यापि स्वयंप्रकाशस्य स्वात्मांशे प्रामाण्यस्यावर्जनीयत्वात् ।

पृष्ठ १७७

१. ज्ञानात्मज्ञानरूपत्वात् स्वप्नमेयग्रहाणतः ।
विषयान्यभिचारित्वेऽप्यप्रामाण्यं स्मृतेर्मतम् ॥

पृष्ठ १८१

१. 'चैतन्यस्य विषयेण दृढसंयोगो हि निश्चयः । तस्यैव बहुभिर्युगपददृढ-संयोगः संशयः' इत्यात्मसिद्धिग्रन्थोऽपि न विरुद्धः ।

पृष्ठ १८२

१. साधारणाकृतेर्दृष्ट्याऽनेकाकारग्रहात्तथा ।
विपश्चितां विवादाच्च त्रिधा संशय इष्यते ॥

पृष्ठ १८३

१. किंसंज्ञकोऽयं वृक्ष इत्येवमादिरूपोऽनध्यवसायो नामान्यो ज्ञानविशेष इति केचित् । तदसारम्, तस्य संज्ञादिविशेषसंदेहसमनन्तरभावितद्विशेष-शुभुत्सात्मकत्वात् । अथवा अवच्छेदकादर्शनादनवच्छिन्नकोटिविशेषः संशय एव ।

पृष्ठ १८४

१. सर्वं ज्ञानं न मानं परमतविजयाप्राप्त्याणं स्वबाधात्
मानामानव्यवस्था तदियमनुमता लौकिकैर्बौद्धिकैश्च ।

पृष्ठ १८६

१. यन्नाथमुनिमिश्राद्यैर्यथार्थख्यातिसाधनम् ।
तल्लोकबुद्धयनारोहाद्वैभवं केचिदूचिरे ॥

पृष्ठ १८९

१. शुक्तौ रूप्यं प्रभाग्भः श्रुतिनयवशतः स्वाप्नमप्यस्तु मानं
योग्यायोग्यादिभेदाग्रह इह चरमां गाहते सम्प्रतिष्ठाम् ।

पृष्ठ १९०

१. किं चासत्ख्यातिरंशे प्रसजति भवतामन्यथाख्यातिवेद्ये ।

पृष्ठ १९६

१. यदपि तत्तन्निर्वचनखण्डनया सर्वमनिर्वाच्यमिति, तदप्यनिर्वचनीयनिर्व-
चनखण्डनया सर्वं निर्वचनीयं भवेदिति प्रतिवक्तव्यम् ।

पृष्ठ १९७

१. रजते च रजतान्यत्वमुल्लिखन्ती बुद्धिरन्यथाख्यातिस्स्यात् ।

पृष्ठ १९९

१. अन्यद्विज्ञानमस्तीति धीरन्यविषया न वा ।
आद्येऽर्थस्यापि तद्वद्धीरन्यत्रैकैव धीर्भवेत् ॥
२. सहोपलम्भनियमः संविदो ग्राह्यलक्ष्म च ।
बोधेऽप्यर्थ इवेत्येवं ज्ञानार्थैक्यं न तद्भवेत् ॥

पृष्ठ २००

१. चतुष्कोटिविमुक्तं च तत्त्वं प्रामाणिकं न वा ।
२. पूर्वत्र तावती सत्ता न चेत्तद्धीरसन्मतिः ॥

पृष्ठ २०१

१. ज्ञत्वाज्ञत्वादिभेदः कथमिव घटते सर्वथैकामतिश्चेत् ।

पृष्ठ २०९

१. साक्षात्त्वं द्विधा । नित्यं चानित्यं च । ईश्वरनित्यज्ञानादिनिष्ठं नित्यम् ।
अस्मदादिज्ञाननिष्ठं त्वनित्यम् ।

पृष्ठ २१०

१. भावनावलज्जमात्रं जगत्कर्तारं प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिष्ठितं शास्त्रयोन्यधिकरणे ।

पृष्ठ २११

१. मानसप्रत्यक्षमप्यस्मदादीनां नास्त्येवेति वृद्धसम्प्रदायः । आत्मस्वरूपस्य तद्धर्मभूतज्ञानस्य च स्वयंप्रकाशत्वात् ॥

पृष्ठ २१२

१. विषयेन्द्रियसम्बन्धश्च द्रव्येषु संयोगः । द्रव्याश्रितेषु रूपादिषु संयुक्ताश्रयणम् ।

पृष्ठ २१३

१. सप्रत्ययमशं प्रत्यक्षं सविकल्पकम् । तद्वहितं प्रत्यक्षं निर्विकल्पकम् ।

पृष्ठ २१४

१. बालमूकतिर्यगादिविज्ञानमपि हि संज्ञादिविकल्परहितमपि विशिष्टवस्तु-
विषयमेव ।

पृष्ठ २१५

१. प्रह्लादवामदेवादिसमाधिषु चानन्तविशेषणविशिष्टब्रह्मानुभव एव श्रूयते
अतो न शास्त्रान्निर्विशेषविषयनिर्विकल्पकसिद्धिरिति ।

पृष्ठ २२२

१. संज्ञा तु स्मर्यमाणापि प्रत्यक्षत्वं न बाधते ।
संज्ञिनस्सा तटस्था हि न रूपाच्छादनक्षमा ॥
२. वाचस्सूक्ष्माद्यवस्थाकथनमपि विदुर्भावनाद्यर्थमाप्ताः ।

पृष्ठ २२४

१. व्याप्यतया प्रतिसन्धीयमानात्तद्व्यापकतया सामान्यतः प्रसिद्धस्यार्थस्य
विशेषतोऽवगतिरनुमितिरित्यर्थः ।

पृष्ठ २२८

१. यावत् साधनदेशमवर्तमानो यावत्साध्यदेशवर्तीत्युपाधिभिरुपगणात् ।

पृष्ठ २३०

१. साधनवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वे सति साध्यवन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावाप्रति-
योग्युपाधिरित्यादिकमपि लक्षणं संगच्छते ।

पृष्ठ २३५

१. यतो वाचो निवर्त्तन्त इति श्रुतिशकलश्रवणात्, प्रच्छन्नसौगतप्रवादाच्च
ध्यामुह्यन्ननेनानुमानेन प्रतिबोध्यत इति प्रयोजनवानेवायमनुमानप्रयोगः ।

पृष्ठ २३६

१. पक्षेऽन्यत्रापि साध्यं न मितमविदितेनापि सम्बन्धधीः स्यात् ।

पृष्ठ २४६

१. यदुक्तं न्यायतत्त्वे—असिद्धानैकान्तिकविरुद्धा हेत्वाभासा इति । तत्रासिद्धो-
पपक्षधर्मः । इतरावध्याप्तभेदौ हेत्वाभासौ ।

पृष्ठ २५०

१. अथानुमोद्धवं स्मृत्वा हेतुत्वेनापि संस्थितम् ।
मध्ये तयोरिहेदानीं मानं शाब्दं प्रचचमहे ॥

पृष्ठ २५१

१. वाक्यार्थो यस्त्वपूर्वो न खलु किमपि तद्व्याप्यमस्मिन् पदादौ
साङ्गस्थं बोधकत्वादधिकमनुमितौ ग्राह्यमत्रैतदेव ।

पृष्ठ २५२

१. अतोऽपूर्वार्थप्रतीत्या न स्मृतित्वसिद्धिः । •

पृष्ठ २५३

१. प्रामाण्योत्पत्तिज्ञप्त्योर्न परापेक्षा ।
२. व्युत्पत्तिः कार्यं एव प्रथमसमुदिता वृद्धवाक्याप्रवृत्तौ
तत्सर्वास्तत्पराः स्युर्गिर इति यदि न कापि सिद्धेऽपि सिद्धेः ।

पृष्ठ २५६

१. स खलु केवलमाधिपत्यमवपादः प्राह, वयं तु विश्वदेहित्वमीश्वरस्य विश्व-
वाचिशब्दवाच्यत्वञ्चेति विभागः ।
२. मनोब्राह्मे जीवात्मनि सति चक्षुषा गृह्यमाणं शरीरं न जीवविशेषणत्वेन
गृह्यते जीवस्य चक्षुर्ग्राह्यत्वाभावात् । एवं प्रपञ्चोऽपि पामरबुद्धिभिर्नेश्वर-
विशेषणत्वेन गृह्यते ।

पृष्ठ २५८

१. ब्राह्मेण शब्देन बाह्योऽर्थो त्रिद्वित इति प्रतीतेः, प्रत्येकादिविकल्पेन दोषो-
क्तेश्च साग्यात् वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोः प्रतिभारूपत्वेऽपि किं व्यवस्थित-
प्रतिभारूपत्वमुताव्यवस्थितप्रतिभारूपत्वम् ? अव्यवस्थितरूपत्वे लोक-
व्यवहारविरोधः, व्यवस्थितरूपत्वे सैव व्यवस्था शब्दार्थयोरप्रतिभारूपत्वे
• स्यादिति भावः ।

पृष्ठ २५९

१. पदानां स्वार्थबोधनशक्तिः, पदार्थानां संसर्गबोधनशक्तिः, पदानामेव पदार्थेषु
संसर्गबोधनशक्त्यप्राधानशक्तिरिति शक्तित्रयं कल्प्यमभिहितान्वयवादिनः ।

पृष्ठ २६२

१. भिन्नानामर्थानामेकत्र धर्मिणि वृत्तिरर्थसामानाधिकरण्यम् । भिन्नप्रवृत्ति-
निमित्तानां शब्दानां एकस्मिन्नर्थे वृत्तिः पर्यवसानं शब्दसामानाधिक-
करण्यम् ।

पृष्ठ २६३

१. यथा नित्यमीश्वरज्ञानं कारणदोषाभावात् प्रमाणम्, एवं वेदवाक्यमपि कारणदोषाभावात् प्रमाणम्, तद्वाक्यजनितं ज्ञानमपि निर्दोषवाक्य-जनितत्वात्प्रमैवेति ।
२. मानं बाधाद्यभावाज्जिगम इतरवद्वक्तृदोषस्तु नास्मिन् ।

पृष्ठ २६६

१. उपमानमपि यदि गृह्यमाणपदार्थगतसादृश्यविज्ञानात् स्मर्यमाणपदार्थ-गतसादृश्यविज्ञानं तदा स्मृतिः, तत्तद्वस्तुसंस्थानविशेषादव्यतिरिक्तस्य सादृश्यस्याभावात्, तस्य पूर्वदृष्टत्वात्, स्मर्यमाणत्वाच्च ।

पृष्ठ २६८

१. अर्थापत्तिः परोक्ता न पृथगनुमितेर्व्यासिबोधादिसाम्यात् ।

पृष्ठ २६९

१. ऐतिह्यं वृद्धवाक्यं बहुदिवसगतैर्यत्त्वनिर्द्धार्यमूलं
मानं चेदागमस्तत्तदितरदपि च स्यात्तदाभास एव ।

पृष्ठ २७०

१. एवं चेष्टालिप्यक्षरादिकमप्यभिप्रायवर्णविशेषाद्यविनाभूतमनुमानमेव ।
२. प्रतिसन्धानमप्यात्मगोचरं प्रत्यभिज्ञाविशेष एव, योऽहमद्राक्षं स एव स्पृशामि, इत्येवमादिरूपत्वात् ।

पृष्ठ २७२

१. संस्कारमात्रजन्यत्वस्यासाधारणत्वात् स्वविषयप्रकाशव्यवहारयोस्तु स्मृते-रपि स्वतन्त्रत्वात् ।

पृष्ठ २७३

१. निष्प्रयोजनत्वादप्रामाण्यमिति चेन्न, तृणादिविषयप्रत्यक्षादिनाऽनैकान्त्यात्, असिद्धेश्च ।
२. स्मृत्यैव हि जगतां कृताकृतप्रत्यवेक्षणसिद्धिः । स्मृत्यैव हि कवयः काव्यानि कवयन्ति । स्मृत्यैव हि शब्दानुमानयोः प्रवृत्तिः । परभक्त्या-दिनिष्पत्तिश्च । पूर्वानुभवस्यैव तानि प्रयोजनानीति चेत्, सर्वजगदादि-कारणस्य ब्रह्मसंकरूपस्यैव किं न स्युः ?

पृष्ठ २७५

१. त्रिविधोऽनुभवश्चैव तन्मूला च तथा स्मृतिः ।
इति षोढा विभागे तु न विमन्यामहे वयम् ॥

पृष्ठ ३२१

१. द्रव्याद्रव्यप्रभेदान्मितमुभयविधं तद्विदस्तत्त्वमाहुः
 द्रव्यं द्वेधा विभक्तं जडमजडमिति प्राच्यमन्यक्तकालौ ।
 अन्त्यं प्रत्यक् पराक् च प्रथममुभयथा तत्र जीवेशभेदा-
 न्नित्याभूतिर्मतिश्चेत्यपरमिह जडामादिमां केचिदाहुः ॥

पृष्ठ ३२९

१. अविभक्तनामरूपचिदचिच्छरीरकस्य विभक्तनामरूपचिदचिच्छरीरकत्वा-
 पेक्षयोपादानत्वसिद्धेः, अविभक्तचिदचिच्छरीरकत्वातिरिक्तेन कुलालादि-
 साधारणसङ्कल्पविशेषवत्त्वाद्याकारेण निमित्तत्वसिद्धेश्च ।

पृष्ठ ३३१

१. प्राप्यः परमभोग्यत्वान्निषेध्यः स्वामिभावतः ।
 शक्तिकारुण्यभूम्ना च शरण्यस्सीदतां प्रभुः ॥

पृष्ठ ३३२

१. तस्मादीशो विरुद्धद्वितयमघटयन् सर्वशक्तिः कथं स्यान्-
 मैवं व्याघातशून्येष्वनितरसुशक्तेष्वस्य तादृक्त्वसिद्धेः ।

पृष्ठ ३३३

१. तत्तद्द्रव्येषु दृष्टं नियतिमदपृथक्सिद्धमद्रव्यजातं
 तद्वद्विश्वं परस्य व्यवधिनियमनाजस्वरूपेऽस्य दोषः ।

पृष्ठ ३३४

१. आत्मा स्वेनैव सिद्ध्यत्यहमिति निगमैर्यत्स्वयं ज्योतिरुक्तः ।
 २. यो मे हस्तादिवर्मेत्यवयवनिवहाद् भाति भिन्नस् एकः
 प्रत्येकं चेतनत्वे बहुरिह कलहो वोतरागो न जातः ।

पृष्ठ ३३५

१. साविद्यं ब्रह्मजीवस्स च न बहुतनुर्नेतरे सन्ति जीवाः
 स्वप्नादेकस्य लोके बहुविधपुरुषाध्यासवद्विश्वकृत्सिः ।
 २. ऐक्यस्याप्यक्षतत्वादनवधि च सति ब्रह्मणि स्यादवद्यम् ।

पृष्ठ ३३६

१. प्रत्यक्त्वं पुंसि केचित् स्वविषयधिषणाधारतामात्रमाहुः
 स्वस्मै स्वेनैव भानं तदिति समुचितं तत्स्वतस्सिद्धिसिद्धेः ।

पृष्ठ ३३७

१. स्वतस्सुखी चायमात्मा । उपाधिवशात् संसरति । स द्विधा—संसारी
 असंसारी चेति । पुण्यपापादिमान् पूर्वः । तच्छून्य इतरः । पूर्वोऽपि
 द्विधा—नित्यसंसारी भाविसंसारविरहश्चेति ।

•
पृष्ठ ३३८

१. तथा चायमीश्वर इवापहतपाप्मत्वसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादिविशिष्टो भवति ।
तच्चास्य समस्तप्रतिबन्धकात्यन्तिकलयादाविर्भूतं स्वाभाविकं रूपम् ।

पृष्ठ ३३९

१. 'परमं साम्यमुपैति', 'मम साधर्म्यमागताः' इत्यादिबलाच्च 'ब्रह्मैव भवती'-
त्यादीनामपि साम्य एव तात्पर्यमिति पूर्वमेवोपपादितम् ।

पृष्ठ ३४०

१. पुनामात्मतिरस्क्रियायवनिकामिच्छाविहारस्थलीं
निर्व्यापारविभावरीसहचरीं निद्रामनिद्रात्मनः ।
ब्रह्मस्तम्बमहेन्द्रजालरचनापिञ्ज्वावलिं श्रीमतो-
र्विष्णोर्लोहितशुक्लकृष्णशबलां विद्यामविद्यातनुम् ॥

पृष्ठ ३४१

१. ईदृक् सत्कार्यवादश्च वैदिकैः परिगृह्यते ।
द्रव्यस्य पूर्वसिद्धस्य साध्यावस्थाविशेषतः ॥

पृष्ठ ३५२

१. तेन च तद्रव्यतिरिक्तस्य निखिलस्याधाराधेयभावेश्वरेशितव्यत्वशेष-
शेषित्वशरीरशरीरिभावकार्यकारणभावादयो यथाग्रहणं संबन्धाः ।

पृष्ठ ३५८

१. शरीरशरीरित्ववचनात् घटिशशेषित्वं च तत्रार्थसिद्धे ।

पृष्ठ ३६०

१. अपृथक्सिद्धविशेषणत्वेनोपलभ्यन्ते द्रव्यं प्रत्यद्रव्याणि । 'अतः स्वभावादेव
द्रव्याद्रव्ययोरुपश्लेषः ।

पृष्ठ ३६१

१. धारणं हि प्रज्ञाप्रज्ञाधीनं श्रूयते ।

•
पृष्ठ ३८२

१. प्रपदनमपि ह्यत्र प्रार्थनापूर्वकं परस्यै देवतायै प्रत्यगात्मरूपस्य हविष-
स्त्यागाः, इन्द्रायेदं न ममेत्यादिवत् भगवत् एवाहमस्मि न ममेति ।
२. यद्वा प्रपदनाङ्गभूताकिञ्चन्यपुरस्कारविरुद्धोपायान्तराशाग्रहाणमेवात्र
त्याग इति ।

पृष्ठ ३८४

१. ततश्च यावत्प्रारब्धं वा, यावत्तद्देहं वा, यावत्तत्क्षणं वा, इति
प्रपन्नानां मोक्षावधिनियमे तदिच्छातीव्रत्वतारतम्यमेव सर्वज्ञसाक्षिकं
प्रमाणमिति ।

१. दयाऽत्र प्रपत्युल्लसिता रक्षयेच्छा ।

१. ज्ञानी तु परमेकान्ती तदायत्तात्मजीवितः ।
तत्संश्लेषवियोगैकमुखदुःखस्तदात्मधीः ॥

१. तेन पूर्वयामानुसंहितमन्तःकरणचित्रभित्तिगतं विचित्रशुभाश्रयविशिष्टं
ध्येयं निद्रातमोन्तरितमपि तत्कालसमुन्मिषितसत्त्वसंघुक्षितसात्त्विकज्ञान-
रूपप्रदीपप्रकाशेन सम्यगवलोक्यते । तत एवापररात्रयोगो निष्पद्यते,
य एष सात्त्वतादिषु ब्राह्ममुहूर्तात्पूर्वमेव कर्त्तव्यत्वेन प्रपञ्च्यते ।
२. सम्यगाचमनाशक्तावभावे सलिलस्य च ।
पूर्वोक्तेषु निमित्तेषु दक्षिणं श्रवणं स्पृशेत् ॥
३. न च शेषवृत्तौ प्रवर्त्तमानस्य स्वरूपैक्यभावनं जायतीति ।

१. धृत्या यया धारयते मनः प्राणेन्द्रियक्रियाः ।
योगेनाव्यभिचारिण्या धृतिस्सा पार्थ सात्त्विकी ॥

१. अत्र गुरुपरम्पराप्रपत्तिपूर्वकमिदं ध्यानं विवक्षितम्—
गुरुन् प्रपद्य प्रथमं तद्गुरुंश्च ततो हरिम् । इति ।

१. पृथिव्याः प्रियदत्तेति कीर्तनं च विष्णोः ब्रह्मण्यदेवकीर्तनवदनव-
सादहेतुत्वेन स्मर्यते—
पृथिवीं प्रियदत्तेति गायन् सर्वसहेति वै ।
विष्णुं ब्रह्मण्यदेवेति कीर्तयन्नावसीदति ॥

१. प्रातरुत्थाय चिन्वीयात् स्वारामात् स्वयमेव हि ।
पूजार्थमस्त्रमन्त्रेण पुष्पादीन् यत्नतः सदा ॥

१. लक्ष्मत्वादात्मभर्तुः प्रकृतिपरिणतिग्रन्थिदाहात्मकत्वात्
कर्माङ्गत्वादितत्त्वात्तनुतनुशयिनोस्संस्कृतित्वात्प्रियत्वात् ।
हेतुत्वात्सद्गृहीतेरितरपरिहृतेर्द्रावणात् किङ्करादे-
र्धार्थं चक्रादिचिह्नं कृतिभिरकृतिभिरश्रेयसे मुक्तये च ॥

१. अजनिषि चिरमादौ हन्त देहेन्द्रियादि-
 स्तदनु तदधिकः सन्नीश्वरोऽहं बभूव ।
 अथ भगवत एवाभूवमर्थादिदानीं
 तव पुनरहमासं पादुके धन्यजन्मा ॥

१. एकैकस्मिन् परमवयवेऽनन्तसौन्दर्यमग्नं
 सर्वं द्रक्ष्ये कथमिति मुधा मामधामन्दचक्षुः ।
 त्वां सौभ्रात्रव्यतिकरकरं रङ्गराजार्ङ्गकानां
 तद्भाषण्यं परिणमयिता विश्वपारीणवृत्ति ॥

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